
Gass B 11131 
Book l_Sj2 



t 

A 



CRITICAL EXPOSITION 

11\1 



OF 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY ; 



OR THE 

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS: 

EMBRACING 

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS, THE ELEMENTS 

OF REASONING, AND THE PHILOSOPHY 

OF THE FEELINGS AND WILL. 



ADAPTED TO 

ACADEMIC AND POPULAR USE. 

V- 

BY LEICESTER A. SAWYER, A. M. 



" Wisdom is the principal thing, therefore get wisdom; and with all thy getting, get understanding." 

Solomon. 



NEW HAVEN : 

PUBLISHED BY DURRIE & PECK. 
1839. 






ENTERED, 

ACCORDING TO THE ACT OF CONGRESS, IN THE YEAR MDCCCXXXIX, BY 

LEICESTER A. SAWYER, A. M. 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF 

CONNECTICUT DISTRICT. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Mental Philosophy is a subject of intense and general 
interest. Most branches of it have been ably discussed by 
successive writers of ancient and modern times. As a science, 
however, it may be considered as of modern date. Locke, 
Reid, Stewart, Brown, Kant, Cousin, and many others, have 
contributed to develop and establish its principles, and to 
diffuse a knowledge of them through the civilized world. 
Minds are as legitimate objects of knowledge, as material ob- 
jects. The doctrines of mental philosophy, are not mere 
matters of conjecture and opinion, any more than those of 
mathematics and physics. The amount of knowledge at- 
tained and attainable, respecting minds, is much greater than 
many suppose. 

Much knowledge, however, that is actually attained by 
some, is far less extensively diffused than its importance de- 
mands ; and other and higher truths belonging to this depart- 
ment of science, which are fully within the grasp of human 
reason, are yet unattained. 

In the present work, considerable improvements have been 
attempted, in the theory of sensations, ideas, affections, and 
of the will ; and in the general division and arrangement of 
mental phenomena. In each of the generic departments of 
mental philosophy, particularly in that of ideas, it is believed 
that the doctrines of the following pages are in advance of 
the existing state of mental philosophy, as it appears in any 
other work. Whether this is really the case or not, and in 
what degree it is the case, if it is so at all, is submitted to 
the judgment of candid and competent critics, and to the still 
higher judgment of the public at large, by which that of the 
most enlightened individual critics is sometimes justly re- 
versed. 

This work is not put forth under any impression that it is 
perfect. Imperfection is common to all human productions; 
especially so to those which embrace the discussion of the 



Vlll INTRODUCTION. 

principles and operations of the human mind. Locke is not 
perfect ; Reid is not perfect ; Stewart is not perfect. The 
same will be true of all who undertake to prosecute and com- 
plete the investigations commenced by those illustrious men. 
That which is not perfect, however, may be better than noth- 
ing, and one imperfect thing better than others. 

The nomenclature of the present work is conformed as 
strictly as possible ; 

1. To established popular usage ; 

2. To that of approved writers on mental philosophy. 

No unnecessary innovation has been attempted in this res- 
pect. The only one which has been found necessary, is that 
of extending or restricting the meaning of several words, and 
using them in significations more or less general than is com- 
mon. One instance of this occurs in respect to the word 
ideas, which is used to denote a particular class of mental 
exercises, exclusive of sensations and emotions. By most 
writers on mental philosophy, ideas are confounded with sen- 
sations, and sensations with ideas. These two classes of 
phenomena, however, are entirely distinct, and ought to be 
clearly distinguished from each other. In order to distin- 
guish them, it is necessary to restrict the improper extension 
of the terms by which they are expressed. Such restrictions 
are fully authorized by the practice of the best writers, in all 
departments of science, and are required by the necessities 
of the case. They constitute a large and important class of 
the most valuable improvements in language, and are con- 
stantly and necessarily multiplying, in proportion as science 
advances. 

The extension of the common signification of the word 
minds, and the application of the titles animal and vegetable 
minds, to denote the principles of animal and vegetable life, 
and the description of them as of the same genus with hu- 
man minds, but of lower orders, are legitimate results of the 
principle of classification, by which we refer the subjects of 
all similar phenomena to the same ultimate genera, and dis- 
tribute them into subordinate genera, according to their spe^ 
cific differences. 

New-Haven , Conn., April, 1839. 



CONTENTS. 



PART FIRST. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA, AND 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 

Section 1. — The generic properties and orders of Phe- 
nomena, •••• 13 

Section 2. — The generic properties and orders of Men- 
tal Phenomena, 16 

Section 3. — The generic properties and orders of Men- 
tal Phenomena, which are the objects of Con- 
sciousness, • 19 

CHAPTER II. 

the philosophy of sensations. 

Section 1. — The generic properties and orders of Sen- 
sations, 23 

Section 2. — Sensations which are the basis and exci- 
ting causes of the Bodily Appetites, • 28 

Section 3. — Weariness and fatigue, heat and cold, and 

pain, »•- 32 

Section 4. — Sensations of Touch, • • 38 

Section 5. — Sensations of Sight, 42 

Section 6. — Sensations of Hearing, 45 

Section 7. — Sensations of Taste and Smell, 47 

Section 8. — The relations and ends of Sensations, •••• 49 



X CONTENTS. 

PART SECOND. 

XDEALOGY, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEAS. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS, AND THE 
IDEAL FACULTY. 

Section 1. — The generic properties of Ideas, • •••* 59 

Section 2. — The generic orders of Ideas, 68 

Section 3. — Properties of the Ideal Faculty, 73 

CHAPTER II. 

THE PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF JUDGMENTS AND COG- 
NITIONS. 

Section 1. — The generic properties of Judgments, 8] 

Section 2. — The generic orders of Judgments, 87 

Section 3. — The generic properties of Knowledge, •••• 92 

Section 4. — -The sphere of Knowledge, 101 

CHAPTER III. 
conceptions, imaginations, and reminiscences. 

Section 1. — The generic properties of Conceptions and 

Imaginations, • • 107 

Section 2. — The generic properties and orders of Re- 
miniscences, 114 

Section 3. — The laws of Memory, or the principles of 

the suggestion of Reminiscences, 120 

CHAPTER IV. 

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS CONSIDERED WITH RELATION 
TO THEIR OBJECTS. 

Section 1. — Ideas of Phenomena, 127 

Section 2. — Ideas of Minds, or Spiritual Objects, 132 

Section 3. — Ideas of Material Objects, 138 

Section 4. — Mind and Matter compared, * 146 

Section 5. — Ideas of God, 150 



CONTENTS. XI 

Section 6. — Ideas of objects neither material nor spir- 
itual, embracing Identity and Diversity, Number, 

Space, and Time, 158 

Section 7. — Ideas of Causality and Dependence, 167 

Section 8. — Ideas of moral Actions and Agents, • 171 

CHAPTER V. 

THE elements of reasoning. 

Section 1. — Abstraction, Comparison, and Sy -»boK ... 181 
Section 2. — Generalization, and Ideas denoted by gen- 
eral terms, 185 

Section 3. — A logical analysis of Discourses, 189 

Section 4. — Mathematical Reasoning, 198 

Section 5. — Philosophical Reasoning, 207 

Section 6. — Testimony, • • 219 

Section 7. — -Reason, Common Sense, and Conscience, 224 



PART THIRD. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS, AFFECTIONS, 
DESIRES, AND WILL. 

CHAPTER I. 

the philosophy of the emotions. 

Section 1. — The generic properties and orders of the 

Emotions, 233 

Section 2. — The capacity of experiencing Emotions, • • 244 

Section 3. — The final ends of Emotions, • 248 

CHAPTER II. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 

Section 1. — The generic properties and orders of the 

Affections, • 251 

Section 2. — The generic properties and orders of Love 

and Hatred, 254 



XII CONTENTS. 

Section 3. — Self-love, the social and domestic Affec- 
tions, and the love of animals and inanimate ob- 
jects, 257 

Section 4. — The love of God, •" 261 

Section 5. — Hope and Fear, • 264 

Section 6. — Tempers and Dispositions, 266 

CHAPTER III. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 

Section 1. — The generic properties and orders of De- 
sires, 271 

Section 2. — Important classes of Desires, 275 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE philosophy of the will. 

Section 1. — The Nature and Exercises of the Will, 283 

Section 2. — The Nature and Laws of Choices, 284 

Section 3. — The Nature and Laws of Purposes, ••• 289 

Section 4. — The Nature and Laws of Volitions, 293 

Section 5. — The General Laws of the Will, 298 

Section 6. — Liberty and Necessity, • 304 



PART FOURTH. 

THE ORIGIN AND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 

CHAPTER I. 
the origin and derivation of minds. 308 



MENTAL PHILOSOPHY- 



PART FIRST. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA AND 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 
SECTION I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF PHENOMENA. 

Phenomenon is a word of extensive use in natural and 
mental science. It is applied to designate whatever is the 
direct object of observation, in the material and spiritual 
world ; and refers to events, operations, and experiences, 
considered irrespective of their agents or subjective causes. 
It is derived from the Greek verb <pouvw (phaino,) to pro- 
duce, to show, to bring to view, to exhibit ; and denotes 
whatever is produced, shown, or exhibited. 

Tides, eclipses, the successions of day and night, the 
fall and weight of bodies, their composition and de-com- 
position, &c, are phenomena. The same is true of all 
the objects of consciousness ; such as sensations, ideas, 
emotions, affections, desires, acts of will, &c. 

Phenomena are the primary objects of knowledge. With 
these, human knowledge uniformly commences, and to them 
a large and important portion of it relates. What we first 
know, are the objects of consciousness, commencing with 
sensations ; from them, and by means of them, we observe 

2 



14 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the phenomena of the material world, attending first to 
those of the solidity, forms, positions, motions, and struc- 
tures of material objects, which are at hand ; and subse- 
quently extending our observations to remote parts of the 
world, of the solar system, and of the visible universe. 

What is exhibited to our eyes, we see ; what is addressed 
to our ears, we hear; what acts upon our other senses, we 
feel. From our sensations we judge. One judgment leads 
to another, and others to others still, multiplying without 
end. 

Phenomena are of two generic orders : 

1 . The phenomena of mind ; 

2. The phenomena of matter. 

This division of phenomena into two different generic 
orders, is made in conformity with the principle, that all 
phenomena must have subjective causes ; and that in every 
appearance, or exhibition, or object of consciousness, there 
must be something which appears or which is exhibited ; 
or which is the subjective cause or agent of those states 
of sensation, ideas, emotions, &c, that are the objects of 
consciousness. 

Assuming the principle, that in all appearances and op- 
erations, there is something different from the appearance 
and operation, which appears and operates ; we are led, 
irresistibly, to the division of phenomena into the generic 
orders above specified. In multitudes of cases, we find 
that which is the subjective cause of the phenomena of 
matter, incapable of those attributed to mind ; and that 
which is the subjective cause of the phenomena of mind, 
incapable of those of matter. 

Hence we infer, that the subjective causes in these ca- 
ses are different; that is, possess peculiar properties ; and 
w 7 e distribute their respective phenomena into different 
corresponding orders. 

This classification and distribution of phenomena is 
made to some extent, by all men, not excepting those of 
the most limited attainments. It is impossible not to make 
it ; or so far to revolutionize the opinions and judgments 
of men in reference to this subject, as altogether to super- 
sede this mode of classification. 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 15 

The assumption of two classes of subjective causes is 
necessary, to account for the two orders of phenomena 
which are distinguished from each other, as those of matter 
and mind. They are sufficient for this purpose. All 
subjective causes of phenomena, must be either spiritual 
or material. There is no room for an intermediate order 
of agents. Spiritual and material agents may be of dif- 
ferent orders and varieties, but there can be nothing besides, 
which is incapable of being reduced to one or other of 
these generic orders. All agents which are not material, 
are spiritual ; and all which are not spiritual, are material. 
Hence we infer, that all phenomena belong either to ma- 
terial or spiritual agents, and that they consist of two, and 
only two generic orders. 

Having adopted the principle of classification above 
specified, our next business is to classify all known phe- 
nomena accordingly, by referring them to one or the other 
of these two orders. In some cases, this is easily done ; 
in others, the accomplishment of it is difficult; and in 
some, a few, perhaps impossible. 

The most obvious phenomena of mind, are sensations, 
ideas, emotions, affections, and other exercises which are 
the immediate objects of consciousness. All men agree 
in the judgment, that these phenomena do not belong to 
material objects, such as earths, metals, salts, alkalis, acids, 
&c. 

The most obvious phenomena of matter are resistance, 
attraction, motion, &c, of many different modes and de- 
grees. All men agree in the judgment that these phe- 
nomena, as they occur incessantly around us, do not be- 
long to minds or spiritual objects. 

The discrimination of these two orders of phenomena, 
depends on their relation to subjective causes only, not on 
any other properties or relations. All those phenomena 
of every possible variety, of which the mind is the sub- 
ject, are phenomena of the mind ; and all of every possi- 
ble variety of which matter is the subject, are the phe- 
nomena of matter. 



16 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION II. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 

Mental phenomena are distinguished from others, solely 
by their relation to minds as the subjects of them. This 
relation is sometimes indicated directly by consciousness, 
as in the case of sensations, ideas, &c. ; and sometimes by 
evidences of other kinds, which are less direct, but in many 
cases not less, or if any, but little less, decisive of the fact 
in question. 

Mental phenomena are accordingly divided into two 
generic orders : 

1. Those which are objects of consciousness; 

2. Those which are not objects of consciousness. 

Of the former class are sensations, ideas, &c. ; and of 
the latter, the phenomena of organic and animal life ; such 
as respiration, sensation, &c. 

These two orders of phenomena agree in resulting from 
the immediate agency of minds or beings, which are not 
material. Mere matter is inadequate, and equally inade- 
quate to the production of either of them. Considered with 
respect to their origin, therefore, they are of the same order. 

They differ, however, by the element of consciousness 
being the uniform accompaniment of some and not of 
others. We are always conscious of sensations, ideas, 
&c; never of the processes of organic life. Considered 
with respect to this accompaniment, therefore, the phe- 
nomena of the mind are of two orders, those which are 
the objects of consciousness, and those which are not. 

The essential and generic quality of these phenomena, 
is, that they originate in the mind or in spiritual agency, 
and the specific difference of the two classes in this order, 
that of attending consciousness in the case of the first, 
which are thereby distinguished from others of the same 
spiritual origin. Those mental phenomena which are ob- 
jects of consciousness, are the objects of one department 
of mental science ; those which are not objects of con- 
sciousness, are the objects of another. The theory and 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 17 

exposition of the former, is generally denominated mental 
philosophy ; that of the latter, human, animal, and vege- 
table physiology. 

The idea that all mental phenomena are necessarily ob- 
jects, of consciousness ; or, in other words, that the mind 
cannot act without being conscious of its action, is entirely 
conjectural. It is destitute of any rational support from 
experience or observation, and irreconcilable with certain 
facts and legitimate inferences from known phenomena. 
It is, therefore, manifestly and entirely erroneous. 

Other phenomena bear evident marks of belonging to 
the same agents, and agents of the same spiritual or incor- 
poreal nature, as those which are the objects of con- 
sciousness. The phenomena of animal and vegetable 
life are of this description, comprehending the animation, 
growth, vital and voluntary motions of animal and vege- 
table bodies, and their production of successors. 

The state of a living animal or vegetable body, is a 
state of animation. In the case of man and most animals, 
the circulating and respiratory systems are in constant op- 
eration. The blood is constantly circulating, and the lungs 
constantly operating to fit it for useful circulation. Other 
processes of absorption, secretion, perspiration, and excre- 
tion, are also constantly going on, and co-operating with 
the circulating and respiratory systems. Every part of a 
living body is the theater of incessant action. The in- 
struments of that action are material organs. But what 
is the agent ? By what are those organs kept in exercise, 
w 7 hich knows no remission ? That agent must be either 
the mind in the case of animals and of man, or else some 
other being not material. It is generally supposed to be 
some other being not material, denominated the principle 
of animal life. But what do we know of this principle ? 
Simply, that it operates incessantly in the various processes 
of animal life. How do we know, then, that it is not the 
soul or mind ? 

' The soul or mind is a being not material. The cir- 
culation of the blood, respiration, absorption, secretion, 
perspiration, excretion, &c, indicate the presence and 
agency of a being not material. One such being is 

2* 



18 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

present, to wit : the soul. Why then shall we not con- 
clude, that the phenomena above referred to, belong to 
the soul, which we know from other evidences to be present, 
instead of supposing the existence of a separate principle 
of animal life, merely to account for them 1 There is ev- 
idently no sufficient reason for the hypothesis of a princi- 
ple of animal and human life, separate from the soul or mind 
which is the subject of consciousness, and of various con- 
scious exercises. 

The doctrine, that the phenomena of animal life belong 
to the same spiritual agent as those of consciousness, is 
further supported by the following considerations. 

1. The nerves which serve as the organs of the princi- 
ple of animal and organic life, and those which serve as 
the organs of the mind in sensation and voluntary action,, 
constitute one nervous system, all the parts of which are in 
immediate communion with each other. We infer from 
this, the identity of the agent which operates by means both 
of voluntary and involuntary, sentient and motive nerves ; 
or, in other words, of the principle of animal and organic 
life, and the mind which is the subject of conscious exer- 
cises. 

2. The destruction of organic life is attended with the 
cessation of all the phenomena of consciousness, in hu- 
man and animal bodies. When respiration, the circulation 
of the blood, and the other processes of organic life cease, 
all signs of consciousness cease. The body ceases to be 
an instrument of sensation and theater for the other con- 
scious exercises of the mind, whenever it ceases to be an 
instrument of the organic operations which constitute a 
state of animal and organic life. 

If organic life could continue indefinitely without any 
capacity of sensation and volition either manifest or latent, 
or if sensation and volition could manifest themselves in 
in the absence of any signs of organic life, we might con- 
clude that the principles of organic life and of mental phe- 
nomena were different. The facts, however, are the op- 
posite of what is here supposed. The principle of mental 
phenomena may be latent in sleep, syncope, and various 
other states of the body. At the same time, however, 
there is always a partial suspension of the operations of 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 19 

organic life ; and the principle of thought becomes latent 
in consequence of obstructions thus interposed, and co- 
temporaneously with the partial concealment of the prin- 
ciple of organic vital actions. 

In no case is the mind supposed to be disengaged from 
the body, where any of the phenomena of organic life ap- 
pear, clearly proving that in the common apprehensions of 
all mankind, the slightest indication of animal or organic 
life, is supposed to be indicative of the presence and con- 
nection of the mind with its material tenement. 

In our waking hours, the presence of the mind and its 
connection with the body, are indicated by sensations, ideas, 
emotions, and other conscious exercises ; in sleep, by res- 
piration, circulation of the blood, and the various opera- 
tions of organic life ; so in syncope, lethargy, and every 
species of disease. 

The vital processes of vegetable, are similar to those 
of animal life, and equally indicative of the agency of 
vegetable minds or principles of vegetable life which are 
not material. 

The animation or vital action, growth, and production of 
vegetables, are analogous to corresponding phenomena in 
the animal kingdom. 

The phenomena of animal, organic, and vegetable life, 
belong chiefly to animal and vegetable physiology ; but are 
equally, with those of consciousness, developments of 
mind, or of substances not material ; and as such, are le- 
gitimate objects of mental science, and entitled to a generic 
classification with other mental phenomena. 



SECTION III. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA 
WHICH ARE THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The phenomena of the mind, which are the objects of 
consciousness, are numerous and diversified. They consist 
of the following orders : 



20 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. Sensations ; 

2. Ideas ; 

3. Emotions ^ 

4. Affections : 

5. Desires ; 

6. Acts of will. 

All those mental phenomena which are the objects of 
consciousness, are of one or other of these classes, and 
none of more than one. Pain, for example, is a sensation, 
not an idea, emotion, or act of will; the idea, that five and 
five equal ten, is an idea, not a sensation, emotion, or de- 
sire ; an emotion of beauty, sublimity, or the ludicrous, is 
not a sensation or desire.. So of phenomena of all the 
other classes.. 

The different generic orders of mental exercises, which 
are objects of consciousness, are all continuous, and partly 
successive and partly cotemporaneous. They are also 
characterized by particular orders, both of cotemporaneous- 
ness and succession. Sensations give rise to ideas, and 
continue with them ; ideas to emotions, affections, and de- 
sires, and continue with them ; and so on. 

The same is true of different varieties of the same or- 
der of mental phenomena. Different sensations, ideas, 
emotions, and other mental exercises of the same order, 
exist to a greater or less extent, in the same complex state 
of mind, and require to be separated by a careful analysis. 

The continuity of mental exercises, which are the ob- 
jects of consciousness, is one of their universal properties, 
and one which they possess in common with all phenom- 
ena. Their relations of cotemporaneousness and succes- 
sion are consequences of this. 

The generic orders of mental phenomena above speci- 
fied, admit of being subdivided into various subordinate 
classes, and the subordinate classes into others subordinate 
to them, and so on, indefinitely. 

Their highest generic distinction is phenomena ; next, 
mental phenomena ; next, phenomena which are objects 
of consciousness ; next, sensations, ideas, emotions, affec- 
tions, desires, and acts of will ; then particular species of 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA. 21 

sensations, ideas, emotions, affections, desires, and acts 
of will, &c. 

Considered simply as phenomena, mental exercises 
stand in the same comprehensive genus with the phenom- 
ena of matter ; considered as mental phenomena, they are 
discriminated from those of matter ; considered as sensa- 
tions, ideas, &c, they are discriminated from other co-or- 
dinate classes of mental phenomena ; considered as differ- 
ent species of sensations, ideas, emotions, &c, they are 
discriminated from other co-ordinate species of the same 
generic orders. 

Sensations occupy the first place among the generic 
orders of mental phenomena, in the order of succession. 
They are the first phenomena that appear in infancy ; and 
continue during every successive period of life, to stand 
at the head of numerous independent trains of successive 
mental phenomena; consisting of the different classes 
above specified. 

Our first trains of thought originate in sensations. The 
same is true of numerous successive trains of ideas, belong- 
ing to the experience of every day, and almost every hour. 
Sensations are first, then ideas of sensible objects, then 
emotions excited by those ideas, then affections, desires, 
purposes, and volitions. 

The theory of sensation is the basis or fundamental 
section of mental philosophy. Without a perfect and ac- 
curate knowledge of its leading principles, the successful 
study of other classes of mental phenomena is impossible. 
After having ascertained the true character and end of sen- 
sations, we pass easily to the investigation of ideas, many 
of which are not intelligible without these preparatory ac- 
quisitions. This is especially the case with that numerous 
class of ideas denominated perceptions ; or perceptions of 
material objects. 

It is supposed by many, that sensations are uninterest- 
ing and unimportant subjects of philosophical investiga- 
tion, and that they may be slightly and superficially ex- 
amined, or passed over entirely, without subjecting us to 
serious embarrassment in the investigation of other mental 
phenomena. This, however, is not the case. An accurate 



22 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge of the nature and office of sensations, is highly 
important and interesting, as a primary department" of men- 
tal science, and as introductory to that of ideas, which is 
next in order. Many, and pernicious errors, have prevail- 
ed and still prevail, in respect to ideas, from not distin- 
guishing properly between them and sensations, and from 
not ascertaining and observing the peculiar characteristics 
of each. To understand ideas, therefore, we must under- 
stand sensations. 

There is a similar relation between all the other orders 
of mental phenomena, and those which occupy the next 
previous places in the natural order of succession. A 
knowledge of ideas is necessary to that of emotions ; a 
knowledge of emotions to that of affections ; a knowledge 
of emotions and affections to that of desires ; and a knowl- 
edge of emotions, affections, and desires, to that of pur- 
poses and volitions. 

Emotions are subsequent to ideas in the order of suc- 
cession, and, therefore, ought to be studied subsequently. 
Affections and desires are subsequent to emotions, and, 
therefore, ought to be studied subsequently to them ; so 
of purposes and volitions. 

A neglect to observe the order of succession in the oc- 
currence of mental phenomena, and to pursue a corres- 
ponding order in the investigation of them, has led to much 
confusion of ideas, and to many serious errors, in every 
department of mental science. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 

SECTION I. 
THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF SENSATIONS. 

Mental phenomena, which are not the effects of any 
previous exercise of mind, but which result immediately 
from a peculiar condition of the body, or of some particu- 
lar parts of it, are denominated sensations. 

Those feelings which excite desires for food and drink ; 
feelings of weariness and fatigue, of heat and cold, of 
pain; together with the exercises of the five external 
senses, are of this kind. 

Sensations are exercised by means of bodily organs, 
and may be distributed into several different classes, ac- 
cording to the different organizations on which they de- 
pend, and their corresponding differences of quality. The 
following are the principal divisions of this order of phe- 
nomena : 

1. Sensations which are the basis and exciting causes 
of the bodily appetites ; 

2. Sensations of weariness and fatigue ; 

3. Sensations of heat and cold; 

4. Sensations of pain ; 

5. Sensations of touch ; 

6. Sensations of sight; 

7. Sensations of hearing ; 

8. Sensations of taste ; 

9. Sensations of smell. 

The sensations obtained from the exercise of different 
organs, are of different qualities. Thus, those of sight 
differ in quality from those of hearing, touch, &c. 

The quality of sensations is an object of consciousness, 
and is incapable of being accurately defined by words. 
Words are applied to denote this class of phenomena, 
embracing the idea of their quality. But these words can 



24 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be interpreted only by their being referred to phenom- 
ena of the same class, as they have occurred in the expe- 
rience of the interpreter. To understand colors, we must 
exercise the sensations of sight ; and to understand sounds, 
we must exercise those of hearing. The same is true of 
the other classes of sensations. The most elaborate 
descriptions are utterly incapable of giving the least idea 
of the quality of any class of sensations, to one who has 
never exercised them. 

The description of sensations, by referring them to their 
organs, and the occasions on which they occur, is easily 
understood by those who have these organs, and the oppor- 
tunity and ability to exercise them. This method of de- 
scribing them, is that usually adopted, and is the only one 
which is practicable. 

The different orders of sensations constitute one beau- 
tiful and harmonious system of phenomena, which may 
be easily distinguished from all other mental exercises, 
and which sustain important relations to all others. 

The occurrence of sensations, by means of bodily or- 
gans, and in consequence of certain states of those organs, 
furnishes a convenient method of distinguishing them 
from other classes of mental phenomena, and from each 
other. But their fundamental properties, as objects of 
consciousness, considered without respect to the manner 
or means of their being excited, are quality and quantity ; 
both of which are objects of consciousness only. 

1. The quality of sensations. 

The quality of sensations, is that by which those of one 
class differ from those of another, and varieties of one 
class differ from other varieties of the same ; also by which 
sensations of every class and variety, differ from other 
classes of mental phenomena, which are the objects of 
consciousness, considered without respect to the means 
and manner of their being excited. 

Considered with respect to quality, sensations are either 
pleasurable, painful or displeasurable, or indifferent. 
Those which arise from the legitimate gratification of the 
appetites, are pleasurable ; those which serve as the pri- 
mary exciting causes of the appetites, are painful or dis- 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 25 

pleasurable ; those which arise from a derangement or in- 
jury of the bodily organs, are painful ; those of touch, 
sight, hearing, taste, and smell, are either pleasurable, 
painful, or indifferent. 

The quality of the sensations which we are capable of 
deriving from different material objects, is the basis of our 
estimates respecting those objects, as pleasing, displea- 
sing, and indifferent. An object of pleasurable sensations, 
is pleasing and agreeable; one of displeasurable sensa- 
tions, is displeasing and disagreeable. The sensible qual- 
ities of objects, are all relative to the capacities of sensa- 
tion, according to which they are estimated. That which 
produces sensations of sweetness, is sweet, and those of 
bitterness, bitter. If two persons were so constituted, 
that the same object which was sweet to one, was bitter to 
the other, and the same object which was black to one, 
was white to the other, and the same state of the organs 
which was a cause of pain to the one, was a cause of op- 
posite pleasurable sensations to the other, &c, the sensi- 
ble qualities of objects to those persons, would be of a di- 
rectly opposite character. The reason of this would be, 
not any difference in the objects, considered absolutely, 
but' a difference in the capacities of sensation in the per- 
sons concerned, by which objects are made relatively dif- 
ferent, and of relatively opposite qualities. 

Every degree of diversity in the capacities of sensation, 
considered with respect to the quality of the sensations ob- 
tained from given objects, leads to corresponding diversi- 
ties of judgment, respecting the qualities of those objects. 

Universal agreement respecting the sensible qualities of 
objects, depends on a corresponding agreement in the ca- 
pacity of experiencing from them, sensations of given 
qualities. 

2. The quantity of sensations. 

The quantity of sensations denotes their relation to 
others of the same class and variety, considered as more 
or less, or capable of being estimated in common parts. 
The two elements of the quantity of sensations, are inten- 
sity and duration. 

3 



26 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Sensations of every class and variety, may be of greater 
or less perceptible degrees of intensity, and may continue 
during longer or shorter periods of time. 

The duration of sensations is capable, in many cases, 
of being easily and accurately estimated. This is true of 
the sensations connected with the appetites, heat, and cold, 
and pain, and the sensations of touch, sight, hearing, taste, 
and smell. 

Sensations usually commence in immediate succession 
to certain states of their respective organs, and continue 
with such remissions as occur from other sensations, 
ideas, emotions, affections, and actions, till those organic 
states on which they depend, are superseded by others 
not adapted to excite them. 

The occurrence of particular classes of sensations is 
limited to the periods during which the organic states 
adapted to produce them, continue. Particular sensations 
of those classes may commence and terminate during any 
part of the periods above specified, but cannot precede or 
follow them. 

Sensations of the same class and of different classes, 
may be of different degrees of intensity. Thus the sen- 
sations connected with the appetites, may be estimated as 
of one, two, or many degrees of intensity. So of weari- 
ness and fatigue, heat and cold, and pain; and of the sen- 
sations of touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell. The in- 
tensity of touch, all other things being equal, varies with 
the degree of resistance ; that of sight, with the number 
of rays of light, of given kinds, which emanate from 
given surfaces, so as to fall upon the eye ; that of hearing, 
with the extent of the vibratory motions, by which it is 
produced; and those of taste and smell, with the number 
and strength of sapid and odoriferous particles, which 
are simultaneously the objects of these sensations. 

The objects of sensation being the same, the intensity 
of sensations in the experience of particular individuals, 
varies according to the condition of the organs of sense* 
and the cotemporaneous state of the other mental faculties. 
Those whose organs are most susceptible, other things 
being equal, experience sensations from given objects, of 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSAT.IONS. 27 

proportionally increased intensity ; and those whose or- 
gans are least susceptible, in similar circumstances, expe- 
rience sensations of proportionally diminished intensity. 
Those also who are least engaged in other cotempora- 
neous mental exercises, whether sensations, ideas, or emo- 
tions, &c, other things being equal, experience from given 
sensible objects, sensations of the greatest intensity; and 
those who are most engaged in other cotemporaneous 
mental exercises, experience sensations of the least inten- 
The capacities of sensation are capable of different de- 
grees of susceptibility. Some persons are much more 
susceptible of the different classes of sensations generally, 
or of one or more particular classes of them, than others; 
and the same person possesses different degrees of sus- 
ceptibility, in different periods of life, and in different 
states of sickness and health. 

The organs of sensation are liable to injury, from the 
direct action of physical agents, impairing or destroying 
their delicate structures; and the mind may increase or 
diminish its capacity of using them to advantage, by a 
judicious and appropriate, or injudicious and inappropriate 
use of them. 

The state of feebleness and ignorance in which we 
commence our conscious existence, does not require the 
highest exercises of sensation, or the exercise of some of 
those classes of sensations, which are characteristic of 
mature age, in any degree. The capacities and endow- 
ments of infants, in respect to this class of the human 
faculties, are proportionable to their wants. They possess 
all the senses which they need during their infantile state, 
and with those degrees of susceptibility which are best 
adapted to that state. As they advance in age and infor- 
mation, their necessities increase and multiply, and they 
experience a corresponding increase and multiplication of 
sensations, and improvement of their organization for this 
purpose. 



28 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION II. 

SENSATIONS WHICH ARE THE BASIS AND EXCITING CAUSES OF THE 
BODILY APPETITES. 

The principal of the bodily appetites, are those which 
have respect to food and drink as their objects, and which 
are denominated hunger and thirst. These appetites have 
their origin in peculiar classes of unpleasant sensations, 
which serve as their basis, and by which they are excited. 

The appetite of hunger originates in a class of sensa- 
tions, which maybe denominated sensations of hunger; 
that of thirst, in others which maybe denominated sensa- 
tions of thirst. In designating these sensations by the 
same names as their corresponding desires or appetites, 
we mustbe careful not to confound, in our conceptions of 
them, these two classes of phenomena.. The sensation of 
hunger is not the appetite or desire of food, or any part of 
it ;. nor the sensation of thirst the desire of drink. They 
are only the immediate exciting causes of these desires, 
and are as different from them, as the sensation of plea- 
sing sounds is different from the desire of their continuance 
or repetition. 

The sensations connected with the appetites, considered 
with respect to quality, are of two kinds, pleasurable and 
displeasurable. Those which arise from the attainment of 
the objects of the appetites, such as food and drink, are 
pleasurable, and those which precede the attainment of 
those objects, displeasurable. The displeasurable sensa- 
tions connected with the appetites, are the chief, but not 
the sole exciting causes of this class of desires. They 
are reinforced by the pleasures of gratification, which con- 
sist in peculiar pleasurable sensations. The appetites, 
therefore, depend on two classes of sensations. They 
originate in existing displeasurable sensations, and are 
heightened and increased by the prospect, not only of re- 
lief from them, but of the attainment of opposite pleasurable 
sensations. This is the case with the appetite for food* 
and equally so, with all the bodily appetites. 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 29 

The sensations connected with the appetites, depend 
upon the existence of appropriate organs, as really as 
those of sight and hearing. Without organs for the exer- 
cise of these sensations, we are incapable of attaining 
them. The organs of the appetites, are organs of corres- 
ponding sensations, to which they sustain the same rela- 
tions, which the eye does to sensations of sight, and the 
ear to those of sound. The office of organs in sensation, 
is merely instrumental. They are not, in any case, the 
ultimate subjective cause of these phenomena. 

A perfect organization and a healthy condition of the 
organs, is necessary to the attainment of those sensations 
which are best suited to the purposes which these phe- 
nomena are adapted to subserve. This is obviously the 
case with the organs of sight and hearing, it is equally 
so with those of the sensations connected with the appe- 
tites. If the eye or ear are imperfect in their organization, 
or essentially diseased, they become incapable of serving 
as the organs of sight and sound, or else perform this of- 
fice in a manner less adapted to the purposes of these 
classes of sensations, than otherwise. Instances of this 
are frequent, from injuries and diseases of the eyes and 
ears. 

The same is true of the organs of those sensations which 
are the basis of the appetites. If they become injured or 
diseased in their structure, the capacity of experiencing 
their appropriate sensations is proportionably impaired. 
When the injury is carried to a certain extent, that capa- 
city is destroyed entirely. 

The general modifications of the diseases of these or^ 
gans are : 

1. Those which are characterized by an increased sus- 
ceptibility of their appropriate sensations. 

2. Those which are characterized by a diminished sus- 
ceptibility of them, 

3. Those which are characterized by sensations of 3, 
morbid quality. 

These diseases often arise in consequence of others 
which have their seat in different parts of the body; and 
are often excited by an improper and intemperate use of 

3* 



30 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

their respective organs. They require the application of 
medical and moral remedies, according as their causes are 
physical, or moral, or both. Either of these classes of 
remedies will often prove ineffectual without the other, 
where both would be completely successful. 

The sensations connected with the same class of appe- 
tites, differ chiefly in degree. Thus the sensations of hun- 
ger and thirst may be exercised in a slight degree, by ab- 
stinence for a short time, and are susceptible of increase 
by continued abstinence, till they attain the highest degree 
possible. Some are capable of experiencing them in 
higher degrees than others. The same persons may ex- 
perience them in different degrees from abstinence for sim- 
ilar periods, according to the condition of their organs and 
other circumstances, tending to increase or diminish the 
intensity of this class of phenomena ; such as the cotem- 
poraneous exercise of other classes of sensations in dif- 
ferent degrees of intensity, and mental exercises of other 
generic orders. 

The ultimate purpose of the sensations connected with 
the appetites, is evidently the voluntary preservation of 
life, and the continuance and multiplication of the differ- 
ent orders of voluntary beings. They serve as the exci- 
ting causes of desires and actions, which are necessaiy to 
the attainment of these ends, and are an essential part of 
the nature of all voluntary beings. Man is not alone in 
the exercise of them. All the other tribes of voluntary 
beings, which are subject to his dominion, or divide with 
him the empire of the world, are capable of similar ex- 
ercises. 

These internal sensations are less subject to the domin- 
ion of the will, than those of the external senses of touch, 
sight, hearing, &c This is particularly the case with the 
displeasurable ones, which precede indulgence. We are 
able, generally, to feel tangible objects by touch, or to re- 
frain from doing so. The same is true of sight, hearing, 
and the other external senses. We have full power to ex- 
ercise them or not, as we judge best, in particular circum- 
stances. But in many cases, to avoid experiencing, in 
any degree, the sensations connected with the appetites, is 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 31 

impossible. While the organs continue in a healthy state, 
the famishing, for instance, cannot but experience, in some 
degrees, and during some intervals, the sensations appro- 
priate to such a condition. 

No class of sensations are, however, for any consider- 
able time incessant. This is equally true of the sensations 
which are connected with the appetites, and of all others. 
They succeed each other with longer or shorter remissions, 
according to circumstances, which are, in some degree, 
and often in a great degree, subject to the will. The sen- 
sations of the hungry and thirsty are often suspended, 
even in cases where they are most intense ; so of . all other 
sensations connected with the appetites. The exercise of 
them may be superseded by those of other classes, and 
by other different orders of mental exercises, such as ideas 
and affections. 

The temperate exercise of the sensations connected 
with the appetites, and the simultaneous development and 
exercise of the other mental faculties, tend to keep them 
all in due proportion to each other. When this proportion 
is not maintained, the greatest irregularities and mischiefs 
ensue. In a healthy and well regulated state of the hu- 
man faculties, the capacities of experiencing those sensa- 
tions connected with the appetites, are exercised in sub- 
servience to the ends for which they are given, and in 
conformity with the laws of God. Among the animal 
tribes, the temperate exercise of them is generally secured 
by the divinely established laws of their being and condi- 
tions. 

To mankind are delegated greater voluntary powers 
than to the lower tribes of voluntary beings. All the hu- 
man faculties are capable of uses, and liable to abuses of 
which those of other creatures are not capable. 

The laws by which we ought to be governed in the vol- 
untary exercise of the sensations connected with the ap- 
petites, are : 

1. To exercise them for the attainment of their legiti- 
mate ends, and for no other purpose. Thus, w r e ought to 
eat and drink to promote our health and strength, and to- 



32 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

continue our lives, not merely to attain the pleasures of 
this species of gratification. 

2. To exercise them by means of lawful objects, and 
by means of no others. Thus, we ought to eat and drink 
only of what belongs to us. Our liberty of choice does 
not extend to the possessions of others. 

3. To exercise them in preference to other faculties, 
and by one class of objects in preference to others, only 
when such exercises will prove the greatest good we can 
secure. 

The observance of either of these rules, requires 
knowledge and discrimination. This is especially the 
case with that of the last. To exercise the capacities of 
sensation connected with the appetites, only in pursuance 
of the greatest attainable good ; and to do this habitually, 
in every successive period, and amid all the varying cir- 
cumstances of life, without a single instance or degree of 
error, is the constant and laborious endeavor of the truly 
wise and good. The full accomplishment of this endeav- 
or, exceeds the abilities of any mere man. An approxi- 
mation towards it, however, is within the power of all ; and 
it is equally the interest and duty of all to pursue this ap- 
proximation to the greatest possible extent. 



SECTION III. 

WEARINESS AND FATIGUE, HEAT AND COLD, AND PAIN. 

1. Weariness and fatigue. 

Weariness and fatigue are sensations which arise from 
inaction and labor. A continued state of inaction produ- 
ces weariness, and continued labor fatigue. The constant 
attendants and immediate effects of these sensations, are 
corresponding desires. Weariness is attended with a de- 
sire of action, and fatigue with a desire of rest. These 
desires arise from the displeasurable nature of their ex- 
citing sensations, and are directed primarily to the attain- 
ment of relief from the same. 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 33 

Sensations of weariness and fatigue are common to all 
parts of the body. This is particularly the case with those 
of fatigue. Fatigue may be experienced in the hands, 
arms, feet, legs, body, eyes, and ears. We may also be 
fatigued with mental exertions, which do not call any of 
the external organs of the body into exercise ; particularly 
with those of reason and imagination. All kinds of labo- 
rious effort are made laborious by the fatigue which they 
excite. This is the case with all kinds of mechanical la- 
bor, reading, speaking, observing objects of sight, such as 
paintings, engravings, natural scenery, natural curiosities, 
&c. ; and with silent investigation and study of every kind, 
including those of the poet and the novelist, equally with 
the severer studies of the mathematician and philosopher. 

Those who are most accustomed to labor, are most affect- 
ed with weariness, in case of continued inaction, and those 
who are most accustomed to inaction, are most affected 
with fatigue in the case of continued exertion. Habitual 
activity, prosecuted to as great a degree as is consistent 
with health, diminishes our susceptibility of fatigue ; and 
continual inaction contributes, in the same degree, and on 
the same principles, to diminish our susceptibility of wea- 
riness. 

The design of weariness and fatigue is to promote, in 
connection with other principles of action, a reasonable 
exercise of our voluntary powers. Fatigue excites desires 
of rest, and weariness of exertion. Both are useful and 
often invaluable stimulants and monitors. They serve not 
only as exciting causes of corresponding desires, but as 
principles of important judgments, respecting the extent 
to which we can pursue our labors, or continue our inac- 
tion with safety. Certain degrees of weariness indicate, 
not only that we have rested sufficiently, but that farther 
inaction will be injurious ; and certain degrees of fatigue 
indicate, with equal clearness, not only that we have labor- 
ed sufficiently to promote the healthy condition of our 
bodily organs, but that the farther continuance of our la- 
bors without remission will be injurious, and perhaps fatal. 
The utility of this class of sensations as principles of 
judgment, respecting the labor and rest which may be re- 



34 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

quisite for our physical well being, is heightened by their 
cotemporaneous influence in exciting desires for the same. 
In such cases, the physical good to be obtained by labor or 
rest, is one basis of desire and one ground of volition, and 
relief from the displeasurable sensations by which that 
good is indicated, another. When the former would be in- 
sufficient of itself to sway the will, it often prevails through 
the additional weight of the latter. Persons may resort to 
labor or exercise from weariness, and may cease from labor 
through fatigue, when other indications of their need of la- 
bor and rest, which are, in no degree, or in any less degree 
displeasurable, would be insufficient to secure these results. 

Fatigue and weariness, therefore, are not in themselves 
evils. The capacity of experiencing them is an important 
and valuable endowment given us for our good, and ought 
to be appreciated and improved as such. 

2. Sensations of heat and cold. 

Feelings of heat and cold are sensations which arise 
from particular temperatures of the body, or of some parts 
of it, and of the objects which come in contact with the 
parts thus affected. The frequent occurrence of these 
sensations, in connection with those of touch, and by 
means of the same organs and objects, has led many to 
consider them as belonging to that class of sensations. 
The inaccuracy of this classification cannot fail to strike 
any one who attends to his own experience on the subject. 

Touch and taste are not more dissimilar than touch 
and the sensations of heat and cold. The two former may 
be exercised simultaneously in the mouth, in reference to 
the same objects, but are not, on that account, of the same 
class ; and the two latter may be exercised simultaneously 
on the surface of the body generally, in reference to the 
same objects, but do not, on that account, any more than 
the others, cease to be of different orders. Touch refers 
to objects as resisting, and the sensations of heat and cold, 
to the same, considered as of higher or lower tempera- 
tures. Besides, sensations of heat and cold are often ex- 
ercised separately from those of touch, in a particular 
limb, or throughout the body generally, and in the interior 
of the same, as well as at their surfaces. The practical 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 35 

distinction between sensations of heat and cold, and those 
of touch, is universal and necessary. They are never 
confounded, except in the loose and inaccurate theories 
and generalizations of philosophers. 

Caloric, the material cause of heat, is one of the most 
subtle, universal, and powerful agents of the material 
world. It enters into the substance of all terrestrial ob- 
jects, and is more or less concerned in all their changes 
and operations. The bodies of organized beings, both 
animal and vegetable, are adapted to particular tempera- 
tures. The degrees of temperature which can be en- 
dured by animal bodies, without injury, are comprehended 
within narrower limits than those which can be endured 
by vegetables. 

Certain degrees of heat and cold effect the destruction 
of vegetables. Less degrees of either, are injurious and 
fatal to animals. All animals, however, have some power 
of regulating their temperatures, so as to withstand for a 
time, and in many instances permanently, degrees both of 
heat and cold, which w r ould prove injurious or fatal to 
them, if they had no such regulating power. This power 
is possessed in the highest degree by man. Clothing, 
dwellings, and all the apparatus of fire-places, furnaces, 
and stoves, together with exercise, and rest, are subordin- 
ated by man to the regulation of his temperatures, and are 
designed in most cases, effectually to guard him from in- 
jurious and fatal extremes of heat and cold. 

Sensations of heat and cold, are capable of different de- 
grees, from those which are so slight as to be perceived 
and discriminated with difficulty, to those of the greatest 
possible intensity. 

High degrees of heat and cold are proportionably 
injurious. By the painful sensations which they excite, 
they serve to admonish us of danger, and those sensations 
themselves conspire with the danger which they indicate, 
to excite the most urgent desires and efforts for relief. 

Persons are more or less sensible to heat and cold, and 
all the different degrees of the same, according to the state 
of their health, their natural delicacy or vigor, and their 



36 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cotemporary exercise of other classes of sensations, ideas, 
affections, &c. 

A more than ordinary susceptibility of heat and cold, 
is one of the p rem on it oiy and attending symptoms of nu- 
merous diseases, and exposure to high degrees of cold, is 
a frequent cause of disease. 

3. Sensations of pain. 

We are subject to numerous similar sensations of a 
painful nature, which do not belong to either of the classes 
above specified, which are not among the immediate exci- 
ting causes of the appetites, and are not modifications of 
weariness and fatigue, or of heat and cold, but which are 
usually denominated pains and aches, as pains in the head, 
teeth, or limbs; or the head-ache, tooth-ache, &c. 

Almost all the diversified forms of acute and chronic 
diseases, and almost all injuries from external violence, are 
attended with pains. This is the case with fevers, inflam- 
mations, contusions, and fractures of every kind. 

All the different parts of the body are capable of serv- 
ing as organs of this class of sensations. The suscepti- 
bilities of different persons, in respect to this class of sen- 
sations, vary according to the different principles which 
have already been brought to view. 

A slight and transient organic derangement or injury, 
produces a slight degree of pain, and continues to pro- 
duce it, till the sensibility of the organ is impaired, or the 
injury repaired. A more serious injury, or one which af- 
fects a more vital part, and is therefore proportionably 
more dangerous, usually excites a higher degree of pain, 
in proportion to the extent of the injury, and the delicacy 
and importance of the part affected. 

Thus an injury on one of the limbs, of small extent, 
may be attended with but little pain, and that only for a 
short time; while one of far less extent on the eye, the 
ear, lungs, or head, may be attended with intense suffer- 
ing, and may continue for a long time to be so attended. 

The highest degrees of pain are not entirely unremitted. 
They may be suspended by the excitement of other class- 
es of sensations, by ideas, emotions, affections, &c, and 
also by sleep. 



PHILOSOPHY OP SENSATIONS. 37 

To experience those states of the bodily organs which 
are adapted to produce pain, is one thing, and to experience 
pain another. The former is continual during certain pe- 
riods, the latter occasional or remitted. What is generally- 
considered continual pain, consists usually of a series of 
painful sensations, more or less protracted, and separated 
from each other by longer or shorter intervals of repose 
or relief from the occurrence of other mental exercises. 

The office of pain is to advertise us of some derangement 
or injury of our bodily organs, and to excite us to exert 
ourselves for the correction and repair of the same. It 
forcibly calls our attention to the part or parts in which it 
occurs ; indicates by its intensity the dangerous nature of 
the injury sustained or threatened, and excites desires for 
relief from its own painful exercises, which co-operate with 
those originating in the ulterior injury of which itself is 
only the index, in prompting us to take effectual measures 
for the repair of the injury sustained, and the prevention 
of future injuries. 

The liability of the human race to pain, is thought by 
many to be a great evil. The opposite is the fact. It is 
one of our greatest blessings. The capacity of experien- 
cing this numerous class of sensations, is of the greatest 
service to us in every age and condition. From its exer- 
cise we derive important information, respecting our phys- 
ical condition and prospects, which can be obtained from 
no other source. 

A class of sensations in the place of pains, equally va- 
rious but less distressing, or not at all unpleasant, might 
answer the same purpose with them as indications of our 
physical condition, but would not command attention with 
equal force, or serve to increase the motives to be derived 
from other sources, to correct the irregularity or repair the 
injury which should give occasion for such monitions, in 
the same degree as is now done by pain. Such a change 
in the human constitution may easily be conceived of as 
possible, and to superficial reasoners, or those who neglect 
to reason at all on the subject, may appear desirable. But 
it may as easily be shown to be highly undesirable. 

4. 



38 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The kind offices of pains, and such as could not be per- 
formed by sensations not painful or unpleasant in an equal 
degree, are innumerable and of incalculable value. They 
embrace thousands of instances of restraint from courses 
of action which would prove injurious, and thousands of 
instances of the performance of actions which are of es- 
sential and vital consequence to our well being. 



SECTION IV. 

SENSATIONS OF TOUCH. 

Touch denotes the contact of different bodies at their 
surfaces or extremities. It is also applied to designate one 
of the classes of sensations common to man and other an- 
mals, and the faculty or power of receiving these sensa- 
tions. The sense of touch is the capacity or susceptibility 
of experiencing sensations called by this name. The sen- 
sations of touch are the exercises of this susceptibility or 
capacity. 

All the external parts of the body are endued with this 
susceptibility. It is also diffused, in some degree, over 
the internal cavities, particularly those of the mouth, ears, 
nostrils, &c, in several of which it is particularly deli- 
cate. 

Mere contact is not sufficient to produce sensations of 
touch. Objects may, in many cases, come in contact with 
sensible parts of the body, without exciting any degree of 
sensation. In order to excite sensation, there must be 
some pressure exercised by the tangible object, on the part 
of the body to which it is applied. Pressure conjoined 
with motion, conduces to the production of sensations of 
touch, in the highest degree of perfection. A moderate 
pressure, conjoined with motions of moderate velocity, are 
best for this purpose ; and are constantly made use of in 
the voluntary exercises of this faculty. 

If we wish to feel of any object, we apply the hand or 
fingers to it with greater or less degrees of pressure, till 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 39 

we have attained that which is best for the purpose, and 
move them over it with greater or less degrees of velocity, 
till we attain the proper degree. The degrees of pressure 
and velocity requisite in different cases are different. 

The sensations of touch are of several varieties, which 
differ considerably from each other, and which are either 
pleasurable, painful, or indifferent. Some of them are 
highly pleasurable, and some extremely painful. 

The nature of the sensations of touch on the different 
surfaces which are susceptible of them, varies according 
to the ends which they are designed to answer. When 
there is a necessity for their being pleasurable, they are 
so ; when there is a necessity for their being painful or in- 
different, they are painful or indifferent. 

The chief end of the sensations of touch is informa- 
tion. They are chiefly important and interesting as means 
to this end; not as ultimate pleasures. On this account 
they are generally exercised for the purpose of attaining 
information ; not for that of enjoying them as ultimate 
pleasures. The pleasure of the information they afford, 
is far greater than that involved in the sensations which 
are adapted to afford information. 

The primary judgment, based on the sensation of touch, 
is simply that of resistance. Resistance may exist in dif- 
ferent degrees, from the least which is perceptible, to 
the greatest which can be endured. The sensations of 
touch may be experienced in a single point, or on a sur- 
face of greater or less extent. In most cases they are dif- 
fused over surfaces of perceptible extent. 

Sensations of heat and cold often accompany those of 
touch, but are entirely different from them, and ought to 
be distinguished. 

There is no more propriety in confounding them, than 
in confounding touch and taste, or taste and heat. The 
sensations of touch may be experienced in the mouth co- 
temporaneously with those of taste, and on the same mate- 
rial organs ; but they are not sensations of the same class. 
So we may feel the sensation of touch, and heat or cold, 
at the same instant, and on the same parts of the body , 



40 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

but they are not on that account, or any other, to be con- 
sidered as sensations of the same class. 

The material organs of touch are the skin and muscles. 
The agent, as in all other cases of sensation, is the mind. 

The skin consists of three parts, called by anatomists, 
cutis vera, the true skin; rete mucosum, the mucous net; 
and the scarf skin, or cuticle. 

The cutis vera, or true skin, is separated from the flesh 
by a cellular substance, the cells of which are filled with 
fat. It is profusely supplied with blood vessels and nerves. 
Its nerves are so numerous, that it cannot be perforated by 
the point of the finest needle without wounding some of 
them. The color of the tiue skin is nearly the same in 
all races of men, being extremely light. 

It is adapted to purposes of sensation by the extreme 
delicacy and number of its nerves. 

The rete mucosum is a thin layer which covers the true 
skin, for the purpose of protecting it from the injurious ac- 
tion of air, light, and heat. It is black, copper-colored, 
yellowish, or white; and determines the complexion of in- 
dividuals and races accordingly. 

The scarf skin, or cuticle, covers the rete mucosum, and 
is pellucid, rough, insensible, and of different degrees of 
thickness. In the palms of the hands and on the soles of 
the feet, it becomes very much thickened by the action to 
which those parts of the body are applied. 

The skin is an organ of absorption and perspiration, as 
well as of touch. The former processes, however, are 
not sensible. It is extremely elastic, and in that respect 
is similar to the muscles. It is not only susceptible of 
the sensations of touch, but is peculiarly susceptible of 
pain from local injury, and of heat and cold. Most of the 
pain which is experienced in surgical operations, arises from 
the injury of this part of the system. 

Next to the skin, the muscles generally participate in the 
sensations arising from resistance, and are more or less 
exercised in all cases of touch. 

The slightest pressure with the finger or hand, exercises 
both some parts of the skin, and some of the muscles ; to 



PHILOSOPHY OP SENSATIONS. 41 

wit, those of the finger or arm. So of every other instance 
of pressure or resistance. 

The muscles consist of parallel fibres distributed in 
bundles, the larger of which are discernible by the naked 
eye. These, however, are subdivided into smaller bun- 
dles, and they into smaller still, indefinitely. They are 
capable of alternate contraction and relaxation. When a 
muscle acts, it becomes shorter and thicker than at other 
times. The human body contains about two hundred pair 
of muscles, besides some which are single. Those mus- 
cles which are contracted and relaxed independently of the 
will, are called involuntary. Those whose contraction and 
relaxation depend upon the will, are called voluntary. 
Some are of a mixed character, of which those concerned 
in respiration are an obvious example. 

Each division and subdivision of the muscular fibres, is 
surrounded by a cellular membrane, at once separating and 
uniting them. 

The nervous and muscular systems are intimately con- 
nected. Every muscle has its due supply of nerves, 
which enter it generally in different branches, and become 
so minutely divided and dispersed among the muscular 
fibers, as to be incapable of being traced with accuracy 
to their terminations. 

The vital functions of the muscles, both voluntary and 
involuntary, are performed under influence exerted by the 
mind through the nerves. If the nerves are destroyed or 
cut off, the muscles with which they communicated be- 
come inefficient and useless. 

The nerves connect every muscle with the brain and 
spinal marrow, and with the mind ; and their agency is 
concerned in every instance of vital action, and of sensation. 
This is true of the sensation of touch, in common with 
others. The capacity of experiencing this sensation, be- 
longs to the skin and muscles generally, not to either ex- 
clusively. Whenever muscles are contracted or relaxed 
by resistance, then the corresponding sensation may be 
experienced ; provided a due supply of nerves is afforded 
far the purpose. 



42 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The nerves of sensation and motion, however, are not 
the same, and the presence of the latter does not necessa- 
rily imply that of the former. 

Some parts of the body are supplied with nerves of mo- 
tion in a greater degree than with those of sensation; and 
in general, the two are distributed in a manner which has 
appeared best to the eye of infinite wisdom and goodness, 
and which challenges the severest scrutiny. 

Me>re contact, without some degree of resistance, ex- 
cites no sensation. 

Ideas of resistance, extension, hardness and softness, 
smoothness and roughness, locality, identity and diversity, 
number and quantity, are all capable of being derived 
from touch by an exercise of reason ; but they form no 
part of the sensation. They are all inferences from sen- 
sations. For example: bodies are considered as hard or 
soft, according as the resistance they offer to touch is 
greater or less ; from their contiguous resistance in more 
than one point, we infer that they are extended ; when the 
points of resistance are immediately contiguous, and in 
the same plane, they suggest the idea of smoothness ; 
when they are not immediately contiguous, and are in dif- 
ferent planes, they suggest the idea of roughness ; the 
different positions of resisting points and surfaces, with 
respect to each other, suggest the idea of locality, also of 
diversity and number; the continued or repeated experi- 
ence of similar resistance at the same point or points, or 
on the same surface, and in the same plane, suggests the 
idea of identity ; extension is an inference from locality. 

The above and other similar ideas and classes of ideas, 
which are intimately associated with touch, are not sensa- 
tions, but judgments founded on sensations. 



SECTION Y. 

SENSATIONS OF SIGHT. 

The exclusive organ of sight is the eye. The ball of 
the eye serves as a medium of refraction, which brings 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 43 

the divergent rays of light from luminous and visible ob- 
jects to a focus, and thus forms complete pictures of the 
same. These pictures are received on the retina, an ex- 
pansion of the optic nerve, which covers the whole poste- 
rior part of the internal globe of the eye. 

The retina is the seat of vision, or of the sensations 
peculiar to the eye ; light is the instrument of vision, and 
the convex ball of the eye, consisting of different mem- 
branes and humors, or liquids, is an instrument for the 
refraction of light and the formation of pictures on the 
retina. 

The dark circular space in the center of the front part 
of the eye, is called the pupil. The colored portion of 
the eye, immediately around the pupil, is called the iris, 
from its resemblance to the rainbow. That part of the 
eye which covers the iris and pupil is transparent, and is 
called the cornea. The iris is variable in extent, contract- 
ing and enlarging on its interior boundary, so as to dimin- 
ish or enlarge the circular opening which it encloses ac- 
cording to the intensity of the light received. By this 
enlargement and contraction, the eye is enabled to accom- 
modate itself within certain limits, with that degree or 
amount of light which is best fitted for the purpose of 
vision. When the light is too intense, the iris instantly 
becomes dilated, and the pupil proportionably contracted; 
when it is too feeble, the iris contracts and the pupil be- 
comes proportionably enlarged. 

The pupil or circular opening, therefore, through which 
light is admitted for the purpose of vision, is subject to 
constant variation in size, and is inversely as the degree 
or intensity of light enjoyed. 

Light proceeds from every point of a luminous or visible 
surface, to every part of the pupil, in divergent and conical 
rays or pencils. The same rays are so refracted by the 
cornea, aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous humors, parts 
of the eye through which they pass, as to become con- 
vergent, and meet in points on the retina, where they form 
a complete inverted and dimunitive sensible image of the 
surface from which they emanated. The light, as it impin- 



44 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ges on the retina, corresponds, in every respect, to the 
same, as it emanates from a visible body. 

. The effect of light thus received, is a certain sensation, 
denominated color, nothing more. Every point of the 
retina on which it is received, is susceplible of these sen- 
sations. Consequently we may experience cotemporane- 
ously, an indefinite number of sensations of color. The 
extreme delicacy of the retina renders it susceptible of 
sensations infinitely diversified, according to the kind and 
intensity of light which it receives. Our sensations of 
color vary according to the intensity of light of the same 
kind, by which they are excited, and also according to the 
different kinds or combinations of this element, which are 
capable of being infinitely diversified. 

The perfection of the eye requires both that all of the 
several parts of which it is composed, should be perfect in 
their kind, and that they should possess the relative size 
and position, which are requisite in order to secure the per- 
fect convergence of the rays of light from visible objects 
on the retina. 

This organ may be defective in three ways; (1.) by the 
diseased condition of some one or more of its parts, by 
which they lose their transparency, or refractive power; 
(2.) by too great convexity of the refracting media, com- 
pared with the position of the retina, whereby the conver- 
gence of the light is effected, before it reaches that part 
of the visual organ ; (3.) by too little convexity of the re- 
fracting media, whereby the convergence of the light is 
not effected on its reaching the retina. 

The eyes of near-sighted persons are too convex, and 
those of the dim-sighted, from age, not enough so. To 
remedy these deficiencies, the former use concave glasses, 
and the latter convex. 

The eye is simply an organ of the sense of color; and 
the peculiar sensations received by it, are those of colors, 
or of light only. . 

These sensations serve as the basis of numerous judg- 
ments respecting the existence, location, distance, size, 
form, and nature, of visible, or color-producing objects. 
The sense of sight alone, however,, could never give us 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 45 

the ideas of extension, figure, locality, &c„ which are 
now constantly associated with the exercises of this sense. 
These ideas are derived from touch, and are connected 
with sight by association. 

Vision consists of several consecutive and cotempora- 
neous judgments, based on the sensations of color, and 
having relation to the existence, form, position, distance, 
&c, of the body from which the light, productive of those 
sensations, proceeds. In vision, we judge of objects as 
causes of the sensations of color, and of other sensations, 
which similar objects have been found, in our former ex- 
perience, capable of producing. 

The sense of color leads us to form an idea of its cause, 
and to identify that cause, where we can, with the cause 
of other different sensations, such as touch, smell, taste. 
Thus I experience the colors produced by a rose, and 
form a number of cotemporaneous and consecutive judg- 
ments respecting the locality, size, form, smell, taste, tex- 
ture, &c. of the cause of those colors. 



SECTION V.I. 

SENSATIONS OF HEARING. 

The organ of hearing is the ear. The external ear is 
formed of a fibrous, elastic cartilage, and is attached to the 
side of the head by a cellular tissue, and by muscles 
which, in the case of man, are but partially developed. 
The human ear presents five eminences, and three cavi- 
ties. The ear-tube, or meatus auditorious, is an aperture 
extending from the external ear, and in an adult person, is 
about three quarters of an inch in length. At its termina- 
tion is the tympanum, which separates the external from 
the internal ear. Beyond the tympanum is the internal 
ear, or labyrinth, composed of several cavities, communi- 
cating with each other, covered with a very thin mem- 
brane, filled with a thin liquid, and pervaded by the acous- 
tic nerve. The internal and middle ear are traversed by 



46 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

several other nervous threads, besides those of the acous- 
tic nerve. 

The auditory or acoustic nerves are the seventh pair, 
not much larger than sewing threads, before entering the 
ear. They assume a variety of shapes in the different 
tubes, sacs, canals, and pits of the ear. 

The sensation peculiar to the ear, is that of sound. It 
is produced by a vibratory or tremulous motion of the 
particles of sounding bodies, communicated first to the 
air, then through the air to the tympanum, or drum of the 
ear, and through the tympanum to the other parts of that 
organ, in which the different branches and portions of the 
acoustic nerve are contained. 

The sensations of sound differ in respect to tone, inten- 
sity, and simplicity. They may be either grave or acute, 
strong and loud, or weak and low, simple and melodious, 
Or complex, harsh, destitute of melody, &c, of many dif- 
ferent varieties. 

Sound is capable of great variety, in respect to tone, 
from the lowest or most grave, which the air is capable of 
communicating, embracing thirty-two vibrations per sec- 
ond, to the most acute, embracing twelve thousand. 

The strength or intensity of sounds depends on the ex- 
tent of the vibrations by which they are produced. These 
admit of considerable variety, but are restricted within 
certain limits. 

The simplicity and complexity of sounds depend on 
the simplicity and complexity of the sounding bodies by 
which they are produced. Sounding bodies of uniform 
density and elasticity, and of regular figures, produce sim- 
ple sounds. Others produce sounds more or less com- 
plex. Where different parts of a sounding body vibrate 
in different and irregular times, their sound is complex and 
harsh. 

The capacity of hearing, like that of sight, exists in 
different degrees of perfection, in different persons. Some 
are capable of distinguishing different sounds much more 
readily than others, and of distinguishing much smaller 
differences either in tone, intensity, or complexity. The 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 47 

hearing of some is more perfect than that of others, in pro- 
portion to the greater perfection of this organ. 

What is called a musical ear, is partly natural and partly 
artificial. It requires such a degree of perfection in the 
acoustic apparatus, as enables the mind to discriminate 
easily between different tones, to discover and appreciate 
harmony, and detect discords. This capacity, however, 
may exist undeveloped. It is necessary, therefore, to the 
formation of a musical ear, that it should be in some de- 
gree developed by observation and exercise. 

Musical sounds are divided into octaves, or series of 
eight notes, which are separated by unequal intervals, 
called tones and semi-tones. The vibrations of an octave 
are twice as frequent as those of the first note in the scale. 

Every octave contains five tones and two semi-tones. 
Those notes which are agreeable to the ear, when sound- 
ed together, form concords; those which are disagreeable, 
discords. The 1st and 8th, 1st and 3d, and 1st and 5th, 
are examples of concords or accordant notes. 

Vocal language and music are both addressed to the ear, 
and consist simply in sounds, which are the only sensa- 
tions they excite. The various ideas of sounding bodies, 
their distances, conditions, &c, are associations and de- 
ductions of reason, but form no part of the sensations 
which are received by the ear. 



SECTION VII. 

SENSATIONS OF TASTE AND SMELL. 

1. Sensations of taste. 

The principal organ of taste is the tongue. The inter- 
nal surfaces of the lips, cheeks, &c, seem to share a sim- 
ilar susceptibility, in some degree. The gustatory or lin- 
gual nerve of the fifth pair, terminates on the surface of 
the tongue, in the form of small tubercles, beginning at the 
point, and extending to the throat. Several other nerves 



48 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are distributed to the interior parts of the mouth, and are, 
probably, exercised more or less in the sensations of taste. 

The salivary glands facilitate the exercise of taste by 
the secretion of saliva, which serves as a solvent or di- 
luent of sapid bodies. When the mouth becomes dry, 
taste is not easily exercised. 

Those bodies which are capable of producing the sen- 
sations of taste, are called sapid. Taste is the sensation 
produced on the organs of taste by sapid bodies. In or- 
der to produce their respective varieties of taste in the 
highest perfection, sapid bodies ought to be retained some 
time in the mouth. When swallowed or thrown out im- 
mediately, their full effect is not produced. 

Taste is simply a sensation. It is generally exercised 
cotemporaneously with the sense of touch. Different 
flavors or tastes are characterized as sweet, bitter, acid, 
agreeable, disagreeable, &c. The same flavors are agree- 
able to some and disagreeable to others ; and agreeable in 
one period of life and disagreeable to the same person in 
other periods. 

We judge of the healthful and unhealthful character of 
food and drinks chiefly by taste ; and are directed chiefly 
by this sense, in making choice of our food and drinks. 

2. Sensations of smell. 

The organ of smell consists of the pituitary membrane, 
which lines the cavities of the nose ; of the membrane 
which covers the sinuses, and of the olfactory nerve. The 
pituitary membrane covers the whole of the nostrils. It 
is furnished^ abundantly, with nerves and other appropriate 
vessels. The upper passages from the nostrils to the 
throat, communicate with certain cavities hollowed out of 
the bones of the head, called sinuses. The membrane 
which covers the sinuses, secretes the nasal mucus by 
which the pituitary membrane is constantly moistened, and 
which facilitates the exercise of smell, very much as the 
saliva does that of taste. 

The olfactory nerve springs by three roots from the pos- 
terior, inferior, and internal parts of the anterior lobe of 
the brain. It diffuses itself by a great number of small 
threads over the pituitary membrane, and is distributed, 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 49 

most abundantly, to the superior part of it. The filaments 
of this nerve have never been discovered in the sinuses, or 
in the middle passage to the throat. Other nerves are dis- 
tributed, both to the sinuses and to other adjacent nasal 
cavities. 

Smell is exercised when air, containing odoriferous par- 
ticles, proceeds through the nose to the lungs. The higher 
part of the passage is extremely small, and more or less 
filled with the nasal mucus. This mucus arrests the odo- 
riferous particles, and retains them till their appropriate 
impression is made on the pituitary membrane, and through 
that on the mind. Smell is analagous to taste and pos- 
sesses similar varieties. 



SECTION VIII. 

THE RELATIONS AND ENDS OF SENSATIONS. 

1. The relation of sensations to the mind and body. 

Sensations are affections or states of mind, not of mat- 
ter, or of material organs. Material organs are the instru- 
ments of their exercise, not the agents to which they 
belong. The stomach does not hunger and thirst ; the 
limbs or body, generally, do not experience the sensations 
of weariness and fatigue, of heat and cold, or of pleasure 
and pain. The same may be said, with equal propriety, of 
the organs of the external senses. The skin and muscu- 
lar system do not experience the sensations of touch, the 
eye does not experience color, the ear sound, the mouth 
taste, or the nose smell. The subject of these various 
classes of sensations is one and the same. It is the mind. 

Sensations are particular affections or states of mind, 
produced by particular affections or states of the body. 
They accompany certain states of the body as their effects, 
and are made to do so by God, in the exercise of the same 
sovereignty by which he has connected antecedents and 
consequents, causes and effects, in all other cases. 

5 



50 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 






The phenomena of sensation clearly indicate the exist- 
ence of one sentient being, communicating with all parts 
of the body, but not identical with it, or with any part of 
it. The ascription of sensation to the organs of sense, or 
to the brain, as the ultimate agents concerned, is entirely 
unsupported by the semblance of evidence. The organs 
of sense experience certain physical effects from the ac- 
tion of external objects. These effects may act through 
the nerves upon the brain, and produce certain other phys- 
ical effects upon that organ. The physical effects produ- 
ced on external organs of sense, result in particular states 
of those organs, and the physical effects produced by them 
on the brain, result in particular states of the brain ; but 
they leave sensation entirely unaccounted for. That which 
is the subject of sensation, is manifestly something differ- 
ent from the brain, and from any or all other parts of the 
body. 

Sensations relate both to mind and matter. They relate 
to the mind which experiences them, as the only subject 
to which they all belong, and to matter in its various forms, 
as the objects by which the mind is operated upon in their 
production. 

The three requisites for sensations are, 

(1.) A mind ; 

(2.) Organs of sense with which the mind communi- 
cates ; 

(3.) External objects adapted to the organs of sense. 

External objects alone cannot produce sensations. They 
cannot do this by acting on material organs, which have 
no connection with a mind or sentient principle ; neither 
can the mind obtain sensations without organs and objects. 
Had it been left unfurnished with organs of sense, it could 
never, as now constituted, have experienced sensations ; 
and had it been furnished perfectly with those organs, as 
it now is, or in any conceivable manner, and yet left with- 
out objects to act upon them, its furniture would have been 
perfectly useless. 

The organs of sense are simply mediums of commu- 
nication between mind and matter. They are adapted to 
the mind with which they communicate on the one hand, 



PHILOSOPHY OP SENSATIONS. 51 

and to matter of different kinds on the other. They are 
material, and consist of particular portions of organized 
matter. Their formation, preservation, and destruction, 
take place in conformity with uniform laws which God has 
established. The same is true of their connection with 
the mind, to whose service they are respectively devoted. 
This connection commences, continues, and terminates in 
appropriate circumstances. In circumstances appropriate 
to its commencement, it commences ; in those appropriate 
to its continuance, it continues ; and in those appropriate 
to its dissolution, it terminates. 

When divested of the organs of sense at death, the 
mind is thrown back upon the hands of God, to be provi- 
ded with such other capacities as he sees fit to bestow. 
Its introduction to another state at death, will doubtless be 
analagous to its introduction to the present state at birth, 
so far as the bestowment of new capacities and powers is 
concerned. The powers and capacities requisite for this 
life, are bestowed on the mind at birth; those which will 
be requisite for the life to come, will, no doubt, in like 
manner be conferred at death, the period of our being born 
into another world. 

Death divests us entirely of all the organs of sense, and 
consequently of all capacity of experiencing sensations of 
any kind. Our birth to another world will probably invest 
us with other capacities, of a similar but higher nature. 

2. The relation of sensations to ideas. 

The relations of sensations to ideas, are those of imme- 
diate and direct antecedence and conditionality, which is 
the case with perceptions of sensible objects ; or of re- 
mote and indirect antecedence and conditionality, which is 
the case with all ideas which result from perceptions, by 
successive inferences or judgments. 

(1.) Sensations excite ideas of material objects, and are 
necessary to their occurrence. 

Our minds are affected in certain modes by means of 
the stomach, limbs, skin, muscles, eyes, ears, &c, which 
we denominate sensations. From our sensations we in- 
fer the existence of sensible objects. These inferences 
are usually called perceptions. Perception does not take 



52 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

place by the senses directly. The senses are not organs 
of perception. By them we obtain sensations only, and 
from sensations infer sensible objects. For example : 
Touch, or the sensation which arises from applying the 
hand to an external object, is a sensation, or state of mind. 
On turning the eye in the direction of an object of touch, 
we become sensible of color. Resistance and color are 
capable of cotemporaneous excitement, and of indefinite 
continuance. We infer from them, the existence of a tan- 
gible and visible object. That which excites touch is tan- 
gible. That which excites color is visible. Having thus 
attained the idea of tangible and visible objects, we infer 
from touch and sight, their other qualities and relations of 
locality, extension, form, &c. 

Without sensations of some kind, ideas of material ob- 
jects cannot be suggested, or exist. The senses are the 
exclusive organs of the mind, by which it experiences 
touch, sees color, hears sounds, and experiences tastes and 
odors. Without touch, we could form no idea of resisting 
extended and figured bodies ; without sight, none of visible 
or colored ones, and so of the other senses ; and with no 
sense at all, we, of course, could form no idea of sensible 
objects of any kind whatever. 

(2.) Sensations are necessary to ideas of any kind. They 
are the fundamental series of mental phenomena, from 
which all others take their rise. 

Sensation is a wonderful expedient for the development 
and exercise of the faculty of ideas, and of the emotions 
and affections dependent thereupon. It sustains similar 
relations to the ideality and affections of animals and of 
men. The lowest grades of animals, and men of the 
highest orders of intellect and affections, are equally in- 
debted to sensations as the indispensable conditions of all 
their intellectual and moral attainments. God, doubtless, 
might have created us capable of the exercise of reason 
by other means, and he may furnish us with other endow- 
ments in a future state, which will supersede the necessity 
of these. But in the present life, sensation is indispen- 
sably necessary to the development and exercise of our 
other mental faculties of conscious exercises in any degree. 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 53 

•Without it, the first exercise of judgments, imaginations, 
reminiscences, and affections, and their continued exercise 
after having been developed by this means, are alike im- 
possible. 

3. The relation of sensations to voluntary action. 
- The relation of sensations to acts of will is twofold, that 
of subjection and government. 

(.1 .) The subjection of sensations to voluntary action. 

We are capable of. producing and suspending all those 
sensations for which we have the requisite faculties and 
objects, in conformity with- appropriate choices, purposes, 
and volitions. Voluntary heat and cold, weariness and 
fatigue, hunger and thirst, pain, touch, sight, hearing, tast- 
ting, and smelling, are all equally of this description. They 
are of daily and hourly occurrence, as the effects of voli 
tion, and their exercises are daily and hourly suspended 
by means of the same agency. 

Our voluntary control and determination of our sensa- 
tions of different- orders is accomplished, 

1. By preventing or securing the concurrence of cir- 
cumstances and organic impressions, adapted to produce 
them. 

2. By attending to such organic impressions when they 
occur. 

3. By withholding our attention from other objects, and 
desisting from other mental exercises inconsistent with 
that of sensations. 

Capacities of sensation and sensible objects, are the two 
indispensible conditions of sensation. We cannot attain 
sensations which we have not capacities to exercise, and 
we have no capacities to exercise them independently of 
their appropriate exciting causes and objects. 

(2.) The influence of sensations in determining voluri-- 
tary action. 

Sensations are, in many cases, the causes as well as the 
objects of voluntary action. They lead us to perform ac- 
tions, which otherwise we should not perform, in number- 
less instances, and during every day and hour of our con- 
scious existence. In connection with other appropriate 

5* 



54 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

principles of action, they contribute largely to the proper 
exercise and direction of all our mental faculties. 

Painful and pleasurable sensations tend to produce cor- 
responding affections and desires, and these affections and 
desires, corresponding voluntary mental and bodily actions. 
The ordinary engagements and pursuits of mankind, both 
of business and pleasure, depend, to a considerable extent, 
on motives derived from this source. 

Other motives concur in leading us to pursue them, but 
without the additional influence exerted by these, would 
be entirely inadequate to produce the beneficial results 
now attained. 

The knowledge of our capacity to experience different 
classes of sensations, exercises an influence in determin- 
ing our voluntary actions, similar to that of the sensations 
themselves, when in exercise. It leads us to act with a 
view to avoid sensations which are displeasurable, and to 
obtain those which are pleasurable. 

So that sensations in exercise excite corresponding de- 
sires and affections, leading to corresponding voluntary ac- 
tions ; and ideas that we are capable of attaining them by 
means of certain objects, and voluntary exertions, do the 
same. 

The office of sensations, as principles of voluntary ac- 
tion, is of the highest importance. Even those which are 
most painful are capable, in most cases, of subserving our 
highest interests, both as means of information and motives 
to rational effort. This is the case with pains which indi- 
cate the physical derangement of some one or more bodily 
organs, and with every class of painful sensations. 

The loss of any single natural capacity of painful sen- 
sations, or of any degree of susceptibility to the exercises 
of the same, which is characteristic of a healthy condi- 
tion of the organs, and a well regulated state of the mind, 
would be a calamity to be equally deprecated and deplor- 
ed with a loss or injury of the eye or ear. 

The senses of animals are still more Commanding in 
their influence over the animal will, than those of man are 
over the human will. The affections and desires of ani- 
mals are almost entirely dependent on this class of exer- 



PHILOSOPHY OP SENSATIONS. 55 

cises. Consequently, they are incapable of exercising 
that self-government which is the prerogative and glory of 
man. Whither their sensations impel them, they go ; and 
whatever they judge to be an object of the most agreeable 
sensations, they pursue ; without any check from contra- 
dictory emotions, and from their corresponding opposite 
affections and desires. 

The higher faculties of emotion given to man, and their 
corresponding affections and desires, are designed to act 
cotemporaneously with the accompanying faculties of sen- 
sation, as joint principles of action. 

The proper exercise and improvement of our different 
capacities of sensation, so as to adapt them to the ever 
varying circumstances of our being, requires constant at- 
tention and effort. Negligence, in a single instance, is 
often attended with disastrous effects, which no subsequent 
exertions can prevent or remedy. The greater the judg- 
ment and discretion with which we prosecute the voluntary 
exercise of sensations, the greater is the benefit which will 
accrue to us from the exercise of these faculties. 

Every class and variety of sensations, ought to be ex- 
ercised on their appropriate occasions, and for their ap- 
propriate ends, in that degree, and with that frequency, 
which is necessary to the greatest present and eternal 
happiness of ourselves and other beings. 

The degrees of susceptibility of sensation with which 
we are endowed, and which we are capable of attaining, 
are exactly such as w T e need in the present life. They 
serve as channels of important information and motives 
to useful exertion. They do not, indeed, afford us all the 
information, or impel as strongly and exclusively to useful 
effort, as we might desire. But they furnish us the means 
of all that information which is necessary to our present 
and future happiness, and furnish powerful motives to 
many of those voluntary actions which are of the highest 
necessity, in order to the attainment of the same. 

All sensations are within the body. Some of them are 
produced by causes operating on their organs within the 
body ; some by causes operating in immediate contact with 
the same ; and some, as is the case with sensations of 



56 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sight and sound, by causes operating from greater or less 
distances, and with degrees of energy inversely propor- 
tionable to the squares of those distances. 

We learn, at an early period, that some of our sensations 
are useful, and others injurious, or the indications of ope- 
rations which are injurious, and exercise our voluntary 
powers in multiplying, prolonging, and increasing the in- 
tensity of those which are useful, so as to promote their 
greatest possible usefulness, and in suspending and avoid- 
ing those .which are not useful. 

The consequence of these voluntary exercises is the 
improvement of the capacities of sensation most exercised, 
in a degree proportionable to their superior comparative 
usefulness. All the senses are susceptible of education 
and improvement by this means. 

The blind, for example, are capable of such improve- 
ments of their susceptibilities of touch, and of their capa- 
cities of judgment therewith connected, as to compensate, 
in a considerable degree, for the loss of sight. Sight and 
hearing, and all the senses, are more or less acute and 
discriminating, according to the frequency, accuracy, and 
energy with w r hich they are habitually exercised. 

The capacity of attaining increased susceptibilities of 
the different classes of sensations, by exercise, is subser- 
vient to highly important and useful purposes. It renders 
us capable of modifying this class of our mental faculties 
in conformity with our varying necessities, in different pe- 
riods and circumstances of life ; and tends, in all condi- 
tions, to give those capacities of sensations the greatest 
susceptibility, which, in those conditions, are of the great- 
est and most frequent use to us. 

The dependence of sensations on bodily organs, and 
particular organic impressions, clearly shows that this 
faculty is not a necessary susceptibility of the mind as 
such, but an accidental or special endowment, which may 
be given or withheld, without affecting the existence or 
reality of the being to whom it is given, or from whom it 
is withheld. That the mind may exist without sensations 
in actual exercise, we know from experience and observa- 
tion ; that it may exist without capacities of sensation, we 



PHILOSOPHY OF SENSATIONS. 57 

are authorized to infer, from the dependence of those ca- 
pacities on material organs and organic states. The con- 
nection between particular states of the organs of sense 
and particular sensations, is one of causality and depen- 
dence. No account can be given of it, except by referring 
it to the will and ordinance of God. Particular states of 
the organs of sensation, lead to the exercise of their ap- 
propriate and diversified sensations, because God wills 
and ordains it should be so. 

Considered merely in respect to sensations, man does 
not differ essentially from the lower tribes of animals. 
Many of them possess all the generic faculties of sensa-- 
tion which belong to human beings, and some of them 
possess several of these faculties, in greater degrees of 
energy and acuteness than men. 

The acknowledged and manifest superiority of man to 
animals, is not derived from greater or more numerous 
capacities- of sensation, but from the superiority of other 
and higher faculties hereafter to be considered* 



PART SECOND- 

IDEALOGY, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEAS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS, 
AND THE IDEAL FACULTY. 

SECTION I. 
THE GENERIC PROPERTIES OF IDEAS. 

The next co-ordinate class of mental phenomena to 
sensations, is that of ideas. Of these, all our knowledge 
and imaginations consist. 

Ideas differ from sensations in their essential properties 
as objects of consciousness, in the manner of their occur- 
rence or the means by which they are excited, and in their 
relations to other classes of mental phenomena. 

They are equally with sensations, from which they take 
their rise, objects of knowledge. We are conscious of 
them as we are of all mental phenomena of the other or- 
ders, which are objects of consciousness. Considered as 
objects of consciousness, they are similar to sensations. 
In other respects, they are entirely different from them 
and from all other known phenomena, both of matter and 
mind. 

The quality of ideas embraces elements which all ideas 
possess in common, and by which they are distinguished 
from other phenomena; also those by which one idea and 
one class of ideas differ from others. There are ele- 
ments which all ideas possess in common, as there 
are those which all sensations, or all phenomena, of any 
other class, possess in common. There are also elements 



60 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

by which all ideas differ in common from phenomena of 
every other class ; and those by which each particular 
idea and class of ideas differs from every other. 

All the qualities which belong to ideas merely as phe- 
nomena, belong to them in common with all other phe- 
nomena ; all those which belong to them as mental phe- 
nomena, belong to them in common with all other mental 
phenomena ; all those which belong to them as mental 
phenomena, which are objects of consciousness, belong to 
them in common with other mental phenomena, which are 
objects of consciousness. So, on the other hand, all those 
qualities by which ideas differ from the phenomena of 
matter, from the unconscious phenomena of mind, from 
mental phenomena of other co-ordinate classes, such as 
sensations, emotions, &c, and from other ideas, belong 
to them as distinct and peculiar phenomena and classes of 
phenomena, and are the basis or ground of their separa- 
tion from phenomena of other orders, and from other phe- 
nomena of the same order. 

Ideas are: 1. phenomena; 2. mental phenomena ; 3. 
mental phenomena which are objects of consciousness ; 
4. mental phenomena which are objects of consciousness, 
and which have certain peculiar properties in common, 
whereby they are distinguished from conscious mental 
phenomena of other orders. 

The generic properties of ideas, which they possess in 
common with mental phenomena of other generic orders, 
are : 

1. Relations to consciousness as immediate objects of 
knowledge ; 

2. Relations to the mind as mental phenomena, in dis- 
tinction from those of matter ; 

3. Relations to the faculty of knowledge and concep- 
tion, as capable, in various ways, of being known and con- 
sidered ; 

4. Relations to time as continuous. 

I. The relation of ideas to consciousness. 

Ideas are equally, with sensations and emotions, objects 
of consciousness. By ideas we know our sensations, and 
by other ideas we know our cognitions of sensations; so 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 61 

of every other class of ideas* An idea does not involve 
a knowledge of itself, but it sustains such relations to the 
mind as to be capable of being known directly. It pos- 
sesses this property in common with sensations, emotions, 
affections, desires, and acts of will, but in distinction from 
those mental phenomena which are not objects of con- 
sciousness, and from all the phenomena of matter. 

2. The relation of ideas to the mind as its phenomena, 
in distinction from those of matter. 

It is impossible to conceive of ideas without conceiving 
of them as phenomena, having respect to some subjective 
cause or agent. Ideas are not independent absolute enti- 
ties, but states or manifestations of some entity which they 
reveal. In this respect they are similar to sensations, and 
other orders of mental phenomena, which are objects of 
consciousness. Sensations are exercises or experiences 
of beings endued with capacities of sensation, and ideas 
of those endued w r ith capacities of thought. The simplest 
possible conception of sensations, involves the idea of be- 
ings which exercise or experience them, and the simplest 
possible conception of ideas, that of beings which exercise 
and experience them. 

3. The general relations of ideas to the faculty of knowl- 
edge and conception, as objects of thought. 

Ideas are capable of being known by other means than 
as direct objects of consciousness, or of memory founded 
on previous consciousness. We are conscious only of our 
own ideas, but we are capable of learning many of the 
ideas of others. 

We do not ascertain the ideas of others by conscious- 
ness, or as the immediate objects of sensation. We have 
no consciousness of them, and no power of discovering 
them as the direct objects of sensation. They are not 
tangible, visible, or audible ; and are objects of conscious- 
ness only to the persons who exercise them, at the time of 
their being exercised. Yet no class of phenomena are 
more easily or accurately understood, or the objects of 
more general attention, than the ideas of others. 

4. The relation of ideas to time as continuous. 

6 



62 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Continuity is one of the properties of sensations, and 
the other co-ordinate genera of mental phenomena. Ev- 
ery sensation is more or less continuous. The same is 
true of all phenomena, both of matter and mind. A phe- 
nomenon which is not continuous, in any degree, is impos- 
sible. Ideas possess continuity in common with other 
phenomena. They cannot exist without it. They may 
continue during longer or shorter intervals, from those 
which are indefinitely short to those which are indefinitely 
long, but they cannot exist without some continuance. 

The generic properties of ideas, which are peculiar to 
them as a distinct order of mental phenomena, are : 

1. Quality as objects of consciousness; 

2. Want of measurable intensity ; 

3. Relations to objects of thought ; 

4. Relations to other co-ordinate genera of mental phe- 
nomena, and to other ideas. 

1. The quality of ideas as objects of consciousness. 

In being objects of consciousness, ideas are similar to 
sensations and other co-ordinate genera of mental phenom- 
ena. But their quality as objects of consciousness, is dif- 
ferent from that of any other class of mental phenomena. 
To be conscious of a sensation, is to have an idea of 
an existing sensation ; to be conscious of an idea, is to 
have an idea of an existing idea. A sensation bears the 
same relation to its idea of consciousness, that an idea does 
to it. 

Our first knowledge of sensations consist in ideas of 
them, which are obtained directly by consciousness ; and 
our first knowledge of ideas, consist in ideas of them 
which are obtained by consciousness. To these primary 
ideas, and to others derived from this source, additional 
ones are subsequently added, which are derived from oth- 
er sources ; all of which, constitute all that we know on 
these subjects. Ideas of different sensations are similar, 
therefore we judge sensations to be similar ; ideas of ideas 
are similar, therefore we judge ideas to be similar ; ideas 
of ideas differ essentially from those of sensations, there- 
fore we judge ideas to be essentially different from sensa- 
tions. 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 63 

Ideas are the matter and immediate instruments of all 
our knowledge. Our knowledge consists of ideas, and 
relates to objects only as objects of ideas. What is not 
an object of thought, cannot be an object of knowledge. 
The generic qualities of ideas which are peculiar to 
them as objects of consciousness, are those by which we 
generally distinguish this class of phenomena from others 
that accompany them. 

We can easily distinguish ideas from sensations, and 
from other mental phenomena, such as emotions, affections, 
and desires, by their generic qualities as objects of con- 
sciousness. We are conscious of an idea as being one 
thing, and of a sensation, whether accompanying it or not, 
as being another and different thing. 

2. The unintensive nature of ideas. 

Measurable intensity is characteristic of sensations and 
other classes of mental exercises, which are objects of 
consciousness. Whenever we think of intensive phenom- 
ena, we think of them as having certain degrees of inten- 
sity. We describe some sensations as more intense, and 
others as less so. The same is true of emotions, affec- 
tions, desires, and acts of will. 

Ideas do not differ from each other in this respect. They 
are capable of being distinguished, and possess obvious 
distinguishing properties ; but intensity is not one of them. 

Ideas which relate to mountains, continents, rivers, and 
systems, are no more intense than those which relate to 
hills, islands, tapers, mites, and infinitesimals; and one idea 
of a mountain, or of any other -object, is no more intense 
than another. 

Ideas of mountains may be advantageously compared 
with those of hills, and be found to agree or differ ; those 
of continents with those of islands; those of rivers and 
systems with those of tapers, mites, and infinitesimals ; 
and ideas of any one kind whatever, with those of other 
kinds. So, also, ideas of the same kind may be compar- 
ed with each other, and the same idea at one time may be 
compared with itself at other times. 

These comparisons, however, must have respect to pro- 
perties which they possess, and in which they may either 



64 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

agree or differ ; not to properties of which they are desti- 
tute, and which belong exclusively to other co-ordinate 
genera of mental phenomena. 

3. The relation of ideas to objects of thought. 

The objective relations of ideas are among the generic 
properties which they all possess in common with each 
other, and by which they are distinguished from every 
other class of phenomena. Strictly speaking, sensations, 
and other classes of mental phenomena, which are objects 
of consciousness, with the exception of ideas, have no ob- 
jective relations. What are denominated the objects of 
sensations, for example, are really the objects of ideas, 
which are excited by sensations ; and what are denomi- 
nated the objects of emotions, affections, desires, &c, are 
the objects of the ideas which excite emotions, affections, 
and desires. Objective relations are among the essential 
properties of ideas. Every possible idea is an idea of 
some object. To think, and not think of something, is 
impossible, and is equivalent to thinking and not thinking 
at the same time. 

Ideas relate to their objects as having certain properties. 
This is the case with ideas of sensations, ideas, and other 
objects of consciousness ; also with ideas of minds and 
material objects, and of real and imaginary beings. 

Every thing which is thought of, is thought of as hav- 
ing certain properties. To think of something which has no 
properties, is the same as to think of nothing, or to have 
no thoughts. 

Want of intensity and objective relationship are invol- 
ved in the quality of ideas as objects of consciousness. 
We are conscious of ideas as phenomena which have no 
measurable intensity, and which relate to objects. Their 
relation to objects of thought, is one of their essential 
qualities as objects of consciousness. The consciousness 
of an idea is simply an idea of an idea. What an idea 
appears to be as an object of consciousness, or of other 
ideas, it is ; and all its properties must be in agreement 
with these fundamental ones. 

By consciousness, we ascertain some of the properties 
of ideas ; and by reasoning based on ideas of conscious- 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 65 

ness, we pursue and extend our discoveries respecting 
this, as we do respecting other classes of phenomena. 

We do not learn every thing about ideas merely by con- 
sciousness, any more than we learn every thing about the 
phenomena of matter, merely by judgments concerning 
them immediately connected with sensations. Our knowl- 
edge of the phenomena of matter, only commences with 
those judgments which are immediately connected with 
sensations. So our knowledge of ideas only commences 
with those judgments respecting them, which are obtained 
directly by consciousness. 

4. The relation of ideas to other mental phenomena. 

No other generic order of mental phenomena can pro- 
duce phenomena of its own order, or of any other order, 
except ideas. Sensations cannot produce sensations ; 
emotions emotions ; affections affections ; desires desires ; 
or acts of will other acts of will ; without the intervention 
of other appropriate agencies. Each of these orders is 
equally incapable of producing either of the others. Sen- 
sations cannot produce emotions, or emotions sensations, 
and so of the others. 

All the orders of mental phenomena, which are objects 
of consciousness, produce the ideas which relate to them 
as objects of consciousness directly, without the interven- 
tion of any instrumentality or agency whatever. Ideas of 
sensations, as they occur in consciousness, are the imme- 
diate effect of sensations ; those of emotions, affections, 
desires, and acts of will, are the immediate effects of emo- 
tions, affections, desires, and acts of will; and those of 
ideas, are the effects of ideas. Those ideas, therefore, 
which constitute parts of consciousness, are the immedi- 
ate effects of different generic orders of mental phenomer 
na ; effects resulting from causes as different as the dif- 
ferent phenomena to which they relate, but which are 
themselves similar as ideas. 

Sensations occur, independently of other mental phe- 
nomena. This is not the case with ideas. Ideas are al- 
ways consequents and effects of other mental phenomena. 
Those of consciousness, are the consequents and effects 
of mental phenomena, which are objects of consciousness. 

6* 



66 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Those which relate to minds and to material objects, as 
subjective and objective causes of sensations and other ac- 
companying phenomena, are consequents and effects of 
ideas of consciousness. Without previous ideas of con- 
sciousness, we could never experience them ; with such 
ideas, we cannot but experience them. 

Consciousness of sensations leads to ideas of sensible 
objects, as directly as organic impressions, adapted to 
that purpose, lead to sensations ; it also leads, with equal 
directness and certainty, to ideas of ourselves as subjects 
of sensation. Consciousness of sensations, ideas, and 
other generic orders of mental phenomena, produces ideas 
of ourselves as possessing all these various capacities ; 
not as possessing any one of them to the exclusion of 
others. 

Ideas, therefore, have their origin in sensations and other 
conscious exercises. They are not of the nature of sen- 
sations in respect to quality, or in respect to other funda- 
mental and essential properties. But sensations are among 
their antecedents and producing causes, and are essential 
to the production of those_which relate to sensation — produ- 
cing objects and operations, and of all, which are derived 
from these, as their antecedents and suggesting causes. 

Had we been constituted incapable of sensations, and 
in other respects as we now are, we never could have at- 
tained ideas of any kind. It is an essential feature of our 
constitution, that ideas must arise from previous exercises 
which are objects of consciousness. Without such exer- 
cises of some kind, we are as incapable of ideas as we are 
of sensations, without organic conditions to concur in their 
production. 

All ideas of consciousness are the consequents and ef- 
fects of those phenomena which are objects of conscious- 
ness, and are connected with their constant antecedents 
and causes, as other consequents and effects are with 
theirs. 

Ideas are equally, with sensations, the antecedents and 
causes of other ideas, which relate to them as objects of 
consciousness. They are, also, concurring and necessary 
causes of all ideas, which are inferred or deduced from 



PROPERTIES AND OPvDERS OF IDEAS. 67 

ihem as grounds of inference, or principles of judgment 
and conception, inasmuch as the attainment of those rela- 
ted ideas is impossible by other means. 

Ideas are antecedents and causes of emotions, affections, 
desires, and acts of will. This is not the case with any 
other class of mental phenomena. Perceptions of exter- 
nal objects are not the more uniform effects of sensations, 
in the general experience of mankind, than emotions, af- 
fections, desires, and acts of will are of ideas. We can- 
not attain perceptions of material objects except by means 
of sensations ; so we cannot attain emotions, affections, 
desires, and acts of will, except by means of ideas. The 
objects of emotions and other corresponding feelings, are 
only the objects of emotion and feeling — producing ideas, 
and indirectly and remotely of the feelings consequent on 
ideas. 

All sensations have essential properties which do not 
belong to ideas, and all ideas have essential properties 
which do not belong to sensations. Some of these have 
been pointed out in the foregoing pages, and are too obvi- 
ous to be mistaken. They may be easily ascertained, by 
comparing particular ideas and classes of ideas, with par- 
ticular sensations and classes of sensations. 

1. Sensations depend on organic conditions as their 
immediate antecedents and exciting causes ; ideas do not 
depend on organic conditions of any kind. 

2. Sensations are intensive ; ideas have no measurable 
intensity. 

3. Sensations are simple independent phenomena, hav- 
ing no intrinsic relation to sensation producing objects, ex- 
cept through the medium of ideas. Ideas relate directly, 
universally, and necessarily, to objects of thought. 

4. Ideas occur only as consequents of other mental 
phenomena, which are objects of consciousness. They 
differ from sensations in the manner of their occurrence, by 
means of previous conscious exercises, as much as in 
their essential properties as objects of consciousness. 
Sensations occur only as the effects of particular con- 
ditions of bodily organs, most of which are capable of 
being easily observed, and traced to appropriate phys- 



68 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ical causes. This is not the case with ideas. They do 
not, in any case, stand in immediate succession to par- 
ticular states of bodily organs, but in all cases, where or- 
ganic conditions appear to excite them, they do it by means 
of intervening sensations. The last discoverable link in 
the chain of phenomena previous to ideas, is always an 
object of consciousness, such as sensations, previous ideas, 
emotions, &c. 

Ideas may be considered as consisting of two or more 
simple ideas, and may be resolved into the same ; but they 
cannot, in any case, be resolved into sensations ; neither 
can sensations be resolved into ideas. Sensations are not 
the elements of thought, nor thoughts of sensations. 

Where the sphere of sensation ends, that of ideas be- 
gins. The two are perfectly distinct and separate. The 
sphere of ideas is bounded on one hand, by that of sensa- 
tions, from which it is clearly separated ; and on the other, 
by that of emotions, affections, and desires, from which it 
is separated as clearly as from the sphere of sensations. 
The sphere of ideas, therefore, is intermediate in respect 
to the spheres of other mental exercises, having that of 
sensations below it, and taking its departure from the same, 
and having that of emotions, affections, and desires above 
it, and depending upon it. 

The sphere of sensations is necessary to that of ideas, 
and the sphere of ideas to that of emotions, affections, and 
desires ; each extending beyond and rising above the other, 
and depending on that immediately before and below it. 



SECTION II. 

THE GENERIC ORDERS OF IDEAS. 

Ideas are numerous and diversified. They all possess 
several obvious and important properties in common with 
other classes of mental phenomena, and several others in 
common, only with other ideas. Some ideas are distinguish- 
ed from others by peculiar properties. They are all capable 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 69 

of being distinguished from each other as particular, and 
in some respects, peculiar objects of thought ; and of being 
distributed into different subordinate genera and species, 
according as they agree or differ in the possession of par- 
ticular properties. 

The generic orders of ideas are : 

1. Judgments ; 

2. Knowledge, or cognitions ; 

3. Conceptions ; 

4. Reminiscences. 
1. Judgments. 

All ideas which are inferred directly from previous men- 
tal exercises, whether sensations, ideas, emotions, affec- 
tions, desires, or acts of will, considered with relation to 
the grounds from which they are inferred, may be denom- 
inated judgments. This definition comprehends primary 
acts of consciousness, equally with those ideas which are 
uusally denominated judgments, both in the language of 
philosophers, and of mankind generally. Primary acts of 
consciousness do not differ essentially from ideas, which 
are generally denominated judgments. They are of the 
nature of inferences drawn from states of mind to which 
they relate as objects. Consciousness of sensations are 
inferences from sensations; consciousness of ideas, emo- 
tions, affections, desires, and acts of will, are inferences 
from the same. 

This is obviously true in respect to exercises of con- 
sciousness, in all cases which require deliberation, and in 
which our conclusions are formed gradually, and is equally 
so in all cases. 

Where particular acts of consciousness have been re- 
peated so often as to become familiar, and require no par- 
ticular attention in order to their exercise, and where the 
exercise of them is clearly seen to be natural and neces- 
sary in given circumstances, they cease to partake of the 
nature of judgments, and become cognitions, or parts of 
knowledge. Till that result is attained, they are simply 
judgments. 

Those ideas to which the title of judgments is usually 
applied, consist of inferences or deductions from sensa- 



70 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tions, ideas, and other conscious mental exercises. We 
experience certain sensations of pain, and infer or judge 
that we are the subjects of particular diseases, of which 
we know these pains to be symptomatic ; w r e see a distant 
object and judge it to be a man, animal, or other object ; 
we also form various judgments respecting the magnitudes, 
forms, positions, and distances of visible objects. We 
judge persons to be good or evil, wise or unwise, rich or 
poor, handsome or homely, friendly or unfriendly, worthy 
of confidence or of distrust, &c. 

2. Knowledge, or cognitions. 

The distinction between judgments and knowledge is 
common to all nations and all men. It enters into the 
structure of all languages, and is recognized by every class 
of writers, from poets and novelists, to historians, philoso- 
phers, and divines. 

The line of demarkation between these two classes of 
ideas, is no where distinctly drawn. It is difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to draw it with unerring precision, so as to in- 
clude all knowledge in one sphere, and all judgments in 
another. 

Many ideas have, from the earliest times, and among all 
nations, been distinguished from others, and called by titles 
equivalent to cognitions or knowledge ; and others have 
been separated, with equal unanimity, from the general 
mass, and called by titles equivalent to judgments ; while 
others still, have been distributed at different times, to each 
of these generic orders ; sometimes being considered as 
judgments and sometimes as cognitions. 

Some ideas are called by common consent, judgments ; 
others, cognitions; and others, either judgments or cogni- 
tions, according to the taste of the speaker or writer. Ideas 
are daily transferred from the class of judgments to that 
of cognitions, by means of which, the latter class is con- 
stantly recruited from the former. We are also constantly 
adding to our judgments, by new inferences and conclu- 
sions, and are, with equal constancy, transferring those 
judgments which we judge to be indubitably certain, from 
the order of judgments to that of cognitions or knowl- 
edge. 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 71 

Ideas, or classes of ideas, which on their first occurrence 
are denominated judgments, in distinction from cognitions, 
come, in many cases, afterwards, to be denominated cog- 
nitions, in distinction from judgments. 

Ideas which ultimately constitute parts of knowledge, 
on their first occurrence, belong to the sphere of judgments. 
We first form particular judgments, or judgments of a par- 
ticular class, then repeat them, or form others successively 
like them and resting on the same grounds, and form other 
judgments concerning them as resting on valid grounds, 
and capable of being protracted and repeated indefinitely, 
or else as in some degree doubtful. If we judge them to 
rest, on valid grounds, and to be capable of being protrac- 
ted and repeated indefinitely, we immediately consider 
them as cognitions, not as judgments merely. If we are 
in any degree uncertain whether they rest on valid grounds, 
or are capable of being protracted or repeated indefinitely, 
we retain them in the class of judgments, and consider 
them as'yet wanting the essential properties of cognitions. 

Judgments and cognitions denote ideas, considered with 
respect to certain other phenomena which are objects of 
consciousness, from which they are inferred, deduced, or 
concluded. We judge men to be innocent or guilty, good 
or evil, &c, on certain grounds. Our knowledge of their 
innocence or guilt, sustains a similar relation to grounds 
of inference with judgments of a similar character. Judg- 
ments on their first occurrence, depend on evidence. When 
they become cognitions, they continue to possess the same 
properties, in this respect, as before. Knowledge depends 
as much on evidence as judgments. These two classes 
of ideas may differ in the amount of evidence on which 
they rest; but agree in resting on evidence. Cognitions 
rest on all the evidence which supported them as judg- 
ments, together with some additional items of evidence 
subsequently added thereto. 

3. Conceptions. 

Ideas, considered absolutely without respect to the 
grounds from which they are inferred, or without respect 
to any necessary grounds of inference, are denominated 
conceptions. 



72 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

All our judgments and cognitions become conceptions, 
by our exercising them absolutely, without respect to the 
grounds on which they rest, or the evidence by which 
they are supported. 

We conceive of the objects of our knowledge and judg- 
ments, at the same time that we exercise ideas of judg- 
ment and knowledge respecting them. Conceptions are 
constantly occurring as accompaniments of judgments and 
cognitions. 

We know two objects to be equal or unequal, similar or 
dissimilar, and conceive of them as such. We know that 
a given object is a man, animal, bird, or mineral, and con- 
ceive of it as such. We judge that a man is wise or un- 
wise, innocent or guilty, well or sick, and conceive of him 
as such, &c. 

4. Reminiscences. 

Ideas which occur in consequence of their having oc- 
curred before, and which relate directly to sensations and 
other conscious exercises, that ceased previous toHheir oc- 
currence, are denominated reminiscences, or acts of mem- 
ory. Ideas of the pains and pleasures of our past lives 
are of this description ; also those of all the objects of 
past sensations and consciousness. 

Reminiscences relate to objects considered as objects of 
judgment and cognition, not as objects of conception mere- 
ly. They do not differ essentially from judgments and 
cognitions, except in relating to the conscious exercises 
from which they are derived, as past not present. 

The other classes of ideas relate to objects as present 
objects of sensation, or of other conscious exercises; re- 
miniscences relate to them as objects of sensations or other 
conscious exercises, which formerly existed and have 
ceased. 

Ideas of objects and events as they appeared to us on 
former occasions, are perpetually recurring, and accompa- 
nying our present judgments and cognitions. They form 
an important part of our intellectual furniture, serve as the 
basis of important judgments and cognitions, and are the 
direct exciting causes of various emotions, affections, de- 
sires, and acts of will. 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 73 

Reminiscences are not identical with judgments and cog- 
nitions ; but they serve as the basis of both. We judge 
and know, because we remember. For example : I know 
that I prosecuted certain studies and saw certain objects 
yesterday, because I remember having done so. 

All ideas are of one or other of the foregoing classes. 
Some are judgments, some cognitions, some conceptions, 
and some reminiscences. These different classes of ideas 
have several essential generic properties, as mental phe- 
nomena and as ideas in common. They also each have 
some peculiar properties, by which they are distinguished 
from ideas of other generic orders. Judgments are, in 
some respects, different from cognitions, conceptions, and 
reminiscences. Cognitions, and each of the other generic 
orders of ideas, are also different from each of the co-or- 
dinate genera of the same. 

Considered without respect to their generic character as 
judgments, cognitions, conceptions, and reminiscences, ideas 
may be distributed into the following different orders, ac- 
cording to the nature of their objects, each of which com- 
prehends both judgments, cognitions, conceptions, and re- 
miniscences. 

1. Ideas of mental phenomena; 

2. Ideas of the phenomena of matter ; 

3. Ideas of minds, or spiritual objects ; 

4. Ideas of material objects; 

5. Ideas of objects neither material nor spiritual ; but 
related in some way to such as are material, or spiritual, 
or both, and suggested by them. # 



SECTION III. 

PROPERTIES OF THE IDEAL FACULTY. 

The susceptibility of ideas is, like that of sensations, one 
of the generic faculties of the mind. It is common to 
men and animals ; and is the uniform accompaniment of 
capacities of sensation. The latter would be useless with- 

7 



74 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

out the former. Sensibility without ideality, would be 
exercised in vain ; and ideality without sensations to com- 
mence and facilitate its development, is, in this world, 
impossible. 

The faculty of exercising or experiencing ideas, differs 
from that of sensations ; 

1. In the quality of its phenomena ; 

2. In not depending on bodily organs. 

Sensations occur only by means of bodily organs, and 
can, in most cases, be traced distinctly to the organic 
impressions or conditions which produce them. This is 
not the case with ideas. They are not, in any instance, 
the effect of organic impressions and conditions, but of 
other mental phenomena, such as sensations, previous 
ideas, &c. A sensation may be exercised at the extremity 
of either of the fingers, or of all of them simultaneously, 
and lead to corresponding ideas. In this case, organic 
impressions or conditions are followed by -sensations, and 
the sensations by ideas. Things which act on the organs 
of sensation communicate with the mind, and make their 
impressions on it by means of those organs. They have 
no other means of doing it. Sensations, however, act upon 
the mind directly. No organ can intervene between a sen- 
sation and the mind which experiences it. Sensations are 
phenomena of the mind itself. They therefore produce 
their effects on it directly, without the intervention of 
bodily organs. 

The organs of sensation are so many points and chan- 
nels of communication* between mind and matter. The 
sphere of sensations is partly in the region of the mind 
and partly in that of material objects. The material cau- 
ses of sensations are certain conditions of material organs. 

Ideas of sensible objects are the immediate effects of 
sensations; and all other ideas attainable in this life, its 
remote effects, depending on sensation to such a degree, 
that without it, their attainment, according to the existing 
laws of our mental constitution, would be impossible. 

If sensations are denominated organic mental phenom- 
ena, ideas may, with equal propriety, be denominated un- 
organic ; since ideas do not depend on organic states of 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 75 

any kind as their immediate cause, and only remotely on 
those which are the immediate antecedents and causes of 
sensation. 

The doctrine of the immediate connection of ideas, with 
previous mental phenomena as their causes, to the exclu- 
sion of all organic conditions, derives additional support 
from the following considerations. 

1. It accords with the idea, that the mind sustains an 
equally intimate connection with every part of the nervous 
system. We have as decisive evidence of the agency of 
mind in the extremities of the nervous system, as we have 
in the center. If it does not communicate directly with 
the smallest filaments of the nerves, it may not with their 
larger trunks, and if it does not communicate with any 
nerve directly, out of the different lobes of the brain, it 
may not communicate with the brain itself, which is gen- 
erally considered the seat of the mind, merely because it 
is the center and basis of the nervous system, with which 
the mind communicates. The principal manifestations of 
the mind as connected with the body, are in sensations 
which occur by means of different organs, occupying dif- 
ferent positions, but generally exterior to the brain. We 
therefore infer that the mind is not contained within the 
brain, but is actually present in all parts of the body where 
sensations and other mental phenomena occur. But if 
this is true, the faculty of ideas cannot be organic, for 
there are no organs out of the brain, that can be supposed 
to perform that office. 

The hypothesis, that ideas occur by means of bodily 
organs, adapted to the purpose of producing them, is de- 
pendent on another previous hypothesis, that the mind is 
in direct communication only with the brain, and that it 
does not transcend the narrow limits of that organ. The 
first hypothesis is not only unproved, but is inconsistent 
with undoubted facts relating to the case; therefore, the 
second, and all the inferences depending on it, are un- 
proved. 

2. No organs in the brain or out of it, can possibly per- 
form the office assigned by theorists, to the supposed or- 
gans for the exercise of ideas. On the supposition that 



76 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas are exercised by means of corporeal organs, and in 
consequence of certain conditions of the same, it follows 
that every individual must have several organs for the pro- 
duction of ideas, each producing ideas of one generic class, 
and no others ; or else, that one, or at most, two organs of 
ideality, must sustain the whole of this immense respon- 
sibility, and serve as instrumental causes in the production 
of all possible ideas. There are evidently no organs for 
the production of ideas out of the brain. Whether the 
brain is supposed to contain a plurality of such organs, or 
to constitute one central organ of this description, is im- 
material to the purposes of the present argument. 

The brain, however, cannot serve as the organ of those 
ideas which originate in sensations, such as perceptions of 
sensible bodies, because it does not intervene between 
sensations and the mind. Sensations are affections of the 
mind, perfectly distinct from the organic conditions in 
which they originate. The mind, in consequence of these 
primary affections, forms ideas of the same, of sensible 
objects, and of itself, both as the subject of sensations and 
of ideas. 

The organic condition which produces sensations, may 
extend to the brain, and may result in other different con- 
ditions of the nerves of sensation and of the brain in which 
they originate. These ulterior conditions, both of the 
nerves of sensation and of the brain, may be conceived of 
as producing other phenomena of mind corresponding to 
sensations, but specifically different from those which re- 
sult from the previous organic conditions above referred to. 
Those phenomena, however they might differ from other 
classes of sensations, in quality and quantity, would still 
be of the same generic order. They would be effects re- 
sulting from previous organic conditions, and would, of 
course, correspond both in respect to intensity and quanti- 
ty, to the conditions which produced them, or which con- 
curred as necessary instrumental means of- their produc- 
tion. They would, therefore, constitute another generic 
order of sensations, and would be, as all possible orders of 
sensations are, essentially different from ideas. 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 77 

The hypothesis of the organic origin of ideas is still 
more inapplicable to ideas of other ideas, and of the mind 
itself as the subjective cause of sensations and ideas, than 
to perceptions. It requires us to believe that there is no 
direct connection between ideas of any kind ; that the 
idea of an idea is not the immediate effect and consequent 
of the former, but of an organic condition produced by the 
former, so that in consciousness the order of phenomena 
is the following ; 

1. The sensations, ideas, &c, which are objects of con- 
sciousness ; 

2. The organic conditions which they produce, so won- 
derfully diversified, as to correspond to the infinite varia- 
tions by which ideas are distinguished from each other ; 

3. The ideas of the previous ideas, corresponding to the 
organic impressions which produce them. 

In the case of ideas of our minds as the subjective cau- 
ses of sensations and ideas, the following phenomena oc- 
cur in addition to those above specified : 

4. Certain organic conditions produced by ideas of pre- 
vious ideas ; 

5. Ideas of our minds as subjective causes of sensations 
and ideas, corresponding to the organic conditions refer- 
red to under the former head. 

Such is the system of materialism, necessarily involved 
in the hypothesis of the organic production of ideas. It 
is seldom carried out to its legitimate results. as above 
stated. If it were, few of its present votaries would em- 
brace it, still less propagate its anti^philosophical^ anti- 
christian, and absurd dogmas. 

The doctrine of the organic" origin of ideas, is the basis 
of what, in its full development, is called the sensual 
school, or scheme of philosophy. Those who admit the 
principle, are bound in consistency to follow it to all the 
absurd and anti-christian results of sensualism. 

One of the most plausible objections to the doctrine of 
the unorganic origin of ideas, is that which is based on the 
fact of mental fatigue, or fatigue from the continued ex- 
ercise of the ideal faculties in comparing, judging, imag-. 

ining, &c. 

7* 



78 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY- 

Every one is conscious of fatigue from continued ex- 
ercises of this kind. That fatigue is a sensation, depend- 
ing on organic conditions like other sensations. It shows, 
therefore, that the exercise of the ideal faculties operates, 
in some way, on the bodily organs, in producing the organic 
changes on which these sensations depend. The phe- 
nomenon which it indicates, is simply an effect produced 
on the body, which terminates in the sensations of fatigue, 
and which is produced directly or indirectly by the previ- 
ous phenomenon of thinking, reasoning, imagining, &c. ; 
whether directly or indirectly, or in what mode of direct 
or indirect action, is entirely a matter of inference. In 
ordinary sensations, the body acts on the mind ; in fatigue 
from mental exercises, the mind acts on the body, and the 
state of body thus produced, acts on the mind like other 
organic conditions which produce sensations. 

Fatigue from the continued exercises of reason and 
imagination, does not prove that these mental processes 
are performed by means of bodily organs, and that we 
have organs of thought as we have of sight, hearing, and 
the other senses ; but only that the functions of judgment 
and imagination, &c, are so connected with those of animal 
and organic life, that the protracted exercise of the former, 
makes certain impressions on the organs of the latter; or, 
in other words, that the protracted exercises of imagination 
and reason, produce certain conditions of the organs of 
animal and organic life, which have the sensations of fa- 
tigue connected with them as their uniform effects. 

The faculty of sensation communicates with external 
objects, and requires bodily organization for this purpose. 
The ideal faculty communicates with that of sensation 
and other mental faculties, as functions of the same mind. 
Its sphere, therefore, is altogether in the mind ; and no 
bodily organization is necessary to be the channel of com- 
munication between one mental faculty and another. The 
phrenological doctrines of corporeal organs of ideality, are 
entirely gratuitous. If the mind is a spiritual substance, 
it can have no need of such organs. Sensations give it 
all the materials which it receives, or is capable of receiv- 



PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF IDEAS. 79 

ing from material objects. Its other exercises are purely 
spiritual. 

The body is necessary as an instrument of sensations. 
Those states of the body which disturb the exercise of the 
senses, and in which the unconscious operations of the 
mind on the body, in the various processes of life, are in- 
terrupted or deranged, are in some cases attended with a 
derangement of the ideal faculty, or with the entire sus- 
pension or loss of it ; proving that the exercises of the 
ideal faculty are conditional, and that they are not possible 
except in appropriate circumstances. 

Certain states of the body are immediately appropriate 
to the exercise of the senses, or the faculty of sensation, 
and remotely to that of the ideal faculty. When the ex- 
ercise of the senses is suspended, the ideal faculty slum- 
bers with it, as in sleep, faintness, &c. 

The ultimate fact is, that the ideal and sensative systems 
are intimately connected with each other, so that a disorder- 
ed condition of the latter is accompanied with a similar state 
of the former. This does not prove that the ideal system 
is corporeal, but is fully accounted for by the assumption, 
that it is placed by God, during the present life, in constant 
fellowship with the subordinate systems of sensation and 
vital action, so as to be affected sympathetically by their 
condition. 

The exercise of the ideal faculty is chiefly voluntary. 
The processes of judgment, imagination, and memory, 
are, in many cases, laborious, but become easy by exercise. 

Ideas are, like sensations, phenomena of the mind- The 
susceptibility of ideas is like that of sensations, one of the 
common endowments of men and animals; but is given 
to man in a much higher degree than to animals. Mind 
may exist without exhibiting or exercising ideas, as well 
as without exhibiting or exercising sensations. But it 
is one of the prerogatives of human and animal minds, 
both to exercise sensations and ideas, and to fill up a large 
part of this life with the exercise of them. 

The ideal faculty bears the same relation to ideas which 
the sensative faculty does to sensations. We conceive of 
the faculty of experiencing sensations as a single faculty 



80 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

or susceptibility, by the exercise of which we obtain sen- 
sations of all the different orders ; and we may, with equal 
propriety, conceive of the faculty of exercising or attain- 
ing ideas as possessing a similar unity. We have one 
generic faculty of experiencing sensations of different or- 
ders, and by means of different organs ; and one generic 
faculty of exercising every possible variety of ideas, with- 
out the intervention of any organs, and by processes purely 
mental. 

Judging, knowing, conceiving, and remembering, are 
exercises of the faculty of attaining ideas, as touch, taste, 
and smell, are of the faculty of experiencing sensations. 
They are exercises, however, of different orders, and im- 
ply the existence of different susceptibilities, or suscepti- 
bilities of different exercises. 

These different susceptibilities are often referred to as 
different specific capacities, belonging to the generic order 
of faculties of ideas ; just as we conceive and speak of 
different specific capacities of sensation, as belonging to 
the generic order of the capacities of sensations. 

Thus the capacity of judging, we call the faculty of 
judgments ; that of knowing, the faculty of knowledge ; 
that of conceiving and imagining, the faculty of concep- 
tion and imagination ; and that of remembering, the faculty 
of memory. 

The ideal faculty comprehends all the others, and is the 
genus of which they are the species. All are faculties of 
cine mind, 



CHAPTER II. 

THE PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF JUDGMENTS AND 
COGNITIONS. 

SECTION I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES OF JUDGMENTS. 

Judgments are a numerous and diversified class of ideas. 
The act by which we attain them is denominated judging. 
Judging and judgments are terms relating to the same phe- 
nomena, considered in different points of view. Thus, we 
feel, see, hear, taste, smell, and judge concerning these 
sensations and their objects. We observe our judgments 
and other conscious exercises, and judge concerning them. 
We attend to evidences of various kinds, and derived from 
various sources, and infer from them various judgments re- 
specting ulterior facts which they establish or reveal. 

We judge objects to exist or not to exist, and to possess 
certain properties or not to possess them. Whatever ideas 
we form of them as existing or not existing, and possess- 
ing certain properties or not possessing them, previous to 
our having attained a knowledge of the same, are judg- 
ments. All knowledge, therefore, originates in judgments. 
We must first have judged, in order to know. But all 
judgments do not terminate in knowledge. We often 
judge respecting objects and their properties, which we 
are never able fully to know. 

Judgments, like sensations, depend on certain conditions. 
The conditions of sensations are appropriate organic im- 
pressions ; those of judgments are appropriate previous 
mental exercises, which are objects of consciousness ; such 
as sensations, ideas, &c. Without some previous mental 
exercise, which is an object of consciousness, we can form 
no judgment. Our first ideas relate to objects of con- 
sciousness, and are generally denominated ideas of con- 



82 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sciousness. From these, all our judgments, properly so 
called, are derived. 

We are not capable of forming any judgment which is 
not directly or indirectly dependent on our ideas of con- 
sciousness, any more than we are capable of attaining 
sensations independent of organic impressions. 

Ideas of consciousness, therefore, are the basis of judg- 
ments and of all those cognitions in which judgments ter- 
minate. 

All judgments maybe resolved into two elements, which 
are intimately connected, either of which does not consti- 
tute a judgment without the other ; 

1. The matter of judgments; 

2. The grounds or reasons of them. 
1. The matter of judgments. 

The matter of judgments consists of conceptions. Thus, 
the ideas or conceptions that a given visible object is an 
animal or man ; that the soul is not material and not mor- 
tal ; that the sun will rise to-morrow and in future years ; 
that particular men are innocent or guilty, wise or unwise, 
rich or poor, friendly or unfriendly, &c, exist in judgments, 
and are what we judge concerning certain objects. We 
judge a visible object to be a man or animal ; we judge the 
soul to be not material, and not liable to absolute destruc- 
tion ; we judge that the sun will rise to-morrow, and in 
future years, &c. 

Every variety of conceptions may serve as the matter 
of judgments. We conceive of certain objects as material, 
and judge them to be so, or not to be so ; we conceive of 
them as real or fictitious, and judge them to be of either 
description ; we conceive of them as possessing certain 
properties and relations, and judge respecting their pos- 
session of them, either affirmatively or negatively. 

The sphere of judgment, therefore, is co-extensive with 
that of conception. All possible conceptions may serve 
as the matter of affirmative or negative judgments. 

Conceptions often occur as inferences from other con- 
scious exercises, having respect to objects considered as 
possible, desirable, or agreeable to some rule which holds 
in other cases, before they become judgments concerning 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS.. __ 83 

them, as real or unreal. These primary inferences are of 
the same nature as the ultimate judgments to which they 
lead, considered in relation to their matter. They consist 
of conceptions of the same objects, or in other words, of 
the same or similar conceptions. 

Thus, I see a distant object and infer that it may be a 
man or animal, before I infer that it is actually such. I 
infer that particular men may be innocent or guilty, rich or 
poor, wise or unwise, before I infer or judge that they re- 
ally are so. 

Besides, we often judge certain objects of conception 
to be desirable, undesirable, or possible, considered with 
respect to certain objects of judgment or knowledge, at 
the same time that we consider them as having no subjec- 
tive reality ; or without considering or judging whether 
they are real or unreal. 

2. The grounds or reasons of judgments. 

It is characteristic of the conceptions which enter into 
judgments, and constitute the matter of them to be infer- 
red from certain premises, and to be adopted or concluded 
on the ground of certain arguments or reasons. 

An inference must have some antecedent from which it 
is inferred, and a conclusion some arguments or reasons 
on which it rests. 

Thus, I judge a particular distant object to be a man or 
animal, on account of some resemblance which it bears to 
the same, as an object of sight. I judge a man to be in- 
nocent or guilty, rich or poor, wise or unwise, on account 
of some indications of innocence or guilt, wealth or pov- 
erty, wisdom or folly. 

So I judge that a particular distant object of sight, may 
be a man or animal, on account of some things in its ap- 
pearance favorable to such a conclusion, unaccompanied 
with equal evidence to the contrary. On similar grounds, 
I judge that men may, in particular cases, be innocent or 
guilty, rich or poor, wise or unwise, &c. 

The immediate grounds or reasons of judgments are 
previous exercises, which are objects of consciousness, 
such as sensations, ideas, emotions, &c. ; their remote 
grounds, the objects of ideas. The former are subjective 



84 m MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and the latter objective. Objective grounds of judgment 
become effective, only by means of the subjective ones 
which they are capable of producing. 

The objective grounds of judgments are frequent mat- 
ters of consideration and discussion, under the title of ev- 
idence. 

Evidence is a relative term, and denotes objects and 
events, considered simply as the objective grounds of judg- 
ments. It is the objective rule of judgments, or the ob- 
jective means by which judgments are produced, just as 
material objects are objective causes of sensations. 

The capacity of appreciating evidence, is simply the 
capacity of judging. An incapacity to appreciate evidence 
in any case, is an incapacity to judge in that case. 

As far as we have decisive evidence, and are capable of 
appreciating it, we can pursue our judgments and extend 
the field of our knowledge ; no farther. Where evidence 
fails entirely, or is, in any degree, indecisive, judgment is 
limited in an equal degree. When we push our conclu- 
sions beyond what is required by evidence, they cease to 
be valid, and become conjectures, hypotheses, and errors. 

Evidence is either direct or indirect. 

Direct evidence tends directly to produce the judgment 
to which it sustains this relation, without any intervening 
judgments. 

Indirect evidence tends to produce the judgments to 
which it sustains this relation, by means of other inter- 
mediate judgments. In every chain of consecutive rea- 
soning, the premises and conclusions which are in imme- 
diate proximity, are connected in the relations of direct 
evidence and truths evidenced; whereas, remote premises 
are indirect evidences of remote conclusions, deduced 
from them by means of intermediate direct ones. 

The same objects may serve as single and associated 
direct evidences of various judgments, which are more, or 
less obvious, and as single and associated indirect eviden- 
ces of various others, depending remotely on the same. 

Single evidences may serve as the basis of a certain 
number of judgments, depending immediately on each of 
them alone. Considered together, different evidences give 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 85 

rise to several additional direct judgments, which could not 
be deduced from either of them considered separately, and 
in this way become associated evidences of truth, which 
they do not reveal separately or unassociated. 

That which does not serve as the basis of any judg- 
ment, is not of the character of evidence. It is as neces- 
sary to evidence to produce judgments in appropriate 
circumstances, as it is to sensible objects to produce sen- 
sations, or to exhibit sensation-producing phenomena. That 
which is incapable of being, in any way, an object and 
producing cause of sensations, is not a sensible object. 
So, also, that which is incapable of producing judgments 
is not an evidence. 

Particular objects are evidences considered with respect 
to the judgments which they are capable of producing, and 
with respect to no others. 

Some of the inferences to be deduced frorn evidence are 
obvious, and occur immediately to all. Persons have but 
to understand the objects and events which constitute the 
evidence, in order to draw the inferences, and can hardly 
avoid drawing them, and drawing them correctly. 

Other inferences, which are equally legitimate, are not 
equally obvious, but require more protracted and vigorous 
attention, in order to their being drawn. Such escape the 
notice of superficial inquirers, and are often keenly dispu- 
ted by them. They still, however, depend on evidence, 
and are capable of being proved to the satisfaction of the 
human mind, and of becoming objects of as much cer- 
tainty as more obvious judgments. Least obvious judg- 
ments may be as certain as those which are most obvious 
but aje less general. They are attained slowly and with 
labor, and only by the few ; whereas, the most obvious 
judgments which arise from the consideration of evidence, 
are the property of the many. 

There is a wonderful uniformity in the judgments of 
different persons, and of the same persons at different 
times, corresponding to the uniform nature of the human 
mind, and of the evidences by which human judgments 
are determined. There is also a manifest disconformity 
in the judgments of different persons, and in those of 

8 



86 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the same persons at different times, corresponding to 
the more or less improved state, and the more or less pro- 
tracted and vigorous exercise of their minds, and to the 
smaller or greater number of evidences made use of. 

To neglect the consideration of evidence, is to neglect 
the essential conditions of judgment, to which that evi- 
dence is subservient. To consider evidence duly, is to 
lay ourselves under a necessity of judging according to 
the same. 

Considered with relation to particular judgments, objec- 
tive evidence may be distinguished as real or supposed, 
complete or incomplete. 

(1.) Real evidence is that which sustains the judgments 
supposed to be deducible from it ; and from which those 
judgments are capable of being legitimately, uniformly, 
and universally inferred. 

(2.) Supposed evidence is that which is supposed to be 
a legitimate basis, from which to draw certain inferences 
when it is not. Many of the facts attested in courts of 
justice, and many of the arguments adduced by contro- 
versialists, are of this description. 

(3.) Evidence is complete when it establishes the judg- 
ment based upon it as an absolute truth ; or when it estab- 
lishes all the parts of the judgment, and establishes them as 
absolute truths, in regard to which we cannot be mistaken. 

(4.) Evidence is incomplete when it does not establish 
the judgments based on it, as absolute truths, but only as 
relative, or in other words, as more or less probable. 

It may be incomplete, in some one article, in several 
articles, or in all. 

For example : the evidence that a particular event will 
occur to-morrow, or at any other particular time, may be 
incomplete, in not showing that the event will occur at the 
time specified; or in not showing this conclusively; or it 
may be incomplete in not showing that the event referred 
to will occur at all ; or that any event will occur. 

So evidence that a particular evenl did occur at a par- 
ticular time, may be incomplete, in not showing that the 
event occurred at the time specified ; or in not showing this 
conclusively ; or in not showing that the event in question 
ever occurred. 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 87 

SECTION II. 

THE GENERIC ORDERS OF JUDGMENTS. 

Considered with relation to evidence, judgments are of 
two orders : 

1. Correct; 

2. Erroneous. 

1. Correct judgments. 

Those judgments which are conformable to evidence, are 
correct. The conformity of judgments to evidence, is it- 
self an object of judgment. We judge our judgments to 
be conformable to evidence or otherwise. Judgments are 
conformable to evidence, when they are what that evidence 
is adapted to make them, and neither more nor less. We 
know that they are of this character, when the evidence 
in question produces them uniformly in all circumstances, 
and when it does this in conformity with our modes of 
judging in analogous cases. We are still farther confirmed 
in this, when we discover our own judgments to bear the 
same relations to given evidences which the judgments of 
others do. 

2. Erroneous judgments. 

Those judgments which are not conformable to evidence, 
are erroneous. Judgments are not conformable to evi- 
dence, when they are not what evidence is adapted to 
make them. We know that they are not of this char- 
acter, when the evidence in question does not produce 
them uniformly in all circumstances, and when it does not 
produce them in conformity with our established modes of 
judgment in analogous cases. 

We are still farther confirmed in this, when we discover 
our own occasional judgments in question, not to bear the 
same relations to given evidences which the judgments of 
others generally do, who are equally well informed with 
ourselves. 

Correct judgments are confirmed by their agreement 
with previous and later judgments, depending on similar 
grounds ; and incorrect judgments invalidated by their 
corresponding disagreements. 



88 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Our voluntary control over our judgments is similar to 
that which we exercise over our sensations, and is subject 
to similar restrictions. Both faculties are liable to abuse 
and perversion, but neither of them admits of being per- 
verted only to a limited extent. There are sensations 
which we cannot but feel in circumstances appropriate to 
the experience of them, and judgments which we cannot 
but form. 

In popular and judicial language, evidence is considered 
as capable of being measured by degrees, and persuasion, 
or belief which is founded on it, is considered as admitting 
of a corresponding measurement. 

One, or a few degrees of evidence, are considered as 
not furnishing adequate grounds of inference, when several 
degrees would be sufficient for this purpose/ Degrees, 
however, are not strictly predicable either of evidence or 
belief. 

Evidence does not properly admit of being measured or 
estimated by degrees. It either establishes certain con- 
clusions or it does not establish them. Those conclusions 
which it establishes, it perfectly establishes. Those which 
it does not establish, it does not establish ; and they ought 
not, on such grounds, to be received as true, or to be 
adopted as judgments. 

To infer from given evidence, judgments which they do 
not require and establish, is to judge incorrectly ; or to 
form judgments which are not conformable to evidence. 

Those supposed degrees of evidence in favor of par- 
ticular judgments, which do not fully authorize and require 
the same, are falsely called evidence. They approximate 
towards the nature of evidence, in the same degrees in 
w r hich they are supposed to be of the nature of it. When 
they become legitimate grounds of judgment, they become 
of the nature of evidence in respect to the judgments le- 
gitimately deduced from them, and not till then. All those 
judgments deduced from them which are not legitimate, 
are erroneous ; that is, not according to evidence. 

Evidence may be more or less obvious in respect to the 
judgments which may be legitimately deduced from it; 
but its relations to those judgments is, in all cases, the 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 89 

same, and does not admit of being compared in respect to 
degrees. Perfect conviction does not vary in degree ; and 
imperfect conviction is not conviction of any degree. 

To be persuaded in any degree less than perfectly, is 
really to be not persuaded at all; and to believe in any 
degree less than confidently, is really not to believe at all. 

Persons never speak of degrees of evidence or of per- 
suasion, when they have certain convictions. Ideas which 
do not rest on satisfactory and decisive evidence, are the 
only class of judgments which we consider as capable of 
being measured by degrees. 

We have ideas that certain events will take place to- 
morrow. Whether they will really take place or not, w T e 
have no means of determining with certainty. We judge 
that they are possible, perhaps probable, or more likely, so 
far as we have the means of judging, to occur than not to 
occur. Perhaps there is a strong probability, so far as our 
knowledge extends, that they will occur. We may see 
strong reasons to believe they will occur, and none to be- 
lieve that they will not occur. 

At the same time, we may know perfectly that our 
knowledge does not extend to all the causes, by the opera- 
tion of which the occurrence of these events is to be de- 
termined. We, therefore, cannot, judge that they will oc- 
cur, or not. We can only judge that their occurrence is 
probable, so far as certain causes tending to produce them, 
and tending to prevent their production are concerned; no 
farther. 

When we have no means of determining whether events 
will really occur or not, from an incapacity of investigating 
all the causes that operate in producing them, or promoting 
their production, we may still investigate the causes with- 
in the sphere of our knowledge, and ascertain whether, so 
far as these are concerned, the occurrence or non-occur- 
rence of the events in question is probable. 

In cases of this kind, we form certain judgments on the 
basis of certain evidences. Our inferences are such as 
the evidences are supposed to require and authorize ; no 
more and no less. The evidences do not reveal the oc- 
currence or non-occurrence of the event to which they 

8* 



90 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

relate, considered absolutely, but its occurrence or non- 
occurrence, so far as particular causes are concerned, 
which come within the sphere of our knowledge, to the 
exclusion of others. What the evidence proves, it proves 
conclusively. What it leaves unproved, we are incapable 
of concluding with certainty, or making an object of legit- 
imate judgments. 

We have numerous ideas respecting objects and events, 
which are not legitimate judgments. Many of these are 
described as acts of persuasion and belief, when, if strictly 
examined, they will be found not to be conformable to 
evidence, and to be capable of being clearly distinguished 
from those ideas which have substantial grounds of infer- 
ence. 

We distinguish this class of ideas from others, as less 
certain, or in some degree uncertain ; and consider them 
as more or less certain or uncertain, according as the ideas 
from which they are deduced, approximate more or less to 
the character of complete evidence. 

In all cases in which the evidence of particular facts is 
in any degree incomplete, we are incapable of forming le- 
gitimate judgments that they have occurred. They may 
have occurred, but their occurrence, in these cases, can- 
not be objects of legitimate judgments. 

We may judge that events have occurred without com- 
plete evidence of the facts ; and these judgments may 
agree with the facts, but do not agree with the evidence, 
which by the supposition is not complete, and are, there- 
fore, not legitimate. 

When the evidence of facts is incomplete, we cannot 
form legitimate judgments respecting them. We may 
believe or not believe them, but have no proper and ade- 
quate warrant for belief or unbelief. We ought to judge 
them to be true, only as far as we have evidence in their 
favor, and to be more or less doubtful as far as any items 
are wanting to render the mass of evidence complete, 

A legitimate judgment, that any truth is probable, of 
which we have no certain evidence, implies the following 
conditions : 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 91 

1 . A knowledge of an imperfect mass of evidence re- 
lating to the same, which is, on the whole, favorable to 
the supposition in question. 

2. A knowledge of the fact, that the evidence in ques- 
tion is imperfect, and that some other items must be added 
to it, to make it decisive of the fact which it is considered 
as rendering probable. 

3. An impartial estimate of the evidence possessed, and 
an inference respecting the fact in question from this evi- 
dence, considered without respect to the supplement want- 
ing to render it complete. 

All judgments of this kind are liable to be erroneous in 
cases where they are perfectly legitimate. A given mass 
of imperfect evidence may be in favor of one conclusion, 
when the same evidence, considered in connection with 
the other parts necessary to render it complete, would re- 
quire an opposite one. 

Legitimate judgments, founded on incomplete evidence, 
are often reversed by later judgments, deduced from the 
same evidences considered in connection with others when 
rendered complete. 

Where the evidence which sustains our judgments, is 
in any degree incomplete, we cannot form legitimate ab- 
solute judgments. We may form absolute judgments on 
the ground of incomplete evidence, and they may happen 
to be in accordance with facts, and may be confirmed and 
rendered legitimate and certain, whenever the evidence on 
which they rest is completed. But as long as the evidence 
on which they rest is incomplete, they are not legitimate 
judgments. 

Incomplete evidence cannot establish the conclusions 
to which it sustains this relation as absolute truths. 

The same evidence that is incomplete, considered in re- 
spect to one conclusion, may be complete considered with 
respect to others. 

Thus a particular mass of evidence may be incomplete, 
considered with respect to the conclusion, that a particular 
man is guilty of any particular crime ; and yet may be com- 
plete, considered with respect to the conclusion, that some 
man committed the crime in question ; or that the panic- 



92 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ular man in question did something, or exercised some 
agency in the case. 

Complete evidence may be redundant. So may partic- 
ular parts of that which is incomplete. Redundant evi- 
dence, however, adds nothing to the legitimacy of our 
judgments or conclusions. 

Truths in geometry are no more certain, on account of 
their being demonstrated by evidence derived from differ- 
ent sources, than as if they were capable of single de- 
monstrations. 

The same is true respecting all judgments of what is, 
what has been, and what is to be. A past or future event, 
which is indicated by a single mass of complete evidence, 
is as certain as one which is indicated with equal clearness, 
by two, five, or ten such masses of evidence. There is 
no difference between necessary and contingent truths in 
this respect. Complete evidence of contingent truths, is 
as decisive and satisfactory in regard to them, as complete 
evidence of necessary truths is in regard to them. 

Belief and faith are appropriate titles of legitimate 
and valid judgments ; and believing is synonomous with 
judging. 

We believe on the ground of evidence, and our faith or 
belief is legitimate or illegitimate, according as it is con- 
formable to the evidence on which it rests, or not. All 
that has been said of judgments may be transferred to 
faith, which is but another name, applied to denote the 
same phenomena. 



SECTION III. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 

Knowledge comprehends a large and important class of 
ideas, which, considered individually, may be denominated 
cognitions. All knowledge may be resolved into single 
cognitions. Cognitions cannot be resolved into simpler 
elements, without losing their generic properties as a dis- 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 93 

tinct class of ideas. They are analagous to judgments in 
which they originate, and may be considered like them, as 
consisting of two essential elements : 

1. The matter of cognitions; 

2. The grounds or reasons of them. 

1. The matter of cognitions. 

The matter of cognitions, like that of judgments, con- 
sists of conceptions. Considered with respect to this 
element, cognitions do not differ at all from simple con- 
ceptions relating to the same objects ; or from judgments 
into which those conceptions enter. 

The conceptions which constitute the matter of cogni- 
tions, are the same as those which exist independently as 
conceptions simply, and which constitute the matter of 
judgments. 

2. The grounds or conditions of knowledge. 

The peculiar characteristic of cognitions, is to be found 
in the relations of the conceptions which compose them, 
to other elements from which they are deduced. 

The subjective grounds or conditions of cognitions are 
similar to those of judgments, and like them, consist of 
previous mental exercises, which are objects of conscious- 
ness. We can have no knowledge which does not depend 
on grounds of this description. Consciousness is the im- 
mediate and essential condition of all knowledge, as it is 
of all judgments. 

The same conscious exercises which serve as the con- 
ditions of successive judgments, or as the grounds of in- 
ference from which successive judgments are deduced, 
serve also as the conditions and grounds of knowledge. 

The objective grounds or conditions of knowledge, bear 
the same relation to those of judgment, which subjective 
ones do. As all the objective grounds of judgment may 
be comprehended under the title of evidence, the same is 
true of the objective grounds of knowledge. Knowledge 
depends on evidence, equally with judgments ; and it de- 
pends on nothing else. 

The relation of evidence to the knowledge of which it 
is an essential condition, and which depends upon it, is 
more or less remote, having those conscious exercises 



94 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which are the subjective grounds of knowledge, as a bond 
of union between them. Objective grounds of knowledge 
produce those conscious exercises, which are the subjec- 
tive grounds of it, and these produce knowledge. Knowl- 
edge depends immediately on certain exercises, which 
are objects of consciousness, and these exercises on evi- 
dence. 

The specific difference between legitimate judgments 
and cognitions, is not very obvious or very great. Con- 
sidered with relation to their objects, there is no difference. 
Legitimate judgments bear the same relation to thfeir ob- 
jects which cognitions do. To judge a guilty man to be 
guilty, and to know him to be guilty, considered with re- 
lation to the objects of this judgment and knowledge, are 
the same thing. 

To judge two objects to be equal or unequal, similar or 
dissimilar, &c, and to know them to be so, is to judge in 
one case precisely the same thing that we know in another. 
So of all legitimate judgments and corresponding cogni- 
tions. 

The same is true of all judgments which are not le- 
gitimate, from depending on defective evidence, but 
which are capable of being made legitimate. We often 
infer the existence of objects and their properties, from 
insufficient grounds. Sometimes these inferences prove 
correct, and sometimes incorrect. 

Illegitimate judgments, the evidence of which is capable 
of being rendered complete, sustain the same relations to 
their objects which legitimate ones and cognitions do. 

In such cases, we judge the same things or form the 
same conclusions, that we should form, if the defective ev- 
idence, from which illegitimate conclusions are drawn, was 
completed. Such judgments, however, are widely differ- 
ent from cognitions. We cannot, with propriety, be con- 
sidered as knowing things which are only the objects of 
illegitimate judgments. 

The difference between legitimate judgments and cor- 
responding cognitions, is less obvious than that between 
illegitimate ones, the evidence of which is capable of be- 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 95 

ing completed, and cognitions corresponding to them ; still 
there is some perceptible diversity even here. 

The distinction which has been made in all ages, and 
by all nations, between these two orders of ideas, is not 
without a cause in the properties of the ideas thus dis- 
tinguished. 

We first judge, then repeat our judgments on the same 
grounds, and in many cases, on different and additional 
grounds, associating with them, on subsequent occasions, 
ideas of their having been previously exercised ; and final- 
ly, in consequence of their repeated exercise, and of the 
increased facility with which we attain them, distinguish 
the ideas thus attained from simple judgments, by the title 
of knowledge or cognitions. 

If I could have the idea of my existence, without per- 
ceiving its relation to evidence, it would not be either a 
judgment or cognition. If I merely inferred it from evi- 
dence, without any power of forming accompanying judg- 
ments on the validity of that evidence, and without power 
to repeat and protract it indefinitely with increased facility, 
it would still be only a judgment. But when I have in- 
ferred it from evidence, and am able to repeat the inference 
at pleasure,' and find it always consistent with itself, and 
with other "acts of which I am conscious, I naturally re- 
gard the idea thus obtained, as of the peculiar character 
which I have found it to possess, and distinguish it from 
others which do not possess this character, by the title of 
knowledge. 

The peculiar properties of cognitions, therefore, are, 
that they originate in legitimate judgments, and consist of 
such judgments made easy by repetition. We form legit- 
imate judgments and convert them into cognitions, simply 
by repetition and accompanying judgments respecting 
them. 

All legitimate judgments, that we have formed in one or 
more instances, and are able to repeat indefinitely, either 
on the original grounds or others, may be referred to the 
order of cognitions. No others are of this class. 

Knowledge may be considered as possessing quality and 
quantity. 



96 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

1. The quality of knowledge. 

Knowledge is of a superior or inferior quality; (1.) as 
it is adapted to be more or less useful ; (2.) as it is capa- 
ble of being more or less easily acquired; (3.) as it is 
capable of being excited with greater or less facility. 

(1.) Cognitions are more or less useful. 

All cognitions are capable of subserving, in different 
ways, the happiness and usefulness of the persons who 
exercise them. All, however, are not equally useful ; far 
from it. Some afford more happiness, and are of more 
service to the subjects of them, than others ; and some 
contribute more than others, to render the subjects of them 
useful, in particular instances, and to particular individuals, 
or generally, and to society at large. 

It is sometimes convenient to compare different branch- 
es and items of knowledge, in respect to their general or 
occasional utility, and to estimate them as superior or in- 
ferior, either absolutely and universally, or relatively and 
in particular cases, according as they are of greater or less 
necessity and utility. 

(2.) Cognitions are acquired with more or less facility. 

Cognitions differ widely from each other, in respect to 
the facility or difficulty of their acquisition. Some are 
capable of being attained with perfect ease. We cannot 
avoid attaining them. The acquisition of others is in 
some degree difficult, and cannot be made without pro- 
portionable effort, directed to that end. That of others is 
still more difficult, requiring proportionably greater effort 
in their pursuit ; and so on till we arrive at those, the ac- 
quisition of which requires faculties of the highest order, 
exerted with their utmost vigor, during the longest periods. 

Considered with respect to the facility or difficulty of 
their acquisition, cognitions are of inferior or superior or- 
ders, those which are acquired with the greatest difficulty, 
being of the highest; those which are acquired with the 
greatest ease, the lowest ; and those which occupy interme- 
diate positions between these two extremes, being of inter- 
mediate orders. Our primary cognitions, having relation 
to matter and mind, space and time, number and quantity, 
morality and religion, &c, and others which are attained 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 97 

with little or no effort, belong to that portion of human 
knowledge which is of the lower orders. Cognitions hav- 
ing relation to these and other objects, which cannot be 
attained without intense and long continued effort, belong 
to^that portion of knowledge which is of the higher orders. 

(3.) Cognitions are excited with more or less facility. 

Cognitions are subject to remissions, similar to those 
which take place in respect to sensations. I know that I 
exist. But this idea presently ceases, and gives place to 
others. I know that two and two equal four. That idea 
is also transient. But in both these cases, and in all other 
cases of knowledge, the ideas which constitute actual 
knowledge, are capable. of being excited in circumstances 
in which, but for our having attained the knowledge in 
question, they would not occur. 

Actual cognitions having once occurred, their recurrence 
is easily effected ever after, as long as they continue to 
retain the character of cognitions. 

The amount of human knowledge possessed at any one 
time, is far greater than the amount of ideas then existing 
or in exercise. It embraces the cognitions then in exercise, 
added to those which we have formerly had, and are able 
to excite again with more or less facility. 

We may have had knowledge that we have lost. Much 
that we knew in former years, we have no knowledge of 
in later years; and much that we know now, we shall in- 
evitably cease to know in years to come. Cognitions con- 
tinue to constitute parts of our knowledge only while we 
are able to excite them with more or less facility. 

Thus we continue to understand different arts, as long 
as we are capable of performing, with facility, the process- 
es which they involve ; we continue to understand different 
sciences as long as we are able readily to demonstrate 
their principles and rules, and to apply the same to their 
appropriate purposes. 

When we have lost our ability to demonstrate readily 
the principles and rules of any science, which we formerly 
understood, we have so far lost the knowledge of it. 

When we can readily demonstrate and apply the obvious 
principles and rules of any science, but not those which 

9 



98 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are in some degree difficult, our knowledge of that science 
is imperfect and superficial. 

Knowledge is perfect or imperfect. 

Perfect knowledge denotes an acquired capacity readily 
to attain cognitions relating to all the parts of the object or 
science known. 

Imperfect knowledge denotes an acquired capacity readily 
to attain cognitions relating only to some of the parts of the 
objects and sciences concerned. A person who has stu- 
died all the rules and problems of arithmetic, and who can 
readily demonstrate the correctness of those rules, and 
apply them to the solution of problems, /understands 
arithmetic perfectly. One who cannot readily demonstrate 
the correctness of all the rules of arithmetic, or apply 
them to the solution of all the problems to which they are 
applicable, understands arithmetic imperfectly, or has an 
imperfect knowledge of it. So of other sciences. 

The perfection of knowledge embraces two elements. 

(I.) An acquired capacity of attaining certain cogni- 
tions, in certain circumstances. 

(2.) A capacity of attaining them more or less readily. 

Knowledge is more or less perfect, according to the 
number of cognitions which it embraces, and the degree 
of readiness and facilty with which we can attain them. 

The degree of facility and readiness with which cog- 
nitions are attained being the same, persons have more or 
less perfect knowledge of objects, according to the number 
and quality of the cognitions they are capable of attaining, 
respecting them. 

The number and quality of cognitions being the same, 
knowledge is more or less perfect, according to the facility 
or readiness with which those cognitions are capable of 
being excited. 

Human knowledge is never absolutely perfect, consid- 
ered either with respect to the number of cognitions which 
are possible, or in respect to the degrees of facility and 
readiness with which they are capable of being attained. 
Perfect knowledge is peculiar to God. 

We are not capable of attaining all possible cognitions 
respecting any object of knowledge, however diminutive or 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 99 

simple ; still less respecting any considerable number 
of such objects. Neither are we capable of acquiring 
such facility in the acquisition of cognitions which have 
become elements of our knowledge, but that greater is 
possible. 

The most perfect knowledge attainable in this world, is 
only a slight approximation towards that which is abso- 
lutely perfect, and which belongs to the infinite mind of 
Jehovah. 

2. The quantity of knowledge. 

The quantity of knowledge is its relation to any given 
standard as more or less. A man has more knowledge 
than a child ; a learned man more than an unlearned one ; 
and a wise man more than one who is not wise. Men 
differ in respect to the amount of their knowledge, some 
having more and others less ; some more of one quality, 
and others more of different qualities; and all having more 
or less of several qualities at different periods of life. 

Some have a large amount of knowledge of the lower 
orders in respect to quality, and little or none of the higher ; 
others have more of the higher orders and less of the low- 
er; and others still have large amounts of knowledge, both 
of the higher and lower orders. 

In the lowest state of mental improvement, persons have 
but little knowledge of any kind, and that chiefly, if not 
entirely, of the lowest orders. This is the state of infants 
and savages. They know but little, and that little is of 
the most obvious nature. 

The differences between different persons and classes 
of persons, considered in respect to the amount and quality 
of their knowledge, are objects of general notoriety and 
attention. We can hardly avoid comparing different per- 
sons, both of our general and particular acquaintance, in 
these respects, and of forming corresponding judgments 
and opinions concerning them. 

No considerable number of judgments, and no con- 
siderable amount of knowledge or number of cognitions 
are ever in actual exercise at any one time by human 
minds, 



100 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Ideas of all classes are transient and successive. The 
occurrence and continuance of some, is incompatible with 
the simultaneous occurrence and continuance of others. 
While we are occupied with one or several ideas, others 
do not occur ; and when others, in any considerable num- 
bers or with any considerable distinctness occur, those pre- 
viously in exercise cease. This is equally the case with 
cognitions and with mental phenomena, which are objects 
of consciousness of other generic orders. Sensations, 
emotions, &c, may be to some extent simultaneous ; but 
they can be so only to a very limited extent. There can- 
not be an indefinite accumulation of simultaneous mental 
phenomena- A few may co-exist, as sensations of dif- 
ferent orders, or sensations and ideas of sensible objects, 
ideas and emotions, &c, and different ideas. 

The doctrine that the mind is susceptible only of a single 
phenomenon at a time s and that no two mental phenomena 
are strictly cotemporaneous, contradicts the clearest evi- 
dence of consciousness and observation, and is manifestly 
erroneous. 

It is obvious, however, that our capacities of simultane- 
ous mental phenomena, are restricted within narrow limits, 
w T hich we cannot transcend. The usual phenomena of a 
day, may be developed in a much shorter period, perhaps 
in an hour ; and those of an hour in a proportionably shorter 
period. We may be the subjects of more mental phe- 
nomena of the different orders in some periods, than in 
others of equal lengths ; and may have more ideas, and 
those of higher orders in some hours, than in some days, 
and in some days, than in some weeks. But we cannot 
crowd the numerous cognitions of a life into an hour, or the 
judgments of a life into a day. We have the power of at- 
taining more judgments in a year than in a day ; and so of 
cognitions, and all other mental exercises. 

We have the power of retaining our existing ideas to 
some extent, while acquiring new ones, and of making the 
former serviceable in the acquisition of the latter. But 
the extent to which we can do this is very limited. Ex- 
isting ideas may receive some additional ideas as cotempo- 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 101 

raries, and continue with them ; but continual and indefinite 
accessions as cotemporaries are impossible. The contin- 
ual acquisition of new ideas, results necessarily in the 
continual loss of old ones. In other words, ideas of every 
class are successive, and are so related to the mind and to 
each other, that they cannot co-exist to an indefinite amount, 
or in any considerable numbers. 

Our simultaneous cognitions are few. But those which 
we have exercised on different successive occasions, and 
which we are capable of exercising with more or less fa- 
cility, as often as we may have occasion to do so, may be 
indefinitely multiplied. 

In proportion as mankind are more improved, their 
knowledge is increased in quantity, and improved in qual- 
ity. They know more, and their knowledge is of higher 
orders. 

Those who enjoy the advantages of common school and 
academic education, live in civilized ^and enlightened so- 
cieties, and are more or less habituated to reading and 
thinking, stand on an elevation high above infants and sav- 
ages in this respect. 

Those who are most enlightened, and who have prose- 
cuted the investigation of truth to the farthest limit, and in 
the highest departments of information, occupy an eleva- 
tion in respect to the quality and amount of their knowl- 
edge, as much above that of the mass of civilized men, as 
the mass of civilized men do above that of infants and 
savages, 



SECTION IV. 

THE SPHERE OF KNOWLEDGE. 

Capacities and objects of knowledge are relative terms. 
Things are not objects of knowledge, except to beings who 
have capacities of knowing them. 

All things which God is capable of knowing, are to him 
objects of knowledge ; all things which men are capable 

9* 



102 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of knowing, are to them objects of knowledge ; and all 
things which animals and insects are capable of knowing, 
are objects of animal and insect knowledge. 

Different beings have different spheres of knowledge, 
each of which centers in the being to which it belongs. 

The sphere of the Divine knowledge embraces that of 
all created beings, and extends indefinitely beyond them 
all. God knows all that can be known by created beings 
of all orders, and indefinitely more than they can ever 
learn ; or than they are capable of knowing. 

The sphere of human knowledge is much more exten- 
ded than that of the most intelligent animals or insects, 
but it does not embrace all the items of knowledge which 
are attainable by the animal and insect tribes. Animals 
and insects are capable of many cognitions which are not 
attainable by man. But the sphere of knowledge assigned 
to any one of the animal or insect tribes, or that of all 
together, is far more limited than the sphere of human 
knowledge. 

Human knowledge is progressive. 

In early infancy our ideas are few and simple. Those 
of ourselves and others, however, as feeling, thinking, and 
acting beings, and of material and resisting objects, togeth- 
er with those of space and time, are among the earliest 
that we attain, and of which we are conscious. As we 
advance in years and experience, we discover new proper- 
ties in the objects of our previous knowledge, and also new 
objects of knowledge. These discoveries are capable of 
being prosecuted indefinitely. Those who prosecute them 
farthest, are the most learned ; and those whose prosecu- 
tion of them is most limited, are most ignorant. 

Ideas lead to emotions, ideas and emotions co-existing 
or existing in immediate succession, to other ideas, and by 
means of other ideas, to other emotions and affections, and 
so on. 

The attainment of knowledge is chiefly voluntary. 

Existing ideas excite emotions of some kind, either on 
account of the peculiar natme of their objects, or on ac- 
count of some interesting relations which they are suppo- 
sed to possess. In consequence of these emotions, they 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 103 

are retained in exercise till they produce other ideas, and 
they, till they produce others still ; and so on. 

We prosecute particular studies and observations in 
consequence of choices and purposes, having reference to 
the same ; and each hour's application is the effect of co- 
temporaneous volitions. 

Choices, purposes, and volitions, have as extensive, ob- 
vious, and important an agency in the acquisition of knowl- 
edge, as in any class of human pursuits. 

The spheres of knowledge, considered with respect to 
time, are the past, present, and future ; with respect to 
space, this world, the solar system, the visible creation 
generally, and the invisible world. Of the beings, actions, 
and events, which belong to time past, we know but little. 
Our own observations and experience conduct us back only 
a few years. Sacred and secular history carry us consid- 
erably farther back. But even they fail us after a few 
thousand years, and of the periods through which they ex- 
tend, they give us very slight and imperfect notices. We 
can know but little of the beings and events which belong 
to this world, and which have preceded us in the drama of 
time. Still less do we know of the past history of other 
worlds, and of all the beings and events of innumerable 
past ages. 

The sphere of our present knowledge, shifting with each 
moment, is still more limited than that of the unfathomable 
past. It is limited to our consciousness, the material ob- 
jects immediately around us, the spiritual objects around 
us, with which we are in communion by bodies or other 
means, and ideal objects. The present is the smallest ap- 
preciable portion of time, and its sphere of knowledge, to 
man, is proportionably limited. 

Of the future, we have the means of knowing some- 
thing. It opens before us a never-ending line of existences, 
and never-ending series of actions and events. What is 
to be, we learn entirely from what is and what has been. 
God is, and is to be forever. God has caused what has 
been and what is, and may be expected to act on the same 
principles which he has heretofore acted upon, in causing 
what is to be. 



104 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Our knowledge of this world comprehends several sci- 
ences, such as geography, chemistry, natural and civil 
history, embracing politics, ethics, religion, &c. 

All that we know of other parts of the visible universe, 
is comprehended in astronomy. Of the immeasurable re- 
gions of space, the objects of which are too remote to be 
visible, we know nothing. 

The sphere of our knowledge is not coincident with that 
of our thoughts or cognitions at any one time. All actual 
cognitions are within the sphere of our knowledge, but not 
necessarily on its extreme limits. Judgments and concep- 
tions may transcend the sphere of our knowledge. We 
often judge and imagine w T hen we do not know. 

In thinking of the objects of our knowledge, we form 
different ideas of them, and those more or less specific 
and complete, according to our habits of thought, the pur- 
poses we have in view, and other circumstances. Thus, 
we think of a particular man at any one time as having a 
particular form and complexion, at another time, as having 
a particular disposition, at another, as engaged in particu- 
lar pursuits ; at one time, as mortal, at another, as immor- 
tal, at another, as religious, &c. 

We cannot think of all the qualities and relations of the 
most simple objects at one and the same time. Our ideas 
of the known qualities of objects, are to a great extent 
successive. 

Persons most unlike, in respect to the extent of their 
knowledge on particular subjects, and in relation to partic- 
ular objects of thought, may, in particular circumstances, 
have the same ideas of those objects. Thus the most 
illiterate and the most profound chemists and philosophers 
may, in given circumstances, form the same ideas of a 
piece of gold, or any other natural body. 

In thinking of particular objects we form ideas of them, 
having reference to one or more of their properties and 
relations, to the exclusion of others, according to the na- 
ture of the series to which our thoughts belong, and the 
objects we have in view. In this way, our ideas of the 
same objects may be indefinitely varied, without being 
contradictory, and the trains of thought which they com- 
pose, be indefinitely diversified. 



JUDGMENTS AND COGNITIONS. 105 

Considered with reference to other mental exercises, 
the sphere of knowledge is within that of ideas. We can 
have no knowledge without ideas, because cognitions are a 
class of ideas. 

Considered with reference to its subjective conditions, 
the sphere of knowledge depends entirely on those men- 
tal phenomena which are objects of consciousness, of 
which, in the case of man and animals, sensations take the 
lead. Human and animal knowledge originates in human 
and animal consciousness ; and the Divine knowledge in 
the Divine consciousness. 

Considered w T ith reference to its objective conditions, 
every sphere of knowledge must be restricted to objects 
of conscious exercises, or the exciting causes of conscious 
exercises in the mind to which it belongs. 

Neither God, nor man, nor animals, or insects, can have 
the sphere of their knowledge extended beyond the objects 
of their respective conscious exercises, and such other ob- 
jects as may be inferred immediately or remotely, directly 
or indirectly therefrom. 

In the Divine mind, the spheres of actual and possible 
knowledge are the same. All knowledge that is possible 
to God, is in actual exercise by him. 

In human and animal minds, these spheres are widely 
different ; and those of actual, far less extended than those 
of possible knowledge. Men and animals do not, in any 
instance, know all that they are capable of knowing. The 
sphere of man's actual knowledge embraces but a small 
fraction of that which is possible. It is capable of indefi- 
nite extension, but is contained within exceedingly narrow 
limits on every hand. 

The wisest and most learned know but little of what the 
human mind is capable of knowing, and the unwise and 
ignorant know incomparably less than they. 

The sphere of man's actual knowledge is capable of 
being indefinitely extended ; but can never exceed that of 
possible knowledge. The means of its extension are ob- 
servation and reasoning. The more extensively and ac- 
curately we observe and reason, and the farther we pursue 



106 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

our observations and reasonings, the more we learn. Ob- 
servation is first, then reasoning, and lastly, conclusions, 
which, when repeated and tested till we attain a perfect 
conviction of their correctness, and a capacity of repeat- 
ing them indefinitely, terminate in knowledge or cogni- 
tions. 



CHAPTER III. 

CONCEPTIONS, IMAGINATIONS, AND REMINISCENCES. 
SECTION I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES OF CONCEPTIONS AND IMAGINATIONS. 

Conceptions denote ideas, considered without respect 
to the grounds from which they are deduced ; as the con- 
ceptions of men, animals, insects, minerals. 

The conceptions of men or other objects before our 
eyes as objects of sight, are judgments depending on vision. 
Those of men or other objects not before us as present 
objects of sight, are conceptions, not legitimate judgments. 
The same is true of conceptions of objects, as possess- 
ing any other properties. They may occur as judgments 
or as conceptions merely, according as they depend on 
evidence or not. 

Conceptions may be considered as consisting of three 
orders : 

1. Those which constitute the matter of legitimate 
judgments, cognitions, and reminiscences ; 

2. Those which constitute the matter of erroneous 
judgments ; 

3. Those which exist absolutely as conceptions. 

Legitimate judgments and cognitions depend on evi- 
dence from which they are inferred. They are the effects 
of evidence, and can be only what the evidence on which 
they depend makes them. 

Erroneous judgments are not conformable to the evi- 
dence on which they are supposed to depend; that is, they 
embrace more or less, or something different from what 
the grounds from which they are inferred warrant. 

The element or elements by which erroneous judgments 
differ from what may be legitimately deduced from their 
supposed premises, are conceptions which the premises do 
not authorize, and which are really derived from some 



108 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

other source. This derivation is usually by association. 
Those elements of a given erroneous judgment, which are 
derived by legitimate inferences from given premises, con- 
stitute one part of it, and those which are united with it 
by association, another. 

Those conceptions which do not consist of erroneous 
judgments, and which we regard at the time as conceptions 
merely, are generally denominated imaginations ; and the 
act of producing or exercising them, is called imagining. 
These terms are often applied to denote all classes of 
ideas, considered without respect to grounds from which 
they are deduced, whether true or false. The faculty of 
conceiving of the various objects of knowledge and opin- 
ion, considered without respect to the character of its ex- 
ercises as true or false, is sometimes denominated the con- 
ceptive faculty ; and such conceptions are called ima- 
ginations. 

In its most restricted sense, imagination denotes ideas 
which are known at the time not to correspond to real 
objects, or which may be known to be of this character, 
to the exclusion of others. 

The essential conditions of absolute conceptions or 
imaginations, are previous ideas, which may be traced, ul- 
timately, to legitimate judgments ; and proximately, to 
judgments of every kind and cognitions. 

We first judge correctly, or infer from certain grounds, 
the truths which they are adapted to reveal, We then 
prosecute the exercise of judgment, by forming some cor- 
rect and some erroneous judgments, and distinguish many 
of the former from these, under the title of knowledge or 
cognitions. To these we add conceptions, which we know 
at the time not to be conformable to evidence; and which 
we distinguish from all other ideas, by the title of ima- 
ginations. 

Our primitive judgments must be conformable to the evi- 
dence which produces them, and on which they depend ; 
because, till we have first obtained legitimate judgments, 
we can have no elements to associate with them and render 
them illegitimate. 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 109 

In forming or inferring them we cannot be subject to any 
bias, for there can be nothing in those circumstances to cre- 
ate a bias. 

After our first judgments are formed, subsequent ones 
are liable to be erroneous, by the association of foreign 
elements, derived from different sources. 

Every possible imagination is derived, in some way, 
from previous ideas. 

We judge an object to be present and imagine it to be 
absent ; we judge it to be in one place and imagine it to 
be in another; we judge it to possess certain qualities and 
imagine it to possess others. In all these cases imagina- 
tions are connected with judgments, as their antecedents 
and exciting causes. If we had not first judged, we should 
not subsequently have imagined. 

All the objects of imagination are similar to those of 
previous judgment and cognition. Visible and tangible 
objects are first objects of perception, then of imagination. 

If we had never become acquainted with color by sight, 
we never could have imagined it ; if we had never become 
acquainted with sound by hearing, we never could have 
imagined it; if we had never become acquainted with vis- 
ible and tangible bodies, considered as visible and tangible, 
we never could have imagined them. 

Hence it is impossible to imagine a sensation different 
in quality from any which we have experienced ; or a be- 
ing which is not material or spiritual. The sphere of 
imagination, therefore, is so far limited to that of knowl- 
edge, that all imaginations must be derived, by association, 
from judgments, cognitions, and reminiscences. We may 
form the elements derived from these sources, into various 
compounds. But we can obtain no other elements for that 
purpose. 

All imaginations which we do not recognize at the time, 
as such, belong to the class of erroneous judgments or 
opinions, and are generally called by these names. 

Those which we recognize at the time as not depending 
on evidence, and not conformable to it, are generally 
denominated imaginations, and carefully distinguished 
from legitimate judgments and cognitions. 

10 



110 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

We speak of judging some things, knowing others, and 
imagining others ; but never confound our known imagin- 
ations with judgments and cognitions. 

Novels, and poems of every description, are generally 
denominated works of imagination. They consist of nar- 
rative or dramatic compositions, many of which do not de- 
scribe objects and events as they have appeared, by a 
careful deduction from evidences ; but in attitudes and 
colors, and with properties and relations, more or less 
imaginary. 

Persons are imagined of different characters, and moving 
in different spheres of public and private life. Different 
circumstances and events are imagined and described in 
particular orders of succession. Almost every object, 
event, and action, are in some of their features imaginary ; 
and many are so in all. 

The most pure works of imagination, however, are 
works of judgment and knowledge too. Judgment acts 
as the guide of imagination, in every part of the narrative 
or dialogue, the novel or poem. 

All the parts of the most fictitious character were ob- 
jects of judgment, and many of them considered by them- 
selves, objects of accurate knowledge to the writer. In 
selecting, associating, and modifying them, he was guided 
by judgments respecting their qualities as effects of certain 
causes, and means to certain ends. 

It is the office of the biographer and historian, to de- 
scribe persons and events as they have actually existed. 
It is that of the novelist, to describe them as they may be 
supposed to have existed. The former is restricted to 
what has been and is capable of being ascertained as true, 
the latter to what may be supposed to have been, whether 
it can be demonstrated in the particular cases where it is 
assumed or not. Both require the exercise of judgment, 
and are developed only by means of this faculty. In the 
former, we infer what actually did occur from certain prem- 
ises ; in the latter, we infer what may, or might have oc- 
curred, from certain other and different premises. 

The biographer and historian infer, from certain facts, 
certain judgments respecting particular individuals, and 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. Ill 

several important transactions in which they were con- 
cerned. From certain other facts of a more general nature, 
and obtained from a great variety of sources, the novelist 
draws his inferences respecting what may or might have 
been, and expresses them in language similar to what he 
would use if he had inferred them as realities, rather than 
as possibilities or fictions. The historian has his facts to 
reason from, and his rules of judgment from which he de- 
duces one set of conclusions. The novelist his facts and 
his similar rules of judgment, from which he deduces 
another set of conclusions. The former concludes by 
reasoning, what was, in conformity with certain evidences ; 
and the latter concludes by reasoning, what may or might 
have been in certain conditions, agreeably to general and 
particular principles of human nature. 

Imaginations and legitimate judgments often co-exist as 
parts of the same complex state of mind, and mingle im- 
perceptibly in successive trains of thought. We judge 
and imagine, and judge correctly and incorrectly in thou- 
sands of instances daily. 

Some of our judgments and imaginations continue only 
for an instant. Others continue during longer or shorter 
periods of perceptible length. Some are never repeated, 
and others are repeated more or less frequently. 

Judgments and cognitions, which depend directly on 
sensations, are generally more or less protracted, and more 
or less frequently repeated. While we look at sensible 
objects, we naturally protract our perceptions of them as 
objects of sight. As often as we look at such objects, we 
repeat our perceptions of them. 

Imaginations which depend on uniform causes, occur 
and are repeated, according to the same laws, as percep- 
tions. When the cause operates, the imagination occurs, 
when it ceases to operate, the imagination ceases, and 
when it is renewed, the imagination is renewed. 

Sensible objects, which are habitually present, produce 
habitual judgments and cognitions ; and those which are 
occasionally present, occasional ones. 

Habitual judgments and imaginations are formed with 
much greater -facility than others ; and on proportionably 



1 1 2 MENTAL PHILOSOFHY. 

less obvious grounds. The rapidity and completeness with 
which we form them, are among the wonders of mental 
science. 

When sensations are in exercise, they compel us to 
form ideas more or less conformable to them. With sen- 
sations of sight, we are compelled to form corresponding 
ideas of visible objects ; with those of touch, to form cor- 
responding ideas of tangible objects ; and so of all other 
sensations. On the same ground upon which we are com- 
pelled to form ideas, we are compelled to entertain them 
more or less permanently ; and to repeat them more or less 
frequently. 

With particular grounds of judgment we mast judge, 
and with elements of imagination we must imagine. The 
extent to which we prosecute our judgments, and the time 
during which we protract them, depend more or less on 
our volitions ; but not to form or protract them at all, is in 
many cases impossible. The same is true of imagin- 
ations. 

The exercise of one class of ideas, prevents or impedes 
that of others at the same time. Judgments prevent or 
impede the exercise of imaginations, and imaginations 
prevent or impede the exercise of judgments. 

The action of sensible objects on the senses, tends to 
excite ideas respecting them, and to prevent the simulta- 
neous occurrence of other ideas, either of imagination or 
judgment. It restricts us to perceptions, as prominent and 
commanding ideas, in all those trains of thought which 
occur in our waking hours. Some perceptions we must 
have ; others we may have or not ; and other ideas still, we 
may have or not, according as they are compatible with 
pre-existing ideas. 

The capacity of having different simultaneous ideas, is 
restricted within narrow limits. Ideas of any particular 
class in considerable numbers, are incompatible with other 
ideas, on account of the extent to which they occupy the 
attention, and often on other accounts. 

Imaginations having some degree of variety and per- 
manence, may mingle with perceptions as separate, or be 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 113 

incorporated with them as parts of the same complex ideas. 
But this can occur only to a limited extent. 

In order to have imaginations of considerable complex- 
ity, and to retain them for any considerable time, we must 
cease from the exercise of complex and continued percep- 
tions, and from that of all other orders of ideas; and in 
order to have perceptions and judgments of other orders, of 
considerable complexity, and to retain them for any con- 
siderable time, we must cease from the exercise of com- 
plex and continued imaginations. 

The distinctness of ideas depends upon the degree of 
attention with which they are exercised, and the continu- 
ance of these exercises without remission, during periods 
of perceptible duration. 

Simple ideas are generally distinct; complex ones are 
more or less indistinct. When several ideas occur cotem- 
poraneously, or in immediate and rapid succession, some 
of them are almost always indistinct. 

This is the case with most of the imaginations which 
occur during our waking hours. They are transient, in- 
distinct, and imperfect, from the co-existence of other ideas, 
which pre-occupy the mind ; when, but for those other 
ideas, they would naturally have had the permanence, dis- 
tinctness, and completeness of corresponding perceptions 
and judgments. 

The imaginations which occur in sleep are more dis- 
tinct and complex, and more complete than those which 
ordinarily occur in our waking hours, from the exclusion 
of other simultaneous ideas by means of the relaxed con- 
dition of the organs of sensation. 

The capacity of the mind to imagine, is the same, con- 
sidered absolutely, whether we are asleep or awake. But 
in our waking hours, we are seldom or never completely 
disengaged from sensations and corresponding perceptions. 
During those periods of sleep in which we have ideas, and 
are the subjects of consciousness, we have few or no sen- 
sations; and consequently, few of the perceptions which 
would inevitably occur at the time if we were awake. 

Consequently, those imaginations which occur in sleep, 
possess advantages for being continued, distinct, and com- 

10* 



114 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

plete, which similar ideas do not possess in our waking 
hours. 

When awake, we are constantly employed in judging, 
knowing, imagining, and remembering. The consequence 
of this employment is the attainment of the various ideas, 
which we easily distinguish, as judgments, cognitions, 
imaginations, and reminiscences. 

The same processes are carried on in those portions of 
our sleeping hours in which we are the subjects of con- 
sciousness ; or in other words, of sensations, ideas, emo- 
tions, &c. 

Our waking ideas are more or less permanent and com- 
plete, according to the interest which they excite. Those 
which excite no interest vanish instantly ; and others con- 
tinue during longer or shorter periods, according as they 
are objects of greater or less interest, and according to the 
length of time during which they continue to be so. 

The same is true of the ideas which occur in sleep. 
Some vanish instantly on account of not exciting any in- 
terest, and others continue for minutes, and with slight re- 
missions, for hours, through the cotemporary influence of 
the emotions, affections, &c, which they excite. 
. Dreams consist, to a great extent, of erroneous judg- 
ments, not of ideas which are known to be imaginary at 
the time. We find it impossible to correct these judg- 
ments till we wake, when we easily correct them by means 
of other later judgments, based on the most indubitable 
evidences afforded by sensations, reminiscences, which 
sensations contribute to excite, accompanying perceptions^ 
and other accompanying judgments and cognitions. 



SECTION II. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF REMINISCENCES. 

Reminiscences differ essentially from other ideas, in 
the mode of their suggestion, and the. accompanying ideas 
which relate to them, as having occurred before. 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 115 

Yesterday I saw a friend ; to-day I remember having 
seen him; yesterday I observed that he was sad or cheer- 
ful, sick or well; to-day I remember that he was in the 
conditions then observed. So of all other objects of 
thought, whether of judgment, knowledge, or imagination. 
Judgments, cognitions, and imaginations, are all equally 
the objects of memory. 

Reminiscences consist of ideas, not sensations, emo- 
tions, affections, or acts of will. We remember sensa- 
tions, emotions, &c, as the objects of ideas ; but our 
reminiscences do not involve the repetition of them. 
The memory of a sensation of any kind, does not involve 
a repetition or recurrence of it; neither does that of emo- 
tions, acts of will, &c, involve a recurrence of them. 
We remember colors, sounds, pains, &c, without experi- 
encing a recurrence of those sensations ; and joy or sor- 
row, love or hatred, purposes and volitions, &c, without 
experiencing a recurrence of them. 

To remember sensations, is to have ideas of past sen- 
sations ; and to remember joy or sorrow, love or hatred, 
purposes and volitions, is to have ideas of these phenom- 
ena ; not the phenomena themselves, which are objects of 
these ideas. 

Whatever can be an object of thought, in the present 
time, may be an object of memory, in future time. There 
can be no reminiscences without objects of memory, any 
more than there can be judgments, knowledge, &c, with- 
out corresponding objects of judgment and knowledge. 

Like all the other orders of ideas, reminiscences depend 
upon conscious exercises of some kind, as their exciting 
causes. We cannot remember, except by means of ex- 
isting ideas, or other conscious exercises, any more than 
we can judge, know, or imagine, without similar aids. 

Reminiscences are excited by previous ideas, or other 
conscious exercises. The present sight of a friend, ex- 
cites ideas previously obtained by seeing him. So pres- 
ent pain or pleasure, joy or sorrow, and the ideas which 
relate to them, excite ideas of past exercises of similar 
characters. 



116 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Judgments may be described as inferences or conclu- 
sions, from certain premises ; imaginations, as the artifi- 
cial association of elementary conceptions; and reminis- 
cences, as suggestions, depending on suggesting ideas. 

Evidence leads to inferences and conclusions ; judg- 
ments and cognitions suggest conceptions and imagina- 
tions ; and present ideas, those which we have formerly 
exercised. 

Reminiscences may be direct or indirect, complete or 
incomplete, correct or erroneous. . 

( 1 .) A direct reminiscence is one which is excited im- 
mediately by its suggesting idea, without the intervention 
of any other ideas, either of judgment, cognition, or im- 
agination. 

(2.) Reminiscences are indirect, when they are remote- 
ly connected with their suggesting ideas ; those ideas 
first serving as grounds of inference, for certain judg- 
ments, imaginations, or other reminiscences, and these 
intermediate ideas suggesting those in question. Remi- 
niscences are direct, considered with respect to their im- 
mediate exciting ideas, and indirect, considered with res- 
pect to their remote exciting ideas. 

(3.) Reminiscences are complete, when the ideas of 
which they consist, embrace all the elements of the pre- 
vious ideas to which they correspond. 

(4.) They are incomplete, when they do not embrace 
all the elements of the previous ideas to which they cor- 
respond. 

Completeness and incompleteness are predicated of 
reminiscences, considered singly, or as comprehending 
trains of associated ideas. 

When a man remembers part of a message, with the 
delivery of which he was entrusted, his reminiscence is 
incomplete, considered with respect to the whole. If he 
remembers any part of it, his reminiscence is complete, 
considered with respect to the part remembered. 

(5.) Reminiscences are correct, when the elements of 
which they consist, are the same as those of the original 
ideas which they represent. 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 117 

(6.) They are incorrect, when these elements are not 
the same as those of their originals. 

Correct reminiscences are analogous to correct judg- 
ments ; and incorrect ones, to erroneous judgments. 

We distinguish between those which are correct and 
incorrect, in the same manner as we do between correct 
and incorrect judgments. 

The faculty of memory belongs to men, in common 
with animals and insects. The possession of it, in some 
degree, is co-extensive with ideas. All beings which are 
capable of ideas, by acts of judgment and cognition, are 
capable of reminiscences. 

Memory varies in different persons, and in the same 
persons, considered with respect to different periods of 
life, both in the amount and quality of reminiscences, 
which are capable of being attained. Some remember 
much more, and for much longer periods, than others; 
and the same persons remember more and longer, in some 
periods of life, than in others. 

There is a similar diversity between different persons, 
and the same persons at different times, in respect to the 
quality of their actual or possible reminiscences. 

This faculty, like all others which relate to ideas, is 
more or less under the control of the will. We remem- 
ber many ideas, in consequence of specific purposes and 
volitions directed to that end, which otherwise would 
never occur; and we prevent the occurrence of many 
possible reminiscences, by similar means. 

We purpose to remember a text, remark, discourse, 
engagement, &c, without having the ideas desired, in 
exercise. In consequence of this purpose, we enter on a 
train of thought, which we judge will lead to the sugges- 
tion of the ideas desired, and, in many cases, succeed in 
attaining reminiscences, by means of purposes directed to 
that end. We purpose to prevent the recurrence of ideas 
which are disagreeable, and in consequence of that pur- 
pose, avoid those objects and trains of thought, which we 
think likely to suggest them. In many cases, we succeed 
by these means, in preventing the recurrence of disagreea- 



1 18 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ble ideas, when we should otherwise inevitably attain 
them. 

Committing to memory, is a process designed to secure 
the suggestion of particular trains of ideas, on future oc- 
casions. A large proportion of our connected trains of 
reminiscences, occur in consequence of having been the 
objects of this process. We commit a discourse or poem 
to memory, and are enabled, by that means, to recall it, 
when its recurrence would otherwise be unattainable, 
without the aid of judgments and cognitions. 

This process consists substantially, in retaining and re- 
peating the ideas we wish to remember, during a certain 
period, with a view to facilitate their recurrence, by sug- 
gestion, on future occasions. 

The essential conditions of reminiscences, are previous 
ideas, to which the reminiscence may correspond, as its 
original, and other previous suggesting ideas. 

Ideas must exist as original judgments, cognitions, or 
imaginations, before they can be suggested as reminiscen- 
ces. They must, also, be suggested by suggesting ideas. 
Without ideas, to serve as means of suggestion, we can- 
not obtain reminiscences, any more than we can obtain 
judgments, without grounds of inference. 

The word idea, is sometimes applied to denote a single 
idea, and sometimes a succession of similar ideas, rela- 
ting to the same objects. The same is true of judgment, 
cognition, imagination, and reminiscence. Thus, succes- 
sive ideas of God, man, animals, &c, which possess the 
same essential properties, are conceived of and described 
as the same. We have a particular idea of God to-day, 
and have it again to-morrow. We form particular judg- 
ments to-day, and form the same to-morrow." So of ima- 
ginations and reminiscences. The reminiscence of an 
object occurs to-day, and occurs again to-morrow, and on 
subsequent occasions. 

Ideas, however, are not permanent existences, but tran- 
sient phenomena ; and therefore, successive ideas cannot 
be, in all respects, identical, though they may be, in many 
respects, similar. 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 119 

When an idea ceases, it ceases forever. It may be fol- 
lowed by others like it, but can never resume its existence. 

My present idea that two and two equal four, is not 
identical with the similar idea of the relation subsisting 
between these numbers, five minutes since, or at any pre- 
vious time. It is a particular mental phenomenon, which 
never existed before, and will never exist again. Similar 
ideas have occurred before, and similar ones may continue 
to occur ; but each idea ceases to exist when it ceases to 
be in exercise, and is incapable of being, in all respects, 
identified with any of its successors. 

It is still more obvious, that reminiscences are not iden- 
tical with the previous ideas to which they correspond, 
and in which they originate. The reminiscence of an 
object is not the same as the perception of it. The for- 
mer ceases before the latter commences. 

We first perceive or imagine, then remember. The 
perception and imagination are one thing, and the subse- 
quent reminiscence another. 

These different ideas, however, have several things in 
common. Their objects are the same; and considered 
w T ith relation to these objects, primitive ideas and reminis- 
cences are the same. A man perceived, and a man re- 
membered, is the same man. In the former case, he is 
an object of perception, and in the latter, an object of 
reminiscence. Perceptions depend on sensations to 
which they refer, as grounds of judgment, and reminis- 
cences depend on suggesting ideas, which sustain the 
same relation to them, that grounds of judgment do to 
judgments. 

Ideas are not things in the mind, but states of the mind. 
They are capable of being perpetuated indefinitely, but 
when once discontinued, can never occur again. The 
similar ideas which succeed them, are not the same as 
their predecessors, but different and similar states of 
the same subject, the soul. The soul is the same in all 
ideas, and in all other mental exercises; and in similar 
ideas, whether judgments, &c, or primitive ideas and 
reminiscences, the objects of thought are the same ; but 
the thoughts themselves are numerically different. 



120 MEJNTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION III. 

THE LAWS OF MEMORY, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SUGGESTION 
OF REMINISCENCES. 

1. Ideas suggest previous ideas which formerly co- 
existed with them. 

It is seldom that a single idea, whether simple or com- 
plex, occupies the mind alone. Several are generally in 
exercise at the same time. This takes place in the exer- 
cise of vision. The same prospect embraces a variety of 
objects, several of which are objects of simultaneous per- 
ception and contemplation. One or more of those objects 
may subsequently be met with in a different group, and 
instantly suggest those previously perceived with them, 
for no other reason than because they were previously 
perceived and contemplated together. For example, I 
see two strangers, and am introduced to both. To- 
morrow the sight of one of them instantly recalls the 
other, merely because they were seen together, and con- 
templated simultaneously before. Acts of memory, pro- 
duced by similar means, are innumerable, and compre- 
hend an important class of oui reminiscences ; perhaps 
the most important. 

Where two or three ideas have co-existed together, 
alone, they have a greater tendency to suggest each other, 
than where they have co-existed together with several 
others ; and where they have co-existed together, for a 
considerable time, they have a greater tendency to suggest 
each other, than' where that co-existence has been tran- 
sient. 

Frequency of co-existence has an effect similar to the 
continuance of it. Both may be illustrated by the case 
of a student committing a discourse or section to memory. 
He commences with the first part of it, contemplating 
several words and sentences, continuously and cotempo- 
raneously, for a certain time; then repeating the same 
process, till the passage is fully committed. 

In this case, the continued and repeated co-existence of 
ideas, is the means of establishing that relation between 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 121 

them, whereby one instantly suggests the other. The 
strength and permanence of this relation, or of the ten- 
dency to suggestion thus produced, is in proportion to the 
time during which the co-existence of the ideas concern- 
ed is continued, and the frequency of their repetition. 

This tendency, however, may be counteracted by dif- 
ferent associations, taking place during the same periods 
of time. If an idea co-exists with one or any given num- 
ber of ideas to-day; with another to-morrow; and the 
next day with another still; and these different associa- 
tions continue to occur at irregular intervals ; neither of 
them will be as strong and certain as either would have 
been, had not the others occurred ; and in many cases 
they fail entirely of establishing any considerable tenden- 
cy to produce the corresponding suggestions. 

The succession of ideas is in a great measure deter- 
mined by suggestions which take place on account of the 
previous co-existence of the suggested with the suggest- 
ing idea. The example just referred to, affords a striking 
illustration of this, where, in remembering a discourse, or 
section, each phrase and sentence suggests the succeeding 
one in order, in consequence of their having been cotem- 
poraneously objects of previous thought and attention. 

The first sentence does not suggest the third, but only 
the second. The second does not suggest the fourth or 
fifth, but only the third ; and so on according to the previ- 
ous co-existence of the ideas in the mind. In all succes- 
sions of thought, there is a co-existence of the different 
ideas, which succeed each other, with those immediately 
preceding and following. This co-existence produces the 
tendency of ideas belonging to a series, to suggest those 
occupying the next place in the same. 

Successive ideas are to some extent cotemporaneous ; 
the one that is first in the succession continuing till after 
that which follows is produced, and co-existing for a time 
with it. 

The tendency of ideas to suggest former ones, in conse- 
quence of previous co-existence in the mind, conforms the 
production of ideas by memory, to their primitive occur- 
rence by the exercise of the other mental faculties ; and 

11 



122 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

by this means answers, in some degree, the purpose of 
permanent ideas. In consequence of this law, the mem- 
ory of different persons varies according to corresponding 
varieties in their capacities of reason and imagination. 

The same objects occasion different cotemporary per- 
ceptions and apprehensions, according to the genius of the 
individual observer and reasoner ; and this diversity in the 
original acquisition of ideas, creates a corresponding one 
in their re-production. 

Those who most readily and particularly notice points 
of agreement or disagreement in the form, structure, posi- 
tions, or other relations of objects, experience .a recurrence 
of ideas, in conformity with those habits and powers of per- 
ception. Those who most readily and particularly discov- 
er and notice the relations of causality, and whose appre- 
hensions of objects have respect to them chiefly, as causes 
and effects, experience a corresponding recurrence of ideas, 
in conformity with their different habits and powers of 
original perception. 

The same simple and complex ideas being differently 
associated on their occurrence, by the primary exercises of 
the mind, acquire a tendency to suggest different associates. 
Thus the same objects which to some minds suggest 
only ideas of similar or different objects, to others suggest 
those of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents ; 
and to others still, those of time. 

The reminiscences of the same mind are greatly 
diversified, partaking of the diversified character of our 
primary trains of thought; and ideas of one class or other 
predominate according to the predominance of the same 
in our primary trains of thought. 

2. Ideas suggest previous ideas, which had one or 
more elements in common with them. 

Most ideas of memory are complex. Very few of them 
are perfectly simple. Different complex ideas may have 
some element or elements in common, corresponding to 
the similar qualities and relations of their objects. These 
common elements serve as principles of suggestion, in the 
same way as ideas which have previously existed together. 
By this means, objects which we see and form ideas of, 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENGES. 123 

for the first time, suggest similar ones never seen or con- 
templated with the same before. Thus new scenes 
remind us of those we have viewed before; ideas of 
strangers suggest those of friends and acquaintances; and 
new ideas in the various departments of knowledge, sug- 
gest previous ones. 

Suggestion, in consequence of the similarity of suggest- 
ing objects, depends on the principle of co-existence. In 
all cases of this kind, some element or elements of the 
suggesting idea, have co-existed in combination with other 
elements, forming different complex ideas. These former 
combinations, therefore, are suggested by elements in ex- 
isting ideas, which before existed in ideas they now suggest. 

3. Ideas suggest previous ideas, by means of intermedi- 
ate ones which formerly co-existed with them, or which 
had one or more elements in common with the suggesting 
ideas. 

This mode of suggestion bears the same relation to that 
which is direct and immediate, which remote inferences 
do to immediate ones, or demonstrations to intuitions. 
Thus one idea may suggest another, some or all of the 
elements of which have previously co-existed with it ; and 
that suggested idea, others which sustain the same relation 
to it, which it does to the first suggesting idea; and soon. 
The last of any such train of suggestions may have no 
elements in common with the first; but those which 
stand in immediate proximity to each other, must, in all 
cases, have some elements in common, to serve as princi- 
ples of suggestion. 

4. Objects are more or less capable of being remem- 
bered, according to the degree of emotion, affection, &c, 
which they excite. 

Objects which excite little or ho feeling of any kind, are 
seldom remembered at all, and continue to be capable of 
being remembered only for a short time. Many such ob- 
jects are perceived and forgotten daily and hourly. 

Objects which excite some degree of emotion, affection, 
&c, continue, longer than others, to engage our attention 
when we first attain a knowledge of them, and are remem- 



124 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

bered with a degree of frequency, and during a length of 
time proportionable to the intensity of the feelings which 
they excite. 

Those which excite strong feelings are long objects of 
thought, at the time of their producing such excitement, 
and are often and long remembered. As long as they con- 
tinue to excite strong feelings, we continue to think of 
them and remember them. When they cease to produce 
any excitement of this kind, we soon cease to think of 
them, and in many cases, after a time forget them entirely. 

Objects of the strongest present excitement may be for- 
gotten, if the remembrance of them from time to time 
ceases to be attended with any perceptible degree of feel- 
ing. Those of comparatively slight present excitement, 
may be long remembered, if the reminiscence of them 
never ceases to awaken some perceptible degree of feeling. 

5. Familiar objects are more easily remembered than 
others.. 

Those who are most familiar with numbers, remember 
particular numbers most perfectly, and for the longest time; 
those most familiar with color, remember colors ; and those 
most familiar with sound, remember sounds with propor- 
tionable facility. 

An accomplished arithmetician is able to remember 
numbers, and an accomplished musician sounds, more per- 
fectly and much longer than others of equal capacities, 
who are not familiar with these objects. 

The exercise of a judgment of any kind, facilitates the 
exercise of similar judgments ; so of cognitions, imagin- 
ations, and reminiscences. Objects which we have fre- 
quently thought of as judgments, cognitions, or imagina- 
tions, we remember more easily than otherwise, in conse- 
quence of such previous exercises. 

6. The occurrence of reminiscences may be prevented 
by the unremitted and vigorous exercise of the other men- 
tal faculties. 

In this respect, reminiscences resemble judgments and 
imaginations. The mind may be prevented from judging, 
by devoting the appropriate time for forming judgments to 
.he formation of imaginations only ; and it may be prevent- 



IMAGINATIONS AND REMINISCENCES. 125 

ed from forming imaginations, by devoting the time for 
forming them to the unremitted exercise of judgments. 
In like manner we may be so absorbed in contemplating 
objects of present thought, as not to think of others which 
they are adapted to suggest. 

We may be too much occupied to remember, when if 
engaged less intensely, reminiscences would naturally 
arise. 

7. Memory may be impaired or destroyed entirely by 
disease. 

Paralytic affections produce this effect. Loss of mem- 
ory is a usual and almost universal accompaniment of age, 
and of extreme bodily weakness, however produced. 
Whatever impairs the bodily constitution, tends to weaken 
the power of memory, and to relax our hold, both on the 
the present and past. Drunkenness, gluttony, and lewd- 
ness, have these effects in a pre-eminent degree. 

8. Accurate discrimination and arrangement facilitate 
the exercise of memory. 

Clearness and precision of thought are highly important 
on many accounts. They conduce to the most effectual 
exercises of reason and imagination. The more clear and 
precise we are in our thoughts, the more readily and cor- 
rectly shall we form the judgments and conceptions which 
they are adapted to excite. 

Clearness and accuracy of thought are as necessary to 
memory, as they are to judgment and imagination. Where 
our thoughts are confused and inaccurate, they are remem- 
bered with difficulty and imperfectly. 

9. Mnemonics, or the art of memory, and the relation 
of reminiscences to previous acts of will. 

We are often aware of having had ideas, which, if re- 
called, would be useful to us. In such cases, we naturally 
desire the recurrence of those ideas, without perceiving 
what they are, or attaining them. These desires lead to 
volitions and voluntary exercises of mind, directed to the 
recovery of the desired ideas. 

Voluntary reminiscence is an art which requires some 
knowledge of the principles of suggestion, and which can 
be practiced only in conformity with these principles. 

11* 



126 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Children begin to learn and practice this art at an early 
period of life. Their knowledge and practice of it are at 
first imperfect. But both are gradually improved by ex- 
perience and exercise; and improved in different degrees. 
Some become greater proficients in it than others, and 
have proportionably better memories. None attain the 
highest possible skill and ability in the practice of this art, 
and multitudes fall far short of a competent share of these 
attainments. 

Reminiscences depend immediately on suggesting ideas. 
No act of will can produce them except by this means,, 
and by this means they are capable of being produced 
without the intervention of volitions. 

Ideas suggest reminiscences spontaneously, as premises 
lead us to infer conclusions ; or as sensible objects, by 
means of the sensations which they excite, lead to ideas 
of themselves as sensible objects. 

The immediate action of the will, considered with re- 
spect to ideas, is always restricted to such as exist at the 
time. Volitions cannot terminate directly in the produc- 
tion of reminiscences, or of any other class of ideas. Those 
ideas which are in exercise, we may, in many cases, vol- 
untarily continue to exeicise or not. We may be aware 
of having formerly had ideas which are not in exercise at 
the time, and may observe, analyze, or compare existing 
ideas, with a view to recover former ones. But we can- 
not exercise an idea, or make it in any way a direct object 
of volition, till we have attained it. We attain ideas only 
by exercising them, and we are capable of exercising them 
only as cotemporaneous and consecutive phenomena, hav- 
ing such relations to each other and to conscious exercises 
generally, as to occur in certain connections, and as the 
accompaniments and consequents of certain other mental 
exercises. 



CHAPTER IV. 

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS CONSIDERED WITH 
RELATION TO THEIR OBJECTS. 

SECTION I . 

IDEAS OF PHENOMENA. 

Ideas of phenomena are of two generic orders; 

1. Ideas of the phenomena of minds, or of objects not 
material ; 

2. Ideas of the phenomena of bodies, or material 
objects. 

1. Ideas of the phenomena of minds. 

The first ideas which are entertained by men and other 
orders of thinking beings, in this world, relate to objects 
of consciousness. The first objects of consciousness are 
sensations. Till we have some sensation to be conscious 
of, we have nothing to serve as an object or exciting 
cause of consciousness ; and till we are conscious of a 
sensation, we can have no idea of one. 

Sensations are legitimate and necessary objects of con- 
sciousness. Their objective relation to consciousness is 
one of their essential properties, so that without this, they 
would not be sensations. To suppose that we have a 
sensation and are not conscious of it, is to suppose that we 
have a sensation and do not have it, at the same time, 
which is absurd. 

Consciousness of sensations is inseparable from the 
sensations to which they relate. By ceasing to be con- 
scious of them we cease to have them; and by renewing 
our consciousness of them we renew the exercise of them, 
as objects of consciousness. 

The capacity to exercise consciousness of sensations, 
is involved in the capacity to exercise sensations, and is 
greater or less, according as we have more or less ability 



128 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to increase or diminish, to create or destroy sensations, by- 
direct voluntary mental effort. 

Considered as objects of consciousness, emotions, 
affections, and desires, are analogous to sensations. To 
have these exercises, is to be conscious of them ; and we 
are always conscious of them in the degrees in which we 
have them. When we have them in high degrees, we are 
conscious of them in high degrees; when we are con- 
scious of them in slight degrees, they are exercised in 
slight degrees. 

Ideas and acts of will are, equally with sensations, emo- 
tions, affections, and desires, objects of consciousness. 
I am conscious of the ideas that two and two equal four ; 
that men are mortal ; and that life is short. I am con- 
scious of choices, purposes, and volitions. 

I cannot have an idea, without being conscious of it. 
If I have the idea that two and two equal four, I am 
conscious of this idea at the time of having it. To have 
it, and not be conscious of it, is impossible. It would not 
be an idea, if it were not an object of consciousness. 

When an idea occurs, the consciousness of it occurs, 
as one of its essential and constituent elements; as long 
as it continues, the consciousness of it continues; and 
when it ceases to be an object of consciousness, it ceases 
to exist. 

If we can have ideas in one case, without being conscious 
of them, we may in all cases ; and if we can have an idea 
for any conceivable length of time, without being con- 
scious of it, we may have it forever in that condition. 
The same is true of choices, purposes, and volitions. 
When a choice occurs, we are conscious of it ; when a 
purpose is formed, we are conscious of it ; and when a 
volition is put forth, we are conscious of it. To exercise 
choices, purposes, and volitions, and not be conscious of 
them, is impossible. 

If our consciousness was not co-extensive with our sen- 
sations, ideas, emotions, and acts of will, these exer- 
cises w r ould not be appropriate objects of knowledge, ex- 
cept by means of other phenomena, which might be, in 
some way, the exciting causes of conscious exercises. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 129 

Our consciousness of mental exercises, is the founda- 
tion and basis of all our reasonings respecting them. On 
this basis, we form ideas of them, as possessing various 
relations and properties, which are not themselves the 
objects of consciousness, when, if we had no conscious- 
ness to commence with, we could attain no ideas what- 
ever. 

Consciousness is necessarily co-extensive with ideas, 
feelings, &c. ; but ideas derived from consciousness, and 
capable of being derived from it, are not necessary or 
universal attendants of the conscious exercises, from 
which they are inferred. We may have them, or may not 
have them, in connection with their logical conditions. 
We cannot have the idea of a man, without being con- 
scious of it as an idea, having a man for its object. We 
may have it, however, without any other ideas respecting it. 

Other ideas of this primary idea, having respect to it, 
as a phenomenon of the mind, as the effect of certain 
causes, and the cause of certain effects, such as emotions, 
affections, &c, may be legitimate judgments and cogni- 
tions, and as such, objects of consciousness, but are not 
exercises of consciousness merely. They are ideas, the 
consciousness of which is only one of their essential ele- 
ments. 

Consciousness is not a phenomenon different from its 
objects, and sustaining to them the relation of consequents 
to antecedents, or effects to causes. It is an essential 
property of its objects, and belongs to intensive mental 
exercises, in common with ideas and acts of will, as 
essential elements of them. 

Our knowledge of particular sensations, ideas, &c, as 
objects of consciousness, and as occurring in those cir- 
cumstances in which we observe their occurrence, is of 
the most certain kind. We may prosecute the attain- 
ment of knowledge in this department of enquiry, to a 
greater or less extent. This is done by different persons, 
and by the same persons at different times. 

We may attend to our conscious mental exercises, and 
study them, or to the various remote objects which they 



130 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

reveal. But we cannot increase our consciousness, with- 
out increasing the amount of our conscious exercises. 
We may prolong given exercises, which are objects of 
consciousness, during longer or shorter periods, and thus 
prolong the consciousness of them ; and we may form 
various judgments, and exercise various cognitions, imagi- 
nations, and reminiscences, respecting the same ; all which 
will be as much objects of consciousness, as the ideas to 
which they relate. In all these cases, we exercise con- 
sciousness, by attaining those sensations, ideas, &c, 
whose objective relation to consciousness is one of their 
essential elements. 

2. Ideas of the phenomena of matter. 

Sensations constitute a large and important class of 
phenomena, which are objects of consciousness. Our 
first exercises of reason relate to them. 

They serve as so many principles, or premises, to rea- 
son from. In reasoning from them, we easily attain ideas 
of other more remote phenomena, on which they depend. 
Thus from sensations of touch, we attain ideas of resist- 
ance, exercised on different points, in different directions, 
and with different degrees of force ; from those of sight, 
we gain ideas of color-producing phenomena; and from 
those of hearing, ideas of phenomena which concur in the 
production of sounds, &c. 

Ideas of the phenomena of material objects are all in- 
ferred directly or indirectly from sensations. We experi- 
ence certain sensations, and infer corresponding phenom- 
ena, as their exciting causes. These inferences refer to 
their objects as the direct or indirect objects and exciting 
causes of sensations, and are as certain as the grounds 
from which they are inferred. 

The phenomena of bodies are numerous and diversified, 
and are the objects of various physical sciences ; such as 
natural philosophy, chimistry, mineralogy, &c. 

We seldom conceive of phenomena, whether of minds 
or material objects, except in connexion with conceptions 
of subjects to which they belong. Thus we conceive of 
sensations, ideas, &c, as phenomena of minds ; and resist- 
ance, color, motions, &c, as phenomena of bodies. But 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OP IDEAS. 131 

the conception of the phenomena in each of these cases, is 
capable of being clearly distinguished from that of their 
subjective causes. The conception of a sensation or idea 
is one thing, and that of a feeling and thinking mind 
another; the conceptions of resistance, form, color, &c, 
are things of one class, and those of material objects, to 
which these phenomena belong, things of another class. 

Phenomena, and the ideas which they excite relating to 
the same as objects, are the first principles of reasoning. 
We experience sensations, and infer from them those phe- 
nomena which are directly or indirectly concurring causes 
of sensations. Having ascertained these phenomena, w r e 
reason in like manner from them. 

It is not true that we know nothing of matter but its 
phenomena, any more than that we know nothing of the 
phenomena of material objects, but the sensations which 
they concur in exciting. From the sensations which ma- 
terial objects concur in exciting, we infer the sensible phe- 
nomena of those objects ; and from their sensible phenom-. 
ena, we draw other equally certain inferences. As far as 
we are capable of drawing legitimate and uniform infer- 
ences, we are capable of prosecuting the attainment of 
knowledge ; no farther. 

Our consciousness reveals to us only the sensations, 
ideas, feelings, and acts of will of which our minds are 
the subjects. By repeated and successive inferences from 
our sensations, we ascertain ; 

(1.) The phenomena of bodies, chimical, mechanical, 
&c. ; 

(2.) Those of other minds, indicated by means of the 
phenomena of material bodies, such as words, gestures, 
and voluntary actions of various kinds. 

Our knowledge of the phenomena of other minds, is a 
matter of inference from the phenomena of material ob- 
jects ; but is not necessarily a matter of any uncertainty. 
We have as certain knowledge of sensations, ideas, &c, 
in the minds of our fellow-men, as we have of the similar 
exercises of our own minds. 

We first attain ideas of our own sensations ; then those 
of the phenomena of matter, which concur in producing 



132 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

them ; then those of the sensations, ideas, &c, of other 
minds, signified by appropriate sensible phenomena. 

Ideas of our sensations precede those of the phenomena 
which concur in their production ; and ideas of the phe- 
nomena which concur in producing our sensations, precede 
all perception of the sensations, ideas, &c, of other hu- 
man or animal minds. 

Those phenomena of matter which serve as indications 
of the mental phenomena of other minds, are objects of 
special interest. 



SECTION II. 

IDEAS OF MINDS, OR SPIRITUAL OBJECTS. 

Ideas of minds, or spiritual objects, as things which are 
different from their phenomena, are universal and neces- 
sary. We are conscious of sensations, ideas, emotions, 
&c, and infer a subject of sensation, thought, and emotion. 
Sensations suggest the idea of a subject of sensations ; 
ideas, that of a subject of ideas ; emotions and other con- 
scious exercises, that of a subject of emotions and other 
conscious exercises. We may experience sensations and 
other mental exercises, without thinking of their subjective 
cause, or agent; but when we raise the question, whether 
they belong to a subject or not, we are compelled to con- 
clude in the affirmative. 

The existence of the mind, as the subject of phenom- 
ena, is an immediate inference from ideas of its phenom- 
ena. Those ideas are definite and certain ; a knowledge 
of them depending only on consciousness. They consti- 
tute absolute knowledge; and the inference which they sug- 
gest respecting their subjective cause, is equally definite 
and certain with themselves. If we were conscious of 
our minds, we could not be more certain of their exist- 
ence than we now are, by inference or judgment, from 
consciousness. 

The primary deduction from our consciousness is sim- 
ply, that conscious exercises are the phenomena of some 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 133 

subject, without determining any thing respecting the na- 
ture of that subject, besides its existence and subjective 
relation to conscious exercises. 

The subject of sensations is conceived of, merely as 
that which experiences sensations ; and the subject of ideas 
as that which thinks, reasons, imagines, conceives, re- 
members, &c. ; or in other words, one subject is conceived 
of as exercising sensations, judging, knowing, conceiving, 
remembering, feeling, acting ; or as being the subjective 
cause of these various phenomena. 

The name of this subject is of no consequence, any 
farther than it is associated with legitimate judgments and 
cognitions respecting it. It is usually denominated mind, 
or spirit, and is distinguished by these and other titles of 
similar import, from matter and material objects. 

The two generic properties of the human mind, deduced 
directly from consciousness, are feeling and thought. 

We know the existence of feelings and thoughts directly 
as objects of consciousness, and infer from these the ex- 
istence of a subject or subjective cause of feeling and 
thought. 

We know our thoughts, as sustaining definite relations 
to our feelings, as being, like feelings, continuous and 
successive, and as succeeding each in uniform modes of 
succession. We are conscious of different feelings and 
thoughts at the same times, and of the frequent recurrence 
of past ideas, by means of existing ones. From these and 
other similar phenomena, we infer the existence of one 
subjective cause of all the phenomena which are objects 
of our consciousness ; one being which feels and thinks. 

As soon as we are conscious of any thing, we have a 
principle from which to infer the existence of a subject, or 
subjective cause of that exercise, to which our conscious- 
ness relates. Whether we draw the inference or not, we 
have a ground from which to draw it, and need only con- 
sider the ground of inference, to have the inference forced 
upon us. As often as the question recurs, whether exer- 
cises of which we are conscious prove the existence of 
any thing to which they belong, or whether they are 
capable of existing independently of any subject; if we 

12 



134 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

judge at all, we uniformly judge the affirmative. We 
cannot do otherwise. To judge the negative is impossi- 
ble. We may assert and imagine the negative, but we 
cannot judge it on valid grounds. 

The supposition that there can be feelings and thoughts, 
without any subjective cause to produce and exercise 
them, is absurd. That supposition cannot be understand- 
ingly entertained and assented to by any human mind. 

If feelings and thoughts prove the existence of beings, 
they prove their existence as the subjects of these phe- 
nomena. If the universe is not a perfect vacuum, con- 
sidered with respect to beings which have a continuous 
existence, and if all phenomena are not- destitute of any 
subjects to which they belong, or of any subjective cau- 
ses, by which they are produced, then feelings and 
thoughts do not occur without involving the agency of 
feeling and thinking beings. 

If sensations and thoughts can exist without subjects, 
they may exist without objects; or if they have objects 
in the phenomena of resistance, limited extensions, mo- 
tions, &c, these phenomena, which are the objects of 
thought, may be equally independent of any subjective 
causes; and in either case, the universe would be an infi- 
nite void, so far as matter, or spirit, or any existing being 
whatever, is concerned. 

But how, then, can we account for resistance? How 
explain the phenomena of solids and fluids? How form 
any judgment whatever? Such a supposition confounds 
judgment, and is inconsistent with any rational ideas. 

We know the existence of sensations and ideas, be- 
cause we are conscious of them. We know the exist- 
ence of the mind, considered as the subjective cause or 
agent of sensations and ideas, by acts of judgment and 
cognition, deduced from our sensations and ideas. Sensa- 
tions and ideas reveal the mind, as a being which is the 
subject and cause of these phenomena, as clearly as evi- 
dence can reveal any thing whatever. Our judgments 
and cognitions on this point, are not exceeded in clear- 
ness by those on any other. Clearer and more certain 
judgments are not conceivable. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 135 

We become aware of our existence at an early period. 
Ourselves are probably the first beings whose existence we 
learn. We first learn our existence, as subjects of con- 
scious exercises, then as extended and material beings, 
having several properties which belong to unorganized 
matter, together with those which characterize organized 
and conscious beings. 

The distinction between mind and matter, and concep- 
tions of each, as having properties which do not belong 
to the other, are subsequent to our conceptions of both, 
as subjective causes of their respective phenomena. We 
have sensations and ideas, and perform voluntary acts ; 
and judge these phenomena to belong to beings endued 
with corresponding faculties. 

We observe the solidity, forms, colors, dimensions, local- 
ities, motions, &c, of material objects, and judge them to 
belong to corresponding objects. We subsequently com- 
pare material and spiritual objects, and infer their generic 
agreement as continuous, existing beings, which are the 
subjects of phenomena, and their specific difference, as 
the subjects of different orders of phenomena; none of 
the peculiar phenomena of mind belonging to matter, and 
none of the peculiar phenomena of matter belonging to 
mind. 

As far as we can prosecute our reasonings, by certain 
inferences from previously ascertained truths, our conclu- 
sions are certain. Some prosecute them to a great ex- 
tent, and some to small extents. Different persons know 
much or little of the properties of their minds, according 
to the more or less limited extent and frequency of their 
accurate reasonings on this subject. 

Those phenomena which place the subjective reality 
of the mind on the clearest and most unquestionable 
grounds, are volitions and voluntary actions. Volition and 
action, more imperiously, if possible, than sensations and 
ideas, require the supposition of a being which exercises 
them. The contrary supposition is absurd in the highest 
degree. 

; Our ideas of minds relate to them as the subjective 
causes of certain phenomena, which become in some way 



136 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

the objects of our knowledge, and as having indefinite 
capacities besides. 

We first learn some of the properties of our minds, 
and form corresponding ideas of them. We then learn 
other properties of them, and modify the ideas we had 
previously attained, accordingly. 

Having attained some knowledge of ourselves, as feel- 
ing and thinking beings, we easily attain a similar knowl- 
edge of others. 

We know our fellow-men to be thinking beings, as 
really as we do ourselves. The same is true of animals 
and insects* We know animals and insects as the sub- 
jects of sensations, ideas, volitions, and voluntary actions, 
as really as we know ourselves and fellow-men to be the 
subjects of similar phenomena. 

By comparing different human minds and the minds of 
different orders of organized beings, we discover some 
properties to be common to all ; others to be common to 
all of particular orders of organized beings, and others to 
be peculiar to individuals. Every mind which is an ob- 
ject of thought, has some generic properties of different 
orders, and some particular properties. Its generic prop- 
erties of the highest order, belong to it in common with all 
known minds; those of lower orders, belong to it in com- 
mon with all minds of their respective orders, and its par- 
ticular properties distinguish it from all other minds, and 
characterize it as an individual. 

In this world minds exist and operate only in connexion 
with material organized bodies. Men, animals, and in- 
sects, are not pure spirits. They are partly spiritual, and 
partly material. They possess all the sensible properties 
of unorganized matter, which belong to them as bodies. 
Besides these, they possess other properties, as the sub- 
jective causes of sensations, ideas, emotions, and acts of 
will, which do not belong to the matter of which they 
consist, but to an untangible and invisible agent, which is 
not material. 

Our knowledge of minds relates to them; 
1. As beings which are susceptible of sensations, ideas, 
emotions, &c. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 137 

2. As different from the bodies in which their develop- 
ment occurs, and sustaining to them the relation of occu- 
pants to a residence, or of agents to machinery, by means 
of which they operate. 

We first ascertain the existence of minds, as the sub- 
jects of thought, feeling, and mental action, and subse- 
quently distinguish different, minds from each other, and 
all minds from material objects. 

The discovery of the generic properties of minds of 
higher and lower orders, and the discrimination of differ- 
ent minds, and different orders of minds from others, and 
from all material objects, especially from organized bodies, 
by means of which their development is effected, is the 
legitimate office of judgment and cognition. 

The most important orders of minds with which we 
are acquainted, are; 

1. Human minds ; 

2. Animal and insect minds; 

3. Vegetable minds ; 

4. Angels and disembodied spirits; 

5. The Divine mind. 

Our knowledge of human, animal, and vegetable minds, 
is derived chiefly from observing their phenomena, and 
reasoning respecting them. Having commenced an ac- 
quaintance with these different orders of beings, we may 
greatly extend it by information derived from the testimo- 
ny and reasonings of others. 

Our knowledge of angels and disembodied spirits, is 
derived entirely from the scriptures, and depends upon 
the testimony of the sacred writers. From the same 
source we derive much important information respecting 
the character, relations, and future destinies of men and 
other beings. 

The Divine mind is the highest and noblest object of 
human knowledge. It is not an object of consciousness, 
or of sensation. In these respects, it stands in the same 
relations to our capacities of knowledge, as all other 
minds, not excepting our own. We are as unconscious 
of our minds, and of the minds of our fellow-men, as we 
are of the Divine mind. 

12* 



1 38 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The knowledge of our minds is derived by inference 
from our consciousness, and other mental exercises. 
That of the ideality and spirituality of others, from sen- 
sible phenomena, which are indicative of the same. 



SECTION III. 

IDEAS OF MATERIAL OBJECTS. 

Ideas of material objects are common to all men, and 
common both to men and animals. They begin to be ex- 
ercised in early life, and continue to arise on various occa- 
sions, as long as the capacities of sensation and reason 
remain. 

Ideas of material objects are of two orders, generic 
and particular. The former are represented by common 
names; such as gold, silver, earth, water, &c; and the 
latter, by proper names, or common names, used to desig- 
nate particular objects, and restricted to them by means of 
some additional epithet, or descriptive term, such as this 
and that, &c. ; as this man, or animal, that silver coin, 
this portion of earth, that body of water, &c. 

Ideas of particular material objects, do not differ from 
ideas of a class of such objects, except in regard to some 
of their respective properties. 

One of the most general of these elements of differ- 
ence, is that of unity and plurality. In ideas of particu- 
lar objects, we regard them as single ; in those of a class 
of such objects, we regard them as plural. 

Ideas of particular material objects, precede those of 
classes of such objects. This entire class of ideas, there- 
fore, commences with those of particular material objects. 

Our ideas of different particular material objects, are in 
no two cases exactly alike. They possess some points of 
diversity, corresponding to that of their objects. They 
all, however, possess several properties in common. 

The common properties of material objects, are ; 

1. Limited extension, figure, divisibility, &c; 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 139 

2. Mutual resistance ; 

3. Mobility; 

4. Attraction. » 

1. The extension of material objects. 

Material objects have some conceivable extension. 
Any thing which has no conceivable extension, is not a 
material object. 

Objects vary in respect to their magnitudes, from those 
which are immensely large, such as suns and planets, to 
those which are extremely small. 

Material objects may be too small to be discoverable by 
the naked eye, or by the most powerful microscopes, or to 
be tangible, and yet possess some conceivable extension. 

The conception of an object of given dimensions, con- 
sidered with respect to its dimensions, may be resolved 
into other conceptions of the same, as consisting of two 
or more parts, occupying proportionable extension. This 
division of objects, considered as extended into material 
elements of proportionable size, may be carried to any 
definite extent. The division of extended objects, is con- 
ceivable beyond any assignable limits. In actual practice, 
it can be prosecuted only to a very limited extent, either 
by chimical or mechanical means; but in conception, it 
can be prosecuted beyond any assignable limits. 

Our conceptions of material objects, refer to them uni- 
versally, as consisting of extended masses of matter, 
which, considered merely with reference to its extension, 
is capable of being divided and sub-divided into smaller 
masses of proportionable extent, beyond any assignable 
limits. 

The idea of limited extension, involves that of figure. 
We can have no idea of any figure, except in connexion 
' with extension ; and we cannot conceive of finite exten- 
sion, without giving it some figure. Ideas of material 
objects of particular forms, therefore, refer to them as 
extended, and as being comprehended within definite 
limits. 

2. The capacity of mutual resistance. 

Another property of material objects, is that of mutual 
resistance. Our knowledge of resistance is derived 



140 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

from touch. Sensations from which we infer this proper- 
ty, are almost in constant exercise, during our waking 
hours. The inference is one of undoubted legitimacy 
and necessity. We cannot avoid it. 

What we infer, in respect to the solidity of material 
objects is, that they resist each other with certain degrees 
of force. We encounter the resistance of the earth, in 
walking upon it, and that of all other material objects, in 
using them for mechanical purposes. 

Air and other aeriform fluids, exercise various degrees 
of resistance, in common with more solid bodies. 

The properties of material objects as resisting, are 
relative, and have respect, in all cases, to other objects of 
the same nature. Resistance cannot be exercised by a 
single object. When one object resists, there must be 
another which is resisted, both of which sustain similar 
relations to each other. The resistance of bodies is 
necessarily mutual and equal. 

Resistance may be estimated as greater or less. The 
instances of it which come within the sphere of human 
knowledge, are all comprehended within definite limits. 
In some of them it is very great, and in others very small. 
That with which mountains and large masses generally, 
press on subjacent portions of matter, is very great, and 
the slightest we can appreciate by any means, as a direct 
or remote object of sensation, very small. Both, how- 
ever, are limited. 

Many masses of material objects, are capable of being 
compressed into narrower and still narrower limits, as the 
force applied is increased. Their power of resistance 
increases with the degree of their compression, and in- 
creases in uniform ratios to that in which their size is 
diminished. From these and other similar phenomena, 
we infer that matter possesses incalculably greater pow- 
ers of resistance., than are ever known to be exercised in 
the material world, and that its compression within limits 
which are inconceivably small, is impossible. 

A given portion of matter is of given dimensions. By 
the application of a given force on all sides, and in all di- 
rections, it can be reduced to one half this size ; by that of 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 141 

a still greater force, to one fourt^ by a greater force still, 
to one eighth its original size, and so on ; the size of the 
object diminishing, and its resistance increasing in a cor- 
responding ratio* 

We may conceive of the increase of the force beyond 
any assignable limits^ and infer a corresponding diminu- 
tion of the body thus compressed in size. 

The extension of matter bears a certain relation to the 
resistance which it encounters. Under the application of 
given forces, it is of certain dimensions ; under that of 
greater or smaller forces, it is of smaller or greater dimen- 
sions; its dimensions, in all cases, having a certain inverse 
ratio to the compressing force exerted upon it. 

The greatest assignable compressing force, would 
leave the matter on which it is exerted, of some conceiva- 
ble extension. These properties, therefore, can never 
destroy each other. No assignable compressing force, 
can destroy the conceivable extension of matter ; and no 
conceivable extension of matter is so small, but that a 
force may be conceived of great enough to reduce the 
largest material objects within it. 

Under the greatest conceivable compression matter 
would still be matter. If the earth were reduced within 
the dimensions of the smallest globe that can be made use 
of, to illustrate its geographical and astronomical phenom- 
ena, it would contain the same amount of matter that it 
now does. That it is not capable of such reduction, by 
the application of conceivable forces, is more than any one 
is authorized to say. The possibility of such a reduction, 
is in manifest accordance with known properties of mat- 
ter. We may conceive of portions of matter incapable of 
compression, within given limits, by any force whatever. 
That any such portions exist, is more than we know. 

We know that all material objects are extended in some 
degree ; that most, if not all, are compressible by the ap- 
plication of force, and in proportion to the degrees of 
force applied; and that under different degrees of com- 
pression, they exercise corresponding and proportionable 
degrees of resistance. 

3. The mobility of material objects. 



142 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY* 

The material universe as far as it comes within the 
sphere of human observation, is all in motion. The sun 
and planets are the subjects of regular motions in their 
orbits and on their axes. All material objects on the 
earth, partake of the earth's motions, and are also capable 
of various other motions, from the application of appro- 
priate forces. 

The simplest conception we can form of a material 
object, is that of something extended, and capable of re- 
sistance and motion. Any thing which possesses con- 
ceivable extension, however small, and which has con- 
joined with it the capacity of resisting external compres- 
sing forces, from the action of other similar bodies, and 
of being in motion or stationary, is material. Any thing 
which is destitute of either of these properties, is not 
material. 

These are not all the properties of any given material 
object, but they are common to all material objects, and 
may be denominated the fundamental properties of matter. 

4. Attraction. 

The property of the mutual attractions of material ob- 
jects, and of all the parts of the same, in gravitation, cohe- 
sion, and chimical affinity, is almost as universal as those 
above mentioned; perhaps quite so. But it is not as obvi- 
ous. These attractions are common to all objects of sight 
and touch, and exercise a constant agency in the mineral, 
vegetable, and animal kingdoms. They are exercised ac- 
cording to certain laws, or in uniform modes, many of 
which have been determined with accuracy. 

The elements of bodies are of two kinds, mechanical 
and chimical. 

The mechanical elements of bodies, are parts which 
result from mechanical divisions of them, and are more 
or less numerous, according to their relative size. 

The chimical elements of bodies, are parts which re- 
sult from a chimical division of them, and are more or 
less numerous, but incapable of being estimated by num- 
bers, from their extreme minuteness. 

The resolution of bodies into their chimical elements, 
may, in many cases, be pursued through successive 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 143 

stages ; one body being resolvible into two other kinds of 
bodies* and one or both of the bodies thus obtained, being 
capable of being resolved into two or more other kinds of 
bodies still, &c. 

There are doubtless limits beyond which chimical analy- 
sis is no farther possible ; but the attainment and deter- 
mination of those limits, is a problem not to be solved by 
man. That matter which would result from the last pos- 
sible chimical analysis, would be a curiosity beyond any 
which has yet been shown by chimists. It is one, how- 
ever, that we have no means of attaining with certainty, 
if at all ; and is not an appropriate object of present knowl- 
edge, to any human mind. 

The matter which is an object of present knowledge, is 
that, and that only, which is capable of being at present 
discovered and reasoned upon, on the giound of its actual 
phenomena. 

The particular properties of material objects are innu- 
merable ; and the full explanation of them belongs to 
physical, rather than mental science. 

Our conceptions of particular bodies, are more or less 
particular, according to the particularity and number of the 
properties which it embraces. We may form only the 
most general conceptions of particular objects. We often 
do so. These conceptions, when formed, are frequently 
rendered more and more particular, by the addition of 
one element after another, till they become particular in 
a high degree. 

What is true of our conceptions of material objects, in 
regard to their being more or less general or particular, is 
equally true of knowledge. 

Our conceptions of material objects, relate to them as 
possessing certain properties, discoverable by sensation, or 
by immediate, or remote inferences from sensation. We 
infer resistance, size, form, color, &c, from sensations. 
Having formed a conception of a given object, as possess- 
ing these properties, we proceed to add others to them, as 
the result of continued observation, and of more extended 
reasoning, till we increase the amount of properties which 
are objects of our conceptions, to the greatest number pos- 
sible. 



144 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The attraction of gravitation, is exercised between 
bodies and parts of bodies, which are situated at sensible 
distances from each other. It extends to the greatest dis- 
tances, and is in the inverse ratio of the squares of the 
distances. Bodies which, at a given distance, attract each 
other with a force equal to one pound ; at half that dis- 
tance attract each other with a force equal to four pounds ; 
at a third of that distance, with a force equal to nine 
pounds ; at a fourth of that distance, with a force equal 
to sixteen pounds, and so on. 

Cohesion and chimical affinity are restricted to insensi- 
ble distances ; but are, doubtless, effects of the same power 
which is exercised in gravitation, though restricted to a 
sphere irsensibly small. 

The force which holds particles of the same kind to- 
gether, is called cohesion ; that which joins particles of 
different kinds, is called chimical affinity. Where the 
sphere of gravitation ends, those of cohesion and chimi- 
cal affinity begin. The spheres of cohesion and chimical 
affinity, therefore, are bounded externally by that of gravi- 
tation. 

The spheres of cohesion and chimical affinity, are 
bounded on their interior by a sphere of repulsion, which 
commences where that of cohesion and chimical affinity 
terminate, and which increases in certain ratios to the 
center. 

At sensible distances, bodies attract each other with 
forces inversely as the squares of the distances. At in- 
sensible distances, comprehended within the sphere of 
gravitation, and external to the sphere of repulsion, cohe- 
sion and chimical affinity are exercised with forces pro- 
portionable to their distances, and varying according to 
laws which have not yet been demonstrated. At distan- 
ces still smaller, the particles of matter exercise mutual 
repulsions, the precise laws of which, like those of cohe- 
sion and chemical affinity, are to be determined. 

That matter is capable of repulsion is certain. That 
the sphere of material repulsion is within that of attrac- 
tion, may be inferred from the impossibility of its being 
exterior to it, or within the same limits. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 145 

The limits of these spheres, and the forces exerted 
within them, may be different, considered with respect to 
different particles of matter. But all matter which has 
any one of them, doubtless has all. Whatever is the sub- 
ject of gravity, is susceptible of chimical affinity and co- 
hesion, and within still more limited spheres of resistance. 

The mutual resistance of the smallest mechanical and 
chimical elements of matter, commences at certain distan- 
ces, and increases in the inverse ratio of some function, 
such as the square, cube, &c, of the distances of their 
centers. 

We thus arrive at subjects of material phenomena, 
which are as subtle as the mind; things which, when resolv- 
ed into their smallest mechanical and chimical elements, 
exercise mutual resistance, within certain distances from 
given centers, in the inverse ratio of some function of those 
distances, such as their squares, cubes, &c; and which, 
within other spheres exterior to those of resistance, exer- 
cise the mutual attractions of cohesion and chimical affin- 
ity, and within other spheres exterior to them, and extend- 
ing perhaps indefinitely beyond, exercise the attraction of 
gravitation. 

These things are as numerous as the smallest possible 
chimical elements of material bodies. Each chimical 
element of material bodies, is to the phenomena of matter, 
considered in the aggregate, what each individual mind is 
to the phenomena of minds. It is a single, indivisible 
being, possessing certain powers of resistance, cohesion, 
chimical affinity, and gravitation, &c. 

These beings must be exceedingly numerous, and their 
spheres of resistance extremely small. Their existence 
and properties, however, as resisting and attracting beings, 
are as certain as the existence and sensible properties of 
the larger masses which they compose. 

The fundamental properties of matter, when resolved 
into its smallest chimical elements, are mutual repulsions, 
within spheres of indefinitely small extent, and beyond 
those spheres, mutual attractions.^ These repulsions and 
attractions are always the same, considered with respect to 
the same particles similarly situated. \ They may be greatly 

13 



146 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

diversified, considered with respect to different particles, 
and the same differently situated. The number of chimi- 
cal elements into which the smallest perceptible body is 
capable of being resolved, may be immensely great, but 
they are doubtless not absolutely innumerable. Man 
cannot enumerate them. But they are accurately num- 
bered by God. It is doubtless as easy for God to take an 
inventory of the number of chimical elements which 
enter into any given portion of matter, or into the earth it- 
self, and all objects which belong to it, as to estimate the 
number of human beings who have descended from Adam. 
The combinations of matter possess many properties in 
common, but in other respects are greatly diversified. A 
similar diversity, no doubt, prevails among its ultimate 
chimical elements. 



SECTION IV. 

MIND AND MATTER COMPARED. 

All material objects consist of ultimate material ele- 
ments, which are not capable of being resolved into more 
simple ones. These elements are simple bodies, existing 
independently of each other. We can resolve many 
bodies into two or more kinds of elementary bodies. 
When we have pursued our analysis to the greatest possi- 
ble extent, the last elementary bodies discovered, may be 
capable of being resolved into other more simple elements, 
or not. If they are capable of being resolved into other 
chimical elements, we may suppose the resolution per- 
formed; and if the elements thus obtained, are capable of 
being resolved into others, we may suppose that resolution 
performed, and the elements resulting therefrom obtain- 
ed; and so on till we have accomplished the last analysis 
possible. There must be a last chimical analysis possi- 
ble, or else successive analyses must be capable of being 
prosecuted to infinity, which is absurd. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 147 

The last possible analysis of material bodies, gives us 
their ultimate chimical elements. 

These elements may be of different specific properties, 
which we have no means of ascertaining; but they must 
possess several generic properties in common with the 
complex elements into which they enter; such as capaci- 
ties of repelling from their centers, and attracting towards 
them. Like the complex elements from which they are 
disengaged, they must be independent existences, capable 
of being estimated as one or more. A single ultimate 
chimical element of material bodies, is a single being pos- 
sessing the power of resisting other material beings, with- 
in a sphere indefinitely small, and capable of attracting 
them from the greatest conceivable distances. The exist- 
ence of such beings, is a matter of inference, and de- 
pends on an extended train of consecutive inferences, but 
is as certain as the premises from which they are deduced. 

Elementary bodies are not as different from minds as 
many have supposed. Both are beings invested with cer- 
tain powers. 

The ultimate particles of matter exercise mutual repul- 
sions and attractions, which give them determinate rela- 
tions to space. Minds neither repel nor attract each other, 
or material objects, and therefore cannot have those deter- 
minate relations to space, which matter derives from these 
operations. 

Mere matter is, from its nature, incapable of producing 
the phenomena which are peculiar to the vegetable and 
animal kingdoms. Its essential properties are those of 
repulsion and attraction, in determinate and separate 
spheres, and according to certain unchanging laws. 

The highest generic property of minds in this world, is 
that of principles of organization, and of the action pecu- 
liar to organized bodies, in the vegetable and animal king- 
doms. The phenomena of animals and vegetables re- 
quire the supposition of a principle of life different from 
the matter of which they are composed. 

The phenomena of organic life in man, animals, and veg- 
etables, equally require the supposition of a principle of this 



148 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

kind. One such principle, and but one, is necessary to 
every animal and vegetable, and to every human being. 

The principles of animal and vegetable life, are the 
agents and subjective exciting causes of animal and veg- 
etable action of every kind. Without the agency of 
these principles, the most perfect organizations are inca- 
pable of operating for a moment. The idea which we 
thus gain of minds, is that of beings capable of using the 
organs of animal bodies for their appropriate purposes. 
These purposes are different in the case of different 
organs, and different organized beings. 

The discoverable relation between animal and vegeta- 
ble minds, and the organs of animal and vegetable bodies, 
is simply that of an agent to an instrument. The organs 
are so many instruments, and the mind the agent which 
uses them for specific purposes. The instrument and in- 
strumental action clearly reveal the agent; but they re- 
veal it only as an agent operating by particular means, for 
the intentional or unintentional attainment of particular 
ends. 

Animal and vegetable minds both agree, in being agents 
of operations, considered in relation to which, animal and 
vegetable organs are instruments. But the former possess 
other capacities of sensations, ideas, emotions, and acts of 
will, which do not belong to the latter. 

Vegetable minds are the agents of all vegetable organic 
action; animal minds of all animal organic action. Be- 
sides the phenomena of organic material action, human 
and animal minds are subjects of phenomena of another 
and higher order, which are objects of consciousness. 
The organic effects of minds are all exterior to their 
agents. They are effects produced on other objects. 
Sensations, ideas, &c, are within the minds which exer- 
cise them, and not any possible effects on matter. The 
action of material organs in the functions of life, is the 
remote effect of minds, through the agency of which it 
occurs. But sensations, ideas, &c, are immediate exer- 
cises of minds, and are comprehended within the same. 
They may produce effects on the bodies associated with 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 149 

the respective minds to which they belong, but they them- 
selves are purely mental. 

Minds and material bodies are capable of being known 
only as agents having certain powers. Vegetable minds 
have only certain powers of operating by means of vegeta- 
ble organs. Animal and human minds have powers of 
performing the various operations involved in organic life, 
by means of appropriate corporeal organs, and additional 
powers of exercising sensations, ideas, emotions, and acts 
of will. Minds have no power either to repel or attract 
each other, or material objects. 

The chimical elements of material objects have certain 
powers of resistance and attraction within determinate 
spheres*, according to certain laws, but have no power of 
serving as principles of organic life, or of exercising sen- 
sations, ideas, &c. 

The properties of beings are relative. This is equally 
the case both with matter and mind. Matter is capable of 
resisting and attracting matter only. It is not capable of 
producing any effects on human or animal minds, except 
through the medium of organized bodies. In cases where 
it acts on minds, the effects which it produces are sensa- 
tions. 

Minds are capable of using the various organs of hu- 
man, animal, and vegetable bodies, to accomplish their 
appropriate purposes ; but have no power to accomplish 
these purposes by any other means. They can perform 
actions by means of appropriate organs, which are impos- 
sible without organs. Human minds possess no power of 
acting, in any way, on bodies which are not organized for 
the purpose. So of animal and vegetable minds. All 
the operations which are performed by men on material 
objects, are performed by means of bodily organs, which 
are the immediate instruments of mental action. Human 
and animal minds have no capacities of exercising sensa- 
tions, except by means of bodily organs, as instruments of 
sensation, and no capacity of attaining ideas of material 
objects of any kind, except by means of sensations. 



150 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

SECTION V. 

IDEAS OF GOD. 

Ideas of phenomena lead necessarily to those of spir- 
itual and material objects, which are the subjective causes 
of these phenomena ; and ideas of spiritual and material 
objects, to those of God. Our knowledge of phenomena 
is first, then that of ourselves and other spiritual and mate- 
rial beings, which belong to this world and other parts of 
the visible universe, then that of God. Having commen- 
ced the acquisition of knowledge, we proceed naturally 
and necessarily, from phenomena to spiritual and material 
objects, and from spiritual and material objects which are 
dependent and created, to a single mind which is indepen- 
dent and uncreated, on which all that is created depends, 
and from which all created things have derived their ex- 
istence. 

The scriptures represent the existence and essential at- 
tributes of God as capable of being clearly ascertained, 
from a consideration of his works. Rom. i. 19, 20. The 
most profound philosophers of ancient and modern times, 
have concurred with the inspired writers in their opinions 
on this subject. 

Mankind generally, have believed in the existence and 
essential attributes of God, not merely on the ground of 
scriptural and traditionary instructions asserting them ; but 
on the ground of their own existence and the existence 
of other beings around them. 

The proper idea of God has reference to him as an in- 
telligent and mighty moral Being, whose existence is unde- 
lived, and therefore eternal, and who is the creator and 
governor of all other beings. The great mass of the hu- 
man family have, in all ages, believed in the existence of 
such a being. Different persons have based this conclu- 
sion on different grounds; but most have concurred in con- 
sidering their own existence, and that of other beings around 
them, as indicating the existence of God, and as inconsist- 
ent with the contrary hypothesis. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 151 

The existence of ourselves, and of other intelligent and 
voluntary beings around us, is absolutely certain. It is 
equally certain that we and other organized beings, both 
animal and vegetable, have derived our existence from oth- 
er similar beings who have preceded us ; and they theirs 
from others who preceded them ; and so on. 

Human and animal minds are not eternal. They begin 
to exist as the subjects of peculiar phenomena at partic- 
ular periods, and derive their existence from something 
which existed previously. This derivation is either from 
matter or mind. But it cannot be from matter, for matter 
has no powers of production, corresponding to this won- 
derful product. Take, for example, human or animal 
minds. Matter resists and attracts ; human and animal 
minds feel and think. Matter is without feeling or thought, 
or any power whatever of producing other matter. How 
much less can it produce beings of a higher and nobler 
order ! 

The derivation of mind from matter is, therefore, impos- 
sible. On the supposition that matter has existed from 
eternity, the derivation of minds must be traced to some 
other source. The supposed eternity of matter does not 
affect the extent and limitation of its powers. 

It follows, therefore, that human and animal minds are 
derived from mind. They are derived, and are not derived 
from matter ; therefore, they are derived from mind. Here 
we may distinguish between their immediate and ultimate 
derivation. Their immediate derivation is from other sim- 
ilar minds, just as the immediate derivation of animal and 
vegetable bodies is from other similar bodies; but their ul- 
timate derivation is from some more remote agent, who 
produces them by the instrumentality of their immediate 
predecessors, in the exercise of creative power. 

Human and animal minds do not possess any creative 
power. All they can do is to exercise certain faculties, 
which result in certain states of themselves or of other 
existing beings. All the operations of human and animal 
minds, terminate on themselves or on other beings which 
previously existed. None terminate in the creation of 



152 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

beings which did not exist before, but which continue af- 
ter their creation to exist and operate. 

Human and animal minds, therefore, are derived from 
a remote mind, possessing the power of creating minds. 
Minds are daily created. Neither matter nor pre-existing 
embodied minds have powers adequate to their production ; 
therefore, they are produced by a more remote agent, who 
possesses powers adequate to produce them. 

The product, considered both in itself and in relation to 
the circumstances in which it is produced, bears obvious 
marks of design, and proves its author to be a designing 
being; consequently, a being of knowledge, and one who 
acts from motives. Such is the clear and unembarrassed 
revelation of God, which may be inferred directly from 
human and animal minds. Vegetable minds may serve as 
grounds of similar inferences. 

The idea that the minds of successors are derived from 
those of predecessors, without requiring an act of crea- 
tion to produce them, proceeds on the assumption that 
they previously existed, but were not disengaged from the 
parent stock. On this hypothesis, their disengagement and 
establishment as separate minds, whereas before they had 
enjoyed no separate appreciable existence, are to be ac- 
counted for. How does a mind, which was previously one, 
become two, and ultimately millions, without suffering any 
d'mlnution of its powers? The disengagement of the 
mind produced, is an effect. What is the ultimate cause 
of it? That cause is not the mind from which the disen- 
gagement takes place, nor any previous mind belonging to 
the lineal succession of dependent minds. It must, there- 
fore, be another mind of a higher order; and the multipli- 
cation of minds from a pre-existing substance, in circum- 
stances which bear evident marks of design, prove, as 
before, that the ultimate cause of this phenomenon is a 
being of design, and one who acts from motives. 

Admitting that minds are created from a pre-existing sub- 
stance, and that in each successive creation there is only 
a disengagement of another being from the pre-existing 
mass; still this disengagement takes place in circum- 
stances clearly indicative of design on the part of some 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 153 

being. By this means, that more remote agent is brought 
distinctly within the sphere of human knowledge. The 
being who disengages minds successively from a pre-ex- 
isting substance, is the author of all minds by such suc- 
cessive disengagements. 

On the theory of the creation of minds from pre-exist- 
ing substances, according to existing laws, we may trace 
each line of successive organized beings to its origin in 
the beings which stand at its head. In process of time 
we should come to the first human pair, the first animal 
and insect pair, and the first vegetable of every generic 
order. 

The creation of the first human pair embraces two 
parts ; 

1. The organization of bodies out of pre-existing mat- 
ter, without modifying its properties in any way. 

2. The creation of minds, either out of a pre-existing 
substance, or else by the formation of a substance adapted 
to this purpose. 

On the supposition that there was at this time a sub- 
stance adapted to serve as a principle of organic and an- 
imal life, the creation of such a substance would have 
been unnecessary. But even in that case, the creation 
of man would exhibit the operation of a wise, powerful, 
and benevolent mind. The same would be true o r the 
creation of other organized beings, embracing every order 
of animals and vegetables. 

On the supposition that the substance of all the minds 
which actuate organized beings, existed previous to the 
creation of such beings, we have, at that time, three or- 
ders of beings ; 

1. Matter; 

2. The substance of human, animal, and vegetable 
minds ; 

3. The being who subsequently creates organized be- 
ings. One of these beings must be eternal. 

Matter is incapable of sensations, ideas, &c. The sub- 
stance which, according to the supposition, is subsequently 
made the principle of organic and animal life, and in the 
case of men and animals, a subject of sensations, ideas, 



154 MEJNTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

emotions, and acts of will, is at this time as senseless and 
unthinking as matter. The future creator of organized 
beings is alone a being of ideas, and capable of acting for 
the intentional accomplishment of pre-determined ends. 

He cannot be derived from that which is destitute of 
intelligence ; therefore he cannot have been derived either 
from matter, or the equally unintelligent mass which he 
subsequently makes intelligent ;, and must be underived 
and eternal. 

These substances, however, even on the supposition 
that they preceded the creation of organized beings, are 
not necessarily eternal. They may have been created. 
One eternal being is sufficient to account for all other be- 
ings. Therefore, one such being is all that can be proved. 
The doctrine of one eternal being is necessary. We can 
not but admit it. More than this we cannot prove. 

The doctrine of the eternity of matter, and of the sub- 
stance out of which human and animal minds are made, 
requires us to conceive of the author of organized and 
thinking beings, merely as the architect of the universe, 
not its creator in the highest sense. The architectural 
skill of God is of the highest order, and is displayed on a 
theater so vast, and in cases so numerous, and is of an 
order so refined, as to excite our highest wonder and ad- 
miration. He is not, however, the disinterested architect 
of matter. He possesses unlimited authority and power 
over it. He is the absolute proprietor of all things, and 
uses them as instruments for the accomplishment of his 
purposes. 

The properties of matter and mind are such as God is 
capable of communicating, and such as he is capable of 
taking away. The organization of matter and its accom- 
panying phenomena, indicate the agency of God as a 
being of intelligence and power, designing and producing 
them ; so matter itself, considered with respect to its es- 
sential properties of resistance and attraction, indicates, 
with equal clearness, the agency of God as its designer 
and producer. The ultimate particles of matter, exhibit 
marks of design in respect to the spheres of resistance 
and attraction, with which they are invested. The great 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 155 

law of gravitation evinces the intelligent design and the 
effective power of a lawgiver, as really as any possible 
product of human art demonstrates the skill of the artist. 
The exercise of this attraction, however, is one of the es- 
sential properties of matter, and if this property was com- 
municated by a designing mind, if it was communicated 
by God, we have reason to believe that all its properties 
were communicated by him. The same may be said of 
the other essential properties of matter, and of those which 
are particular, as well as those which are general. From 
which the inference is clearly authorized, that matter is 
created, and that God is its absolute creator. 

Each particle of matter is a being possessed of certain 
properties, which manifest a designing artificer, as really 
as organized beings. The idea that the adaptation of one 
particle of matter to others, and of the whole to the great 
and glorious ends to which they are subordinated, as parts 
of an immense material and spiritual universe, is not the 
effect of design, is absurd. If these adaptations are the 
effect of design, then matter is created, and reveals God as 
its creator. 

The same reasoning may be applied to minds. They 
are adapted to act and be acted upon, by means of organi- 
zed bodies. They possess an adaptation to other things, 
and other things to them; and especially to each other, 
and to minds of different orders; clearly proving that they 
are the effect of design, and therefore created, not eternal. 
All things indicate one and the same creator, by their 
mutual adaptations to each other. Matter is adapted to 
matter, and also to mind. Mind is adapted to mind, and 
also to matter. AH created objects are parts of one vast 
system of beings, subjected to common laws, and subor- 
dinated to similar purposes. The supposition of one God 
is necessary ; that of more than one, is not only unneces- 
sary, but without any valid evidence in its support. Every 
thing proves one God : nothing proves more than one. 

The idea we thus obtain of God, is a legitimate deduc- 
tion from certain premises, and is, therefore, certain. We 
are capable of knowing God as really as we know our- 
selves, or any other beings. 



156 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

What we know of God, comprehends the following 
particulars : 

1. That he is underived, and therefore independent and 
eternal ; 

2. That he is a being of ideas, knowledge, wisdom, 
affections, purposes, and volitions, and therefore a spirit ; 

3. That he is the creator of miaterial and spiritual 
beings, and the architect by whom the design of the uni- 
verse was conceived and executed; 

4. That he is the providential and moral governor of the 
universe, and the absolute proprietor of all spiritual and 
material beings; and that he has indefinite power to create 
and destroy ; 

5. That he is a being of benevolence and justice. 

We know matter as consisting of a definite number of 
particles, which have powers of mutual resistance and 
attraction within certain definite spheres. We know 
minds as single beings, having capacities of sensation 
from appropriate conditions of material organs, with which 
they communicate, and capacities of ideas, emotions, acts 
of will, and voluntary and involuntary corporeal action. 
We know organized beings as dependent and successive, 
and as being produced and succeeding each other, accord- 
ing to certain laws, conformable to the general laws of 
the material universe, which bear evident marks of design 
on the part of some law-giving and executive power. 

By certain inferences from what we know of matter, 
and of human and animal minds, we arrive at a knowl- 
edge of God, as the underived, eternal, independent, and 
all-wise Creator, both of material and spiritual beings. 
Having ascertained with certainty, the eternity, independ- 
ence, and spirituality of God, and his relation to organi- 
zed and unorganized beings, as their creator and govern- 
or, we easily infer his other divine attributes. 

The proper conception of God involves no absurdity, 
or impossibility. No absurd conclusions can be fairly 
deduced from it. False conceptions of him, and the con- 
ception that there is no such being, are in many cases 
absurd in themselves, and lead to many legitimate con- 
clusions, which are so. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 157 

A knowledge of God is the basis of many other impor- 
tant judgments and cognitions. It is the highest point to 
which we are conducted, by a knowledge of other things, 
and a point from which infinite discoveries are possible, 
which cannot be made from any less elevated position. 

We reason from ourselves and other beings to God, as 
universal creator and governor, and from God back to 
ourselves and other beings, as sustaining to him, and to 
each other, the most interesting and important relations. 

A complete knowledge of objects, embraces ideas of 
their relations to God, and through him, to other beings, as 
really as their direct relations to each other, and to our- 
selves. Genuine philosophy, therefore, is necessarily 
theological. It must recognize God, and contemplate all 
the objects of human knowledge, in their discoverable re- 
lations to him, and through him to each otlier. It finds 
God every where, not as a metaphysical abstraction, but 
as a real agent, possessing the most important relations to 
all other beings. Without a knowledge of God, to serve 
as grounds of farther inferences, we can know but little of 
other objects. With correct ideas of him, to reason from, 
we may pursue our discoveries beyond any assignable 
limits, and extend them from an infinite past to an equally 
infinite future. Till we arrive at a knowledge of God, all 
our reasonings must commence from ourselves and other 
beings, who belong to this world ; when we come to know 
him, they naturally commence from him, as the ultimate 
ground of all reasoning. 

A satisfactory knowledge of other things is impossible, 
without a knowledge of God. Till we attain this, the 
universe appears like an endless maze. Reason is con- 
founded at every step, and hemmed in on every side. Its 
dim light, too feeble to disperse the surrounding darkness, 
serves only to increase its gloom, and develop its horrors. 

The discovery of God explains a thousand mysteries, 
resolves a thousand perplexities, and conducts the mind to 
a foundation firm, and broad, and enduring enough, to 
serve as a basis for the most ample and magnificent super- 
structure of rational ideas. 

14 



158 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



SECTION VI. 

IDEAS OF OBJECTS NEITHER MATERIAL NOR SPIRITUAL, EMBRA- 
CING IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY, NUMBER, SPACE, AND TIME. 

1. Ideas of identity and diversity. 

As soon as we are conscious of sensations, ideas, &c, 
we begin to institute comparisons between these exercises, 
and to form judgments respecting them as identical and 
diverse. We form ideas of certain sensations and other 
mental exercises, as the same, in successive periods of 
duration, and of others, as different. Whence we deduce 
ideas of sameness and difference, or identity and diversity. 

Having obtained ideas of our first objects of thought, as 
being identical and diverse, we still more easily attain sim- 
ilar ideas respecting all our subsequent objects of thought. 
We first judge all the objects of our consciousness to be 
of these characters, and distinguish them as such, and 
then extend these judgments to spiritual and material ob- 
jects, and those which are neither spiritual nor material. 
We judge our minds or ourselves, considered as thinking 
beings, to be identical in different successive portions of 
lime, and in different places and conditions. We form 
similar judgments respecting material objects. 

On similar grounds we judge ourselves to be different 
from others of the same order of beings, and from beings 
of other orders, and judge different objects, both spiritual 
and material, to be different from each other. 

We are liable to form erroneous judgments respecting 
the identity and diversity of different objects ; but many 
of our judgments of this class are among the most certain 
that we are capable of forming. Ideas of the identity of 
ourselves, and of our diversity, considered in respect to 
other spiritual and material beings, are of this description. 
We repeat the judgments and cognitions of our identity, 
considered with respect to our past selves, times without 
number. The same is true of the judgments of our 
diversity, considered with respect to our fellow-men and 
other beings. We know that we are identical with our 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 159 

past selves of yesterday and former years, and know 
with equal certainty, that we are different from all other 
human beings. 

Our identity and diversity are intimately associated. 
They are both relative ; not absolute. We are not, in all 
respects, identical with our past selves, nor in all respects, 
diverse from others. Our identity with our past selves, 
is limited to that of our minds. We judge and know our 
minds to be the same in all successive periods of life. 
These judgments and cognitions are founded on conscious 
exercises, particularly reminiscences. No possible change 
in the size, conformation, and structure of our bodies, can 
prove a diversity in our minds. We believe on valid and 
obvious grounds, the minds of human beings to be the 
same from the first dawn of infant intelligence, till the 
dusky evening of age. 

2. Ideas of number. 

Ideas of unity and plurality, are intimately connected 
with those of identity and diversity. 

We cannot think of objects as identical and diverse, 
without forming ideas respecting them as one or more. 
From the consideration of objects, as one or more, we de- 
duce ideas of number. The element of number is unity. 
All numbers consist of units. These may be of different 
orders, or of the same order. When the units which 
make up a given number, are of the same order, the num- 
ber is simple; when they are of different orders, it is com- 
pound, or complex. Thus twenty dollars is a simple num- 
ber, consisting of units of the same order; twenty dollars, 
and twenty cents, a compound or complex number, con- 
sisting of twenty units of one order, that of dollars, and 
twenty of another, that of cents. 

Ideas of number are first judgments, and then cogni- 
tions. We know one object to be one, two objects to be 
two, and so of other numbers, till we arrive at those im- 
mensely large. Absolute infinity is not predicable of 
numbers. The idea of a number which is absolutely in- 
finite, is impossible and absurd. Relative infinity is a 
conception which enters into many important mathemati- 
cal investigations, and has often been mistaken for that 



160 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which is absolute. All the infinities of mathematics, 
however, are only relative, not absolute. They are capa- 
ble of being compared with each other, and estimated as 
more or less, and are considered as infinite, relatively to 
certain other quantities, not absolutely or relatively, to all 
possible finite quantities. That which can be expressed 
by numbers, is not absolutely infinite, because numbers 
are not so. 

3. Ideas of space. 

Ideas of space are equally peculiar and universal with 
those of bodies. We derive from touch, ideas of locality, 
and from different localities, those of extension and space. 
We form ideas of bodies as occupying space, and of 
space as that which is capable of being occupied by them. 

Finite space possesses the properties of locality, quanti- 
ty, and form, in common with bodies. Different portions of 
space occupy different localities ; consist of different 
quantities; and are of different forms. 

The locality of space is either absolute or relative. 
Absolute locality is estimated from fixed points. Rela- 
tive locality is estimated from movable objects; such as 
the sun, the earth, &c. 

The quantity of space is measured by mathematical 
solids; such as cubes, spheres, and cylinders of given 
dimensions. Cubic inches, feet, and miles are often made 
use of for this purpose. 

The forms of spaces are artificial, and are either regular 
or irregular. Cubes, spheres, spheroids, cylinders, pyra- 
mids, cones, &c, are regular spaces. Those which differ 
in any respect from these and similar spaces, in their forms, 
are irregular. 

Limited spaces are bounded by surfaces ; surfaces ter- 
minate in lines ; and lines in points. Mathematical points 
have no length ; mathematical lines, no breadth ; and 
mathematical surfaces, no thickness. Points are indivisi- 
ble ; lines may be divided indefinitely by points ; surfaces, 
by lines ; and solids, by surfaces. No possible division of 
lines can reduce them to points ; no possible division of 
surfaces can reduce them to lines ; and no possible division 
of solids can reduce them to surfaces. Points possess 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 161 

locality without extension ; lines, locality and extension in 
length; surfaces, locality and extension in length and 
breadth ; and solids, locality and extension in length, 
breadth, and thickness. The elements of lines are shorter 
lines ; those of surfaces, smaller surfaces ; and those of 
solids, smaller solids. Lineal feet consist of lineal inch- 
es ; square feet, of square inches ; and cubic feet, of 
cubic inches, &c. The conception of a lineal foot, is 
relative to that of a lineal inch ; that of a square foot, to 
the conception of a lineal foot; and that of a cubic foot, 
to the conception of a square foot. 

The conception of a line of any length, is relative to 
the lineal unit, in terms of which it is conceived ; that of 
a surface of any extent, to the superficial unit, in terms of 
which it is conceived ; and that of a solid, to the solid unit, 
4n terms of which it is conceived. The same is true of 
the expressions of similar quantities. Modes of expres- 
sion must necessarily conform to modes of conception, in 
order to be intelligible. 

The conception of lineal units is relative to that of 
points, in which they terminate. Points, therefore, are 
the ultimate principles from which we reason, in forming 
ideas of space. We reason from points, in forming ideas 
of lines ; from lines, in forming ideas of surfaces ; and 
from surfaces and lines, in forming ideas of solids. With 
ideas of points, we are compelled to form those of lines ; 
with ideas of lines and points, we are compelled to form 
ideas of surfaces; and with ideas of surfaces, lines, and 
points, we are compelled to form ideas of solids, or of 
figures, bounded by surfaces comprehending only space. 

Space is one thing, and ideas of it another. Legitimate 
ideas of space are such and such only, as correspond to 
evidences respecting the reality. 

Material objects occupy space, and serve as measures 
of different limited portions of it. We cannot compare 
different spaces, except by means of material measures of 
some kind. 

Our first ideas of space have reference to particular 
defined portions of it; as those occupied by our own 

14* 



162 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

bodies and other material objects, or those comprehended 
within the sphere of vision, &c. 

From these, we infer the existence of other portions of 
the same, which we are capable of multiplying, indefi- 
nitely. Having first attained ideas of finite space, w r e de- 
dace from these ideas of infinite space.^ Space is infinite, 
and the idea of any defined portion of it, however small, 
may serve as a principle of judgment, from which to de- 
duce ideas of its infinity. The infinity of space is one of 
its essential properties, and ideas of it arise necessarily from 
just ideas xespecting limited portions of it. Any idea at all 
of space, lays us under a necessity, if we think of it at 
all, to think of it as something which is absolutely in- 
finite. 

Ideas of infinite space are as legitimate and perfect, as 
ideas of finite space. The former, however, cannot be 
resolved into the latter. No conceivable number of limit- 
ed spaces make infinite space. The conception of space 
as consisting of numerous finite spaces, relates to the 
aggregate as finite. No possible multiplication of finite 
spaces, can make them infinite. Ideas of the finite and 
infinite are assentially different, and cannot be resolved 
into common elements. We know that certain spaces 
are finite, and have definite conceptions of them as such ; 
we know equally that all space is infinite, and have indefi- 
nite conceptions of it as such. Definite conceptions of 
the infinite, are absurd and impossible. The incapacity 
to exercise them is not a weakness incident to man; but 
is a consequence of the nature of the object to which it 
relates. 

Definite, means limited. To conceive of things as 
definite, is^to conceive of them as limited. Infinite space 
has no limits, therefore definite conceptions of it cannot 
be formed. 

Ideas of space as infinite, are deduced from those of 
finite spaces, and relate to them as grounds from which 
they are inferred ; and without which they are impossi- 
ble. Ideas of infinite spaces are relative, and relate to 
those of finite spaces. The latter are necessary to the 
former, not merely as judgments, but as conceptions. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 163 

From conceptions of space with limits, we deduce con- 
ceptions of it without limits. 

4. Ideas of time. 

From sensations, ideas, emotions, &e., w r e deduce ideas 
of time. Time is not an object of consciousness or of sen- 
sation, but of inference from the objects of consciousness. 
We are conscious of sensations, ideas, &c, and form suc- 
cessive ideas of them. They occur successively, and we 
form ideas of them as successive. They continue in ex- 
ercise during longer or shorter periods, and we form cor- 
responding_ideas of them as continuous. Ideas of time 
involve those of succession; and ideas of succession, those 
of time. Without ideas of time we can have no ideas of 
succession ; and without ideas of succession, we can have 
none of time. 

Time is, like space, a generic object of thought, which 
cannot be resolved into any other. It may be resolved into 
parts, all of which are successive; and this resolution of 
it may be prosecuted to any conceivable extent, and be- 
yond any conceivable limits. The results of all possible 
analyses are less extended portions of time, but portions of 
it which have some conceivable extension, and which sus- 
tain, definite appreciable relations to the larger portions 
from which they are obtained. The smallest portions of 
time may be divided indefinitely, and reduced to others 
proportionably smaller, all of which are successive ; but 
they can never be reduced by division to any other element. 

Ideas of time are intimately connected with those of 
identity and diversity. We distinguish the present instant, 
minute, hour, day, &c, from subsequent or previous ones, 
as diverse objects of thought. The present instant is di- 
verse from the last; and so of the present minute and 
hour. Different portions of time are conceived of as 
commencing and terminating. Seconds, minutes, and 
hours, begin and end. They have points from which 
they are reckoned, and to which they are reckoned. 
These chronological points do not\)ccupy time. They 
only separate different portions of it. 

We form ideas of our conscious exercises as continu- 
ous, and compare them with each other, in respect to this 



1 64 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

property. Some we judge to be longer, and others short- 
er. The shortest exercises of which we are conscious, 
serve as standards of comparison, to which others are re- 
duced by successive divisions. We consider these as 
units, and others as consisting of a certain number of 
these units ; or we consider the longer periods of time, 
which are indicated by regular changes in the natural 
world, as units of higher orders, and reduce them by divi- 
sions and sub-divisions, to smaller portions, consisting of 
units of lower orders. 

It is as essential a property of phenomena, to be con- 
tinuous, as it is of bodies to be extended. All phenom- 
ena are continuous, and serve as grounds of judgment, 
from which ideas of time are inferred ; just as all tangible 
objects are extended, and serve as grounds of inference, 
from which ideas of space are inferred. 

Tangible objects are the measures of space, and phe- 
nomena the measures of time. We measure time by 
conscious exercises, and also by the regular changes in 
the material world; such as the diurnal and annual revo- 
lutions ^>f the earth; the changes in the appearance of the 
moon, &c. 

Conscious exercises are the primary measures of time, 
and measure it on the same principle that they indicate it 
as an object of thought. The ultimate measure of time is 
the shortest possible exercise of consciousness. We 
compare different conscious exercises, as longer or shorter. 
From the shortest possible, we reason to such as are 
twice as long; and so on, till we arrive, by addition and 
multiplication, at periods of the greatest conceivable 
length. The longest periods are only multiples of the 
shortest. 

Ideas of days, months, years, &c, as periods of time, 
are based on those of seconds. We conceive of a day, 
as consisting of a certain number of hours, minutes, and 
seconds ; a year, as consisting of a certain number of 
days ; and an age, of a certain number of years, &c. 
Seconds, with which we commence our estimation of 
time, are the elements to which all other periods may be 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 165 

reduced, and of which they are composed. Periods of 
time are comparative in two respects : 

1. In respect to their quantity, as longer or shorter ; 

2. Tn respect to their positions, as earlier or later. 

The lengths and positions of different periods, are both 
reckoned from given chronological points, in similar terms; 
such as seconds, minutes, hours, days, &c. 

The points from which time is reckoned, bear the same 
relation to the times reckoned from them, that the points 
from which lines proceed, do to the lines which proceed 
from them. We reason from chronological points, in 
forming ideas of times, just as we do from mathematical 
points, in forming ideas of lines. Lines connect mathe- 
matical points, and times, chronological points. 

Chronological points are denominated epochs. This 
word is generally applied to denote points, from which 
long periods are reckoned in terms of shorter ones, but is 
applicable to all chronological points, from which any 
periods of time, however short, are reckoned. 

One of the most common epochs, is the present. This 
divides all time into the past and future. A large propor- 
tion of our ideas of time, have respect to it as reckoned 
from this point. This epoch is constantly advancing, and 
though highly important for many practical purposes, and 
incapable of being altogether superseded, it does not su- 
persede the necessity of others. 

A large proportion of our ideas of time, have respect to 
it as extending from the present moment, the present hour, 
the present day, year, &c. ; but we find it convenient to 
have other more general epochs, such as that of the birth 
of Christ, and of the conclusion of the work of creation ; 
and to reduce to these many of the ideas which were origin- 
ally formed from less general epochs. 

The most general division of time, is into the past and 
future. All possible periods belong to one or other of 
these divisions. The past is estimated in one direction 
from the present instant, and the future in another. The 
point from which these reckonings commence, is constant- 
ly advancing, and separating seconds, minutes, hours, days, 
years, &c, from the future, and adding them to the past. 



166 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Much that was once future, is now past ; and much that is 
now future, will ultimately be past. 

We may pursue our estimates either of past or future 
time, to any conceivable extent. Both are without limits. 
From ideas of limited portions of time, we infer that 
time of which they consist, and from other parts of which 
they are separated, is infinite. This inference is univer- 
sal and necessary. Time past is infinitely extended in 
one direction ; and time to come, in another. It has no 
natural divisions, but is divided artificially, in conformity 
with certain phenomena, which serve as points, from 
which to estimate it, and instruments, w T ith which to meas- 
ure it. 

Time, considered without respect to any artificial divis- 
ions, and as incapable of being estimated in units of any 
kind, from given points, is denominated eternity. Eterni- 
ty has no beginning, and no end, and is incapable of being 
estimated in units of the greatest conceivable duration. 
All definite periods of time, are parts of eternity ; but 
they are not parts which are capable of measuring it, be- 
cause eternity is immeasurable. The idea of eternity, as 
immeasurable, is as simple and rational as that of definite 
periods of time, considered as measurable, or as capable 
of being conceived of and expressed in terms of shorter 
periods. 

Ideas of eternity are not mere .conceptions of what 
may be, or may have been, but judgments and cognitions 
of what must be, and must have been. An eternal past 
and future are as real and valid objects of judgment and 
cognition, as days and years. 

Ideas of finite time are first, then those of eternity. 
The latter are inferred from the former, as grounds of in- 
ference, not formed out of them, as elements of imagina- 
tion. Eternity cannot be imagined till it is first inferred. 

Ideas of time are in many respects analogous to those 
of space. Both are of frequent occurrence, and mix 
imperceptibly with almost all other classes of ideas. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 167 

SECTION VII. 

IDEAS OF CAUSALITY AND DEPENDENCE. 

Ideas of causality and dependence are attained at an 
early period of life, and are common to all men. They 
are derived ultimately from a comparison of cotempora- 
neous and successive phenomena. We observe the phe- 
nomena of our minds as cotemporaneous and successive, 
and as succeeding each other in particular orders. Sen- 
sations are followed by ideas, ideas by emotions, desires, 
and volitions, and volitions by voluntary actions. From 
these and similar observations, we form ideas of the rela- 
tion of phenomena as successive, and as occuring in par- 
ticular orders of succession. 

From ideas of phenomena as successive, and as suc- 
ceeding each other in particular orders of succession only, 
we deduce other ideas respecting them as causes and ef- 
fects. The antecedence of phenomena is not their cau- 
sality, nor their relations as consequents their dependence ; 
but they are the grounds from which ideas of causality and 
dependence are deduced. We first judge and know phe- 
nomena to be successive, and then dependent. Things 
may be successive and not dependent. This is the case 
with time. All the periods of time are successive, but 
none of them are dependent. Many phenomena are suc- 
cessive, which are not dependent on their immediate per- 
ceptible antecedents. Thus, particular sensations of touch, 
sight, hearing, &c, may succeed particular thoughts and 
not depend on them, but on other appropriate causes which 
they reveal. So different phenomena in the material world, 
may follow each other in immediate succession, without 
any dependence in those which succeed, or preceding ones. 

Night succeeds day, and day night ; but neither of these 
phenomena is the cause of the other. Mere succession, 
therefore, is not the ground of the inference of causality 
in that which precedes, and of dependence in that which 
follows. This inference if legitimate, must be deduced 
from some higher grounds. The true grounds from 



168 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which it is deduced are not phenomena considered as 
successive, but considered as phenomena. Our simplest 
conceptions of phenomena as objects of consciousness, 
such as sensations, ideas, emotions, and acts of will, com- 
pel us to infer their dependence. We may think of them 
without making this inference, but our primitive ideas of 
them as phenomena, are adapted to excite other ideas of 
them as dependent. And when such ideas are once ex- 
cited, and we come to judge whether these phenomena are 
dependent or not, we are compelled to decide in the af- 
firmative. 

We first judge that certain objects of our knowledge are 
dependent, and thus obtain correlative ideas of other ob- 
jects as grounds of their dependence or causes. In the 
order of nature, causes are first, then effects; in that of 
human discovery, effects are first, then their causes. 

The process by which we infer the dependence of the 
phenomena of matter, such as resistance attraction, &c, 
is similar to that by which we infer the dependence of 
mental phenomena. Ideas of mind and matter are infer- 
ences from phenomena, considered as dependent. The 
same is true of the rational idea of God. 

Minds are one class of causes, indicated by certain phe- 
nomena, which sustain to them the relation of effects ; 
material objects are another class of causes indicated by 
certain other phenomena, which sustain to them the rela- 
tion of effects; God is the ultimate cause of all things, 
and is indicated by phenomena which sustains to him the 
relation of effects, and which point him out to the eye of 
reason as clearly, as the phenomena of organized beings 
do them, or those of unorganized beings do them. 

Causality and dependence are of several different kinds. 

1. Subjective and objective; 

2. Voluntary and involuntary ; 

3. Immediate and remote ; 

4. Concurring and exclusive ; 

5. Ultimate and final. 

(1.) Subjective and objective causes. 
Men and animals are the subjective causes of all their 
sensations, ideas, emotions, and acts of will, and of all 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 169 

their bodily actions, whether voluntary or involuntary ; and 
these sensations and other phenomena are their subjective 
effects ; that is, effects of which they are subjects. 

Material objects are the objective causes of the sensa- 
tions, perceptions, emotions, &c, which they are the 
means of exciting. All possible objects of thought are 
the objective causes of the ideas which they excite, and 
which but for them, would not have existed. One portion 
of matter is the objective cause of all those phenomena, 
such as repulsion and attraction, which it produces in 
another. In every instance of repulsion and attraction, 
one portion of matter repels or attracts, and is the subject 
of these operations ; and another is repelled or attracted, 
and is the object of these operations. 
(2.) Voluntary and involuntary causes. 
Men and animals are voluntary causes of all the effects 
which they produce by voluntary action of any kind. Thus 
men are the voluntary causes of the pain and pleasure 
which they produce, by their voluntary actions. I am the 
voluntary cause of the lines I am now writing. Men are 
the voluntary causes of numerous actions, and numerous 
artificial and natural products which they exercise a vol- 
untary agency in producing. 

Those human and animal actions which are not volun- 
tary, are involuntary effects of human and animal agency. 
The same is true of all the remote effects which result 
from them. Matter is an involuntary cause of all the ef- 
fects which it produces. The same is true of vegetable 
minds. They are causes, and produce obvious and numer- 
ous effects, but produce them involuntarily ; and are, there- 
fore, involuntary causes. 

(3.) Immediate and remote causes. 
Immediate causes stand in immediate proximity to their 
effects. Minds are the immediate subjective causes of 
sensations and ideas ; and matter, of resistance and attrac- 
tion. 

Remote causes produce their effects indirectly by means 
of other intermediate agents. Men are immediate causes 
of the effects which they produce directly, and the remote 

15 



170 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

causes of the effects which flow from their immediate 
effects. 

(4.) Concurring and exclusive causes. 

Concurring causes are inadequate, of themselves, to 
produce particular effects, but co-operate with others in 
producing them. Subjective causes concur with objective 
ones, and objective with subjective ; neither being effect- 
ive without the concurrence of those belonging to the 
other class. 

In the same manner, different subjective and objective 
causes concur with others of the same classes, and volun- 
tary causes of both the former classes, with involuntary 
ones, in producing effects which they would be inadequate 
to produce alone. 

Exclusive causes produce their effects without the con- 
currence of any others. All causes are exclusive, consid- 
ered with respect to the effects which depend upon them 
alone. Different objective causes may be exclusive of 
each other; but they cannot be exclusive of subjective 
ones, except in the case of absolute creation. God is the 
exclusive objective cause of the beings which he creates. 
Created beings may produce effects exclusive of other 
objective causes, but not exclusive of subjects on which to 
operate in the production of them. 

(5.) Ultimate and final causes. 

Ultimate causes are the last to which effects can be tra- 
ced. Men are the ultimate causes of those effects which 
originate in human agency, either voluntary or involuntary ; 
animals of those effects which originate in the agency of 
animals ; and material objects of those effects which orig- 
inate in their agency. God is the ultimate cause of those 
effects which originate in the divine agency ; and inasmuch 
as he is the absolute cause of all created beings, he is 
through them, as dependent causes, the ultimate cause of 
all effects whatever. 

Final causes aie reasons which induce voluntary beings 
to produce particular effects. The final causes of human 
and animal voluntary actions and pursuits, and of the pro- 
ducts resulting therefrom, are the ends contemplated by 
the actions, as capable of being attained by such actions, 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 171 

pursuits, and products. The final cause of study, is the 
attainment of knowledge; that 'of labor, is the attainment 
of the fruits of labor ; that of the peculiar structure of the 
eye, is the excitement of sensations by means of light, &c. 

The common property of causes is power. All causes 
possess power; and different causes possess different kinds 
and degrees of power. Particles of matter possess pow- 
ers of mutual resistance and attraction ; minds, powers of 
sensation, judgment, memory, emotion, and voluntary and 
involuntary action. 

Power is of two generic orders, creative and phenom- 
enal. Creative power belongs only to God. Phenomenal 
is common to all created beings, and to their creator. 

Phenomenal power is that which is usually expressed 
by the absolute title of power. It is called phenomenal, 
merely in distinction from that which is creative. Power 
is either voluntary or involuntary. That of unorganized 
beings and vegetables, is involuntary ; that of man and 
animals, both voluntary and involuntary ; and that of God, 
voluntary. 

Powers of the same kinds vary in degree. Material 
objects which have different powers in common, possess 
some of them in greater degrees than others, and the same 
in different degrees from those in which they are possessed 
by other beings. 



SECTION VIII. 

IDEAS OF MORAL ACTIONS AND AGENTS. 

All causes are agents, and all exercises of power in 
producing effects, may be denominated actions. Action 
is of different kinds, according to the nature of the agents 
which put it forth. That of material agents, is either 
chimical, or mechanical ; and is generally distinguished 
from the action of agents which are not material, by the 
title of physical action. 



172 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The action of spiritual agents, is either conscious or 
unconscious, and voluntary or involuntary. Sensations^ 
ideas, &c, are conscious mental actions, the production 
of involuntary motions, connected with organic life, un- 
conscious. One set of nerves is appropriated to the ser- 
vice of the mind, as instruments of voluntary corporeal 
action; and another as instruments of involuntary corpo- 
real action. 

Voluntary action is of different kinds. The most im- 
portant and obvious varieties of it, are right and wrong. 
Some voluntary actions are right, and others wrong. All 
that agree in being right, belong to one class of voluntary 
actions., and all that agree in being wrong, to another. 
Voluntary actions, belonging to both these classes, are 
distinguished from others which belong to neither, un- 
der the title of moral actions ; while those which are neith- 
er right nor wrong, are characterized as voluntary actions 
which have no moral character. 

The voluntary actions of animals and insects, are not re- 
garded as either right or wrong. Those of infants are 
similar in these respects, to the voluntary actions of ani- 
mals. Infants are not capable of moral action. They 
become capable of it only by the attainment of knowledge, 
which is appropriate to a more advanced age. 

Moral character is predicated of every species of vol- 
untary action which is performed by moral agents, such as 
ideas, affections, purposes, volitions, and corporeal actions, 
and single or complex acts. Single acts may be right or 
wrong. The same is true of courses of action involving 
a repetition of similar simple acts, and the cotemporane- 
ous and successive performance of different ones. 

In respect to moral actions, agents are the subjects of 
moral obligation. They are under an obligation to per- 
form those which are morally good, and not to perform 
those which are morally evil. Those actions which are 
performed in consequence of a moral obligation, binding 
the agent to the performance of them, are morally good, 
and those which are performed in opposition to a moral 
obligation, binding to the non-performance of them, are 
morally evil. The nature of moral actions, there fore ? both 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 173 

good and evil, is determined by the nature of moral obli- 
gation. 

Moral obligation is the obligation of moral agents to do 
right, and not to do wrong. The reasons why moral agents 
should do right and not do wrong, are the grounds of moral 
obligation. They embrace all the reasons for moral ac- 
tions. These are numerous and diversified. 

Right moral action, is that which is required by reasons ; 
and wrong moral action, that which is prohibited by rea- 
sons. In this point of view, right and wrong are synony- 
mous with reasonable and unreasonable ; and right and 
wrong moral actions synonymous with reasonable and un- 
reasonable actions. 

What we have reasons fordoing, we ought to do; what 
we have reasons for not doing, we ought not to do. All 
the actions of moral agents which are performed on ac- 
count of valid reasons for performing them, are right ; and 
all which are performed with valid reasons for not perform- 
ing them, are wrong. 

The reasons for different moral actions, are numerous 
and diversified, and are either immediate or remote. 

The ultimate reasons for all voluntary action, are pros- 
pective happiness and misery. All less remote reasons 
which intervene between these and actions, depend on 
them for their efficiency. In other words, the happi- 
ness that will be lost by individuals and communities, and 
the misery they will incur by the non-performance of cer- 
tain possible voluntary actions, are the grounds of their 
obligations to perform them. The same principle holds 
both in respect to moral aclions, and to those which are 
not moral; or in respect to those which are performed by 
moral agents and other voluntary beings. 

Actions are required which are productive of ever so little 
happiness and for ever so short a time, if that happiness 
is not overbalanced either by collateral or subsequent evils. 
Those which are productive of very great present happi- 
ness, and which continue to produce it during any assign- 
able periods are not required, if that happiness is over- 
balanced by collateral or subsequent evils originating in 
the same cause. 



174 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Ultimate gain or loss, considered with respect to happi- 
ness, are the common grounds of all obligation ; both that 
which is moral, and that which is not moral. Those ac- 
tions which are morally good, tend on the whole to the 
promotion of the happiness of their agents; in most cases 
immediately, and in all cases ultimately. But their gen- 
eric peculiarity, as moral actions, is that of a known ten- 
dency to promote the happiness of other beings. A 
knowledge of this tendency enters into the reason for our 
performing them. To perform them with a knowledge 
that they have it, and because they have it, is morally 
right ; not to perform them in these circumstances, is 
morally wrong. Beings not capable of this knowledge, 
are not moral agents. Men are the subjects of moral obli- 
igation, in respect to moral actions, both right and wrong. 
The former they are obligated to perform, and the latter 
not to perform. 

Right actions are of two kinds. 

(1.) Those which are directed primarily to the promo- 
tion of the happiness of the agent, and secondarily to that 
of other beings ; 

(2.) Those which are directed primarily to the promo- 
tion of the happiness of other beings, and secondarily to 
that of the agent. 

Those moral actions which are directed primarily to the 
promotion of the happiness of other beings, agree with 
others in being enforced by a regard to the happiness of 
the agent. The agent has some happiness to gain by per- 
forming them, and some misery to incur by not performing 
them. These gains and losses are valid grounds of his 
obligation to perform them ; and oblige him to perform 
them. 

When persons are thus obliged, those in favor of whom 
such obligations are created, are said to have correspon- 
ding rights. Parents are under moral obligations to pro- 
vide for their children and instruct them ; children have 
corresponding rights to parental care. 

Men are under moral obligations to exercise benevolence 
and justice to their fellow-men ; and have corresponding 
rights to these exercises from each other. 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 175 

Rights depend on obligations, and obligations are crea- 
ted by prospective happiness to be obtained by the agent, 
as a consequence of doing certain things, and to be lost by 
not doing them ; and by prospective misery to be incurred 
by doing certain things, and by not doing certain other 
things. The favorable effects which result to the agent 
from, doing right, may be considered as rewards ; and the 
corresponding unfavorable effects, as punishments. Ac- 
cording to this view of the subject, moral actions are sub- 
jects of rewards and punishments. All that are morally 
good are rewarded, and all that are morally evil are pun- 
ished. 

A great variety of actions are required of men, which * 
relate directly to the promotion of the happiness of other 
beings. They are required by prospective rewards and 
punishments, which are inseparably connected with the 
performance and non-performance of them. 

The performance of all morally good actions is reward- 
ed ; and the non-performance of them, and the perform- 
ance of all morally evil actions is punished. 

Agents are really gainers by those good actions which 
relate directly to the promotion of the happiness of others ; 
and losers by the neglect to perform them, and by the per- 
formance of actions of an opposite character. 

Such are our susceptibilities and faculties, and such is 
the system of government under which we are placed, that 
benevolence, justice, and veracity, are generally and great- 
ly rewarded ; and selfishness, injustice, and falsehood, gen- 
erally and severely punished. The rewards of the former 
are partly in the mind, and arise directly from its suscep- 
tibilities and powers, and the laws which regulate their 
exercise ; and are partly external. The same is true of the 
punishments of the latter. All men are gainers by virtue, 
and losers by vice. The gains of virtue commence in its 
immediate and uniform effects on the subjects of it ; and 
the punishments of vice, in its immediate and uniform ef- 
fects on the subjects of it. Both the rewards of virtue, 
and the punishments of vice, are protracted and carried out 
by the administration of numerous external benefits and 
injuries. 



176 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Many of the benefits which result from right actions, are 
such as can be attained by no other means, and many of 
the evils which result from wrong actions, are peculiar to 
those who perform them. Some of these benefits and 
evils are fully within the sphere of human consciousness 
and observation, and account for the universal attainment 
of ideas respecting the natural obligation of virtue, and the 
natural prohibition of vice. It is by this means, that men 
who have not a written law from their Creator, are " a 
law to themselves," having, within the sphere of their 
consciousness and observation, grounds of inference, from 
which to deduce the fundamental principles of virtue with 
the utmost clearness. Rom. ii. 14, 15. 

The discoveries of unassisted reason on the subject of 
rights, and obligations, and on that of moral actions gen- 
erally, are greatly extended by the scriptures. But they 
are not superseded. Ideas of right and wrong, as. dedu- 
ced from consciousness and observation, and from the ex- 
perience of human beings in this world, are necessary as 
elementary conceptions for the right understanding of the 
scriptures. 

The rights which the scriptures enforce, are, in many 
instances, those which men are fully adequate to discover, 
by deductions from their necessary consciousness and ob- 
servation. These rights they enforce by an explanation 
of their appropriate sanctions, as discoverable from expe- 
rience and observation, and by the revelation of other and 
higher sanctions of the same nature. They give no views 
of the nature of virtue and vice, or of moral good and 
evil, different from those which are attainable by the unas- 
sisted exercise of human reason. Certain ideas of moral 
good and moral evil, as qualities of moral actions, are uni- 
versal. They are as natural and necessary to the human 
mind, in the full development of its pow 7 ers, as ideas of 
unity and plurality, causality and dependence, or of mate- 
rial and spiritual beings. 

The virtue and vice of the scriptures, are the virtue 
and vice of all sound mental philosophy and common 
sense ; as really as the causality and dependence, and the 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 177 

Deity revealed in the scriptures, are the causality and de- 
pendence, and the Deity, revealed by natural means. 

Ideas of right and wrong, are inferred from our con- 
sciousness and observation, independently of any instruc- 
tion from the scriptures. The knowledge which is thus 
commenced, the scriptures afford us the means of great- 
ly extending, both by direct instructions on this subject, 
and on other related subjects which throw light upon this. 

Moral goodness and moral evil are primarily properties 
of moral actions. One class of moral actions are morally 
good ; another morally evil. 

These terms, however, are often applied to denote the 
qualities of moral agents. An agent of morally good ac- 
tions is denominated good ; and one of morally evil ac- 
tions evil. All our conceptions and denominations of 
agents, are derived from those of their actions. We infer 
the holiness or sinfulness of agents, from the correspond- 
ing qualities of their actions. So of their other qualities. 

Rights belong to all beings which are capable of happi- 
ness or misery, from the agency of moral beings; moral 
obligations to all moral beings. Animals and insects have 
rights, considered in relation to men ; and men are the sub- 
jects of moral obligation, considered in relation to animals 
and insects. Animals and insects are in many cases 
the objects of moral obligation, on the part of moral 
beings, but they are never considered as the subjects of it. 
They are supposed to be incapable of attaining those ideas 
which are necessary to serve as a basis of moral obliga- 
tion and accountability. 

Men are the objects of moral obligation on the part of 
others, from the earliest periods of their existence, and the 
subjects of it from the period of their attaining sufficient 
knowledge to be capable of distinguishing between right 
and wrong. This period is generally denominated that of 
the attainment of discretion, or of a knowledge of good 
and evil. 

God is equally, with other moral beings, both the sub- 
ject and object of moral obligation. He has invested his 
creatures with rights which he must respect. He has 



1 78 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

acted voluntarily and wisely, in making such investments. 
His " gifts and callings are without repentance," or any 
occasion for a change of counsels on his part. He cannot 
change. To do so would be to become imperfect, and 
less glorious and happy than he now is. Benevolence, 
justice, and truth, are natural to God. It is his nature to 
exercise them incessantly, impartially, and perfectly. In 
respect to them, therefore, God is as really the subject of 
moral obligation, as the creatures which he has made in his 
image. 

God is the object of moral obligation on the part of all 
moral beings to whom he is revealed. All creatures who 
know God, are under indispensable obligations to love and 
serve him. 

The rights of God, considered with relation to his crea- 
tures, have corresponding obligations in them, considered 
with relation to him. Wherever God has a right, his 
creatures are the subjects of a corresponding obligation. 
The moral obligations resting upon God, considered with 
relation to his creatures, correspond to appropriate rights 
with which they have been invested by him. 

God is the ultimate author of all rights and all moral 
obligations. He makes beings the subjects of rights and 
moral obligations, as he makes them the subjects of cau- 
sality and dependence. By creating beings capable of 
happiness and misery from the agency of moral beings, 
he invests them with certain rights which have respect to 
moral beings generally, and to himself as the highest and 
greatest of moral beings. This is still more obvious in 
respect to moral beings of his creation, than in respect to 
others. By creating moral beings and investing them with 
powers of moral agency, God includes, among other in- 
vestments, that of certain rights considered in respect to 
other moral beings, and to himself. In creating these 
rights, he creates corresponding obligations on the part of 
all the moral beings concerned, not excepting himself. 

God imposes obligations on other beings, and assumes 
them himself. He does not degrade himself by this as- 
sumption. There is nothing dishonorable in it. He makes 
it because it is according to the immutable principles of 



CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IDEAS. 179 

his nature to make it, and to act in accordance with it 
when made. 

God, like other moral beings, is good from choice. 
There can be no moral goodness which is not voluntary. 
The divine choice in favor of goodness, is founded on 
wise and valid reasons. These reasons are derived from 
the adaptations of the things chosen to promote the di- 
ving glory and felicity in higher degrees, than those to 
which they are preferred. God's glory and felicity are 
the fruits of his goodness. Were he less good, he would 
be less glorious and happy than he now is. 

God is a subject of obligation, in the same sense that 
other voluntary beings are. He is obliged to do some 
things and not to do others, by a regard to his happiness 
Those things which are required by a regard to his hap- 
piness, he does, and those which he is required by the 
same not to do, he does not do. 

God's moral actions, like those of other moral beings, 
may contribute directly to promote his own happiness, and 
indirectly that of other beings ; or directly to promote the 
happiness of other beings, and indirectly to promote his 
own. A large proportion of his actions are of the latter 
class. 

No actions are the subjects of moral obligation, which 
are not conducive to the greatest possible amount of hap- 
piness. God's highest happiness does not require him to 
do any thing inconsistent with the highest happiness of 
his moral subjects ; and the highest happiness of men and 
other moral beings, does not require them to do any thing 
which is inconsistent with the highest happiness of each 
other. On the other hand, the highest happiness of God 
does require him to do ihings promotive of the high- 
est possible happiness of holy, moral beings ; and that of 
all moral beings requires them to do things promotive of 
the highest happiness of each other. 

The harmony of the interests of moral beings in the 
performance of morally good actions, is capable of being 
easily inferred from numerous instances of such actions 
as performed by men. The idea of this harmony is 
one of the essential elements of the idea of rectitude or 



180 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY- 

moral goodness. Those actions which harmonize the in- 
terests of moral agents with those of other moral beings, 
are right, all others are wrong. Acts of benevolence, jus- 
tice, and veracity, are all of this kind. 

Moral goodness harmonizes the interests of its subjects 
with those of other beings of the same character ; not 
with those of the morally evil. 

, God's interests are in harmony with those of all holy 
beings, but not in harmony with those of the wicked. The 
same is true of the interests of all who are redeemed and 
sanctified. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 
SECTION I. 

ABSTRACTION, COMPARISON, AND SYMBOLS. 

1. Abstraction. 

To abstract, means to draw off, to separate; and ab- 
straction denotes separation, effected by removing parts 
from others to which they were previously united. 

When applied to denote a mental process, abstraction 
designates the separation of ideas from others with which 
they were associated, and the continuance of those ab- 
stracted or separated from others, after the ideas from 
which they are abstracted cease to exist in exercise. In 
every case of abstraction, some associated ideas are sep- 
arated, and one or more of them continued in exercise, 
while others cease. 

This may occur with respect to different complex ideas, 
which co-exist in the mind, or with respect to the elements 
of a single complex idea. 

We abstract complex ideas from others when, in thinking 
of various objects, we single out one, a particular man, ac- 
tion, relation, &c, from others, and employ our thoughts 
on the object of our selection, to the exclusion of all the 
rest, which were at first perceived cotemporaneously with 
this. 

We abstract a simple idea from others, when we single 
out a simple element of a complex idea, and dwell upon it in 
our thoughts, to the exclusion of all the rest. Thus, in 
thinking of a man, we may abstract the idea of his height, 
age, relations as father, child, citizen, christian, &c; or in 
thinking of gold, we may abstract the ideas of its color, 
weight, size, position, &c, from all related ideas, some of 
which at first co-existed with that which was the object of 
our abstraction. 

16 



182 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Abstraction is analogous to attention, but not synony- 
mous with it. We may exercise attention without ab- 
straction, when any single object of thought is before our 
minds. We exercise it with abstraction, when we attend 
to different parts of complex objects successively. This 
is more or less the case in all our complex thoughts, rea- 
sonings, imaginations, &c. 

In other words, abstraction is synonymous with atten- 
tion, in certain cases. The same mental processes which 
are instances of abstraction, are also instances of attention to 
particular objects of thought. The exclusive attention in 
these cases, results in that dismissal of associated ideas, 
which leaves the ideas that remain in exercise, abstracted 
from their previous accompaniments. 

The process of abstraction is constantly going on, when 
our minds are occupied at all with ideas. Some degrees 
and some instances of it are inseparable from the exer- 
cise of the mental faculties. 

This process is a constant accompaniment both of rea- 
son and the imagination. Our processes of reasoning and 
of imagining, as ' they are pursued consecutively, require 
the repeated exercise of abstraction, at each successive 
stage of development, to separate from co-existing ele- 
ments of thought, those which relate to our then existing 
purposes, and to retain them to the exclusion of others. 

2. Comparison. 

To compare, means to bring things together in fact, or 
in imagination, to ascertain the relations they bear to each 
other; or to ascertain the relations which things bear to 
each other, in the manner above specified. 

Thus we compare rules, cloths, instruments, and pro- 
ducts of every kind. In a manner analogous to this, we 
compare the various objects of perception and reason, 
whether material or spiritual, near or remote, movable or 
immovable, small or large. 

In every instance of comparison, ideas of both the ob- 
jects compared, must co-exist in the mind. Thus, in com- 
paring rules, cloths, the productions of art, &c, we must 
have ideas of the different rules, cloths, and other pro- 
ducts to be compared, in exercise at the time of making 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 183 

the comparison. The more complete and accurate these 
ideas are, the more perfect and complete will be our com- 
parison, and the more important will be the result. 

In the comparison of external objects, either of which is 
capable of being easily moved, we usually bring them to- 
gether for the purpose of obtaining the most perfect and 
definite ideas of each cotemporaneously, and by that 
means arriving at the most complete and accurate results, 
in our judgments of their various relations to each other. 
Contiguous . objects serve as cotemporaneous principles 
of suggestion, both in respect to general ideas, and to those 
which are particular and specific. 

When the objects to which ideas relate, cannot be 
brought together, we represent them by signs, and make a 
similar use of those signs in comparisons, to that which we 
otherwise make of things. 

All our ideas of number, identity, quantity, individuality, 
similarity, dissimilarity, agreement, disagreement, truth, 
falsehood, good and evil, causality, dependence and inde- 
pendence, &c, are derived from comparisons. 

Relations have respect, in all cases, to two or more ob- 
jects or classes ot objects. In order tu discover them, we 
must compare the objects between which they exist ; that 
is, we must contemplate those objects cotemporaneously. 

In all arithmetical, geometrical, and algebraical reason- 
ing, we are constantly engaged in making comparisons, 
and in discovering relations by that means. We compare 
lines, superficies, solids, and quantities of every kind; and 
discover only relations and related objects, which their 
relations indicate. 

3. The relation of symbols to mental processes. 

Visible signs of ideas, and their relations, are of great 
use in directing attention, facilitating abstraction and com- 
parison, and leading us to important and useful discoveries. 

By means of them, we prosecute successfully the stu- 
dies of arithmetic, geometry, and algebra, and perform 
with ease, various complicated processes of reasoning, in 
those sciences which would otherwise defy our utmost 
efforts. The language of these sciences is more simple, 
precise, and perfect, than that which we use in reference 



184 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to religion, politics, morals, legislation, and history. It is 
therefore better adapted to purposes of reasoning. The 
less perfect language of history, and of political and 
moral science, however, is a valuable auxiliary in reason- 
ing on historical, political, and moral subjects. 

The signs of ideas, easily suggest the ideas which they 
represent. By making use of them at every stage of our 
reasoning, to represent the objects and relations to which 
those reasonings appertain, we advance more easily, and 
with less liability to error, than without such helps. It is 
therefore useful 'in all original investigations, to write our 
premises, in order to draw correct conclusions, and our 
grounds of inference, in order to make all the important in- 
ferences which they authorize, and are adapted to suggest, 
and to avoid mistakes in drawing such as are unauthorized. 

Writing affords us great assistance in original reason- 
ing. Vocal words, expressive of our reasonings, are also 
useful, and often enable us to detect errors, into which we 
should otherwise have fallen, and to discover objects and 
relations which would otherwise have escaped our notice. 

Hence we often make discoveries, by the assisiano© of 
words, when communicating our thoughts in conversation 
or public speaking, which escaped us in the most careful, 
silent investigations. And if we follow the vocal commu- 
nication of our reasonings on any subject, with a written 
statement of the same, we generally make other discov- 
eries still. 

The use of the symbols of thought in our reasonings, 
assists us in every part of the process. It contributes to 
distinctness and accuracy in our primitive conceptions; 
aids attention, abstraction, and comparison ; and enables 
us to prolong each indefinitely. It consequently aids in 
making all the discoveries, and in drawing all the inferen- 
ces and conclusions, to which these processes are subser- 
vient. 

Vocal or written signs of ideas assist the reasonings of 
others, by suggesting objects to be compared consecutive- 
ly and simultaneously, and by indicating the relations 
which they are supposed to sustain. By these means, 
attention, abstraction, and comparison, and the attainment 
of knowledge, are facilitated. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 185 

SECTION II. 

GENERALIZATION, AND IDEAS DENOTED BY GENERAL TERMS. 

Our first ideas arise from mental exercises, which are 
objects of consciousness, and relate to those exercises. 
All others are deduced from these, and sustain to them im- 
portant relations. 

Most of the objects of thought are more or less com- 
plex, and are the subjects of different properties. This is 
the case with minds, organized and unorganized bodies, 
and with space and time. 

We consider objects of thought as one thing, and their 
several properties as others ; and distinguish these objects 
by their properties. Every property of a complex object 
is itself a distinct object of thought, and is capable of 
being compared with other properties of the same, and 
with the properties of other objects. All ideas of the 
properties of given objects, have respect to them as iden- 
tical in successive periods of time, and as diverse from 
other properties of the same. This is true of the resis- 
tances, attractions, and other phenomena of material ob- 
jects. The same objects are known as the subjects of 
several different properties, and different objects as the 
subjects of similar properties. This is the case with dif- 
ferent particles of matter, different organized and unor- 
ganized bodies, different minds, and different ideal objects. 

We observe one organized body, and ascertain several 
of its properties ; and then observe another, and ascertain 
several of its properties. We then compare the proper- 
ties of the two, and ascertain their relation to each other, 
as similar or dissimilar. Those which are similar, we 
call by similar names, and those which are different, by 
different names. A particular phenomenon of one body, 
we call attraction ; similar phenomena of others, we call 
by the same name. So of repulsion and other phenom- 
ena. That which is the subject of attraction and repul- 
sion in one case, we call matter; the subjects of similar 
phenomena in other cases, we call by similar names. 
Such is the origin of all common names. We observe 

16* 



186 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

an object in one case, and give it a name ; we observe 
other similar objects, and designate them by similar names. 
These names are common to all the different objects to 
which they are applied; and when applied to particular 
objects, represent them only. 

Common names are applied to particular objects, as the 
subjects of similar properties. They represent them, 
therefore, as possessing those properties, considered with- 
out respect to others, by which they differ from each other. 

Matter, mind, animal, man, and vegetable, are of this 
description. Man denotes a being possessing certain 
properties. It is applicable to thousands of individuals, 
but it denotes them, considered merely as the subjects of 
common properties. Different objects possessing com- 
mon properties, and called by common names, constitute 
genera. Men constitute one genus ; beasts, birds, miner- 
als, ideas, affections, and all objects which are the subjects 
of common properties, and which are called by common 
names, others. 

Objects are named with reference to those properties 
which are considered particularly important; generally 
with reference to those which are obvious, or which are 
capable of being easily ascertained. All properties, how- 
ever, which belong to them in common, are the grounds of 
common appellatives and predicates, and of correspond- 
ing classifications. 

The properties of objects which are the foundation of 
common names, are more or less general. Names which 
denote objects, considered only as subjects of the most 
general properties, are applicable to all objects which pos- 
sess those properties. Those which denote them, consid- 
ered as the subjects of less general properties, are appli- 
cable to all objects which possess those less general prop- 
erties. Thus the name, being, is applicable to any object 
which exists, either material or spiritual ; man is applica- 
ble to any individual of the human race, either old or 
young, male or female ; wise man, to any man of the par- 
ticular character denoted by this compound appellative. 

Names describe objects as the subjects of certain prop- 
erties, but they do not describe all their properties. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 187 

Those which are common to the greatest variety of ob- 
jects, embrace the fewest properties, and those which are 
restricted to the smallest vaiiety of objects, the greatest 
number of properties. Being is applicable to a greater 
variety of objects than man, or animal ; and denotes them, 
considered as the subjects of proportionably fewer prop- 
erties. 

Proper names denote objects, as individuals, without 
reference to any properties which they possess in com- 
mon with others, except individuality. When particular 
proper names, however, are appropriated to objects of 
particular classes, to the exclusion of others, they desig- 
nate them, not merely as individual objects of thought, but 
individuals of particular classes. 

Those objects which agree in the possession of com- 
mon properties, and which are called by common names, 
constitute one genus or species. Beings are one genus, men 
another, ideas another. When the objects which consti- 
tute a genus, are distinguished from each other by common 
names and common properties, they are denominated sub- 
ordinate genera or species. Thus spirits and bodies both 
belong to the genus of beings, and constitute subordinate 
genera or species of the same. 

Genera which comprehend other subordinate ones, are 
denominated higher or superior, and those which they com- 
prehend, lower or inferior. The highest genus is distin- 
guished from all others, under the title of ultimate. 
Those which are next in order to any other genus, are de- 
nominated proximate, and proximate inferior or superior. 
Thus the genus of spirits is proximate inferior to that of 
beings, and the genus of beings proximate superior to 
those of spirits and bodies. 

Species is generally used to denote an inferior genus. 
It does not differ from genus in any other respect. The 
same class of objects is often called a species, considered 
with reference to the individual objects which it embraces, 
and a genus, considered with reference to subordinate spe- 
cies or genera. 

Generic appellations and predicates, denote objects as 
individuals, but as individuals possessing certain proper- 



188 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ties in common with other individuals of the same class. 
Those of the highest orders, denote objects to which they 
are applied, considered as possessing only the properties 
common to all objects of those orders; those of the lower 
orders denote objects, considered as possessing all the 
properties of the superior orders, together with additional 
ones. Generic appellations of the highest order, denote 
objects, considered as possessing certain properties ; those 
of the proximate inferior orders, denote them, considered 
as possessing all the properties denoted by those of the 
superior order, together with some additional ones, and so 
on ; appellations of each successive inferior order, deno- 
ting objects, considered as possessing all the properties of 
the next superior one, together with some additional ones. 

The highest genus comprehends every thing in one 
class. This is divided into different subordinate genera, 
and those into others still, and so on, till we arrive at the 
lowest orders of things. 

All names or appellatives, which are applicable to more 
than one object, are of a generic character, and denote ob- 
jects as possessing properties which are common to a 
class of objects. The same is true of all the predicates 
which are affirmed or denied of subjects in propositions. 
Common predicates, of every kind, are similar to common 
names. 

Having formed ideas of individual objects, as possess- 
ing generic properties, we form ideas of genera, as con- 
sisting of a number of such objects. The idea of a sin- 
gle object, as possessing properties which are common to 
several, is the element of the idea of a genus. 

A number of similar objects, such as inches, feet, men, 
beings, &c, is just as legitimate an object of conception, 
as a single object of the same kind. It is one thing con- 
sisting of individuals more or less numerous, all of which 
have certain properties in common. The power of form- 
ing such ideas is mysterious, but no more so than that of 
forming any ideas at all. Ideas of several objects, consid- 
ered as constituting one class, are of the same nature as 
ideas of single objects, considered as possessing different 



THE ELEMENTS GF REASONING. 189 

properties, or of an object possessing only a single prop- 
erty, if any such exists. 

Generic appellatives and predicates correspond to gen- 
eric properties and phenomena. Language is the creature 
of ideas, and is neither more nor less than they make it. 
Ideas which embrace common elements, or which relate 
to objects having common properties, considered as hav- 
ing those properties, are represented by common names 
and predicates. 

Common names and predicates are the principal vehicle 
of verbal communication. All verbal communications 
may be resolved into these, as their only essential elements. 



SECTION III. 

A LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSES. 

Every speaker and writer is the constructor of oral and 
written discourses. 

Discourses may be resolved into generic parts, denom- 
inated syllogisms; syllogisms into propositions constitu- 
ting premises and conclusions ; and propositions into 
terms and connectives. Terms are the ultimate elements 
of all verbal reasoning. These, with proper connections, 
constitute propositions; propositions constitute syllogisms; 
and syllogisms, discourses. 

1. Logical terms. 

Logical terms consist of single words, or of two or 
more words associated in particular phrases, which repre- 
sent the objects of ideas. Any word or phrase which rep- 
resents an object of thought, may serve as a logical term, 
and is such, whenever it is used in discourses. The ex- 
pression of ideas by words, takes place only by means of 
words used as logical terms, or as representatives of cer- 
tain objects of thought. Those terms which consist of 
single words, such as mind, matter, space, and time, are 
denominated simple terms ; those which consist of two or 
more words associated in the same phrase, such as many 



190 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

minds, large bodies, and separate spaces, are denominated 
complex. 

Considered with respect to quantity, terms are of three 
orders; particular, indefinite, and universal. 

(1.) Particular terms consist of words and phrases, 
which are used to denote particular objects of thought, to 
the exclusion of all others. They consist either of proper 
names, or of common names, used in a restricted sense ; 
such as Adam, Abraham, Rome, London, this man, that 
tree ; meaning, in all these cases, particular objects of 
thought, to the exclusion of all others, however similar. 

(2.) Indefinite terms consist of words and phrases, 
which are used to denote particular objects, without being 
restricted to them exclusively; as beings, creatures, men; 
denoting objects of particular classes, but not distingush- 
ing them from others of the same classes. 

(3.) Universal terms comprehend common names, ap- 
plied to denote all the objects of their respective genera, 
such as all things, every man, no act. 

2. Propositions. 

Propositions consist of logical terms and connectives. 
The terms respecting which any things are affirmed or de- 
nied, are denominated the subjects of propositions ; and the 
terms which express what is affirmed or denied respecting 
the things signified by other terms, their predicates. All 
logical terms are either subjects or predicates of proposi- 
tions. Many propositions have no connectives separate 
from their predicates; as God exists, the sun declines, vir- 
tue adorns its possessor. In a thousand similar cases, the 
predicates perform the office of connectives, in addition to 
that of predicates, and are capable of being resolved into 
separate predicates and connectives; as God is existing, 
the sun is declining, &c. 

Simple propositions contain but one subject and one 
predicate ; those which have more than one of either of 
these terms, are complex. All complex propositions may- 
be resolved into simple ones. God is good; virtue is ami- 
able ; and vice is disgusting, are simple propositions; 
God is wise and good ; virtue is amiable and useful ; and 
vice is disgusting and ruinous, are complex propositions. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 191 

The most important properties of propositions, are qual- 
ity and quantity. 

Considered with respect to quality, propositions are of 
two orders, affirmative and negative. God is good ; wis- 
dom is both desirable and attainable ; study is an essential 
pre-requisite to the attainment of wisdom, are affirmative 
propositions; men are not infallible ; knowledge is not at- 
tainable without study; the mind is not material, are neg- 
ative. The same ideas may, in many cases, be expressed 
either affirmatively or negatively. These different modes 
of expression, however, are seldom exactly synonymous, 
but serve as grounds of inference, from which correspond- 
ing ideas, answering to propositions of an opposite quali- 
ty, may be inferred. Thus the proposition, God is just, is 
not exactly synonymous with the corresponding negative 
proposition, God is not unjust. 

Either of these propositions if established, however, 
may serve as a ground of inference, from which to deduce 
the other. If God is just, it follows that he is not unjust ; 
and if he is not unjust, it follows, since he is a moral 
agent, that he is just. 

The same predicate cannot be correctly affirmed and 
denied of the same subject. The same is true of all 
equivalent subjects and predicates. The same and equiv- 
alent subjects, may have different, but not contradictory 
predicates, and equivalent predicates may, in all cases, be 
exchanged without involving error or absurdity. 

Considered with respect to quantity, propositions, like 
logical terms, of which they consist, are of three orders; 
particular, indefinite, and universal; those whose subjects 
are particular, are particular ; those whose subjects are in- 
definite, are indefinite ; and those whose subjects are uni- 
versal, are universal. 

Most indefinite propositions may be reduced to univer- 
sal or particular ones; and many are indefinite in form, 
when they are universal or particular in signification. 

Propositions are categorical or hypothetical. 

Categorical propositions relate to their objects as real; 
hypothetical ones, as imaginary or supposable. Peter 
was an apostle ; wisdom is desirable ; and matter is ex- 



192 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tended, are categorical propositions. Had Peter been a 
philosopher; if wisdom was universal; if all men were 
enlightened, are hypothetical propositions. 

Categorical propositions are subdivided into pure and 
modal. Those which predicate something of a subject 
simply, without qualification, are pure ; others are modal. 
The modality of propositions is frequently expressed by 
may, can, must, ought, &c. 

Hypothetical propositions are either conditional or dis- 
junctive. 

3. Syllogisms. 

Syllogisms consist of propositions and connectives, so 
arranged as to lead, by consecutive judgments, from prem- 
ises to conclusions. 

Propositions that express ideas, from which others are 
deduced, are denominated premises; those which express 
ideas deduced from the ideas expressed by other proposi- 
tions, conclusions. Discourses may be resolved into as 
many syllogisms as they contain conclusions from ideas 
expressed by other propositions. 

Syllogisms are of two generic orders, each of which 
consists of two species ; (1.) Regular and irregular syllo- 
gisms; (2.) Simple and compound syllogisms. 

(1.) Regular and irregular syllogisms. 

Regular syllogisms consist of three propositions, the 
last of which is deduced from one of the other two, in 
conformity with a rule of judgment expressed by the 
other. The following are examples of regular syllogisms : 

1. All moral agents ought to be holy ; 

2. All men are moral agents ; 

3„ Therefore all men ought to be holy. 

1 . No man is infallible ; 

2. Popes are men ; 

3. Therefore popes are not infallible. 

1. All men are fallible ; 

2. The wisest and most learned are men; 

3. Therefore the wisest and most learned are fallible. 
It is essential to regular syllogisms, that the subjects of 

their major premises should be universal terms, compre- 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 193 

hending those of their conclusions, as subordinate genera, 
or individuals. The minor premise asserts the relation of 
the subject of the conclusion, as a subordinate genus, or 
individual, comprehended in the subject of the major. 
Thus, if the major premise relates to all men, every man, 
or no man, the minor asserts that its subject is a man, or 
an individual belonging to a class of men. When no ob- 
jection lies against the minor premise, the conclusion 
necessarily follows from the major, because the subject of 
it is comprehended in that of the major, and is really the 
subject of the conclusion which that expresses. 

The subject of the major premise is a universal term, 
which has the same thing predicated of it, that is predica- 
ted of the conclusion. The subject of the minor premise 
is a particular term, which has the subject of the major 
premise predicated of it; the subject of the conclusion is 
the same as that of the minor premise, and its predicate 
the same as that of the major. 

The process of reasoning has generally been explained, 
since the time of Aristotle, as follows : 

In major premises, we form judgments and cognitions, 
having respect to genera and species ; in minor premises, 
we ascertain the relation of objects as species belonging to 
the genera referred to in the major premise, or as individ- 
uals belonging to the species referred to in the same ; and 
in the conclusion, we judge the predicate of the subject 
to belong to it, because that subject belongs to a class of 
objects to which the same predicate belongs. 

The general course of the mind, however, in reasoning, 
is the very opposite of that here stated. Instead of be- 
ginning with general judgments, and descending by analy- 
sis to particular ones, in those trains of thought which are 
expressed by discourses, and in all others, we begin with 
particular judgments, and ascend to general ones. The 
general does not produce the particular, but the particular 
the general. Particular judgments and cognitions are the 
source and basis of general ones; not general judgments 
and cognitions of particular ones. 

We infer particular ideas from others. But those 
from which we infer them, sustain to them, in all cases, 

17 



194 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

the relation of minor premises, having the ideas inferred, 
for their conclusions. 

The real grounds from which conclusions are inferred, 
in regular syllogisms, and in all other modes of speech, 
are their minor premises. Thus, from ideas of men as 
moral agents, we infer that they ought to be holy ; from 
ideas of popes as men, we infer that popes are fallible ; 
and from those of wise men as men, we infer that wise 
men are fallible. When the same ideas are inferred from 
different grounds, they have different minor premises. 

The agreement of a judgment with others which we have 
previously attained respecting similar objects, is the ob- 
ject of an additional judgment respecting it, and subsequent 
to it, in the order of time ; but not the foundation of it. 

Conclusions are usually deduced from minor premises, 
before they are compared with the similar judgments ex- 
pressed by majors. 

The idea of one man as a moral agent, suggests ideas 
of other men, and of other men as moral agents or not. 
When we form this judgment in respect to any particular 
men, it is natural to consider whether we have done so in 
regard to other men or not. If we have judged many in- 
dividuals to be moral agents, and especially if we have in- 
ferred the moral agency of all men on previous occasions, 
those previous judgments may be referred to as criterion^ 
by which to ascertain the validity of present judgments on 
subjects of a similar nature. 

From ideas of particular objects, as the subjects of 
generic properties, we infer directly all those conclusions 
which have reference to them as possessing those proper- 
ties. We do not infer these conclusions in one case, mere- 
ly because we have done it in others, or because we have 
previously formed general conclusions on the same sub- 
jects, but because they are legitimate deductions from the 
premises in question. Other similar premises may serve 
as grounds of other similar inferences; but these, and 
these only, are the grounds of appropriate inferences 
which depend on no other premises. 

Minor premises describe certain subjects, by predicating 
of them certain properties, such as man is fallible; God is 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 195 

eternal ; matter is created. Conclusions express certain 
inferences or deductions made from these subjects, as de- 
fined in their minor premises. The minor premise is a 
definition, and the conclusion an inference from the ob- 
ject as defined. Those conclusions which are deduced 
from ideas of objects, as defined in minor premises, are 
legitimate; those which are not deduced from ideas of 
them as thus defined, are not legitimate. It is a common 
error to define objects in minor premises, as having cer- 
tain properties, and to infer conclusions from them, as hav- 
ing other properties different from those specified in their 
definitions. 

When conclusions are inferred from objects considered 
as possessing properties not specified in the minor premi- 
ses, from which they are deduced, they are illegitimate. 
Illegitimate conclusions, are either correct or incorrect. 
When they are inferred from ideas of objects as possess- 
ing properties which they really do possess, though these 
properties are not specified in their minor premises, they 
are correct. When they are inferred from objects consid- 
ered as possessing properties which are imaginary, they 
are incorrect. 

Legitimate conclusions are correct or incorrect, accord- 
ing as the definitions from which they are deduced, are so 
or not. No legitimate conclusions deduced from correct 
minor premises, can be erroneous ; and all illegitimate 
conclusions which are inconsistent with them, must be 
erroneous. 

Every possible idea may be expressed in the form of a 
minor premise, and serve as a ground of inference from 
which to deduce other ideas which shall sustain to it the 
relation of conclusions. 

Every legitimate conclusion from a minor premise, may 
be fortified by the addition of a major, showing its con- 
formity with other judgments in respect to similar ob- 
jects. Such fortification of them is necessary for the 
greater satisfaction of the persons forming them, and for 
the assistance of others in attaining them ; by showing 
that they are in conformity with general rules of judg- 
ment. 



196 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The addition of a major premise answers the purpose 
of a criterion, by which to test our particular judgments, 
and determine their legitimacy or illegitimacy. 

The necessity of major premises arises from our liabil- 
ity to form illegitimate judgments. The general mass of 
judgments serve as rules by which to ascertain the validity 
of particular ones. 

The judgment that one moral agent is accountable, is 
fortified by the fact that it is conformable to the uniform 
tenor of our past judgments in relation to moral agents. 
So of all other particular judgments. Major premises 
are essential parts of rational discourse, and serve to dem- 
onstrate the legitimacy of particular conclusions, in cases 
where they are not obvious without such demonstration. 
Obvious conclusions do not require any demonstration of 
this kind. Those which are not obvious, are often made 
attainable by this means, when otherwise they would not 
be so. A major premise adds every thing to an argument 
which the nature of the case admits. The minor premise 
serves as a ground of inference, and as an independent 
principle of judgment. The major premise expresses the 
general judgments of the human mind, respecting subjects 
of the same class, considered with respect to predicates 
of the same class. If the former agrees with the latter, 
it must be correct, because the judgments of the human 
mind, in regard to any class of subjects generally, would 
not agree, unless they were legitimate. 

We reason first from particular, to general similar con- 
clusions; and then make use of those general conclusions 
as tests of the legitimacy of particular ones, under the 
title of major premises. 

The major premises of syllogisms ought not to be de- 
nominated premises., but rules of judgment. They com- 
prehend conclusions of the same kind as those which they 
axe adduced to confirm; and their natural position in argu- 
ments, is after the conclusions which they contribute to 
establish, but which they do not originate. The natural 
order of propositions in syllogisms, is ; (1 .) The minor or 
real premise; (2.) The conclusion ; (3.) The general rule 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 197 

showing the validity of the conclusion; (4.) The applica- 
tion of the general rule. Thus : 

(I.) Premise. Justice is morally good ; 

(2.) Conclusion. Therefore it is conducive to the high- 
est possible happiness of the agents and other moral 
beings ; 

(3.) General rule. All morally good actions are condu- 
cive to the highest possible happiness of the agents and 
other moral beings ; 

(4.) Therefore this particular judgment is analogous to 
others on the same subject, and on similar subjects. 

The relation of major premises or rules of judgment, to 
conclusions, is properly the subject of a fourth proposition, 
which is not unfrequently expressed, and always implied 
when not expressed. 

Syllogisms, having only single premises expressed, are 
denominated irregular. Irregular syllogisms agree with 
regular ones, in having conclusions expressed, and minor 
premises either expressed or implied. Where there is no 
conclusion expressed, there is no syllogism, and there can- 
not be a conclusion without a minor premise from which 
it is- deduced. These, however, are often omitted in dis- 
courses where the conclusions deduced from them are 
stated in connection with their major premises, or general 
rules of judgment. 

Men are moral agents : Therefore they ought to love 
God, is a syllogism without the major premise: and, 

Moral agents ought to love God : Therefore men ought to 
love him, is a syllogism with the minor premise implied. 

(2.) Simple and compound syllogisms. 

Simple syllogisms contain but one conclusion and one 
minor premise. Compound syllogisms contain more than 
one conclusion, and the same number of minor premises, 
either expressed or implied, as conclusions. All com- 
pound syllogisms may be resolved into simple ones. 

We obtain conclusions only by contemplating ideas 
from which they are deduced ; and having obtained them 
once, we repeat them indefinitely by the same means by 
which we obtained them. The only essential condition 

17* 



198 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 

of judgments, therefore, is ideas from which to deduce 
them. These ideas are expressed by minor premises 
only ; never by majors. Ideas deduced from those ex- 
pressed by the major premises of other conclusions, sus- 
tain to those premises the relations of conclusions to mi- 
nor premises. The immediate grounds of inferences sus- 
tain to them the relations of minor premises. 



SECTION IV. 

MATHEMATICAL REASONING. 

The object of mathematical reasoning is quantity, by 
which is meant, any thing that can be measured or estimated 
as one or more. Lines, superficies, solids, motions, forces, 
days, and years, are quantities. The principal objects of 
mathematical investigation are, space, motion, force, and 
time. Force and motion are correlative objects, inasmuch 
as force is a cause of motion, and is estimated by 
the amount of motion which it is capable of producing. 
Motion is measured in terms of space and time. 

The following are the principal branches of mathemat- 
ical science. 

1. Arithmetic, the processes of which are performed by 
numbers ; 

2. Algebra, the processes of which are performed by 
letters and other signs ; 

3. Geometry, which relates to magnitude or extension, 
embracing lines, surfaces, and solids ; 

4. Trigonometry, which relates to triangles ; 

5. Conic sections, which relate to the peculiar figures 
generated by sections of cones, embracing ellipses, hyper- 
bolas, and parabolas ; 

6. The Differential and Integral Calculus, which prose- 
cutes the investigation of quantities of sensible magni- 
tudes by means of indefinitely small elements. 

The various modes and relations of quantity have been 
objects of attention and study from the earliest periods of 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 199 

the world. Many of them were discovered and taught in 
the schools of ancient philosophers and mathematicians, 
as important matters of information and mental discipline, 
long before the commencement of the Christian era. 
Since the revival and more general diffusion of learning, 
in modern times, many new discoveries have been made 
in this department of science, its bounds greatly enlarged, 
and its utility greatly increased. 

In mathematical investigations three things are to be 
distinguished; 

1 . The fundamental ideas or conceptions with which we 
commence ; 

2. The processes of investigation ; 

3. The results or conclusions. 

1 . The fundamental ideas with which we commence, 
and from which we reason in mathematical investigations. 

We cannot reason without something to reason from. 
The ideas which we reason from in mathematics, are ex- 
pressed by definitions. On account of their relation to 
these ideas, definitions are the foundation of mathematical 
knowledge. This honor belongs properly, however, to the 
ideas, not to the definitions which represent them. The 
unit is the fundamental idea of arithmetic ; ideas of lines, 
planes, triangles, quadrilaterals, &c. ; circles, or other cur- 
vilinear surfaces, and solids of various forms, are the fun- 
damental ideas of geometry, trigonometry, conic sections, 
&c. 

The definitions with which we commence the study of 
different branches of mathematics, relate to the funda- 
mental ideas from which we reason, in pursuing the 
study of the same. They are of no other use than to 
give us those ideas, and to enable us to keep them stead- 
ily in view. Those ideas are not derived primarily from 
definitions. They are first formed as acts of judgment, 
inferring them from certain other ideas; then defined, and 
thus communicated by verbal signs. 

2. The processes of investigation in mathematics. 
These are certain modes of analyzing and comparing 

given ideas and of operating with them, for the purpose 



200 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of arriving at certain results. They are of two kinds, 
relating to theorems and problems. 

Theorems are propositions or truths, which become evi- 
dent by trains of reasoning called demonstrations. The 
following are examples of theorems in geometry : " All 
right angles are equal to each other : Any side of a trian- 
gle is less than the sum of the other two: Every diameter 
divides the circle and its circumference into two equal 
parts." 

Problems are operations to be performed. The per- 
formance of them is called a solution. The following are 
examples of problems in geometry. " To divide a given 
straight line into two equal parts : At a given point in a 
straight line, to erect a perpendicular to that line : To find 
the center of a given circle ; To inscribe a circle in a tri- 
angle." 

All investigations in mathematics, from the simplest 
processes of arithmetic to the most intricate ones of the 
integral calculus, consist either of theorems to be proved, 
or problems to be solved. 

The demonstration of theorems is first, and the solution 
of problems last. The modes of reasoning in respect to 
both, are substantially the same. 

The first propositions in the different branches of math- 
ematics, are inferred from the fundamental ideas of the 
same expressed by definitions, and subsequent proposi- 
tions from previous ones ; and so oil indefinitely. Every 
new inference -or judgment serves as a basis for others, 
and those for others still. 

The objects of strict mathematical reasoning are purely 
ideal. Its lines are extended only in length ; its surfaces 
only in length and breath; its curves and solids, &c, are 
all perfect in their kinds and independent of material ob- 
jects. 

Axioms are universal truths, which are not necessary to 
any department or instance of mathematical reasoning, as 
truths to be reasoned from, or grounds of inferences ; but 
serve merely as rules of judgment or inference, precisely 
as the major propositions do in syllogisms. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 201 

Thus the proposition, that the whole is greater than any 
of its parts, which is an axiom in geometry, sustains the 
relation of major premise to all those conclusions, in 
which particular wholes are concluded or judged to be 
greater than any of their parts. So the axiom that two 
quantities, each of which is equal to a third, are equal to 
each other, serves as a major premise in all cases in which 
two particular quantities are concluded or judged to be 
equal, because they are each equal to a third quantity. 

Propositions may, in most cases, be proved in different 
modes ; single modes of proof, however, are sufficient to 
establish them. 

The characters and signs made use of in mathematical 
investigations, represent, first, the fundamental ideas rea- 
soned from ; secondly, the inferences successively drawn 
from them ; thirdly, the conclusions or ultimate inferences ; 
and fourthly, the modes of analysis and comparison by 
which inferences are attained. Thus figures represent 
modes of unity and plurality or numbers ; diagrams rep- 
resent lines, triangles, squares, circles, cubes, spheres, 
cones, &c. 

Direct mathematical demonstrations commence with 
certain judgments, which are either intuitive or previously 
demonstrated, and which serve as principles to be reason- 
ed from. From these principles one consequence is infer- 
red and added to the same, as an additional principle for 
farther reasoning ; from one or more of the principles 
thus increased, another inference is drawn, and added to 
the same as an additional principle for farther reasoning; 
and so on, till the conclusion is attained. The conclu- 
sion is the last of a train of inferences, commencing with 
the truths assumed at the outset, as either intuitive or 
already proved. 

Analytical demonstrations in mathematics, commence 
with the assumption of the proposition to be proved as true. 
From this proposition one or more inferences are drawn, 
and added to the same as joint principles of farther rea- 
soning. From one or more of these, other inferences are 
drawn and added to the same ; and from one or more of 
the whole thus increased, others still, till some consequence 



202 MENTAL PHTLOSOrHY. 

is attained which is intuitively or demonstratively true or 
false; from which it is inferred, that the proposition assum- 
ed from which that true or false inference is legitimately 
deduced, is accordingly true or false. 

Those assumptions, any legitimate inference from which 
is true, are themselves true ; and those, any legitimate in- 
ference from which is false, are themselves false. 

Analytical demonstrations consist of consecutive judg- 
ments, in all respects similar to those of synthetical ones. 
The only difference between these two modes of proof is, 
that the latter proceeds from certain premises to a direct 
conclusion, in favor of the truth demonstrated ; the former 
proceeds from assumed and conjectural premises, to any 
intuitive or demonstrative truth ; from which the truth of 
the premises is inferred on the principle or according to 
the rule, that a correct mathematical inference or judg- 
ment cannot be deduced from premises which are incor- 
rect ; or that an error in mathematical premises must vi- 
tiate all the legitimate inferences or deductions which are 
drawn from them. 

The letters of the alphabet represent numbers, lines, 
surfaces, or solids ; and the signs plus +, minus — /equal- 
ity =, &c, represent addition, substruction, and equality ; 
and indicate the processes to be performed in order to at- 
tain certain results. 

Demonstrations are of two kinds, direct or indirect. 
By the former, we prove propositions to be true ; and by 
the latter, we prove that they cannot be false. Both are 
equally certain in their conclusions, and one or the other is 
preferable in particular cases, according as the truth in 
such cases is most easily ascertained by direct or indirect 
methods of investigation. Some propositions can be easily 
proved by indirect demonstrations, which it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to demonstrate directly. Direct demon- 
strations are denominated synthetical, and indirect ones 
analytical. 

Truths which are ascertained by a single act of judg- 
ment are intuitive, and do not require to be demonstrated. 
Demonstrations consist of successive judgments, the first 
of which is based on a fundamental idea expressed by a 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 203 

definition, or on a theorem previously demonstrated ; the 
second depends on the first ; the third on the second ; and 
so on till the last. The last of the series of inferences 
or judgments in a demonstration, is called the conclusion, 
and is of the same nature as those which preceded, con- 
sidered as a mental exercise. 

Signs of any kind are not necessary to the attainment 
of the fundamental ideas on which the different branches 
of mathematical science are based, or to the discovery of 
mathematical truths by demonstrations. 

Ideas of unity and space are independent both of w r ords 
and other artificial signs. The same is obviously true of 
additions and substractions, analyses and comparisons, by 
which all the various discoveries possible in this depart- 
ment of inquiry are effected. We can add, substract, 
analyze, and compare, without making any use of words 
or any other signs. This is often done, and done to a 
greater extent by some than by others. The most ac- 
complished and able mathematicians, depend least on 
signs to aid them in their processes of investigation, and 
the least accomplished and least able, depend most on 
them. 

Signs, however, are of great use to all. To the nov- 
ice, and to those of second rate abilities, they are of 
the greatest necessity. Such can do nothing without 
them ; and they facilitate the prosecution of extended and 
difficult investigations, by the most profound mathematical 
scholars. By means of them, one person enables others 
to pursue the same trains of mathematical enquiry pursued 
by himself, and to attain the same results, when without 
such aids, the prosecution of those trains of reasoning by 
the persons in question, would be impossible. By the same 
means, the most perfect masters of mathematical science 
are enabled to advance much more rapidly, and to pur- 
sue their investigations to a much greater extent, than 
would otherwise be possible. 

Written demonstrations consist in the expression of the 
fundamental ideas reasoned from, with signs indicating 
the processes of analysis, comparison, &c. ; by which 
successive judgments are attained, and the expression of 



204 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

all those judgments in their order, terminating in the con- 
clusion. 

The signs made use of, may be figures, letters, or dia- 
grams. They are of no consequence, except as they 
express ideas, and express them clearly. 

Written solutions bear the same relation to problems, 
which written demonstrations do to propositions or theo- 
rems, and consist of similar signs similarly arranged. 

Demonstrations and solutions are easy or difficult, ac- 
cording as the signs used to designate the fundamental 
ideas, to denote the processes of analysis, comparison,, 
&c. ; and to express the different consecutive judgments 
or inferences, are easy or difficult to be understood ; and 
according as the judgments themselves are easy or diffi- 
cult. It often happens, that the signs made use of to in- 
dicate the reasoning processes and to express the results, 
are perfectly intelligible, when the judgments themselves 
are difficult. Continual and intense study of difficult 
mathematical reasonings, and the repeated consideration 
of demonstrations and solutions generally, lead to an ulti- 
mate understanding of them in many cases in which they 
would otherwise be incapable of being understood. 

The first step in the investigation of demonstrations and 
solutions, is to understand perfectly the signs made use of, 
then to perceive the relations which they express. It is 
one thing to understand the sign of equality or other re- 
lations between two or more quantities, and another to per- 
ceive from an analysis and comparison of the quantities 
themselves, that they are really equal. 

All mathematical judgments are deduced from ideas of 
the quantities to which those judgments appertain. We 
must, therefore, have perfect conceptions of these, in or- 
der to be qualified to reason about them. Having attained 
precise and accurate conceptions of the quantities to be 
investigated in any demonstration or problem, we must 
next analyze, compare, and judge respecting them, accord- 
ing to the nature and conditions of the cases. 

These analyses, comparisons, and judgments, require 
time and attention proportionable to their abstruseness and 
intricacy ; and in the inverse ratio of the skill and experi- 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 205 

ence of the student in prosecuting similar processes of 
reasoning. The novice in mathematical reasoning, ad- 
vances slowly and with difficulty, where the student of 
six months' experience in similar investigations, advances 
rapidly and with ease. Students of many years' experi- 
ence, possess similar advantages over those who have 
prosecuted mathematical studies during shorter periods. 

S. The results or conclusions. 

The ultimate judgment in a series constituting a demon- 
stration, is similar to those which precede it in the series, 
and is equally certain with them. The certainty of math- 
ematical judgments is not affected by their remoteness 
from the fundamental ideas to which they relate. They 
may be second or fiftieth in the series, but are not more 
true in the first case, nor less so in the last. Our confi- 
dence in them as true, depends upon the fact that we are 
able to repeat the processes by which we attain them, 
always with the same results ; nevei with opposite re- 
sults. 

The primitive ideas of quantity are judgments derived 
from sensations, particularly those of touch. Other ideas 
are derived from these by intuition, which serve as funda- 
mental ideas, or objects of investigation, in the different 
branches of mathematics. Every new proposition demon- 
strated, is a new truth, as certain as the simplest and most 
obvious judgments pertaining to this department of knowl- 
edge. 

Mathematics are either pure or mixed. The former 
relate to purely ideal quantities ; the latter to such as are 
supposed to have a real existence ; or to correspond to 
material objects. 

The objects of pure mathematics are perfectly ideal, 
and incapable of being accurately represented by any vis- 
ible types. Its lines are extended only in length, its sur- 
faces have no thickness, its circles, triangles, squares, 
polygons, spheres, cubes, hexagons, &c, are perfect, and 
exist only as conceptions or ideas. 

Mathematical reasonings, however, admit of numerous 
and important applications to the business of life, in sur- 
veying, navigation, mechanics, architecture, optics, astron- 

18 



206 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

omy, politics, the domestic and fine arts; also in natural 
philosophy, chimistry, and the other natural sciences. The 
mathematical relations of objects arise from their forms, 
positions, motions, forces, &c; ideas of which are equal- 
ly adapted to be reasoned from with pure conceptions of 
these objects, derived from any other source. 

Mixed mathematics differ from pure, only in respect to 
the ideas to be reasoned from. Thus, in pure mathematics 
we reason from circles, triangles, polygons, squares, 
cubes, cones, and pyramids of given supposed dimensions ; 
in mixed mathematics we reason from ideas of objects of 
particular forms and magnitudes, of particular motions, po- 
sitions, &c, as they appear from observation and measure- 
ment. Observations and measurements furnish only the 
ideas to be reasoned from, in the calculations pertaining to 
them. The conclusions attained, bear the same relations 
to the premises in mixed mathematics as in pure. 

Some degrees of mathematical reasoning are common 
to all. The highest degrees of it are restricted to few. 
Euclid and Archimedes, among the ancients, and Newton 
and La Place, among the moderns, may be referred to as 
examples of first rate mathematical genius. France and 
England have produced many others within the last two 
hundred years, scarcely, if at all, inferior either in point of 
genius or application, to the illustrious men above named. 

Mathematical genius is partly natural and: partly ac- 
quired. All who have naturally superior capacities for 
reasoning, may have mathematical genius, if their atten- 
tion is early and strongly turned to this class of studies. 
Native endowments, which are best adapted for this class 
of pursuits, need to be improved by exercise, in order to 
attain the marked and decisive character of genius for 
mathematics. Early exercise is peculiarly adapted to 
give them the improvement which is requisite for this 
purpose. 

Mathematics have a place assigned them among the 
branches of knowledge which constitute a liberal educa- 
tion, and have been long and deservedly in high repute, 
both on account of the many useful applications of which 
they admit, and of the discipline and improvement which 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 207 

the study of them affords. The prosecution of this class 
of studies is an easy and effectual means of improving 
our reasoning powers, and qualifying us for the more suc- 
cessful prosecution of other pursuits. The exclusive pros- 
ecution of mathematical studies for a considerable time, 
however, promotes a disproportionate development of our 
reasoning powers, for mathematical reasoning; and leaves 
our other faculties proportionably less exercised, and more 
imperfectly developed. A mere mathematician may be a 
poor general scholar, and a poor philosophical and general 
reasoner. Instances of this have often occurred. 



SECTION V. 

PHILOSOPHICAL REASONING. 

Philosophical reasoning relates to phenomena and their 
subjective causes, material and spiritual objects consider- 
ed as causes and effects. It differs widely in this respect 
from mathematical reasoning, which relates to space, time, 
motion, number, &c, and may be prosecuted indefinitely, 
without considering whether corresponding material ob- 
jects have any existence or not. 

Phenomena and their subjective causes are of two 
kinds, physical and metaphysical, or spiritual. Those of 
matter and material objects, are physical. Those of mind 
and of all objects not material, are metaphysical or 
spiritual. 

Each of these general divisions contains various subor- 
dinate classes of objects and their dependent phenomena, 
which constitute as many subordinate departments of phi- 
losophical investigation and of science. 

The essential elements of philosophical reasoning, are 
the following : 

1. The observation of phenomena and the determina- 
tion of their subjective causes; 

2. The analysis of complex objects; 

3. Determinations of stated orders of succession among 
phenomena ; 



208 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

4. Determinations of the causality and dependence of 
spiritual and material objects, and their phenomena. 

5. The distribution of objects into higher and lower 
genera. 

1. The observation of phenomena, and the determina- 
tion of their subjective causes. 

The first duty of a philosopher is that of observation. 
Phenomena are objects to be observed. Their subjective 
causes are not revealed otherwise than by the phenomena 
which they exhibit. Physical and metaphysical science 
take their rise in observations. 

We observe solids, liquids, aeriform fluids, heat, light, 
electricity, &c, and obtain our first correct ideas of them 
from observation. So we observe our sensations, ideas, 
emotions, affections, acts of will, &c, and obtain our first 
correct ideas of them from the same source. 

The more extensive and accurate our observations are 
in respect to any class of phenomena, the more extensive 
and accurate, other things being equal, will be our knowl- 
edge of the same. The first thing to be done in entering 
on the study of matter, is to observe accurately the phe- 
nomena of matter; and the first thing 1o be done in enter- 
ing on the study of the mind, is to observe the phenomena 
of the mind. The same is true of any particular class of 
physical or metaphysical objects, and phenomena. 

Opportunities of observation ought to be carefully sought 
and improved by every class of philosophical reasoners 
Experiments in chimistry and natural philosophy have 
been instituted with great advantage, for the purpose of 
ascertaining and demonstrating the various phenomena of 
those sciences. These experiments are useful chiefly as 
affording opportunities for the observation of phenomena. 

The observation of phenomena ought to be prosecuted 
perpetually and simultaneously with other modes of phi- 
losophical reasoning. A philosophical reasoner can never, 
with propriety, cease to be a philosophical observer. In 
respect to difficult and important subjects, it is useful to 
make our observations a matter of careful record, in order 
that we may accurately remember, and easily review them. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 209 

As the powers and opportunities of observation possess- 
ed by each individual are limited, it^ is highly useful and 
necessary in many cases to have recourse to the observa- 
tions of others. These, properly recorded and authenti- 
cated, may answer the same purpose as if they had been 
made by ourselves. It is a good rule, however, never to 
depend on the observations of others, when we have abil- 
ity and opportunity to make adequate observations our- 
selves. 

In order to be sure that our observations are correct, it 
is necessary to make them with deliberation, and often to 
repeat them. Their correctness may, in many cases, be 
still farther confirmed w T ith advantage, by comparing them 
with the observations of other competent observers and 
witnesses. 

Inaccurate observations have, in all ages, greatly impe-^ 
ded the progress of philosophical science, and are the 
common support of erroneous theories both in physics 
and metaphysics. The eminent services of Bacon, the 
father of experimental philosophy, consisted chiefly in the 
clearness and force w r ith which he insisted on the observa^ 
tion of phenomena, as an indispensable means of the aU 
tainment of real and useful knowledge. The superior 
success of modern philosophers, compared with the 
achievements of the ancients, in ascertaining the laws of 
the material and spiritual world, are owing chiefly to the 
greater number and accuracy of their observations/ 

The observation of phenomena leads naturally to the 
determination of their subjective causes. So intimately 
are ideas of these causes connected with those of their 
phenomena, that it is difficult to separate them. The 
phenomena of light leads us to think of the substance 
which is the subjective cause of these phenomena ; those 
of heat, electricity, and magnetism, of the substances 
which are the subjective causes of those different classes 
of phenomena ; and those of sensation, ideas, and emotion, 
to think of minds as their subjective causes. Ideas of the 
phenomena of matter involve those of matter as their sub- 
jective cause ; and ideas of the phenomena of mind in" 
volve those of mind as their subjective cause. 

18* 



210 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

To form ideas of phenomena independent of subjective 
causes, is impossible. The conception of a change, in- 
volves the idea of something changed ; that of an appear- 
ance, of something appearing; and that of phenomena 
of any kind, other ideas of something of which the phe- 
nomena are attributes and manifestations. Some subjec- 
tive cause we must assume as exhibited in phenomena. 
The nature of that cause we often mistake by associating 
other real or supposed phenomena with it, and attributing 
to it properties which it does not possess. We ought to 
attribute to each known subjective cause, its own phe- 
nomena, and no others. We may then identify the sub- 
jective causes of different phenomena as far as we find 
evidence of such identity; no farther. 

2. The analysis of complex objects. 

Physical objects are analyzed by being separated into 
parts, which sustain certain perceptible relations to each 
other. Thus water is resolved into oxygen and hydrogen, 
sulphuric acid into sulphur and oxygen, oxyd of iron into 
oxygen and iron, and numerous other substances into their 
component elements. The phenomena of material bodies 
may each be considered separately. Thus the phenomena 
of gold, color, weight, extension, adhesion, &c, which 
we analyze, considering each separately from the rest. 
So we analyze the phenomena of the mind, when we dis- 
tinguish separate mental exercises, such as sensations, 
ideas, emotions, &c, from others, and consider them sepa- 
rately. 

The object of analysis is merely to separate phenomena 
and objects which are different, in order to investigate 
them particularly. 

3. Determinations of stated orders of succession among 
phenomena. 

Phenomena may be considered as simultaneous or suc- 
cessive. A large proportion of the phenomena of mate- 
rial objects are simultaneous, such as their visible and 
tangible forms, and many of their chimical and mechanical 
operations. The same is true of many of the phenomena 
of spiritual objects, such as sensations, idea, &c. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 211 

The same phenomena may be simultaneous, considered 
with respect to some phenomena, and successive with re- 
spect to others. Thus day and night, summer and winter, 
seed time and harvest, blossoms and fruit in vegetables, 
and numerous other phenomena in the natural world, are 
both simultaneous and successive. The same is true of 
sensations and ideas of perception, ideas of particular 
sensible objects, and emotions of beauty, sublimity, &c. 

The order in which phenomena occur, is an appropriate 
and important object of philosophical investigation. In 
many instances they follow each other in a particular 
order, which is repeated with little or no variation after 
certain intervals ; and so on perpetually. Thus certain 
phenomena of the sun are repeated with little variation 
daily, others annually, and others still, after a series of 
several years. Certain phenomena of the moon are 
repeated with little variation monthly, annually, and after a 
certain series of years, successively. 

The investigation of uniform orders of succession among 
phenomena, pertains in a degree to those of the mind, 
though in a less degree than to the phenomena of material 
objects. 

Those phenomena which precede others in different 
orders of succession, are called antecedents, and those 
which follow, consequents. 

Some orders of successive phenomena are easily dis- 
covered, and attract the general notice of mankind. Others 
are less obvious, and are discovered only by means of nu- 
merous and extended observations, analyses, and compari- 
sons. 

The order of succession among phenomena is analogous 
to their chronological order ; the former, however, has re- 
spect to events considered merely with relation to each 
other, as antecedents or consequents ; and the latter, with 
relation to time as indicated and measured by particular 
successions, which are universally known; such as days, 
months, and years. 

4. Determinations of the causality and dependence of 
spiritual and material objects, and their phenomena. 



212 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Phenomena may be successive, and may occur in uni- 
form orders of succession, without sustaining to each other 
the relations of causality and dependence. This is true 
of the successions of day and night, and their visible ac- 
companiments. These phenomena follow each other in 
stated orders of succession; but the antecedent phenomena 
do not produce their consequents, or the consequents de- 
pend on their antecedents. 

Day does not produce night, nor night day; summer 
winter, nor winter summer; though they follow each other 
in stated orders of succession. 

Besides the relations of antecedence and consequence, 
phenomena possesses other different relations of causality 
and dependence. Invariable antecedence does not neces- 
sarily imply causality, nor invariable consequence, depend- 
ence. Of several invariable antecedents, some only are 
the causes of certain consequences ; and of several inva- 
riable consequences, some only are the effects of particu- 
lar antecedents. We first observe and analyze phenome- 
na; then determine their relations as antecedents and con- 
sequents; then their relations as causes and effects; and 
lastly, distribute them into genera and species. 

Those antecedents which have consequences depending 
upon them, we denominate causes, and denominate their de- 
pendent consequences, effects. Thus volitions are the an- 
tecedents of voluntary actions in speaking, writing, walk- 
ing, and performing the various labors of which men are 
capable. Particular volitions precede particular actions, 
and produce them. Our actions are indefinitely varied, 
according to the nature of our volitions ; therefore we in- 
fer that volitions are the causes of voluntary actions, and 
voluntary actions their effects. Percussion is, in many 
cases, the antecedent of motion in respect to solid and 
fluid bodies. The amount and direction of motion pro- 
duced, vary according to the force and direction of the 
blow which produces it; therefore we infer that percussion 
is a cause of motion ; and the motions produced by it, are 
denominated its effects. 

Different causes often co-operate in producing effects, 
and modify the influence exerted by each other. Thus ? 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 213 

a body projected horizontally above the earth's surface, 
would, if left to the sole influence of that projectile force, 
continue to move forever with a uniform velocity in that 
direction ; but through the influence of gravitation, and the 
resistance of the air, its velocity is constantly retarded, 
and its direction inclined towards the earth till it ceases to 
move. 

Sound philosophy requires us to investigate all the 
causes which co-operate cotemporaneously and success- 
ively in producing particular effects, and all the effects 
which result from the operation of particular causes. 

Causes and effects are the elements of many different 
cotemporaneous and successive orders of phenomena, all 
of which are more or less dependent on each other. 

With the exception of the elementary particles of mat- 
ter, those causes which are met with in this world, are all 
dependent on others which have preceded them in the dif- 
ferent orders of beings, and are all changeable. They are, 
therefore, dependent causes, being themselves, in their 
present forms and states, the effects of previous causes 
by which they have been produced. 

All questions in philosophy relate to what has been, 
what is, and what is to be. We are capable of knowing 
much of what has been, much of what is, and much of 
what is to be. 

This knowledge, however, must relate to phenomena, 
and their subjective causes revealed by them; the order of 
their succession and their chronology ; their causality and 
dependence; and the distribution of the same in genera 
and species. 

Various instances of causality and dependence have 
been the objects of successive discoveries, from the earli- 
est periods of the world till the present time. The state- 
ment and explanation of them constitute a large and im- 
portant part of the different branches of philosophical 
science. This is true of Chimistry, Natural and Mental 
Philosophy, and all the natural sciences. These relations 
are in many cases extremely obvious ; so much so as not 
to be easily mistaken or overlooked, Jn other cases, they 



214 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

can be discovered only as the result of extensive and ac- 
curate observations and analyses, and frequent compari- 
sons, aided by scientific classification and arrangement. 

5. The distribution of objects into higher and lower 
genera. 

The classification of phenomena and their subjective 
causes, is next in order to their observation and analysis. 
We first observe and analyze, then classify the objects 
of our observation and analyses, referring those which are 
similar to the same classes, and those which are dissim- 
ilar to different classes. A perfect classification requires 
the reduction of the objects classified, to the smallest 
number of classes possible, according as they are in any 
respects similar; and their distribution into the largest 
number possible, according as they are in any respects 
dissimilar. The same objects ought to be reduced to 
genera of the highest order, according to their most gen- 
eral points of resemblance ; and distributed into those of 
lower orders, and into species still subordinate, according 
as they resemble each other in a greater number of par- 
ticulars, and differ proportionably from objects of other 
species belonging to the same genera. 

The mental processes subsidiary to the classification of 
phenomena and their subjective causes, are observation, 
analysis, and comparison. Observation is first in order, 
analysis next, and comparison last. By comparing ob- 
jects, we discover their similarity and dissimilarity, and are 
enabled to classify them accordingly. These different 
processes require to be prosecuted in the order above in- 
dicated, and also to some extent cotemporaneously. 

We must have made some observations in order to have 
any thing to analyze ; and in many cases, we must ana- 
lyze the phenomena and their subjective causes ascertain- 
ed by observation, in order to be able to institute the com- 
parisons necessary to their proper classification. But we 
may prosecute our observations, analyses, comparisons, 
and classification in successive independent orders ; first 
observing, then analyzing, then comparing and classifying 
the results of our observations and analyses, and repeat- 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 215 

ing the same operations in the same order; new observa- 
tions leading to new comparisons and classifications, to an 
indefinite extent. 

Skillful analysis and comparison are essential to a good 
observer. So that to be a good observer of phenomena, 
a man must be a skillful analyst of the phenomena he ob- 
serves, and must be expert in instituting and conducting 
comparisons, having respect to the same, with a view to 
discover their points of resemblance and diversity. 

The classification of material and spiritual objects and 
their phenomena, is prosecuted to some extent by all men. 
Children no sooner manifest the exercise of reason, than 
they exercise it in operations of this kind. The most 
rude and illiterate tribes and families of the human race, 
exercise their reasoning powers within the limited 
sphere of their observations and analysis, in the same 
modes of classification which are pursued in the highest 
schools of philosophy. 

It is the province of philosophy to pursue the modes of 
reasoning natural to the human mind, to the greatest ex- 
tent possible ; and to carry forward to their legitimate and 
remote results, many processes of investigation and dis- 
covery which are commenced by all men. 

All men are observers of phenomena, but philosophers 
addict themselves especially to observation ; all analyze 
and compare the objects of their ideas to some extent, but 
philosophers do it to a much greater extent than others ; 
all classify and arrange the objects of their ideas accord- 
ing as they are similar or dissimilar from each other, and 
refer them to genera of higher and lower orders ; but the 
classifications of philosophy are carried to a much greater 
extent than those of the illiterate and uninformed. 

The observation, analysis, comparison, and classifica- 
tion of moral actions, are analogous to those of other phe- 
nomena. Moral actions must first be observed and ana- 
lyzed, then compared and classified. All actions which 
agree in certain generic properties, are distinguished from 
other voluntary actions, under the title of moral actions. 
Moral actions are of several different subordinate genera, 



216 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

according as they are similar or dissimilar in different 
respects. 

We ascertain the moral character of actions by judg- 
ment. We judge some actions and some series of acts 
to be morally good, and other actions and other series of 
acts to be morally eviL 

The objects of elementary ideas of right and wrong, 
and all actions which we know to be of this character, 
serve as rules of judgment to assist us in determining the 
moral character of other moral actions. Having ascertain- 
ed the moral character of particular acts and modes of 
action, we prosecute our judgments by comparing other 
actions with them, and judge the objects so compared to 
be good or evil, according as they agree or disagree with 
any ascertained rules of right and wrong. 

"The character and law of God are the highest ascer- 
tainable standards of this kind. We judge God to be 
good, and compare other beings with him as a standard 
of goodness. We judge his revealed law to be good, and 
make a similar use of that. Those actions which are in 
accordance with the revealed law of God, are good ; and 
those which do not accord with it, are evil. 

Any precept of the revealed law of God may serve as 
a rule of judgment, to assist us in determining the morality 
or immorality of actions thereby enforced or prohibited. 
By this means we may resolve many questions in morals, 
which we should be unable to resolve on general princi- 
ples, and may arrive directly and without delay, at many 
important practical conclusions, w r hich would otherwise 
require much time and study. The revealed law of God 
is of unspeakable value, considered merely in this point 
of view. It contributes greatly to facilitate many impor- 
tant ethical investigations, and brings many moral truths, 
of the highest consequence to our present and future well 
being, within the grasp of the human intellect, which would 
otherwise defy the most accurate and persevering inquiries 
of the most powerful and acute reasoners. It makes a 
large amount of ethical knowledge attainable by persons of 
ordinary abilities and opportunities, which would otherwise 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 217 

have been confined to a few of the most gifted and favored 
of mankind. 

The general circulatioa and use of the scriptures, in 
families, common schools, and every class of literary insti- 
tutions, is highly important as a means of diffusing infor- 
mation on ethical subjects, and increasing the moral intel- 
ligence of mankind. 

Erroneous classifications of moral actions arise from 
incorrect observations and analyses, and from hasty and 
inaccurate comparisons. In order to classify them cor- 
rectly, we must first observe them accurately ; then ana- 
lyze and compare them with each other, and with approved 
standards of moral rectitude ; and judge of their real char- 
acter according to the results of such comparisons. Com- 
parisons are in order to judgments respecting the similarity 
or dissimilarity, or other perceptible relations of things 
compared ; or of judgments in respect to the particulars 
in which they agree and disagree, or are the subjects of 
other perceptible relations. 

Accurate observations and scripture testimony, furnish 
premises from which many important inferences may be 
drawn, respecting the future consequences of actions which 
are not expressly stated in the scriptures, and which do 
not come within the sphere of observation. These ulte- 
rior ideas are pure deductions of reason. 

The results of reasoning on moral actions are among 
the most important which we are capable of attaining. 
The capacity of forming ideas of actions as morally good 
or evil, and of reasoning upon them, are the distinguishing 
endowments of man, considered with respect to other in- 
telligent beings which divide with him the inheritance of 
this world. They place the human family on an emi- 
nence far above that of the most intelligent and ingenious 
animals and insects ; an eminence to which animals can 
never rise. It qualifies us more than all other attributes to- 
gether, for high and happy fellowship with God and angels. 
Moral actions are as legitimate objects of philosophical 
reasoning as any others. The most important questions 
respecting them, relate to their elements, or highest generic 
properties, and the different subordinate genera which they 

19 



218 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

appropriately constitute ; or the lower generic properties 
by which right and wrong actions of different subordinate 
genera are distinguished from each other. 

Some degree of reasoning, on moral actions, is perform- 
ed by all men. All have some ideas of voluntary actions, 
considered as right and wrong, morally good and evil. 
All are able to judge correctly respecting the moral char- 
acter of many actions. The highest capacities of moral 
discernment and reasoning, however, require extensive 
knowledge and habits of accurate observation, analysis, 
and comparison. 

Very good mathematical reasoners may be bad ethical 
reasoners; and those who reason accurately in the various 
departments of physical and mental science, may fall into 
the greatest errors and absurdities respecting moral ac- 
tions. Instances of this are not uncommon or anomalous. 

Original philosophical discoveries, which are at first at- 
tained with difficulty, and only by minds of the highest 
order, may often be communicated and established with 
ease, to the conviction of ordinary minds. 

Mathematical reasoning may subserve, in many ways, 
the discovery of philosophical truth. This is particularly 
the case in natural philosophy, astronomy, geography, and 
many other branches of science. 

Philosophical genius denotes a superior capacity for 
philosophical reasoning, and may be either general or par- 
ticular. One may have a genius for mechanical reasoning ; 
another for the observation and classification of physical 
phenomena and their subjective causes ; another for the 
observation and analysis of the phenomena of the mind ; 
and others for philosophical discovery generally. 

All sane minds are capable of indefinite improvement 
in respect to this class of mental exercises, especially in 
the early part of their lives. 

Mechanical inventions are a distinct and numerous class 
of philosophical discoveries, and are among the most val- 
uable daily accumulating trophies of reason. 

Written language is an important instrument of philo- 
sophical reasoning, and is indispensable to the preservation 
and communication of the same. By writing down our 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 219 

conclusions, we can advance much farther than otherwise? 
and with proportionally greater precision and accuracy. 
That which we have written we can easily review and 
compare, either with other written or unwritten conclu- 
sions. Frequent reviews and comparisons are indispensa- 
bly necessary, in all difficult and protracted investigations. 



SECTION VI. 

TESTIMONY. 

Testimony is the declaration of a witness respecting 
phenomena; and relates to the phenomena of matter and 
mind. Any phenomenon is an appropriate object of testi- 
mony. Testimony is itself a phenomenon, sustaining the 
relation of an effect of other phenomena to which it re- 
fers as its objective causes. 

The importance of testimony as a means of informa- 
tion respecting past and distant objects and events, and re- 
specting all those phenomena which do not come within 
the spheres of our own consciousness and sensations, en- 
titles it to our particular consideration. 

The quality of testimony, considered as an evidence of 
the facts to which it relates, is denominated credibility. 
That which ought to be received as true, is denominated 
credible, and that which ought not to be received as true, 
incredible. The highest degree of credibility is denom- 
inated certainty. Testimony may be incredible, credible 
in some degree, and credible in the highest degree, or cer- 
tain. It is of greater or less value, other things being 
equal, in proportion to the degree of its credibility. When 
it ceases to be credible in any degree, it is of no value as 
an evidence of the phenomena to which it appertains. 

The credibility of testimony is, in all cases, a matter 
of judgment. We judge it to be credible in different de- 
grees, and we judge it to be incredible. Different persons 
judge differently respecting particular testimonies, when 
all the appropriate grounds of judgment are not obvious ; 



2&0 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

bat in multitudes of cases, and those of the greatest im- 
portance, the judgments of all men are substantially the 
same. There is as great an agreement between the judg- 
ments of different persons on this subject, as on most 
others. 

Testimony may be -true and not be credible ; and it may- 
be credible in some degree, and not be true. To be cred- 
ible in the highest degree, it must be true. It possesses 
this character in a multitude of interesting cases, in which 
it is the substantial basis of general and undoubting belief. 

Testimony which possesses the highest degree of cred- 
ibility, is as valid a ground of absolute judgments, as evi- 
dence of any other kind. Other testimony may serve as 
grounds of relative judgments, but they cannot serve as 
legitimate grounds of absolute ones. 

Teslimony is either original or derived. 

Original oral testimony, is that of witnesses who pro- 
fess to have observed the phenomena which they attest. 

Derived testimony, is that which is professedly receiv- 
ed by witnesses, directly or kidirectly, from other wit- 
nesses. 

Considered in respect to its form, testimony is either 
oral or written. Oral testimony is that which is spoken; 
and written, that which is recorded by the witness. 
When oral testimony is recorded, the persons making the 
record, become witnesses, considered with respect to the 
testimony which they record and attest. Testimony 
which is given near the time of the phenomena to which 
it relates, is of higher authority than that which is given 
at a later period ; and considered merely with reference to 
the time of its delivery, the credibility of testimony is in 
proportion to its nearness, in respect to time, to the phe- 
nomena to which it relates. 

When oral testimony is transmitted from one generation 
to another, without being made a subject of record, it is 
denominated traditionary. Much important information 
is of this description. 

The principal circumstances which affect the credibility 
of original testimony, given at proper times, may be com- 
prehended under the following heads: 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 221 

1. The nature of the phenomena attested; 

2. The character and number of witnesses ; 

3. The responsibility of the witnesses; 

4. The purpose and design of testimony; 

5. The agreement or disagreement of testimony with 
itself, and with other truths. 

1. The nature of the phenomena attested. 

Some phenomena are of common occurrence ; others 
are uncommon; and some are easily distinguished; and 
others incapable of being certainly known, without the 
greatest care and skill. 

Phenomena which are most uncommon, require the 
greatest amount of evidence to attest their occurrence ; 
and those which are most common, the least. 

Witnesses who testify concerning phenomena, in res- 
pect to which they were liable in any degree to have been 
deceived, are required to show that they used the care 
and attention requisite to arrive at the truth, in order to 
make their testimony, respecting such phenomena, in the 
highest degree credible. Allowance is always to be made 
in estimating testimony for probable, and in some degree, 
for possible errors and mistakes in the observer and wit- 
ness. 

Impossibilities and absurdities cannot be made credible 
by testimony of any kind or degree. 

2, The character and number of witnesses. 

Some facts may be fully substantiated by witnesses of 
almost any character, who possess common sense; espe- 
cially if they testify in sufficient numbers. But in many 
cases, testimony is more or less credible, according to the 
intelligence and discernment of the witness; and in most 
cases it is more or less so, according as his moral charac- 
ter is good or bad. 

The testimony of persons of known integrity and ve- 
racity, is often the object of confident reliance, when per- 
fectly similar testimony, given by persons known to be im- 
moral and dishonest, would not be regarded as in any de- 
gree credible. The credibility of testimony, other things 
being equal, is in the ratio of the known integrity and hon- 
esty of the witness. 

19* 



222 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The number oi witnesses who concur in testifying 10 
the same facts, increases the credibility of all the parts of 
the testimony in which they concur. When this testimo- 
ny is given without any concert among the witnesses, and 
is found to agree in several important particulars, and not 
to disagree in any that are essential, its credibility is there- 
by greatly increased. 

3. The responsibility of the witnesses. 

Responsibilities are of different kinds. They all in- 
volve known liabilities to injuries, on the part of witnesses, 
in cases of their having testified falsely. Loss of charac- 
ter, property, and of the Divine favor, are of this descrip- 
tion. Responsible testimony is more credible than that 
which is not responsible; and its credibility, other things 
being equal, is proportionable to the responsibility of the 
witnesses. 

The prospect of good and evil, as the consequence of 
being known to have testified correctly or incorrectly, is 
one of the principal producing causes of correct testimo- 
ny. The principal rewards of testifying correctly, are the 
favor of men and God, enjoyed by faithful witnesses, in 
consequence of having testified correctly. Veracity is 
honorable and advantageous, in many respects, to mem- 
bers of civil society; and the benefits which it confers, 
are strong inducements to the exercise of it. 

False testimony is in many ways prejudicial to those 
who bear it, by exposing them to the displeasure and con- 
tempt of their fellow-men, and to the still more dreadful 
displeasure of God, and to Divine punishments. 

The civil and social responsibilities of witnesses, com- 
prehend those rewards and punishments which are admin- 
istered by mankind. Other things being equal, liability to 
social and civil punishment for false testimony, is propor- 
tionable to the liability of false testimony to be detected. 
Where great penalties are incurred by false testimony, 
and ample means are enjoined to detect it, sensible persons 
are not likely to testify falsely, whether they have any 
sense of their responsibility to God, and their exposure to 
punishment from the administration of his government, or 
not. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 223 

4. The purpose and design of testimony. 

Where persons have an interest of any kind in having 
the objects of their testimony believed, that testimony is 
proportionably less credible. On this ground, persons 
are not allowed, in courts of justice, to testify in cases 
where they are interested. Persons may testify falsely, to 
gain property, honor, or power; to punish an enemy, and 
even to gratify a friend. The manifest absence of any 
motives of this kind, increases the credibility of testimo- 
ny ; and their presence may render it less credible than it 
would otherwise be, and in many cases incredible. When 
a regard for truth and righteousness is the obvious pur- 
pose and design for which testimony is given, its credibil- 
ity is thereby greatly increased. 

5. The agreement or disagreement of testimony with 
itself and other truths. 

Testimony that disagrees with itself in any important 
respects, is proportionably less credible. The same is 
true of that which disagrees with other known truths. In 
cases where testimony relates to several particulars, and 
all the parts of it are consistent with each other, its cred- 
ibility is thereby proportionably increased. The same is 
true of the conformity of the facts attested with other 
known truths. The credibility arising from this source, 
is greatly increased, when the agreement of the facts at- 
tested with other known truths, was not apprehended by 
the witness. 

We are indebted to testimony for a large and important 
part of our knowledge. It furnishes us with a great num- 
ber of important facts, illustrative of the principles of 
Chimistry, Natural Philosophy, and Astronomy, &c. Of 
this nature are all the accounts of observations and exper- 
iments, which are contained in the writings of scientific 
men, or which are orally communicated by them. 

Every branch of science, with the exception of pure 
mathematics, embraces phenomena which we receive as 
true on the evidence of testimony. 

History, however, is the field of knowledge, in which 
this class of evidences are the chief, and almost the sole 
foundations of belief. Historical truth is 3 in many cases^ 



224 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

as certain as mathematical. Human testimony is an ade- 
quate basis for the belief of facts which transpired thou- 
sands of years ago. It gives to many of the phenomena 
of distant countries, and remote antiquity, all the certain- 
ty of those which transpired immediately previous to our 
own age, and in immediate contiguity to the sphere of our 
own observation. 

Testimony is one of the main pillars of philosophy. 
It enables us to avail ourselves of the observations of 
others in every department of philosophical investigation, 
and to prosecute our inquiries immeasurably farther than 
would otherwise be possible. 

The facts attested by others, may often be of great use 
to us, when their theories respecting them are entirely and 
obviously erroneous. In availing ourselves of testimony, 
it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the facts 
observed, and the inferences drawn from them by the ob- 
server. Inferences and conclusions respecting phenome- 
na, are not the phenomena themselves, and may be entire- 
ly erroneous, when the phenomena to which they relate 
are correctly narrated. 



SECTION VII. 

REASON, COMMON SENSE, AND CONSCIENCE. 

1. Reason. 

Reason is applied extensively to denote the faculty of 
ideas, considered as embracing only judgments and cogni- 
tions. All exercises of judgment and cognition are dis- 
tinguished from other mental exercises, and referred to a 
common generic faculty. Judgments and cognitions are 
the exercises of this faculty. By them, and by them, alone, 
it is revealed. The exclusive subject of these exercises 
is the mind. The mind judges and knows. Reason, 
therefore, is not a substance or being of any kind different 
from the mind, but is the mind itself, considered as the 
subject of certain exercises. The mind is that which 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 225 

reasons; and the acts which constitute its reasoning, con- 
sist of judgments and cognitions. Reason, therefore, is 
the mind, considered as the subject of judgments and cog- 
nitions ; or the power of judging and knowing, considered 
as an endowment of the mind. 

This capacity belongs, in some degree, to men and ani- 
mals. All beings which are capable of sensations, are 
capable of drawing certain inferences from their sensa- 
tions, and of forming rational ideas. The final end of 
sensations is the production of corresponding ideas. Hu- 
man sensations lead to human ideas of sensible objects, 
animal sensations to animal ideas of sensible objects. 
Men are the subjects of judgments and cognitions within 
extended spheres of thought; animals within limited ones. 
Human reason bears the same relation to human ideality, 
which animal reason does to animal ideality. 

It is the policy of the Divine government to promote the 
exercise both of human and animal reason to the greatest 
possible extent. Animals and insects are placed in cir- 
cumstances which imperiously demand the exercise of 
what reason they have. Everyday and hour brings them 
occasions for some new or repeated exercises of this kind. 
Night and day, sunshine and storm, summer and winter, 
all afford peculiar occasions for the exercise of animal rea- 
son, by innumerable animal and insect tribes. 

Man is laid under necessities for reasoning proportion- 
able to his endowments. xVs much as his rational endow- 
ments exceed those of animals and insects, so much do 
his necessities exceed theirs. His long and helpless in- 
fancy ; his unprotected and tender body ; his liability to in- 
jury from thousands of causes which are not injurious to 
animals ; his greater dependence on his skill and labor for 
food, clothing, habitations, and protection ; together with 
his higher susceptibilities of emotion and affection from 
the objects of his ideas, create necessities for reasoning, 
and for the attainment of rational ideas, which belong to 
no other class of terrestrial beings. These necessities are 
not in vain. They accomplish their appropriate ends in 
securing the unremitted exercise of human reason from 



226 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the earliest periods of infancy, till the last spark of life is 
extinguished in declining years. 

The lowest orders of animals possess some degree of 
reason ; animals of higher orders possess higher degrees 
of it ; and man the highest degrees of it. The intellect- 
ual endowments of different orders of animals are widely 
different, considered with respect to their extent. 

A similar diversity prevails in respect to the rational 
endowments of species which belong to the same genera, 
and of individuals which belong to the same species. All 
the species which belong to the same genus, are not 
equally intelligent; neither are all the individuals which 
belong to the same species. 

The dispensation of human reason is analogous to that 
of animals. Some varieties of the human race are evi- 
dently more gifted in this respect, as a general rule, than 
others. The same is true of individuals. 

All men possess, in common, those rational endowments 
which are necessary to the attainment of ideas of spirit- 
ual beings as the exclusive subjects of mental phenomena ; 
those which are necessary to the attainment of ideas of 
material beings as the exclusive subjects of the phenome- 
na of matter ; and also those which are necessary to the 
attainment of ideas of moral actions. These capacities 
are peculiar to man, and give human reason a vast supe- 
ority to that of the noblest animals. While all men pos- 
sess these endowments in common with each other, and in 
distinction from all the animal and insect tribes, they 
possess these and other rational powers in different de- 
grees of strength. 

2. Common sense. 

That degree of capacities to reason which is necessary 
to enable persons to take proper care of themselves, and 
which is enjoyed by the great mass of the human family, 
is denominated common sense. Higher degrees of reason 
constitute genius ; and lower degrees of it constitute all 
the different mental conditions between common sense and 
absolute idiocy, or incapacity for the attainment of rational 
ideas peculiar to men. 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 227 

That degree of capacity for the exercise of judgments 
and cognitions, which is common to jhe mass of mankind, 
is common sense ; those degrees of this capacity which 
exceed what are allowed to the mass of mankind, is su- 
perior to common sense ; and those degrees of it which 
fall short of what is allowed to the mass of mankind, are 
inferior to common sense. Common sense, therefore, is 
equivalent to common reason, and denotes those capacities 
of judgment and cognition which are common to the great 
mass of mankind. 

Those who are endowed merely with common sense, 
are distinguished from two other orders of human beings : 
those who are endowed with more than common sense, and 
those who have less. A few have less than common sense; 
a large proportion of the human race have common sense ; 
and some have more than common. Those capacities 
of judgment and cognition which are given to the great 
mass of mankind, serve as a standard of comparison, ac- 
cording to which to estimate the endowments of others as 
greater or less. 

Common sense, or that capacity for the exercise of 
judgments and cognitions which is common to the mass 
of mankind, is the same in kind as superior or inferior 
capacities for similar exercises. Some parts of the field 
of knowledge are capable of being surveyed by all. Those 
who have less than common sense, can know something; 
those who have common sense, can know all that is capable 
of being known by those of inferior rational endowments ; 
those who have more than common sense, can know all 
that is capable of being known by the two orders inferior 
to them ; and those of this order who have the highest en- 
dowments, can know all that is capable of being known by 
others of the same order, and of both the inferior orders 
together. Each superior order of intellect qualifies its 
possessor to know all that can be known by those of inferior 
orders, and something more. 

The four conditions for the attainment of knowledge, 
are : 

1. Capacities; 

2. Means of information; 



228 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

3. Application ; 

4. Time. 

The knowledge of different individuals is in proportion 
to their capacities, their means of information, their appli- 
cation, and the times during which they have prosecuted 
particular studies. Each of the other conditions being 
equal, it will be proportionable: (1.) to their capacities ; 
(2.) to their means of information; (3.) to their applica- 
tion ; or (4.) to the times during which they have pursued 
particular studies. Persons of inferior capacities may ex- 
cel those who are greatly their superiors in that respect, 
in consequence of greater advantages for information, 
greater application, or the prosecution of their studies for 
longer times. 

The great mass of human knowledge is attainable by 
all who possess common sense. Persons of superior ra- 
tional endowments, may attain it more rapidly and easily 
than others ; but all can attain it with sufficient advan- 
tages, application, and time. 

Another signification of common sense, nearly allied to 
the former, is derived from the objects on which human 
reason is chiefly employed. According to this usage, 
common sense denotes a capacity to reason on matters 
which belong to the usual and almost daily experience of 
mankind. Every day's experience presents numerous oc- 
casions for the exercise of judgment, in determining the 
nature and relations of various objects ; and in ascertain- 
ing, from time to time, those ends which are in some de- 
gree desirable, and in what degree they are desirable ; and 
also in devising means to secure the ends of our choice. 

Those who fall considerably below the ordinary stand- 
ard of ability for reasoning on subjects pertaining to the 
common affairs of life, are said to be destitute of common 
sense. Many who are not considered destitute of com- 
mon sense, are manifestly far inferior in the amount, 
promptness, and accuracy of their judgments on common 
affairs, to others of only common advantages for informa- 
tion and improvement. Persons of superior abilities for 
reasoning on common affairs, are sometimes said to have 
a great deal of common sense ; and those of inferior abil- 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 229 

ities but little. Different persons are also often and cor- 
rectly described, in relation to this feature of their charac- 
ters, as having good judgment, and poor; and prompt judg- 
ment, and slow. Some are distinguished for a capacity of 
judging with promptness and accuracy, respecting the na- 
ture and qualities of objects and ends, and the means 
proper for their attainment. Others are equally notorious 
for incapacity of judgment in these respects. 

It sometimes happens, that persons of considerable 
learning and information are far inferior in judgment to the 
most illiterate and uninformed. 

The capacity to reason well on common objects, is a 
specific attainment, which must be secured by exercise. 
Those who wish to excel as mathematical reasoners, 
must accustom themselves to reason accurately and con- 
tinuously on mathematical subjects ; those who wish to 
excel as philosophical and moral reasoners, must pursue a 
similar course in respect to philosophical and moral sub- 
jects. On the same principle, those who wish to acquire 
the capacity of judging promptly and accurately on com- 
mon affairs, must accustom themselves to the frequent, 
vigorous, and accurate exercise of this faculty on the 
same. Some persons reason much more, and with much 
more accuracy and precision, on the objects with which 
they are conversant in business or pleasure, than others, 
and attain by that means, proportionably greater capaci- 
ties for reasonings of this kind. 

In order to form correct judgments in any department of 
investigation, it is necessary to obtain distinct and accurate 
ideas of the matter or object concerning which our judg- 
ment is to be formed. Having obtained definite ideas of 
this matter or object, we ought next to consider and com- 
pare the legitimate grounds of different conceivable judg- 
ments, carefully excluding from the premises every foreign 
element. On the proper consideration and comparison of 
the grounds of different conceivable judgments, and the 
careful exclusion of foreign elements from the premises, 
very much depends. 

If we do not take all the legitimate grounds of judg- 
ment into consideration, we shall be liable to judge incor- 

20 



230 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

rectly, on account of that deficiency in the premises; if 
we take them all into consideration, but do not consider 
some of them with sufficient attention to ascertain their 
due weight, we shall be liable to judge erroneously, on 
account of that deficiency of consideration; if we admit 
in our premises or grounds of judgment, one or more 
foreign elements, that is, considerations which do not le- 
gitimately relate to the case in hand, and which ought not 
to have any influence in determining our judgments, we 
shall be liable to judge erroneously, on account of that 
addition to the legitimate premises. 

By either of the causes above mentioned, our reasonings 
may be embarrassed, and the formation of our judgments 
retarded, in cases where we are not prevented from ulti- 
mately forming correct judgments. 

3. Conscience. 

The capacity to reason on moral subjects, is usually 
distinguished from the general faculty of reason, under 
the title of conscience. Moral reasoning embraces a part 
only of the wide field of knowledge; and conscience de- 
noles the faculty of judgment and cognition, considered 
only with respect to those exercises which relate to moral 
actions and agents. The same mind judges actions to be 
voluntary and involuntary, useful and injurious, and right 
and wrong. 

Considered merely as mental exercises, these different 
judgments are similar, and consist of inferences deduced 
from certain grounds of inference, or conclusions from 
certain premises. The qualities of moral actions are as 
legitimate objects of reasoning, as those of actions which 
have no moral character. 

Common sense embraces some capacity to reason on 
moral subjects. Persons of mature age, who are incapa- 
ble of distinguishing between actions as right or wrong, 
and of reasoning upon them as such, are not endued with 
common sense. Brutes are destitute of those higher ca- 
pacities of judgment and cognition, which are common to 
the great mass of mankind. They have the capacities of 
reasoning to some extent, on quantity, time, number, and 
causality ; but have no ideas of voluntary actions, consid- 



THE ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 231 

ered as right or wrong, and no capacities to reason on 
moral subjects. 

Conscience is not co-ordinate with reason, but is inclu- 
ded under it, and is co-ordinate with the human faculties 
of reasoning on quantity, number, and causality, just as 
each of those faculties is co-ordinate with the others; 
all together constituting the generic faculty of reasoning, 
which is a general endowment of individuals of the hu- 
man race. 



PART THIRD. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS, AFFECTIONS, 
DESIRES, AND WILL. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF THE EMOTIONS. 

Sensations lead to ideas, and ideas to emotions. Emo- 
tions depend on ideas, as their immediate concurring cau- 
ses. The objects of the ideas which produce them, are 
generally denominated the objects of the emotions, which 
they concur in producing. They sustain this relation, 
however, only as the immediate objects of emotion-pro- 
ducing ideas, and have no relation to emotions, except 
through the medium of ideas. 

Emotions are entirely distinct from their exciting ideas, 
and sustain a relation to them similar to that of ideas of 
sensible objects to sensations. Sensations lead to ideas of 
sensible objects, and ideas of every kind lead to emotions. 
The mind first exercises ideas, then emotions correspond- 
ing to them, and depending upon them as concurring cau- 
ses. 

The properties of emotions are quality and quantity. 
Considered in respect to their quality, they are either 
pleasurable or painful ; in respect to their quantity, more 
or less intensive and protracted. 

Emotions are the attendants of ideas which excite 
them, but do not continue after their exciting ideas are dis- 
missed. They are not the necessary or universal effects 

20* 



234 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of emotion-producing ideas; but always occur in connec- 
tion with them, and only while they are in exercise* 
Particular emotions may commence and terminate during 
any part of the period in which their exciting ideas are in 
exercise. But they do not necessarily commence when 
their exciting ideas begin to be exercised, nor continue 
till they cease. Emotion-producing ideas, therefore, are 
not the exclusive objective causes of emotions; for they 
do not produce them universally. Their relation to the 
emotions, which they exercise a concurring agency in pro- 
ducing, is similar to that of organic impressions to sensa- 
tions. Organic impressions are the essential conditions 
and concurring causes of sensations, but do not produce 
them uniformly and invariably ; and in the same manner, 
emotion-producing ideas are the essential conditions and 
concurring causes of emotions. 

We cannot have emotions without ideas of emotion-pro- 
ducing objects, but we may have ideas of such objects, 
without having emotions. 

Besides the reduction of emotions to two generic orders, 
according as they are pleasurable or displeasurable, they 
may be resolved into several orders, according to the na- 
ture of their general and specific objects. 

The following are particularly important and interest- 

1 . Emotions which relate to new or familiar objects. 

Delight in objects, considered as new, is universal. 
We begin to experience it in early childhood, and continue 
to experience it on numerous occasions, till the latest pe- 
riods of life. Children are delighted with new toys, new 
books, new garments, and new diversions and amuse- 
ments. When an object ceases to be new, it loses, to 
them, half its attractions. 

The same is true, to a great extent, with men in every 
period of life. The newness of almost any object, en- 
hances its value in our esteem. This is the case with 
new discourses, new poems, new tunes, new modes and 
articles of dress, furniture, or equipage, and with new ob- 
jects generally. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 235 

Surprise at what is unexpected, depends, in part, upon 
the emotions which relate to novelty. We generally 
speak of being pleased with what is new; sometimes, of 
being surprised at it. New objects may excite various 
pleasurable or painful emotions, corresponding to their 
nature and relations, besides those which relate to their 
novelty. 

Objects continue to be new only for a short time. 
They therefore soon cease to awaken the emotions which 
they first excited, in consequence of their novelty. Novel- 
ty serves as a charm to encourage and reward the acqui- 
sition of knowledge, and of other useful objects. When 
those objects become familiar, the charm of novelty cea- 
ses. They may always interest, as beautiful, sublime, 
useful, &c, but they cannot always interest us as new. 

While we are capable of being pleased with objects, 
considered as new, we are also, in many cases, capable of 
being displeased with them, considered as trite or com- 
mon. This displeasure is felt towards old and often re- 
peated discourses, often read poems, often repeated tunes, 
old fashions in dress, furniture, &c. 

The capacity of being pleased with objects as new, 
renders us susceptible of many pleasures, which are not 
possible by other means. Displeasure, with objects con- 
sidered as trite or common, serves a useful purpose, in 
preventing us from being too much occupied with them. 
Both together contribute powerfully to excite affect ions 
and desires, which lead to the acquisition of useful knowl- 
edge, and of other useful objects. 

The appropriate spheres of novelty and triteness are 
limited. Many objects can never please by their novelty, 
and many others can never displease by their commonness. 
Many objects have such capabilities of delighting us by 
their beauty, sublimity, utility, moral goodness, &c, that 
we never become tired of contemplating them; and others 
are so displeasing by their deformity, injurious effects, de- 
pravity, and misery, that we never can be pleased with 
contemplating them. 

A capacity of being pleased with novelty, and displea- 
sed with commonness or triteness, is capable of being 



236 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

greatly modified by experience and education. Some 
possess it in much greater degrees than others, and the 
cultivation of it may be carried to a very great extent, be- 
yond what is usual to the uncultivated. 

2. Emotions which relate to beautiful or deformed ob- 
jects. 

In its primary application, beauty denotes those quali- 
ties of visible objects which render them pleasing; and 
relates chiefly to forms, colors, and arrangements. Visi- 
ble objects may be beautiful in these respects. Almost 
all visible objects are in some degree beautiful. This is 
the case with trees, plants, flowers, animals, insects, and 
minerals. Not a tree can be found among millions, not a 
plant or flower, not an animal or insect, and not a mineral 
which has not some beauty, considered as an object of 
sight. Trees and plants are beautiful in their cylindrical 
and conical forms, and in the orderly arrangement and col- 
location of their different parts, particularly their roots and 
branches. 

Animals and insects are beautiful in their endless di- 
versity of globular, elliptical, and cylindrical forms, and in 
the due arrangement and proportion of their different 
limbs and organs. Many of them have numerous super- 
added beauties of color and expression. 

Minerals are beautiful in their forms and colors. This 
is particularly the case with those which exist in regular 
chrystaline forms, and those which are wrought into regu- 
lar forms for ornament or use, by human skill and labor. 
Right and curved lines are beautiful ; and graceful mo- 
tions and gestures, such as are used by men in impassion- 
ed discourse, and in walking, riding, and other exercises, 
possess a kind of beauty similar to that of right and cur- 
ved lines. 

The conception of objects as beautiful, is analogous to 
that which relates to them as visible or tangible. Beauty, 
equally with sight and touch, depends on mental suscepti- 
bilities. There is no sight without an eye, and no touch 
without a tactual organ ; so there is properly no beauty 
without a capacity to feel it, as a consequence or concom- 
itant of ideas. The tangibility of objects is their capacity 



PHILOSOPHY OP THE EMOTIONS. 237 

to excite the sensations of touch ; their visibility, their ca- 
pacity to excite sensations of color; and their beauty, their 
corresponding capacity to excite emotions of beauty. 

Beauty is not limited to objects of sight. It belongs 
equally to those of hearing. Conversational and musical 
sounds, the sounds of musical instruments, and of birds, 
and many other varieties of sounds, excite pleasurable 
feelings, similar to those which relate to beautiful colors, 
forms, and arrangements ; and are consequently denom- 
inated beautiful. Beautiful modes of speech, and beauti- 
ful tunes, are common objects of attention and remark, 
and sources of many refined pleasures. . 

The objects of the senses of taste and smell, are not 
generally considered as beautiful or otherwise, They are 
generally conceived of as agreeable or disagreeable, and 
excite agreeable or disagreeable emotions, which are in 
some degree similar to those of beauty and deformity. 
The agreeableness or disagreeableness of the objects of 
taste and smell, are analogous to the beauty and unpleas- 
antness of the objects of sight, touch, and hearing. 

Beauty is of two kinds, natural and artificial. The 
beauty of natural objects, such as trees, plants, flowers, 
fruits, animals, insects, birds, minerals, &c, is natural. It 
is doubtless the effect of design on the part of God ; but 
it is not the effect of human contrivance or of human 
workmanship. 

The beauty of the products of human workmanship is 
artificial. It is the object of design on the part of man, 
and the direct effect of human agency. Houses, articles 
of apparel and furniture, paintings, statues, &c, are of this 
description. 

The natural world is full of beauty of various kinds and 
degrees. The starry heavens ; the verdant landscape in 
spring ; the same covered with the fruits of summer, and 
fading under the gradually increasing coldness and frosts 
of autumn ; the human form, erect with its just proportions, 
fair complexion, beaming eyes, and countenance expres- 
sive of all the varieties of thought and feeling, are un- 
speakably beautiful. 

Ideas of beautiful objects are adapted to excite the 



238 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

emotions which relate to them as beautiful. All, howev- 
er, do not experience these emotions in the same degrees, 
from the contemplation of particular objects ; neither do 
the same persons experience them in the same degrees at 
all times. The same landscapes, the same persons, and 
the same animals or insects, appear far more beautiful to 
some than to others, and to the same persons at different 
times. Persons may be conversant with objects of the 
greatest beauty, and yet be but little affected by it. 

Knowledge, attention, discrimination, and comparison, 
are necessary to a full sense and just appreciation of beau- 
ty, both in its. lighter shades and colorings, and in its 
most obvious and striking manifestations. 

A sense of the beautiful is the basis of the love of 
objects considered as beautiful, and of desires for the 
enjoyment of them. The delight we derive from viewing 
and contemplating particular beautiful objects, leads us to 
love them and to desire the possession and enjoyment of 
them, and of similar objects. 

3. Emotions which relate to sublime objects. 

In its primary application, sublimity denotes those qual- 
ities of tangible, visible, and audible objects, which excite 
strong and pleasurable emotions, analogous to those of 
beauty, but of a higher order. It relates to objects consid- 
ered as possessing great extent, especially great height or 
depth, and as operating with great power. The evening 
sky, viewed with a proper estimate of the position, mag- 
nitudes, and motions of its numerous bodies ; lofty moun- 
tains ; deep ravines; mighty rivers ; great cataracts ; earth- 
quakes ; hurricanes; the sea at all times, especially when 
agitated with storms, are objects of great sublimity. 

Great fortitude and courage, and great exploits of every 
kind, excite emotions which are denominated the moral sub- 
lime. History records many sublime achievements and ex- 
ertions ; and describes many individuals who may be con- 
sidered as being of this character. Such are the achieve- 
ments and characters of Moses, Elijah, and Paul, in sacred 
history ; and those of Alexander, Caesar, Bonaparte, Isaac 
Newton, Milton, and Walter Scott. God is a being of the 
greatest conceivable sublimity, and is an object of the 
highest possible veneration as such. 



FHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 239 

4. Emotions which relate to ludicrous objects. 

Objects are denominated ludicrous, which are adapted 
to excite laughter, or to serve as occasions for amusement. 
We may laugh under the influence of emotions excited by 
novelty or beauty, or by novelty and beauty combined. 
Most objects which excite laughter, have some degrees 
both of beauty and novelty. 

The distinguishing element of the ludicrous, is incon- 
gruity, or the association of the beautiful with the novel 
and incongruous. A variety of objects and events are 
characterized by ludicrous combinations. A superior ca- 
pacity to discover and express them, is denominated wit. 

Laughter is a spasmodic affection, produced by emo- 
tions relating to the ludicrous. The susceptibility of this 
affection, is one of the peculiar endowments of man, and 
is subservient to useful purposes. Some possess it in 
higher degrees than others, and all are capable of increas- 
ing, or diminishing, improving, or impairing it, by judicious 
or injudicious exercise. 

The reasonable exercise of the emotions which relate 
to the ludicrous, and the expression of them by mode- 
rate laughter, is both natural and useful. Their too 
frequent and too long continued exercise, are injurious in 
diverting our attention too much from emotions of higher 
orders, and of a more grave character. 

6. Emotions which relate to happy or miserable objects. 

Happiness and misery are distinct objects of thought, 
from an early period of our lives. Some instances and 
degrees of both are almost constantly before us. They 
enter into the experience of all conscious beings of this 
world, from the smallest insect to the largest and noblest 
animals. 

The contemplation of happiness is pleasing, and that 
of misery or unhappiness, unpleasant. This is true in 
respect to the lowest orders of creatures. We are capa- 
ble of being delighted with the happiness of insects, birds, 
and domestic animals. Instances of this delight are com- 
mon in the experience of all. So, on the other hand, we 
are capable of experiencing unpleasant emotions, in view 



240 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of the distress of animals; arid cannot, in ordinary cases, 
witness their sufferings, without being deeply affected. 

This susceptibility is still greater, in respect to the hap- 
piness and misery of men. Human happiness is a direct 
object of pleasure, and human suffering, of pain. We 
take delight in the delight experienced by others, and are 
distressed in view of their distress. 

Emotions of this class enter largely into our experi- 
ence, in the earliest periods of intelligence and feeling; 
and we continue to exercise them on different occasions, 
and in different degrees, as long as reason and sensibility 
continue. 

Sympathy is an appellation which is often applied to 
denote the class of emotions now under consideration. 
We sympathize with the distressed, when we experience 
painful emotions, in view of their distress, or are distress- 
ed ourselves on account of it. So we sympathize with 
the happy, when we experience pleasurable emotions, in 
view of their happiness, or are happy on account of it. 
Persons have more or less sympathy, according as they 
are more or less pleased or pained with the happiness or 
misery of others. 

This class of susceptibilities is universal. No human 
being can be entirely destitute of them. Some possess 
them in higher degrees than others, and all are capable 
of improving and impairing them, by judicious or inju- 
dicious exercise. Children are extremely sympathetic. 
They are easily and greatly pleased with the happiness of 
others, and experience intense painful emotions, in view 
of the signs of considerable distress. Older persons of- 
ten acquire the habit of contemplating the occasions and 
signs of both of happiness and misery, in the experience 
of others, with little or no emotion. 

6. Emotions which relate to moral actions. 

Moral actions are the appropriate objects both of plea- 
surable and displeasurable emotions. Right moral ac- 
tions excite pleasurable emotions, and wrong moral ac- 
tions, displeasurable ones. A capacity of being pleased 
with actions, considered as morally good, is common to all 
men. In order to have these emotions, we must have 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 241 

ideas of actions, considered as morally good and evil. 
Ideas of morally good actions are adapted to excite pleas- 
ing emotions; and ideas of morally evil actions, painful 
emotions. The connection between these ideas, and their 
corresponding emotions, is similar to that between ideas of 
the beautiful and sublime, and their corresponding emo- 
tions. 

Moral actions are numerous and diversified. They are 
the appropriate objects of daily and hourly attention, and 
consequently of daily and hourly emotions. When we 
consider them merely as voluntary actions, without con- 
necting with them ideas of their agents as moral agents 
in the performance of them, we may experience emotions 
from ideas of them, as useful or injurious ; as promotive of 
happiness, or destructive of it ; but not as morally good 
or evil. In order to have emotions from the contempla- 
tion of moral actions as such, we must contemplate them 
as the actions of moral agents. 

The same actions may excite different, and in many 
cases, opposite emotions, considered in relation to different 
properties. Ideas of them merely as useful or injurious, 
are attended with pleasurable and painful emotions, which 
relate to them as the objects of these ideas. All actions 
may be viewed simply as possessing these properties, and 
thus become the objects of corresponding pleasurable or 
painful emotions. 

Ideas of actions as morally good, relate to them as the 
actions of moral agents, and as being performed with a 
view to promote directly their own happiness, and indi- 
rectly that of other beings; or directly the happiness of 
other beings, and indirectly their own happiness. In 
these actions there are two elements, which are adapted to 
excite pleasurable emotions : 

(1.) An adaptation to promote the happiness of the 
agents and other beings ; 

(2.) An intention to promote both these ends, or to pro- 
mote either, in consistency with the other. 

The former of these elements is common to the actions 
of moral agents, and to many of those which are per- 
formed by voluntary beings, not endowed with powers of 

21 



242 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

moral agency. The latter is peculiar to the actions of 
moral agents, and is common to all right actions. 
The elements of morally evil actions are; 
(1.) An adaptation to destroy the happiness of the 
agents and other beings; that of the former directly, and 
of the latter indirectly ; or that of the latter directly, and 
that of the former indirectly; / 

(2.) An intention to secure the happiness of the agent, 
by methods inconsistent with ..the greatest happiness of 
other beings. 

The former of these elements is common to the actions 
of moral agents, and to many w r hich are performed by 
voluntary beings, not endowed with powers of moral 
agency. The latter are peculiar to the actions of moral 
agents, and common to all morally evil actions. 

The most perfect exercise of emotions relating to 
morally evil actions, require ideas of such actions as being 
performed by subjects of the righteous moral government 
of God; in violation of his righteous laws; in opposition 
to his holy will ; and to the injury of the universe, of 
which he is the glorious head. 

Similar ideas of morally good actions are necessary, in 
order to our attaining the pleasurable emotions in view of 
them, which they are adapted to excite. A knowledge of 
the perfect moral government of God, is the essential con- 
dition, both of adequate conceptions of actions as right 
and wrong, and of the pleasurable and painful emotions 
which depend on such conceptions. 

The same action may excite opposite emotions, when 
contemplated merely as a voluntary or physical action, 
and when contemplated as a moral action. Considered 
as a voluntary or physical action, without any respect to 
its moral character, it maybe highly pleasing; when con- 
sidered as a moral action, it is still more displeasing. 
There is a difference in this respect, between the emo- 
tions with which we regard the actions of beings not 
moral agents, and those of men. 

Where morally good actions are obviously useful, ideas 
of their usefulness unite with those of their moral good- 
ness, in producing cotemporaneous pleasurable emotions. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 243 

When morally evil actions are useful in some respects, 
they are the objects of pleasurable emotions, considered 
as useful; and of displeasurable emotions, considered as 
morally evil. When morally good aclions are injurious 
in some respects, they excite pleasurable emotions, con- 
sidered as morally good, and painful emotions considered 
as injurious. 

8. Anger and gratitude. 

Anger denotes painful emotions which attend ideas of 
voluntary actions, considered as intentional injuries to our- 
selves or others. Ideas of voluntary actions, considered 
as injurious, are necessary concurring causes of this class 
of emotions. Without such ideas we never could be an- 
gry. Anger is common to men and animals. High de- 
grees of it. are generally distinguished from others, by the 
title of indignation. All anger is painful, and high de- 
grees of it extremely so. 

Anger is attended with desires of relief from the injury 
by which it is excited, arising from ideas of it considered 
merely as an injury ; and frequently with desires of un- 
happiness of some kind to the injurer, considered as the 
voluntary cause of the injury. When an injury is mani- 
festly criminal, it excites anger as an intentional injury, and 
cotemporaneous displeasurable emotions considered as a 
crime. 

Anger is wrong when it is excited by imaginary inju- 
ries, or in degrees disproportionate to real ones. When it 
is excited by real injuries, and in degrees proportionable 
to them, it is useful ; and in the case of moral beings, 
right. 

Gratitude is the opposite of anger, and is as pleasurable 
as that is painful. The objects of gratitude are intentional 
benefits. When these are conferred by moral beings, they 
excite pleasurable emotions considered as morally good, in 
addition to those which they excite considered merely as 
useful. 

The occasions of anger and gratitude are both frequent, 
and those of the latter innumerable. 

9. Regret and gladness. 



244 MENTAL. PHILOSOPHY. 

Past events, considered merely as injurious or beneficial, 
either to ourselves or others, are the objects of peculiar 
emotions, denominated regret and gladness. We regret 
past injuries, and are glad on account of past benefits. 

The principal varieties of regret are sorrow for pecuni- 
ary losses ; grief for the loss of friends ; and remorse for sin. 
Losses of every kind, contemplated as real losses, ex- 
cite sorrow ; the death of friends excites grief; and past 
sins of every kind excite remorse. It is as natural to feel 
remorse for past sins, whenever we have adequate ideas of 
them as moral wrongs, as it is to feel sorrow for the loss 
of property, or grief for the loss of friends. 

All the varieties of regret have corresponding opposite 
varieties of gladness. 

Shame is nearly allied to regret, and relates to real or 
supposed violations of decency and propriety. 



SECTION II. 

THE CAPACITY OF EXPERIENCING EMOTIONS. 

Capacities of emotion are essential parts of human na- 
ture. The possession of them is universal. They are, in 
this respect, like the senses and the ideal faculty. No 
man is entirely destitute of sensations or ideas ; neither 
can any be entirely destitute of emotions. The capacity 
of emotions is capable of different degrees of strength and 
delicacy, like those of sensations and ideas. The emo- 
tions of some are much more intense than those of others. 
Ideas which excite strong emotions in some minds, excite 
feeble ones, or none at all, in others ; and those which ex- 
cite pleasurable emotions in some minds, excite in others 
only such as are unpleasant. Thus one is often highly 
pleased or displeased, when another experiences those 
emotions either in a slight degree or not at all ; and when 
others still experience emotions of a directly opposite 
character. 

Certain capacities of emotion are given us at the com- 
mencement of our rational existence. These are, doubt- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 245 

less, different in some respects in different persons; but 
similar in all those respects which are essential. Like the 
original capacities of sensation and of ideas, they are ca- 
pable of being greatly modified by exercise ; of being im- 
proved or impaired in different degrees ; and in some 
cases, entirely destroyed. The preservation and improve- 
ment of this class of our faculties, is an object of the 
highest consequence to our dignity and happiness. The 
emotions are of the nature of capital, to be used and in- 
creased by lawful and appropriate use ; but liable to decay 
by disuse, and to be destroyed and lost by improper and 
injudicious investments. 

The capacities of emotion lose their susceptibility ; 

1 . By disuse or want of exercise ; 

2. By improper use or inappropriate exercises ; and 
may be improved and strengthened by appropriate exer- 
cises. 

Thus we commence our rational existence with certain 
capacities of being pleased with beautiful forms, colors, 
arrangements, and proportions. Our first exercise of 
these capacities is involuntary. Beautiful forms, colors, 
&c, are discovered, and their beauty felt. Having expe- 
rienced emotions of beauty from ideas of particular visi- 
ble objects, we are capable of viewing and considering 
those objects for the purpose of again exciting and of pro- 
tracting the emotions which we experience from them. 

We are also capable of investigating other similar ob- 
jects, for the purpose of gaining similar emotions from 
ideas of them. Such investigations, wisely and deliberr 
ately conducted, bring our capacities of emotion into con- 
stant exercise, and tend to increase their susceptibility, both 
in respect to delicacy and strength. We have a wide field 
for the exercise and improvement of our capacities of emo- 
tion, in the investigation of objects for the purpose of as- 
certaining what emotions they are adapted to excite ; still 
more, in pursuing x the contemplation of such objects as 
are pleasurable, with a view to attain and protract the 
pleasure they are adapted to afford. 

By the continual and repeated contemplation of beauti- 
ful objects, we improve our capacities of experiencing 

21* 



246 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

emotions from ideas of the beautiful ; by the continual 
and repeated discovery of new objects, we increase our 
susceptibility of pleasure from novelty ; by the continual 
and repeated study and consideration of happiness and 
misery, moral goodness and depravity, and other objects 
of emotion, as they are met with in the world, we increase 
our susceptibilities of emotion from the contemplation of 
the same and similar objects. 

The emotions occupy and require time. We must re- 
tain the ideas adapted to excite them during some percep- 
tible portion of time, in order to experience the emotions 
which they are adapted to excite. Emotion-producing 
ideas are often attained and lost, before the emotions 
which they are capable of exciting are half developed ; 
often before their development commences. 

Ideas may fail to produce proper emotions, on account 
of being associated improperly with other ideas adapted 
to produce emotions of different or opposite kinds. Ob- 
jects may be adapted to excite very different emotions, 
according as they are contemplated absolutely, or in par- 
ticular associations and relations. The idea of pain, for 
example, considered absolutely, is unpleasant ; but the 
idea of it, considered as indicative of improved physical 
action, or of other beneficial operations, is pleasurable. 
The idea, however, of pain, considered absolutely, is very 
different from that of the same, considered as indicative 
of a sanitive process, or of other beneficial operations. 
The latter possesses elements which do not belong to the 
former, and which are the immediate and real causes of 
the attending pleasure. 

The pleasurable or painful character of ideas, is affect- 
ed by association, very much as the chimical and mechan- 
ical properties of matter are affected by chimical combi- 
nations. Tn a state of combination with other substan- 
ces, bodies lose their primitive properties, and acquire 
others of an entirely different character. Compound 
bodies possess properties very different from those of 
their component elements. Thus the properties of water 
are very different from those of oxygen and hydrogen ; and 
those of sulphuric acid, very different from those of sul- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 247 

phur and oxygen. So complex and associated ideas pos- 
sess properties considered as causes of emotions, very 
different from those of their component elements. 

Different associations and combinations of ideas, in co- 
temporaneous and successive trains of thought, are adapt- 
ed to excite different corresponding emotions. Simple 
ideas are attended with certain emotions; complex ideas, 
with others ; and combinations of cotemporaneous and 
successive ideas, with others still. 

Every variety of sensation enlarges the sphere of our 
perceptions ; so every variety of simple and complex ideas, 
and every variety of arrangement in which they occur, 
enlarges the sphere and variety of our emotions. 

Different emotions may co-exist as the effect of differ- 
ent cotemporaneous ideas. This often occurs in the case 
of novelty, beauty, and sublimity, and in that of most 
other classes of the emotions. 

Co-existing emotions coalesce and constitute a single, 
indivisible state of emotion, either pleasurable or painful, 
according as the emotions of which they consist are on the 
whole pleasurable or painful. Successive states of emo- 
tion may be greatly diversified, according to the succes- 
sive ideas by which they are produced, and according as 
the same ideas produce their effects more or less perfectly. 

The course of the emotions corresponds with that of 
the ideas. Habits of inattention and thoughtlessness, lead 
to very different kinds and degrees of emotions, from 
those of vigorous and continual study; the study and 
consideration of one class of objects, to very different 
emotions from those which attend the study of other ob- 
jects, and other classes of objects ; and so on. 

The power we have over our emotions and our capaci- 
ties of experiencing emotions of different kinds, both plea- 
surable and painful, is limited. We are susceptible only 
of emotions of certain kinds, and from certain objects, con- 
sidered as objects and causes of ideas. We can have 
only the emotions that we are capable of; no others; and 
we can attain them by no means, but by ideas of certain 
objects, which are themselves to be attained in certain 



248 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

modes, and by means only of the appropriate objects to 
which they relate. 

The pleasures and pains of this life, are partly those of 
sense, and partly those of the emotions. To a certain ex- 
tent, those of sense and emotion are perfectly consistent. 
We may, however, exercise our capacities of sensual 
pleasure, to the prejudice of our pleasurable emotions ; 
and we may exercise our ideal faculty and emotions to the 
prejudice of our sensual enjoyment. The former is com- 
mon ; the latter occasional. 

Different classes of pleasurable emotions are, to a cer- 
tain extent, consistent with each other. We may exer- 
cise and pursue them all conjointly, and enjoy one without 
losing others. But beyond certain limits, we cannot pur- 
sue or indulge one class of emotions, without prejudice to 
others. Delight in one or more classes of objects, or dis- 
pleasurable emotions, relating to objects of one or more 
classes, may be indulged to such an extent as to prevent 
the exercise of other classes of emotions; 

( I .) By preventing us from contemplating objects adapt- 
ed to excite other classes of emotions ; 

(2.) By increasing our susceptibility of the emotions 
indulged, to a degree disproportionable to that of exerci- 
sing other emotions. 

The susceptibilities of sensation and emotion, are often 
developed and exercised disproportionably to their real 
and comparative importance. The disproportionate exer- 
cise of sensations produces sensuality, and is altogether in-^ 
compatible with the highest development, and exercise of 
the emotions which relate to beauty, goodness, &c. 



SECTION III, 

THE FINAL ENDS OF EMOTIONS. 

Emotions are the final rewards and punishments of vol- 
untary actions, both in the case of merely voluntary, and 
of moral beings. In this respect, as in some others, they 
3re analogous to sensations, but are of a higher order. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS. 249 

Without them we should be capable of the happiness and 
misery of pleasurable and painful sensations, but not of 
any higher intellectual and spiritual enjoyments or suffer- 

iri s s - 

The systems of sensations and emotions are intimately 
connected, and are component parts of one great system 
of susceptibilities of happiness and misery. 

We pursue the attainment both of pleasurable sensa- 
tions and emotions, according to previous ideas. We at- 
tain ideas that certain objects may serve as objects of 
pleasurable sensations, and seek them for that purpose. 
So we form ideas that certain objects of thought, or cer- 
tain means of exciting thoughts, will lead to pleasurable 
emotions, and accordingly pursue them. 

In the case of men and other moral beings, pleasura- 
ble emotions are the highest rewards of morally good ac- 
tions; and painful emotions, the highest penalties of 
morally evil actions. These rewards and punishments 
are administered in this world to an extent, and with a uni- 
formity, which far exceeds the apprehensions of most 
men. Its most perfect administration, however, is reserv- 
ed for the world to come. 

Emotions are the elements of all possible happiness 
and misery which do not consist of pleasurable or painful 
sensations. They are, therefore, the final ends of all the 
other endowments and exercises of moral beings. All 
subordinate human faculties and exercises are capable of 
subserving directly or indirectly the exercise of the emo- 
tions. 

Besides being the ends for which other mental exercises 
occur, emotions serve, like sensations, as grounds of in- 
ference, and lead to the attainment of numerous emotion- 
producing ideas, which would otherwise be unattainable. 
We experience emotions in view of particular objects as 
new, beautiful, or sublime, and form corresponding ideas 
of those objects. Ideas of beauty depend on emotions 
which relate to the beautiful, as really as those of color 
depend on sensations of sight. Emotions, in view of the 
beautiful, are as much the foundation of our ideas of ob- 



250 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

jects as beautiful, as sensations from resistance are of 
objects as resisting. 

On the basis of sensations, we form ideas of sensible 
objects ; and on the basis of the emotions, of emotion- 
producing objects. Our usual ideas of emotion-producing 
objects, relate to them as objects of emotions, just as our 
ideas of sensible objects relate to them as sensation-produ- 
cing objects. 

The same objects may excite various emotions, some 
pleasurable, and some painful; and may excite emotions 
of different kinds, in different degrees. At some times 
they may excite emotions of particular kinds, and at 
others those of other kinds. All emotions are capable of 
being excited in different degrees, according to the degree 
of attention which is paid to their objects. Some objects 
are incapable of exciting strong emotions ; others are ca- 
pable of exciting them in different degrees, proportionable 
to the times during which they are made the objects of 
our undivided attention. Those which are capable of ex- 
citing the strongest emotions, may excite them in many 
cases only in slight degrees. 

In forming ideas of objects, considered in relation to 
the emotions which they are capable of exciting, we must 
be governed by the emotions which we actually experi- 
ence from them, and from similar objects, just as in form- 
ing ideas of sensible objects, we must be governed by 
the sensations we experience from them. What we feel 
to be resisting, we must form ideas of as resisting; what 
we see to be colored, we must form ideas of as colored, &c. 
On the same principle, what we find by experience to 
be beautiful or deformed, pleasurable or painful, as objects 
of thought, we must form ideas of accordingly. 

One of the great ends of the primary emotions, is to 
furnish, by means of the ideas which they concur in pro- 
ducing, objects of the affections, of love and hatred, hope 
and fear. Sensations furnish one class of such objects, 
and the emotions another. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 
SECTION I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF THE AFFECTIONS. 

Affections and emotions are often used to denote the 
same classes of mental exercises. The same mental ex- 
ercises and those of the same kinds, are sometimes denom- 
inated emotions, and sometimes affections, and are often 
designated by both these titles in the same discourses and 
paragraphs. In a more restricted sense, however, emo- 
tions are applied to denote one class of phenomena, and 
affections another. The phenomena which are distin- 
guished from all others by the title of emotions, have been 
discussed in a former chapter, and we now come to the 
consideration of those which are appropriately styled af- 
fections. 

The leading orders of the affections are ; 

1 . Love and hatred ; 

2. Hope and fear. 

Each generic order of the affections consists of two sub- 
ordinate genera. They all agree in several important 
properties, which are common to other classes of phe- 
nomena, and in several which are peculiar to themselves. 

They relate to minds as their subjective causes, and to 
ideas as their objective concurring causes in common with 
emotions and desires. They are also, like them, capable 
of different degrees of continuance and intensity, from 
those which are the shortest and smallest which are 
capable of being appreciated, to those which are of 
considerable duration and intensity. 

The capacity of exercising the affections is co-extensive 
with those of the emotions and desires, and is subject 
to similar restrictions. In order to experience affec- 
tions of any kind, we must have appropriate ideas, or 



252 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas of objects adapted to excite them, and these ideas 
must relate to their objects as possessing the peculiar 
properties by the apprehension of which affections may 
be excited. We may have some ideas of the appropriate 
objects of affection, without having ideas of them as pos- 
sessing those properties which are adapted to excite af- 
fections. 

The affections are subsequent, in the order of succes- 
sion, to sensations and emotions. Without having first 
experienced sensations and emotions, affections of any 
kind would have been impossible. We first experience 
sensations and emotions, then determine their relations, as 
uniform effects, to sensible and emotion-producing ob- 
jects ; and lastly, love and hate exercise hope and fear, 
&c, towards different classes of these objects, on account 
of their real or supposed capacity to excite pleasurable or 
painful sensations or emotions. 

Any thing which can serve as a permanent concur- 
ring cause of pleasure or pain, may be the object of af- 
fections belonging to each of the subordinate genera above 
specified; that is, may be loved or hated, and may be an 
object of hope or fear. 

All objects of which we have any knowledge, are ca- 
pable of exciting our affections. 

Love and hatred relates to objects considered without 
respect to time ; and hope and fear to actions and events 
considered as future. Affections of the first of these 
classes are immediate ; and those of the second prospec- 
tive. 

The peculiar element of the affections is an emotion 
either of a pleasurable or painful nature, which arises 
from ideas of objects considered as adapted to afford the 
subject, pleasure or pain. Other emotions do not arise 
from ideas of objects considered as pleasurable or pain- 
ful, but from the ideas of them considered as having prop- 
erties which are independent of emotions of any kind. 
Affections, therefore, are analogous to the emotions, and 
differ from those of other classes only as co-ordinate spe- 
cies belonging to the same genus. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 253 

Emotions are the genus of which primary emotions are 
one species, and secondary emotions, or those which con- 
stitute the distinguishing element of the affections, another. 

The affections agree with the primary emotions in ex- 
citing corresponding desires. 

The affections of moral agents are either morally good 
or evil, according as they lend to promote or destroy the 
happiness of their subjects and other beings. All beings 
capable of affections are as really the subjects of obliga- 
tion in respect to them, as in respect to any other actions ; 
and all moral beings are as much the subjects of moral 
obligation in respect to these exercises, as in respect to 
any of their other actions. The obligations to love and 
to hate, are of the same nature as those which bind us to 
preserve and to destroy ; or to reward virtue and to punish 
vice. 

The names applied to denote the different affections, 
like many other names of mental phenomena, are some- 
times used to denote transient exercises of affection, and 
sometimes to denote successions of similar exercises 
which relate to the same objects. Thus we speak of our 
affections for parents, children, &c, as being the same in 
successive and widely separated periods of time ; because 
they consist of successive and frequently occurring exer- 
cises which are considerably similar. Judgments, cogni- 
tions, imaginations and reminiscences, are described and 
conceived of as the same, on similar grounds.. 

Permanent ideas consist of successive similar ideas ; 
and permanent affections of successive similar affections. 
The previous exercises of permanent affections bear the 
same relations to successive similar ones, that previous 
ideas do to successive similar ideas. Affections for the 
same objects are no more the same in successive periods 
of time, than successive ideas are. 

The attainment of correct ideas of particular objects in 
one or more successive instances, facilitates, and almost 
secures the attainment of correct ones, in all subsequent 
instances in which they may be needed. So that what 
we learn once or twice, we do not easily forget, and are 
almost sure to discover as often as we may have occasion 

22 



254 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY* 

for the discovery. The same is true of the affections. 
An object which we love to day, and for several clays suc- 
cessively, we are more likely to continue to love forever, 
provided the object and our relations to it continue unchan- 
ged. A loss of affections towards objects in different 
successive periods of time, is always the effect of pre- 
vious changes in our ideas of them. These changes in 
our ideas may arise from actual changes in the objects ; 
from changes in our capacities or rules of judgment ; or 
from changes in the relations of the objects concerned, to 
our capacities of pleasurable and painful sensations or 
emotions. 

All the affections serve as concurring causes of numer- 
ous desires, which accompany them as their appropriate 
effects. We love some objects and desire to enjoy them ; 
hate others and desire not to suffer them; hope for some 
objects and desire to attain them ; and fear others and de- 
sire not to suffer them. 



SECTION II. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF LOVE AND HATRED. 

Love and hatred comprehend a numerous class of af- 
fections, which are usually distinguished from each other 
by a specification of their objects. The lower orders of 
these affections relate to inanimate objects, such as miner- 
als, plants, flowers, possessions, &c. Some objects we 
love merely as objects of the appetites ; others as objects 
of taste. Various kinds of food and drink are of the for- 
mer description; and beautiful and sublime objects, either 
natural or artificial, of the latter. 

The love of conscious beings not endowed with powers 
of moral agency, is of a higher order than that of beings 
which are incapable of consciousness. Of this descrip- 
tion is the love of animals, birds, and insects. Children 
are peculiarly susceptible of this class of the affections; 
and distinguished naturalists have, in. many cases, exerci- 
sed them in high degrees. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 255 

The highest order of the affections is that which relates 
to moral agents, considered as possessing powers of 
moral agency. Of this description are the affections of 
men and other moral beings for each other. 

Affections for objects considered merely as the objects 
of appetite, are common to men and animals. The same 
is true, to some extent, of those which relate to objects 
considered as the objects of taste. But affections for ob- 
jects considered as moral beings, are peculiar to moral be- 
ings. Others are not capable of exercising them. 

Objects may be loved with affections of different orders. 
A dog loves his master as a voluntary being, from whom 
he derives particular pleasurable sensations and emotions; 
not as a moral being. The same individual may be loved 
by his infant child, with affections of a similar order. By 
moral agents he may, in many cases, be loved with affec- 
tions similar to those of animals and infants. But he is 
capable of being loved and hated by moral beings with 
affections of a higher order; and such as relate to him not 
merely as an objective concurring cause of pleasurable 
sensations and emotions, considered without respect to his 
moral character ; but as an objective cause of pleasurable 
emotions excited by ideas of his moral goodness; and of 
painful emotions excited by ideas of his depravity. 

Love is of a higher or lower order in respect to quality, 
according to the nature of its objects. That which relates 
to the objects of the bodily appetites, is of the lowest or- 
der ; and that which relates to moral beings, of the high- 
est; leaving that which relates to the beautiful and other 
objects of taste between. 

The intensity of love is entirely distinct from its qual- 
ity; that of all qualities being capable of existing in de- 
grees which are extremely slight, and in those which are 
exceedingly intense. 

Men are capable of loving the lowest objects of affec- 
tion more than they love the highest. Objects are entitled, 
however, to degrees of love from moral beings, propor- 
tionable to to their qualities. 

Moral beings ought to be loved more than animals; ani- 
mals more than inanimate objects ; and objects of taste 
more than those of the appetites. 



256 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Love is pleasurable and hatred painful. The pleasure 
of loving, however, is not the ground or reason of this 
class of affections. We do not love objects because the 
love of them is pleasurable, any more than we experience 
the emotions of beauty or sublimity becausef ihey are 
pleasurable. 

The love of sensible objects, considered merely as con- 
curring causes of pleasurable sensations, is of the same 
nature as the love of emotion-producing objects, consid- 
ered merely as concurring causes of pleasurable emotions. 
The latter, however, is of the highest order. Most sensi- 
ble objects are emotion-producing objects too, and are 
capable of exciting affections of a complex character re- 
lating to them, both as objects of pleasurable sensations 
and of pleasurable emotions, independent of those sen- 
sations. 

Love and hatred are both accompanied with correspond- 
ing desires relating to their objects. We desire to enjoy 
the objects of our love, and desire not to encounter the 
objects of our hatred. Whatever we love we desire to 
enjoy; and whatever we hate we desire not to suffer. 
Objects of love are objects of enjoyment, and of desire 
for purposes of enjoyment ; and objects of hatred are ob- 
jects of suffering, considered as the opposite of enjoyment, 
and of corresponding desires that we may not suffer them. 

Desires which relate to the objects of the affections, are 
usually confounded with the affections which they accom- 
pany. They ought, however, to be carefully distinguish- 
ed, and are an entirely distinct class of phenomena. 

Different instances and varieties of love and hatred are 
usually distinguished by terms expressive of their objects : 
such as self-love, the domestic and social affections, the 
love of animals and inanimate objects, and the love of 
God. 

Hatred bears the same relation to love, which painful 
sensations and painful primary emotions do to pleasurable 
ones. It is excited by objects of painful sensations and 
emotions, precisely as love is by those of pleasurable ones. 
The properties of objects are all relative, and many of them 
variable. Things may be pleasurable in some respects, 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 257 

and painful in others ; pleasurable to some persons, and 
painful to other persons ; and painful at some times, and 
pleasurable at other times. 

Objects cannot be hateful except by means of ideas re- 
lating to them as concurring causes of painful sensations 
ar emotions, or of the prevention of such as are pleasur- 
able. Ideas of objects as directly or indirectly destruc- 
tive of happiness or productive of misery, are adapted to 
excite painful emotions which are the essential elements 
of hatred. Without such ideas of objects, hatred is im- 
possible ; with them, it is not only universally possible, 
but in many cases, inevitable. 

Human depravity is strikingly exhibited in the ordinary 
exercise and development of the affections. The differ- 
ent varieties of love are commonly exercised, in degrees 
far too small to subserve the highest possible happiness 
of men, in the domestic and social relations ; and there is 
a still greater deficiency of love to God, than of affection 
to men. But hatred is exercised as much too frequently, 
and as much too intensely, as love is too infrequently, and 
too feebly. The criminal exercise of it is one of the uni- 
versal manifestations of depravity, and one which is only 
equalled by universal deficiencies of men in respect to 
love. 



SECTION III. -' - 

SELF-LOVE, THE SOCIAL AND DOIMESTIC AFFECTIONS, AND THE 
LOVE OF ANIMALS AND INANIMATE OBJECTS. 

1. Self-love. 

Ideas of ourselves as subjective causes of all our hap- 
piness and misery, are common to men and animals. 
These ideas are indispensable concurring causes of self- 
love. Men love themselves as subjective causes of all 
their possible happiness; and animals love themselves, 
considered in similar relations, as far, and only as far, as 
they perceive those relations. Without any perception of 

22* 



258 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ourselves as subjective causes of our own happiness, self- 
love is not possible. 

Beings are objects of love to themselves, as far as they 
have subjective capacities of happiness, and have a knowl- 
edge of those capacities; no farther. 

Beings capable both of happiness and misery, are ob- 
jects of self-love, or self-loathing, according as one or 
other of these classes of susceptibilities preponderate. 
Those capable of more happiness than misery, will be ap- 
propriate objects of self-love, as far as their capacities of 
happiness exceed those of misery; and those capable of 
more inevitable misery than possible happiness, will be ap- 
propriate objects of self-loathing, as far as their capacities 
of misery exceed those of happiness. 

Our capacities of happiness and misery are both rela- 
tive, and depend on concurring objective causes of their 
respective exercises, in order to be effectual. They re- 
quire to be estimated according to the objects with which 
we are supplied, and which we are capable of attaining. 

Removed from all objects of pleasurable sensations, 
our senses cease to be available in any degree, as means 
of that happiness, which consists of sensations; and shut 
out from all objects of pleasurable emotions, we become 
equally incapable of any happiness from them. Cut off 
from both of those sources of enjoyment, we should be 
incapable of any happiness whatever, and of any degree 
of self-love. 

Men are appropriate objects of self-love, considered not 
as capable of unmingled happiness in this life; but as ca- 
pable, in the ordinary conditions of this life, of an amount 
of happiness far greater than that of inevitable misery. 
Some we must suffer, in the best earthly conditions, but 
our inevitable sufferings are small and few, compared with 
our possible enjoyments. 

Self-love is capable of different degrees of intensity, 
like other affections, and is much greater in some persons 
than in others, and in the same persons at sometimes than 
at others. It is doubtless much greater in men than in 
animals, whose intellectual endowments are more limited ; 
and incomparably greater in beings of still higher orders, 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 259 

than in men. On the same principle, it is generally 
greater in the wise and improved, than in the unwise and 
unimproved. The self-love of God must be infinite. 

Self-love is often confounded with selfishness. The 
two, however, are entirely different. 

We may love ourselves in the highest degree possible, 
but we must love our neighbor as ourselves. This is the 
second and great commandment, which we cannot trans- 
gress with impunity. Matt. xxii. 39. No possible de- 
gree of self-love is wrong; but the smallest degree of sel- 
fishness is entirely so. Self-love is always pleasurable, 
and selfishness always in some degree painful. 

Selfishness consists in a preference of our own happi- 
ness and interests to those of others, as if they could 
ever come in real collision. This preference, however, is 
founded in error. The happiness and interests of holy 
beings, under the righteous government of God, can never 
come in real collision. There is, therefore, no just ground 
for a preference of our happiness or interests to those of 
other moral beings. We may rightly prefer the enjoy- 
ment of some things to that of others; our own happiness 
to our own misery ; and our future happiness to that of the 
present time ; but we may not lawfully prefer our own hap- 
piness to that of other moral beings. Benevelence is the 
opposite of selfishness, and is incapable of excess. 

Self-love is not, as many suppose, the foundation of the 
love of other objects. We love other objects, not be- 
cause we love ourselves, but for the same reason that we 
love ourselves. We love ourselves because we are the 
subjective concurring causes of our happiness ; and we 
love other beings because they are the objective concur- 
ring causes of it. The love of ourselves does not differ 
at all from the love of other beings, except in relation to 
its objects. The love of others is an affection of the 
same nature, in all respects, as the love of ourselves, and 
rests on the same substantial basis. 

2. The domestic and social affections. 

(1.) The domestic affections. 

The domestic affections relate to our fellow-men, con- 
sidered as members of the same families with ourselves. 



260 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

They consist of several varieties, denominated, (1.) Con- 
jugal ; (2.) Parental; (3.) Filial; (4.) Fraternal. 

Each of these varieties of love correspond to important 
social relations, which the objects of them sustain to the 
subjects. Conjugal love is reciprocal; parental love cor- 
responds to filial ; and fraternal love is reciprocal. 

The charm of domestic life is derived from the domes- 
tic affections. They are a source of unbounded happi- 
ness within family circles, and of immense public benefit 
to civil and ecclesiastical communities. 

(2.) The social affections. 

The social affections relate to our fellow-men, consid- 
ered, (I.) As fellow-men; (2.) As fellow-citizens; (3.) 
As members of the same smaller communities, either civil 
or religious; (4.) And as personal friends. 

All men are appropriate objects of love as men ; mem- 
bers of tl^e same states and smaller communities, as fellow- 
citizens and associates; and personal friends, as friends. 
All these affections are designed to be perfectly reciprocal. 
Different persons exercise them with different degrees of 
frequency and intensity, but few, if any, are entirely des- 
titute of them. 

Of the several varieties of the social affections, friend- 
ship is one of the most interesting and important. Like 
the domestic and other social affections, it is designed to 
be reciprocal, and must be reciprocated, in order to be fully 
developed. The essential element of friendship is de- 
light in persons of our acquaintance, as friends. This 
affection relates to them as possessing all the qualities 
which render them agreeable and useful to us in that 
relation. It is nearly allied to the domestic affections; 
relates, like them, to comparatively few objects; and is 
exercised, in many cases, with great frequency and inten- 
sity. 

The love of mankind generally as human beings, is sim- 
ilar to the other varieties of the social affections, but is less 
intense than others, in proportion as it is more extended. 

3. The love of animals and inanimate objects. 

We sustain interesting and important relations to ani- 
mals and inanimate objects generally, and to many objects 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 261 

of these classes, in particular; and are directly or indirect- 
ly dependent, on them, for a large amount of happiness. 

Gardens, favorite plants and flowers, favorite domestic 
animals, and favorite productions of art, are often objects 
of intense love. To be without these affections, in circum- 
stances favorable to their development and exercise, is a 
great misfortune and a sin. 



SECTION IV. 

THE LOVE OF GOD. 

The last and highest order of the affections are those 
which relate to God. God is as real and immediate an 
object of human love, as men and other terrestrial beings. 

Our knowledge of him is of the same nature as that of 
human minds. We know him as the subject of thoughts, 
emotions, affections, and external actions, terminating on 
ourselves and others. Other beings which elicit our af- 
fections, are but types of God. Parents represent him as 
our parent; friends, as our friend; and kind benefactors 
and masters, as our benefactor and master. But no other 
beings can afford a full and adequate representation of 
him, considered either in respect to his essential attri- 
butes, or his relations to the creatures which he has made. 

Ideas of God as an objective concurring cause of our 
happiness, are as really adapted to excite our love to him, 
as similar ideas of parents and friends are adapted to ex- 
cite our love to them. Such ideas are among the most 
legitimate and certain deductions of reason. They are at- 
tainable by processes perfectly similar to those by which 
we attain love-producing ideas of our fellow-men, or of 
other terrestrial objects. The same course of reasoning 
which leads us to ideas of our parents, friends, and ben- 
efactors, as sustaining these relations, prosecuted a few 
steps farther, leads us, with equal certainty, to ideas of God 
as infinitely more to us than all earthly friends and rela- 



262 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

lions together. These ulterior ideas of God have as real 
an adaptation to excite love to him, as ideas of earthly 
friends have to excite love to them. 

The first commandment of the scriptures requires us to 
love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and with all our 
souls, and with all our minds. Matt. xxii. 37. It im- 
plies that the love which is due to him, requires the high- 
est and most vigorous exercise of all our faculties, both of 
reason and affection ; of reason, in ascertaining his char- 
acter and works, and in attaining love-producing ideas of 
him; and of affection, in loving him as the object of those 
ideas. 

No language can be more beautiful, or appropriate, or 
more accordant with the principles of sound mental phi- 
losophy. 

In requiring us to love him, God requires us to obtain 
rational ideas of him as a cause of our happiness. The 
attainment of these ideas requires the exercise of the 
faculty of ideas, and of all the subordinate mental facul- 
ties. In requiring us to love him with all our minds, God 
requires us to pursue the attainment of rational ideas of 
him, to the greatest possible extent, as a means of exci- 
ting our highest love. The character and relations of 
God are a subject of unbounded extent and interest. 
They are appropriate objects of human knowledge, and 
admit of being studied with increasing pleasure and pro- 
fit, not only while this life endures, but forever. 

But having ideas of God, is not loving him. Such 
ideas are essential objective causes of love; but they 
do not produce it necessarily. They may be exercised, 
and love not attend them, or not attend them with proper 
degrees of intensity. Hence there is occasion for the 
other part of the command; " thou shalt love the Lord 
thy God with all thy heart." 

The capacity of loving objects, considered as possess- 
ing certain properties, is common, in some degree, to all 
human beings. Like other mental faculties, it is capable 
of being greatly modified, by the manner in which it is 
occasionally and habitually exercised. Occasional abera- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 263 

tions lead to habitual ones, and habitual ones to incurable 
impotency. 

The affections agree with other mental actions in being 
right or wrong, according as they are viewed by their sub- 
jects, as conducive to their own happiness and that of 
other beings; or as inconsistent in some degree with their 
own greatest ultimate* happiness, or with the happiness of 
other beings. 

The human faculties of affection are similar to those 
of sensations and ideas. We have capacities to exercise 
all the sensations and ideas which we are morally obligated 
to exercise ; and all the emotions and affections which are 
similarly enforced. The sphere of moral action is only 
co-extensive wilh that of the moral powers. The former 
determines the latter. The best affections possible at any 
time, are the best which are required ; and the require- 
ments of every hour vary with the capacities and opportu- 
nities which every hour affords. 

The moral obligations of men to love each other, de- 
pend on their capacities and opportunities to exercise these 
affections ; the same is true of their moral obligations to 
love God. 

The capacities and opportunities of men to love each 
other, are adequate to enable them to perform this class of 
duties ; and their capacities and opportunities to love God 
are equally adequate to enable them to love him. These 
affections would not be duties, either without capacities, or 
opportunities and means for exercising them. 

The Holy Spirit is a concurring agent in the production 
of all right human affections, embracing the love of God 
and man, and both equally. His agency, however, does 
not supersede that of the mind as the sole subjective cause 
of all its exercises." The love of God bears the same re- 
lation to the human faculties of loving him, which the love 
of men does to the corresponding faculties of loving them. 

Men are as really created for the exercise of right af- 
fections, as they are for the attainment of rational ideas. 
Irrational ideas are possible ; and wrong affections are 
also possible; but both are violations of the laws of God, 
and are alike unnecessary and injurious. 



264 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

SECTION V . 

HOPE AND FEAR. 

Hope relates to the objects of future possible happiness, 
and fear to those of future possible misery. These two 
affections, therefore, are similar to love and hatred in re- 
lating to pleasurable and painful objects. Hope and fear 
are often confounded with desires which relate to the ob- 
jects of hope and fear. Like love and hatred, they are 
the concurring causes of desires, but are clearly distin- 
guishable from their effects. We contemplate some future 
possible events with hope, and desire them ; and others 
with fear and desire that they may not happen. 

Other things being equal, the desires which accompany 
the affections, are proportionable to the intensity of the 
affections which produce them. This is the case with the 
accompanying desires of hope and fear, equally with those 
of love and hatred. 

Hopes are pleasurable, and fears painful. When ex- 
ercised by moral agents, they are the subjects of moral 
obligation, and are either right or wrong. 

Those hopes which relate to future possible events as 
directly advantageous to ourselves, and indirectly to oth- 
ers ; or directly advantageous to others, and indirectly to 
ourselves, are right; and those which relate to future pos- 
sible events as directly or indirectly to our advantage, and 
directly or indirectly to the ultimate injury of other beings, 
are wrong. The same is true of fears. 

Some modifications of hope and fear, and of love and 
hatred, are exercised by animals. Most animals love their 
associates and their young. Many of them evince attach- 
ments of great strength, and retain them for considerable 
periods of time. The manifestations of animal hope and 
fear, are analogous to those of animal love. Man, how- 
ever, is vastly superior to animals in respect to capacities 
of emotions and affections. His objects of pleasing and 
painful emotions, are far more numerous and diversified 
than those of animals; and his superiority, considered as 
a being of affections, is proportionable to his superiority 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 265 

in other respects. The objects of human love are infinite 
in number, and infinitely diversified ; those of the love of 
animals are few, and of but little diversity. The same is 
true of human and animal hopes and fears. The objects 
of animal hopes and fears are few in number, are limited 
to short periods of time, and relate to objects of compara- 
tively little importance. Those of human hopes and fears 
are innumerable, extend to periods of the longest conceiv- 
able duration, and relate to events of the greatest conceiv- 
able importance. 

The pleasures of hope are analogous to those of love, 
and the pains of fear to those of hatred. They consti- 
tute a large and important part of the pleasures and pains 
of this life; and will, doubtless, attend us in every future 
state of conscious existence. "Prisoners of hope" is an 
epithet applied to men, in the beautiful and poetic lan- 
guage of the scriptures. Zech. ix. 12. No language can 
be more truly descriptive of human nature, in every age 
and country, and in every stage of development. 

Those events which are the objects of hope, are in 
many cases uncertain. We form ideas of them as possi- 
ble, and hope for them; and form other accompanying 
ideas of their non-occurrence as possible, and fear they 
will not occur. 

Hopes and fears depend immediately on ideas of the ob- 
jects of these affections, as their concurring causes; re- 
motely on the primary emotions and affections ; still more 
remotely on the objective exciting causes of previous 
emotions ; and so on. 

Men and other created beings are the subordinate ob- 
jects of hope and fear, as they are of love and hatred. 
But the only ultimate object of these affections, as exer- 
cised by moral beings, is God. 

God sustains similar relations to the human capacities, 
both of knowledge and of the affections. He is the ulti- 
mate object of all human knowledge. All other beings 
reveal him as their creator; and all the phenomena, both 
of matter and mind, refer to him as their single and exclu- 
sive ultimate cause. God is as really the exclusive ulti- 
mate cause of all things, as man is the exclusive subjective 

23 



266 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cause of his ideas and actions, or matter the exclusive sub- 
jective cause of its attractions and repulsions, 

God is as really the only ultimate object of all right 
human affections, as he is the only ultimate object of all 
rational human ideas. In being the ultimate cause of all 
things, he is the ultimate cause of all possible happiness 
and misery, and is as legitimate an object of love, consid- 
ered in the relation of an ultimate cause of happiness, as 
men are, considered as immediate causes of happiness ; 
and as legitimate an object of hatred, considered as an ulti- 
mate cause of misery, as men are, considered as imme- 
diate causes of it. The same is true of God, considered 
as an ultimate object of hope and fear. All rational hopes 
and fears terminate on him as their ultimate object, for the 
same reason that all rational love and hatred do. 

The love of God is as necessary to serve as a regula- 
ting principle of the other affections, as the knowledge of 
him is, to serve as a regulating principle of other ideas. 
Without a knowledge of God, we cannot understand any- 
thing perfectly ; and without a love of him, we cannot 
have duly regulated love for subordinate objects. The 
hopes and fears which terminate on God, have the same 
relations to those which terminate on subordinate objects, 
which the love of God has to subordinate similar affec- 
tions. They are of the greatest necessity, as regulating 
principles of all subordinate hopes and fears. 



SECTION VI. 

TEMPERS AND DISPOSITIONS. 

Temper and disposition are words in common use, to 
denote different modifications of character, arising from 
different degrees of susceptibility of the emotions and 
affections generally, or of particular classes of them. 

They are of many different varieties, but may be con- 
veniently distributed into the following orders : 1. Ardent 
or excitable; 2. Cool or unexcitable ; 3. Benevolent; 
4. Malevolent; 5. Cheerful; and, 6. Melancholy. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE AFFECTIONS. 267 

1. Ardent tempers. 

All persons who are more excitable than the general 
mass of mankind, by the objects of love and hatred, hope 
and fear, satisfaction and regret, &c, may be considered as 
possessing an ardent or excitable temper, and may be 
classed together accordingly. Persons of this temper 
may be distributed into several subordinate classes, accor- 
ding to the greater or less degrees of their excitability. 

Some are in a slight degree more excitable than the 
great mass of mankind, and others in a great degree more 
so. Those of ardent tempers experience higher degrees 
of love and hatred, hope and fear, satisfaction and regret, in 
relation to given objects, than others; and those whose 
tempers are most ardent, other things being equal, expe- 
rience these affections in the highest degrees. 

2. Cool and unexcitable tempers. 

A cool and unexcitable temper is the opposite of an ar- 
dent one. As some persons are more excitable than ordi- 
nary, by the objects of emotion and affection, so others 
are proportionally less so. The varieties of a cool and 
unexcitable temper, correspond to those of the ardent or 
excitable. Some are in a slight degree less excitable 
than mankind generally, and constitute the highest class of 
cool tempered persons; others are one perceptible degree 
less excitable still, and constitute the second class of the 
unexcitable ; and so on, to those whose excitability is the 
least possible. 

Persons of cool tempers, love and hate, hope and fear, 
experience satisfactions and regrets of less intensity than 
others. 

3. Benevolent tempers. 

A benevolent temper consists in a more than ordinary 
disposition to exercise the affections of love to our neigh- 
bors and fellow-creatures of different orders, and a less 
than ordinary disposition to hate them. Some are more 
disposed to iove, and others to hate; some to pity, and 
others to despise. 

A benevolent temper depends on the predominance of 
the benevolent emotions and affections, and is of a higher 



268 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

or lower order, according as that predominance is greater 
or less. 

A benevolent temper may be either ardent or cool. 
Where ardency and benevolence combine, they invest the 
character with peculiar excellence. Those who are in the 
highest degrees ardent and benevolent in their emotions 
and affections, are in the highest degrees amiable and in- 
teresting. 

4. Malevolent tempers. 

A malevolent temper is the opposite of a benevolent 
one, and consists in a more than ordinary disposition to 
exercise the different orders of malevolent emotions and 
affections. A malevolent temper depends on the predom- 
inance of the malevolent emotions and affections, and is 
of a higher or lower order, according as that predominance 
is greater or less. A malevolent temper may be either 
ardent or cool. In the former case it will be character- 
ized by proportionally intense animosities, bitter resent- 
ments, and cruel revenge; and in the latter, by those pro- 
portionably moderate. 

5. Cheerful tempers. 

A cheerful temper is nearly allied to a benevolent one. 
Benevolence tends to promote cheerfulness, because the 
benevolent emotions and affections are all pleasurable. 
Persons, however, are not always cheerful in the same de- 
gree that they are benevolent. Cheerfulness is some- 
times the accompaniment of malevolence, and melancholy 
the accompaniment of benevolence. 

Cheerfulness consists in the predominance of pleasing 
emotions. Where this predominance is greater than is 
usual to the mass of mankind, it constitutes a cheerful 
temper. These tempers aie of higher or lower orders, 
according as the predominance and intensity of the pleas- 
ing emotions is greater or less. 

Ardency, benevolence, and cheerfulness, or any two of 
them, may co-exist in the same individual. Each of the 
two former tempers tend to elevate the character of the 
latter, in all cases where they co-exist. 

A high degree of cheerfulness may arise from any one 
class of pleasurable emotions ; or what is more common, 
from the concurrence of emotions of different classes. 



PHIL0S0PH5T OF THE AFFECTIONS. 269 

6. Melancholy tempers. 

Melancholy is the opposite of a cheerfulness, and con- 
sists in the predominance of pleasing emotions. Where 
this predominance is habitually greater than is usual to 
the mass of mankind, it constitutes a melancholy temper. 
Melancholy tempers are of different orders, according to 
the degrees in which painful emotions predominate. 

Habitual melancholy is frequently the effect of sick- 
ness, disappointments in business, love, and the various 
pursuits of life. In cases of this kind, the temporary 
exercise of particular emotions and affections, and partic- 
ular classes of them, gives those thus exercised, a predom- 
inace which they permanently retain. 

The different tempers are partly natural, and partly ac- 
quired. 

Persons may be naturally ardent or cool, benevolent or 
malevolent, cheerful or melancholy. Diversities of this 
kind are equally hereditary with those which relate to the 
intellectual powers. 

In their highest degrees of development, however, the 
tempers above described are chiefly acquired. Persons 
form habits of strong or feeble affections ; of benevolent 
or malevolent ones ; and of cheerfulness or melancholy ; 
and various circumstances lead to the formation of various 
habits in these respects ; and contribute to the diversities 
of temper which every where prevail. 

Highly excited and intense emotions and affections, are 
denominated passions. The emotions and affections are 
almost constantly exercised, in some degree, by all men. 
They enter into the experience of every day, and almost 
every hour of life. But their excitement to those degrees 
which constitutes them passions, is less frequent than 
their excitement in less degrees. 

We experience the exercise of the emotions and affec- 
tions hundreds of times in lower degrees, where we ex- 
perience them passionately once ; and hundreds of objects 
excite them in lower degrees, where one excites them 
passionately. Thus we love hundreds of objects in dif- 
ferent degrees, less than sufficient to constitute passions, 
and a few individual objects passionately. We hate hun- 

23* 



270 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

dreds of objects in some, degrees less than sufficient to 
constitute passions, and hate some passionately. So of 
hope and fear, satisfaction and regret, joy and sorrow, 
and the emotions and affections generally. 

Persons may be occasionally or habitually passionate. 
They may also be addicted to passions of one or more 
classes, or to the exercise of all the passions generally. 
Some love passionately, who can hardly be said to be the 
subjects of any other habitual passion. Some hate pas- 
sionately, without experiencing the habitual exercise of 
love in a passionate degree. So of all the other affections. 

Youth is generally considered the period when the pas- 
sions are most easily excited, and capable of being excited 
in the highest degrees. Then the ardent are usually the 
most ardent, and the stupid the least stupid, the loving 
the most affectionate, and the hating the most malevolent, 
the cheerful the most cheerful and joyous, and the melan- 
choly least sad ; and all the different passions of love and 
hatred, regret and satisfaction, and of hope and fear, are 
capable of the easiest and strongest excitement. Some 
of the passions, however, of mature years, and even of 
age, are incomparably stronger than those of early life. 
Most are capable of increasing strength from exercise. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 

SECTION I. 

THE GENERIC PROPERTIES AND ORDERS OF DESIRES. 

Desires are a class of emotions dependent on ideas of 
objects considered as concurring causes of pleasurable or 
painful sensations, primary emolions or affections ; and are 
subsequent in the order of succession to sensations and 
primary emotions ; and also to the affections. They are 
sometimes denominated emotions, and sometimes affec- 
tions. All these exercises, like different classes of ideas, 
have several generic properties in common. But they are 
also capable of being easily distinguished from each other, 
and reduced to subordinate genera, all belonging to the sin- 
gle genus of emotions or feelings dependent on ideas. 

We contemplate possible objects of pleasure, and desire 
to enjoy them ; possible objects of pain, and desire not to 
suffer them. Desires are common to men and animals. 
Those of men are far more numerous than animal desires ; 
relate to many objects of far greater importance ; and ex- 
tend to incalculably longer periods of duration. 

The desires of moral beings agree with their other 
modes of voluntary action, in being either right or wrong. 
Those which relate to objects viewed as pleasurable di- 
rectly to ourselves, and indirectly to others; or directly to 
others and indirectly to ouiselves, are right ; and those 
which relate to objects considered as not ultimately plea- 
surable to ourselves, or as pleasurable to ourselves, but di- 
rectly or indirectly injurious to others, are wrong. 

Wrong desires imply a competition of interests among 
moral beings, and an indifference to the happiness and 
misery of other beings, for which there is no just occasion 
under the Divine government. 

The desires sustain important and interesting relations 
to all the other classes of mental phenomena. They re- 



272 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

late to some other mental exercises as their essential con- 
curring causes, and to others as their uniform effects. 
Ideas of desirable objects are essential conditions of de- 
sires. 

Without ideas of life, we cannot have desires to live ; 
without ideas of food, we cannot have desires of food ; 
and without ideas of happiness, we cannot have desires 
of happiness. So of all objects of desire. Desires ter- 
minate on the objects of ideas, and cannot be produced 
except by means of those objects and of the ideas which 
relate to them. 

Desires are common to all voluntary beings. God is as 
really the subject of them, as his rational creatures. 

Desires of different objects can co-exist in created minds 
only to a limited extent, corresponding to that of the co- 
existence of ideas. As far as we can have co-existing 
ideas, we may have cotemporaneous desires ; no farther. 
To desire objects of which we have no ideas at the time, 
is impossible. The sphere of our possible desires is co- 
extensive with that of our possible ideas ; and that of our 
actual desires is limited by that of our actual ideas. 

Different cotemporaneous desires may agree or disa- 
gree, according as their objects are compatible or incom- 
patible with each other. We may desire different objects 
at the same time, which are compatible with each other, 
and those which are incompatible. 

When we are the subjects of cotemporaneous disagree- 
ing desires, the desire of one object counterbalances that 
of another, which is incompatible with it; so that we may 
desire each, considered by itself; but in consideration of 
their incompatibility, may desire only the one which we 
judge most desirable. 

Many objects are desirable on some accounts, and un- 
desirable on others. In these cases we compare the pro- 
perties of objects which render them desirable, with those 
which make them undesirable ; and either desire them or 
desire not to have them, as we judge their desirable or 
undesirable properties to predominate. 

Cotemporaneous desires may be opposite in some re- 
spects, but they cannot be opposite in all respects. W® 



PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 273 

may desire to have an object on some accounts, and de- 
sire not to have it on other accounts, at the same time. 
But the ultimate objects of desire in these cases, are dif- 
ferent. What we desire to have, is an object possessing 
certain desirable properties ; and what we desire not to 
have, is an object possessing certain undesirable proper- 
ties. Where we associate these properties as those of 
one and the same object, that object becomes desirable or 
undesirable, according as one or other of these classes of 
properties predominate. 

The connexion between desires and ideas, is similar to 
that between emotions and ideas adapted to excite them ; 
and to that between sensations and organic impressions. 
Appropriate ideas excite particular desires, as uniformly as 
ideas of beautiful objects, excite emotions of beauty, or 
those of sublime objects, emotions of sublimity, &c. 
Ideas of objects as desirable or undesirable, have respect 
to them as objects of sensation or emotion of some kind. 

That which does not, in our judgment, sustain the rela- 
tion of an object to some possible sensations or emotions, 
either pleasurable or painful, cannot be an object of desire. 
That which is not capable of being an object of desire, 
from its real or supposed relations to the possible sensa- 
tions or emotions of the subject, cannot be an object of 
desire at all. The relation of desirable objects to the 
emotions of the subject of desire, may be direct or indi- 
rect, immediate or remote. 

Many objects are highly desirable on account of their 
remote and ultimate relations to the happiness of individ- 
uals, which, considered with respect to their immediate 
effects, would be highly undesirable. 

Persons who contemplate objects only as related to their 
capacities of pleasurable or painful sensations, desire them 
or not, as those objects are supposed capable of administer- 
ing to their sensual enjoyment or not. Those who contem- 
plate objects as capable of ministering to their intellectual 
pleasure, desire them for these higher and nobler purposes; 
and those who contemplate them as capable of affording 
intellectual pleasure of the highest order, desire them for 
purposes of the highest order. A similar comparison may 



274 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be instituted between objects considered in respect to their 
relations to our immediate, remote, and ultimate happiness 
or misery. Those who contemplate objects only as adapt- 
ed to promote their present gratification or otherwise, de- 
sire them only on account of such adaptations, and in de- 
grees proportionable to the same. Those who embrace 
in their conceptions of objects, ideas of all their possible 
adaptations to promote their happiness or misery, both im- 
mediate and remote, desire them or not, according as they 
appear on the whole to be desirable or undesirable. 

It is necessary to contemplate objects in all their dis- 
coverable relations, and to consider in our estimates of 
them, all their possible effects, in order to have properly 
regulated desires in regard to them. Partial views often 
lead us to desire, when more liberal and extended ones ex- 
cite within us the strongest aversions. Our desires cannot 
correspond to the real qualities of things, unless our ideas 
correspond to them. The attainment of just and adequate 
ideas is, therefore, an essential condition of appropriate and 
well regulated desires. Just and adequate ideas of knowl- 
edge lead us to desire knowledge ; just and adequate ideas 
of the favor of God, lead us to desire the favor of God; 
and just and adequate ideas of human happiness, lead us 
to desire human happiness. So of all other objects of de- 
sire. In the case of moral beings, the most adequate 
ideas of objects possible, are subjects of moral obligation, 
considered as the concurring causes of desires. The same 
is true of them considered as the concurring causes of the 
emotions and affections, which are previous to desires in 
the order of succession. 

Beings not endowed with powers of moral agency, are 
the subjects of obligation to attain adequate desire-produ- 
cing ideas equally with moral beings ; and to exercise cor- 
responding desires by means of such ideas ; but their obli- 
gations to do this, like those which relate to their other ac- 
tions, are not moral 3 and are comparatively slight. 



PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 275 

SECTION IT. 

IMPORTANT CLASSES OF DESIRES. 

1. Desires of knowledge. 

Knowledge is an appropriate object of thought, as 
something useful. Thus, we easily think of a knowl- 
edge of language, of mathematics, and the arts. We see 
persons derive great benefit from a knowledge cf partic- 
ular sciences, particular departments of literature, and 
particular arts ; and experience the benefit of knowledge 
in numerous instances ourselves. By experience and 
observation of the utility of knowledge generally, and 
of particular branches of it to persons in particular cir- 
cumstances, we become qualified to judge respecting our 
own wants in this respect. "We find that some branches 
of knowledge are useful to all, and that others are useful 
to individuals in particular circumstances. Anticipating 
our own future circumstances, we judge that we shall 
need particular branches of knowledge appropriate to 
them. 

Having judged that knowledge generally will be useful 
to us, or that this is the fact in respect to particular branch- 
es of it, we immediately have desires for those branches 
of knowledge, and for those degrees of knowledge in re- 
spect to them, which our greatest happiness and prosperi- 
ty require. 

We cannot desire knowledge of any kind, without first 
having formed ideas that it will be useful to us. If we 
judge that it will be useful in a slight degree, we exercise 
comparatively feeble desires for it ; if we judge that it 
will be highly useful, we desire it with proportionable 
strength. 

The desire of knowledge may be general or particular. 
The most intense desires of this class have respect to 
particular branches and items of knowledge, from which 
we judge important and particular benefits are capable of 
being derived. 

2. Desires of wealth. 



276 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Wealth embraces a great variety of objects, capable of 
appropriation to the satisfaction of the wants of individ- 
uals, and possessing exchangeable value. In consequence 
of their exchangeable value, they serve as means of pro- 
curing any objects whatever, that are in the market, and 
that do not exceed them in value. 

Wealth, therefore, is an object of affection and desire, 
considered without respect to its form, simply as something 
which possesses exchangeable value. 

We judge wealth to be capable of affording us gratifi- 
cations, and desire it accordingly. According to the na- 
ture and extent of the pleasure which we judge it capable 
of affording, will be the intensity and nature of our desires 
for it. 

We have desires of considerable strength for wealth 
generally ; but those which arise most frequently, and 
which are of the greatest strength, have respect to more 
or less particular kinds and amounts of wealth. Thus a 
farmer desires to free a particular farm from all incum- 
brances, and to have it properly stocked and furnished ; 
mechanics., merchants, and adventurers of every class, 
have definite acquisitions constantly in view, to which this 
class of desires are chiefly directed. 

Men desire particular amounts and kinds of property, 
after which they are striving, more than they desire all the 
world of wealth besides. Their desires are mostly limit- 
ed to definite and small acquisitions, which they regard as 
immediate objects of pursuit, and which are followed by 
other similar desires corresponding to the varying condi- 
tion and means of acquisition possessed by individuals. 
One man in given circumstances, desires a dollar more than 
another desires a thousand ; shillings, dollars, thousands, 
and ten thousands of dollars are the successive objects of 
desire in the experience of the same individual, according 
to his circumstances and necessities, and his supposed 
means of acquisition. 

3. Desires of esteem. 

The esteem and respect of our fellow-men, is an acqui- 
sition of great value. It is the immediate cause of highly 
pleasurable emotions, and is indirectly the means of pro- 



PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 277 

curing numerous and important benefits. Not to have 
some knowledge of the value of the esteem and respect 
of our fellow-men, is incompatible with the exercise of 
common sense. A proper comparative estimate of this 
attainment, is made only by the wisest and most discrim- 
inating. In proportion to the value which we attach to the 
esteem and respect of our fellow-men, will be our desires 
to secure it. 

Those who consider general esteem particularly valua- 
ble, will exercise proportionable desires to secure it. 
Those who do not regard it as particularly necessary or 
useful to them, will desire it proportionably less. So of 
the esteem of particular communities and individuals. 
We have a greater interest in the esteem of some persons 
and some communities, than of others. This is the case 
with respect to the neighborhoods, states, and nations to 
which we belong, and the individuals with whom we are 
associated in domestic and public life. 

5. Desires of power. 

Power has respect to action and influence of some kind. 
It relates first to the use of our limbs and mental facul- 
ties, then to effects which we produce on other objects, 
whereby we adapt them to our convenience or necessities. 
We speak of a power to labor, to think, and to perform 
the various processes in the arts. Besides this, we are 
capable of influencing the conduct and affecting the con- 
dition of our fellow-men in various modes, and in different 
degrees. We may do this (1.) by argument and persua- 
sion; (2.) by civil, religious, or domestic authority. The 
former is the power of conviction and persuasion, and the 
latter of authority. 

The higher ranks in society are generally invested with 
considerable power to influence the conduct and affect the 
condition of those below them. Parents have authority 
over their children, masters over their servants, officers of 
every class, over those assigned to their charge. The 
lower ranks of society re-act on the higher. A proper 
degree of power is a valuable acquisition. Parents need 
to have sufficient power to govern their children; mas- 

24 



278 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ters to govern their servants; civil, military, and ecclesias- 
tical officers to accomplish the ends of their respective 
offices; children, servants, and the subjects of civil, mili- 
tary, and religious government^ to protect themselves and 
others from injustice, and to enforce a due administration 
on the part of those placed over them. 

These and other analogous degrees and modes of power, 
are appropriate objects of thought, affection, and desire. 
The desire of power is universal. The exercise of this 
desire is particularly obvious in the case of those who as- 
pire to civil, military, or ecclesiastical authority. It is 
impossible not to desire power in some of its degrees and 
modes. 

Power is an object of thought, as a means of securing 
various advantages to the possessor of it, and of doing great 
good to others. The acquisition of it is, therefore, of the 
greatest value, and is an appropriate and important object 
of human pursuit. In this respect it is analogous to knowl- 
edge, wealth, esteem, and society. In respect to all these 
objects, however, our desires ought to be regulated by our 
real necessities and opportunities of usefulness. These 
objects generally are desirable. Many particular modes 
and degrees of them are so. But this is not universally 
the case. There are many things which we have no need 
to know, many articles and degrees of wealth which we 
have no need to acquire, many instances and degrees of 
esteem and of association with others, and many degrees 
and species of power which are highly undesirable, and 
the desire of which is injurious and criminal. 

6. Desires of superiority. 

The relative condition of men in this world is that of 
equals, and of inferiors, and superiors. Brothers or sis- 
ters in the same family, and of the same age, may be con- 
sidered as representing equals, though they are never so 
in all respects. All are associated with others in the re- 
lations of superiors and inferiors, to a much greater extent 
than would be supposed, without a thorough investigation 
of this subject. In some respect we are associated with 
others as equals ; but in many respects as inferiors and 
superiors. Superior and inferior stations are designed to 



PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 279 

have their peculiar advantages. They have their pecu- 
liar disadvantages. The advantages of superiority render 
it an appropriate object of desire. They are universally 
perceived, and corresponding desires are consequently 
universally felt. In a state where no advantages would be 
derived from superiority, no desire could appropriately be 
exercised towards it. This would be the case with a state 
of perfect holiness, and is doubtless so with heaven. But 
it is far from being the case in this world. Attainments 
are often more valuable in this world, and considered with 
respect to temporal benefits, by making us superior to 
others in power, wealth, or honor, than by any other 
means. 

7. Desires of continued existence. 

It is the high prerogative of man to remember the past, 
and anticipate the future. To restrict our ideas to the 
present, is impossible. It is equally so to restrict them to 
the present and past. We must anticipate to-morrow, 
next year, the next century, and other succeeding periods 
of time. Ideas of our existence or non-existence in fu- 
ture years and ages, are forced upon our attention. We 
must entertain them. They excite corresponding emo- 
tions. That of future existence is pleasing ; that of future 
non-existence, unspeakably painful. The immortality 
which we desire, is a state of consciousness and enjoy- 
ment. Having formed ideas of such a state, we desire 
it as we do any other pleasurable object, and with a de- 
gree of intensity proportioned to our ideas of the pleasures 
of the existence desired. We cannot conceive of future 
happy existence, without desiring it. 

The intensity of our desires for continued existence, is 
proportionable to the pleasures we expect to gain by it ; 
and that of our desires not to sink into non-existence or 
unconsciousness, is proportionable to the pleasures we ex- 
pect to lose by such a catastrophe. 

The more we hope to gain by continued existence, the 
more we shall desire our existence to continue ; and the less 
we hope to gain by it, the less shall we desire it. When 
we cease to hope for any advantage or happiness from ex- 
istence, we cease to have any desire to exist, 



280 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The same is true of our present mode of existence in 
an incarnate and probationary state. While we see any 
advantages to be gained from the continuance of our lives, 
either to ourselves, or to others whom we love, we desire 
to live. When life ceases, by reason of infirmity or any- 
other cause, to appear to be of any real advantage to us, 
and at the same time becomes actually painful, we desire 
not to live. We desire the continued existence of other 
objects, on the same principles that we do our own. 

8. Desires of happiness to others. 

The happiness of others is an object of pleasurable 
emotion. Parents delight in the happiness of their chil- 
dren ; children in the happiness of each other ; and all 
men, in all conditions, have more or less delight in the 
happiness which they witness around them. This capaci- 
ty of enjoyment extends to the happiness of domestic ani- 
mals, as well as to that of human beings. 

The happiness enjoyed by other beings, therefore, is in 
many cases a real benefit to us, because the notice of it 
excites pleasurable emotions, and in many cases, those 
which are highly pleasurable in ourselves. 

Whenever the happiness of a being afTords us satisfac- 
tion, we are capable of desiring it, and of desiring it in a 
degree proportionable to the satisfaction which it affords 
us. A large proportion of the whole amount of human 
happiness is derived from ideas of the happiness of other 
beings. Those who are most susceptible of happiness 
from this source, are generally most happy; and those 
who are least susceptible of it, least happy. 

Delight in the happiness of others, and emotions of an 
opposite character from their mise^r, serve as concurring 
causes of desires, having the promotion of the happiness, 
and the alleviation of the miseries of others for their final 
object. Whatever attainments can be conducive to the 
happiness of others, may be objects of desires in their be- 
half, as really as whatever can be conducive to our own 
happiness, may be an object of desires in our own behalfi 

9. Desires of unhappiness to others. 

A delight in the happiness of others, leads us to desire 
that they may be happy. In all cases in which the hap- 



PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES. 281 

piness of others is on the whole pleasing to us, we desire 
it ; in cases where it is on the whole displeasing, we are 
averse to it, or desire the contrary. 

Men are capable of desiring that others may not be 
happy ; or that they may be less happy than they are or 
may be, on the following accounts: 

(1.) Some real or supposed collision of the interests of 
others with their interests; 

(2.) Some real or supposed injury inflicted by those 
whose evil is an object of desire. 

Envy and emulation, in cases where the success of 
others will render us unsuccessful, as in attaining a prize, 
office, situation, or particular object of any kind, are of the 
former class ; resentment and revenge, of the latter. 

Envy and emulation are of a similar nature, and com- 
prehend desires that others may be unhappy or less hap- 
py than is possible, under the apprehension that their hap- 
piness in the particulars referred to, would be injurious to 
us. Persons may be envious or emulous, in respect to one 
or more particulars, and not at all, or in a slight degree so, 
in respect to others. 

One exercises these desires chiefly in respect to wealth; 
another in respect to hereditary or acquired rank ; another 
in respect to dress and personal accomplishments; and 
another in respect to knowledge. 

Resentment and revenge both have reference to real or 
supposed intentional injuries. They are characterized by 
desires of evil to others, on account of the intentional in- 
juries which we suppose they have done, or designed to do 
us. Thus we resent an insult, or an intentional injury to 
our persons, property, condition, or character. Revenge is 
similar to resentment, and cozuprehends desires of evil to 
the object of it. 

The desire of evil to others is often exercised improp- 
erly. This is sometimes the case with the desire of good 
to them. We ought to desire that all sentient beings 
should have as much happiness as possible, in consistency 
with the general good. To desire evil to any sentient 
being as an ultimate end, or for its own sake, is impossible. 
Whenever evil is an object of desire, it is desired as a 

24* 



282 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

means of securing some ulterior end. The only end 
which justifies the desire of it, is the greater ultimate hap- 
piness of the subject, or of other beings. 

The only condition in which the misery of some moral 
being is conducive to the happiness of others, is that in 
which they suffer in consequence of sins. In that condi- 
tion, evil may be a legitimate object, of desire. It is 
right, therefore, to desire that thieves and murderers may 
be detected and punished, as a means of promoting the 
happiness of other moral beings. The same is true of all 
sins which are appropriate objects of the Divine displea- 
sure. The conviction and punishment of sinners, is doubt- 
less desirable, considered with relation to the universe of 
moral beings, on the same ground that the punishment of 
thieves and robbers is desirable, considered with relation 
to civil communities. 

As long as men do right, their interests are in perfect 
harmony with those of other moral beings. When, by 
doing wrong, they diminish the possible happiness of other 
beings, it is just that they should suffer, to repair their 
voluntary injury of others; and that having brought their 
interests into collision with those of others, theirs should 
be sacrificed, and the interests of others secured. 

All morally good actions are legitimate objects of de- 
sire. We ought to desire to perform them ourselves, and 
to have others perform them. Acts of benevolence, jus- 
tice, and veracity are of this description. These acts all 
agree in being conducive to the happiness of the agents 
and of other moral beings, who act on the same principles. 
They may involve the unhappiness of moral agents, but 
they cannot involve the ultimate unhappiness of any that 
are morally good. 

Morally good actions do not cease to be desirable in 
cases where they involve the misery of the morally evil, 
because in these cases, as in all others, their effects are, 
on the whole, favorable to the happiness, both of the sub- 
jects and other holy beings. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 
SECTION I. 

THE NATURE AND EXERCISES OF THE WILL. 

Beings are made capable of sensations, ideas, emotions, 
affections, and desires, not to be passive in experiencing 
them, but in order that they may choose the good and re- 
fuse the evil. This is true to some extent of animals and 
insects. They are made capable of happiness, in order 
that they choose and obtain it ; and are made capable of 
misery, in order that they may refuse and avoid the things 
which lead to it. The same is true, to a still gieater 
extent, of man, whose capacities of knowledge, and of hap- 
piness and misery, are incomparably greater than those of 
the noblest animals. > 

The sphere of choice is limited, and is proportionable 
to the capacities of the agents. Those agents which 
have the greatest capacities, have most to choose and re- 
fuse; and those which have the least capacities, least ei- 
ther to choose or refuse. The sphere of human choice is 
of vast extent ; and the objects which it embraces are in- 
numerable. 

Voluntary animal or human action is that which pro- 
ceeds from choice. All other action is involuntary. To 
will is to choose ; and to perform voluntary action, is to 
act from choice. Involuntary action may be simply in- 
voluntary or contra-voluntary. The actions of material 
agents in resistance and attraction, are simply involuntary ; 
that is, do not proceed from choice on the part of their 
subjects. The same is true of respiration and all those 
organic actions which we choose to have go on, though 
they proceed independently of our choice. They are invol- 
untary, but not contra-voluntary, except in cases where we 
choose to have them cease. Pain and other conscious 



284 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

exercises are contra-voluntary, when they are experienced 
contrary to our choice. 

The immediate object of choice is happiness of some 
kind ; its remote objects the means of happiness, both sub- 
jective and objective. 

The choice of immediate good produces volitions and 
consequent actions, and that of remote good, purposes. 
Purposes, when continued till the time and occasion for 
their accomplishment, give place to volitions, which like 
other volitions terminate in immediate action. All the 
phenomena of the will, therefore, may be comprehended 
under choices, purposes, and volitions. 

The sole subjective cause of these phenomena is the 
mind. The mind chooses purposes and exercises voli- 
tions. It puts forth these exercises in circumstances ap- 
propriate to choices, purposes, and volitions, just as it ex- 
ercises sensations, ideas, and emotions, in circumstances 
appropriate to them. The will, therefore, is not some- 
thing separate from the mind, which exercises a mastery 
over it. It is the mind itself, acting in the exercise of 
choices, purposes, and volitions ; just as reason is the 
mind, considered as the subjective cause of judgments and 
cognitions. 



SECTION II. 

THE NATURE AND LAWS OF CHOICES. 

Choice is synonymous with election and preference. 
Tt implies a capacity to choose, and objects of choice. 
Things not endowed with capacities to choose, cannot ex- 
ercise choice ; and beings endowed with these capacities, 
cannot exercise them without objects of choice, any more 
than beings endowed with capacities of sight, can see 
without visible objects ; or those endowed with capacities 
to reason, can reason without ideas to reason from. 

All possible varieties of pleasure and pain, and all their 
concurring causes, both immediate and remote, are legiti- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 285 

mate objects of choice. We prefer to have an object, 
rather* than not to have it; we prefer to have one object 
rather than another; and prefer to have an object now, 
rather than to have it at another time ; or at another time, 
rather than now. 

Choices may be distributed into positive and negative. 
In positive choices, we choose to have paiticular objects 
in preference to others, or in preference to not having 
them ; and in negative choices, we choose not to have 
particular objects in preference to others ; or not to have 
them in preference to having them. 

The faculty of choice is common to men and animals, 
and is exercised cotemporaneously with the other mental 
faculties, by all classes of voluntary beings. 

The essential conditions of choice are ideas of objects 
of choice ; just as the essential conditions of love are 
ideas of objects of love; and those of desires, ideas of 
desirable objects. In order to choose one apple from a 
number, we must have ideas of all the apples which we 
are to choose from; and in order to choose to have an ap- 
ple, or to choose not to have it, we must have ideas of our 
reception or non-reception of it, as depending upon our 
choice to have it or not to have it. So of all possible ob- 
jects of choice. 

The faculty of ideas sustains the same relation to 
choices, which it does to emotions, affections, and desires. 
All these phenomena are based on ideas. Choices, how- 
ever, are subsequent in the order of succession to desires, 
as desires are to primary emotions and affections. 

Our sensations and previous ideas contribute to deter- 
mine our primary emotions ; all these, and the additional 
ideas consequent upon them, contribute to determine our 
affections; all these, and the additional ideas consequent 
upon them, to determine our desires ; and all these, and 
the additional ideas consequent upon them, to determine 
our choices. 

Choice is never exercised in an arbitrary manner. 
There are always reasons for our choices. We cannot 
prefer one object to others, without reasons of some kind 
for our preference. Choice, therefore, involves the exer- 



286 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

cise of reason, and takes place in consequence of certain 
inferences, deductions, or conclusions, which are referable 
to the faculty of reason or judgment. For example, in 
choosing an article of merchandize from a number of ar- 
ticles of the same kind, reason is called into exercise, to 
determine which, of all that we select from, is best adapt- 
ed to our purpose; which will do us the best service, or 
be of the most use to us ; which is the handsomest, best, 
most durable, &c. That which we judge to possess the 
qualities above specified, or other desirable qualities, in 
the highest degree, becomes, in consequence of such judg- 
ment, the object of our choice. In these cases the judg- 
ment determines the choice. The same is true in all 
analogous cases. 

Choices, therefore, are in conformity with the judg- 
ments which we form of the articles or objects to be cho- 
sen. That which we judge to be best, or best adapted to 
our use, we choose for that reason. Where the grounds 
of judgment are clear and obvious, correct choices are 
easily obtained. Thus we find no difficulty in choosing 
between a manifestly good article, and one of the same 
kind, and of the same price, that is manifestly poor and 
defective. But where the grounds of correct judgment 
are not obvious, we are proportionably liable to error in 
our judgments, and in the choices to which they lead. 

When we judge correctly, our choices will be correct, 
and when we judge erroneously, our choices will be erro- 
neous, and proportionably disadvantageous. We cannot 
judge essentially wrong, and choose right; or judge right 
in all respects, and choose wrong. 

In order that judgments may be correct, they must cor- 
respond to the facts and evidence pertaining to the cases 
to which they relate. They must arise, therefore, from a 
perception and due consideration of facts and evidence. 
All the important facts, and all the important evidence, 
must be known and considered. When we have reason 
to believe our knowledge is incomplete, we ought to sus- 
pend our judgments, and protract our preliminary inqui- 
ries, till it is completed. 

This suspension of judgment depends on a purpose or 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 287 

determination to be fully informed previous to judging, 
and on the careful exercise of this faculty, both on the 
facts and evidence ascertained, and on the points of inquiry 
suggested for farther consideration. 

Immoderate appetites and affections lead to erroneous 
choices. An immoderate appetite for strong drink, leads 
the drunkard to prefer it to wholesome food, and to any 
other object which can be brought in competition with it. 
An immoderate love of company leads many to prefer it, 
in particular cases, before other sources of enjoyment of 
far greater value. So of an immoderate love of money, 
of praise, of honor, of fame, of power, &c. 

The extensive dominion of immoderate appetites and 
affections, in producing erroneous choices, is owing, in a 
degree, to the fact that they are liable to operate with 
their full power, when the objects to which they are oppo- 
sed are not taken into consideration. With sufficient 
knowledge to choose against an immoderate appetite, v/e 
may choose in agreement with it, through a moment's in- 
consideration. 

We are liable to choose wrong, under the influence of 
wrong examples, and of persuasion. We are creatures of 
imitation. What others do we are inclined to do because 
they do it ; what others choose, especially those whom w r e 
esteem and love, we are inclined to choose because they 
have chosen it. The first wrong choice of our first par- 
ents, was exercised under the influence of persuasion, per- 
verting the dictates of reason, and leading to the errone- 
ous judgment, that benefit could be obtained from eating 
the fruit which God had expressly prohibited. 

When example and persuasion are right, they tend pow- 
erfully to lead us to choose right. But when, as often 
happens, they are wrong, they tend as powerfully to lead 
us to choose and do wrong. 

We cannot choose contrary to all our feelings and sus- 
ceptibilities. We may choose contrary to some feelings, 
and in agreement with others. Thus we may choose that 
which will subject us to pain, in the hope of improving our 
condition in respect to property, health, honor, or favor 
with God. And we may choose that which is prejudicial 



288 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

to health, property, honor, fame, and favor with God, for 
the sake of avoiding pain. But we cannot choose an ob- 
ject which is contrary to all our feelings and susceptibili- 
ties, and which we view as being so at the time of making 
our choice. 

In most of our choices we consult for the gratification of 
some of our susceptibilities, at the expense of occasioning 
pain to others, or of withholding gratification from them. 

The principle on which we act, in such cases, is to 
choose whatever is, on the whole, beneficial in the highest 
degree. These choices require a comparison of the evils 
to be anticipated from particular objects, with the benefits 
to be expected from them, and an estimation in favor of 
those benefits, as on the whole the greatest we can se- 
cure. In these comparisons, and the estimates to which 
they lead, we are extremely liable to error, both from igno- 
rance and inconsideration. Especially are we liable to 
over-rate the present, and the immediate future, as they 
are related to the objects of our choice, and to undervalue 
the more remote future. Errors of this kind are frequent 
and often fatal. 

The choices of animals and infants have no moral char- 
acter. Those of moral agents are right or wrong, accord- 
ing as they are conformable to the law of God, or in con- 
trariety with it, or according as they relate to objects con- 
sidered as harmonizing the interests of the subject with 
those of other beings, or to those of an opposite character. 

The pleasures and pains of voluntary beings depend, to 
a great extent, upon their choices. Animal choices are 
essential conditions of animal comfort. Voluntary beings 
are placed between pleasure and pain, happiness and mis- 
ery; and are compelled to choose happiness, in order to 
attain it ; and to choose not to have pain, in order to avoid 
it. Not only are they compelled to choose in regard to 
happiness and misery ; they are compelled to choose equal- 
ly in regard to the concurring causes of both. They must 
choose in favor of the concurring causes of happiness, both 
immediate and more or less remote, if they would secure 
happiness; and against the similar concurring causes of 
misery, if they w r ould avoid misery. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 289 

This necessity is laid, in some degree, upon animals, 
but it is laid in a far greater degree upon men. 

Men are required to choose between infinite happiness 
and infinite misery ; and between the more and less remote 
concurring causes of both. Their liabilities and capaci- 
ties are incomparably greater than those of animals, con- 
sidered merely with respect to this life, and at the same 
time are heightened and increased by an endless line of 
miseries or delights, to be administered in the life to come. 
Man runs for an infinite and eternal prize. He is placed 
on the race ground ; the prize is held up distinctly before 
him, and the hazards clearly explained. He is not at lib- 
erty to decline the race; and if he does not gain the infi- 
nite prize, he must lose every thing good, and incur infinite 
evil. 



SECTION III. 

THE NATURE AND LAWS OF PURPOSES. 

Purposes are similar to choices, and may be consider- 
ed as a distinct species of them. They consist of those 
choices which relate to our future possible actions, and are 
distinguished from others which relate to our future possi- 
ble happiness and misery, and their concurring causes, 
whether more or less remote. We choose happiness in 
preference to misery; higher degrees of happiness of the 
same kinds, in preference to lower degrees of it, and some 
kinds of happiness in preference to others. 

In the same manner we purpose future possible actions, 
considered as concurring causes of happiness, more or 
less immediate or remote ; and purpose those which are 
viewed as concurring causes of greater degrees of happi- 
ness of the same kinds, in preference to others ; and those 
which are concurring causes of some kinds of happiness, 
in -preference to those which are concurring causes of 
other kinds of happiness. 

Purposes are synonymous with resolutions and deter- 
minations. To purpose, is the same as to resolve or de 

25 



290 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

termine to perform some future action, supposed to be 
possible. 

Purposes are either general or particular. 

General purposes relate to courses of action embracing 
a greater or smaller number of particular acts; particular 
purposes relate to particular acts. The purpose to do 
right, is general; that to do right in a particular instance, 
particular. 

The exercise of the mind in forming purposes, either 
of a general or specific nature, is similar to its exercise in 
choosing. The same things which induce us to choose 
an object of choice, induce us in pursuance of that choice, 
to purpose the acts which are requisite for its attainment. 
All the laws of choice, therefore, apply equally to the 
formation of purposes. 

Our purposes are limited to our supposed powers of 
voluntary action, as our choices are to our supposed capa- 
cities of enjoyment. We cannot purpose to do what we 
do not suppose at the time we shall have power to do. 
In order to purpose any act or course of action, we must 
suppose it practicable. Otherwise we may regard it de- 
sirable, and may even wish we were able to effect it, but 
cannot resolve to do so. Men, therefore, cannot purpose 
what they clearly perceive or fully believe to be impossi- 
ble. 

Of things which we are able to do, we cannot purpose 
such as appear not adapted to be of any use to us or others. 
Future action must be viewed as adapted to subserve, in 
some degree, our happiness or that of other beings, in order 
that we may purpose it. 

There must, also, appear some reason for forming a pur- 
pose to do a future possible and desirable act, more than 
the idea that the act contemplated is possible and desira- 
ble. These ideas are necessary prerequisites, but they 
are not sufficient alone to produce purposes. We must 
perceive that there is some necessity for the purpose in 
question; that there is something to be gained by forming 
it, and something to be lost by not forming it. The same 
is true of choices and volitions. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 291 

We often suspend a choice for days and months after 
the objects of choice are presented before us, because 
there does not appear sufficient reason why we should 
make an immediate choice. In order, therefore, to form 
purposes, we must view these acts, not only as possible, 
but as of immediate utility, and perceive an existing de- 
mand for them. The use of choices and resolutions is to 
serve as rules of subsequent voluntary action. When we 
see the need of them for that purpose, if no obstacle inter- 
venes, we form them. The relation of that necessity to 
real or supposed obstacles, as estimated by the mind, de- 
termines the formation or suspension of purposes. We 
form purposes, when the apparent reasons for forming 
them are greater than the apparent reasons for delaying 
the formation of them to a future time. Common reasons 
for delay, are desires of farther information. Common 
reasons for forming them immediately, are drawn from the 
necessity of adapting our conduct to such resolutions, or 
else of acting in a manner which will prove unfavorable to 
our interests, provided we should wish to form them at a 
future time. 

A young man deliberates on the subject of learning a 
particular trade. A favorable opportunity offers : he has 
not yet formed his purpose, but is waiting and searching 
for reasons for and against it. He must decide within a 
limited time, or lose the present favorable opportunity of 
carrying the proposed resolution into effect. To secure 
this chance, he decides in favor of the trade, when, other- 
wise, he would have left the matter undecided for months. 
Similar considerations produce determinations in other 
cases. Cases often occur in which we may resolve either 
to do, or not to do, a particular action; or to pursue, or not 
pursue, a particular course of action with advantage. It is 
often better to decide either way, than not to decide one 
way. 

All our purposes have reference to our future actions, as 
the best means of securing the best ends, which are com- 
prehended within the sphere of our knowledge and con- 
sideration, at the time of forming them. They involve, 



292 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore, in these points of view, the highest exercises of 
our reasoning powers, and must, necessarily, be determin- 
ed by them. Correct reasonings lead to correct purpo- 
ses; and reasonings essentially incorrect, lead necessarily 
to incorrect and injurious ones. All the circumstances 
which contribute to promote or retard the formation of 
purposes, are embraced within the wide domains of rea- 
son; and according as our reasonings are correct or incor- 
rect, our purposes are useful or injurious, wise and good, 
or unwise and evil. 

Our capacity of forming purposes, is co-extensive with 
that of possible future action. Whatever we have power 
to do, however arduous and difficult the doing of it may 
be, we can resolve to do, under appropriate influences, and 
in appropriate circumstances. The power to form ration- 
al purposes is, like the other mental faculties, limited ; 
but it is limited only by the other faculties. The exercise 
of this power is all with which we have any particular 
concern. Within the limits to which it extends, the exer- 
cise of it may be effected, not arbitrarily, but in a rational 
way, or through the appropriate exercise of our rational 
powers. The formation of right and useful purposes, is 
as appropriate an object of pursuit and effort, as any other 
which can engage our attention. 

Our influence over our future conduct, is exerted chief- 
ly by means of purposes. They bear a similar, though 
less intimate relation to future action, which volitions do to 
present action; and the object of purposes is as really to 
produce future action, as that of volition to produce pres- 
ent action. 

The capacity of forming purposes, in respect to future 
voluntary acts, is of great importance and utility. On the 
manner of our exercising it, much of our happiness or 
unhappiness, virtue or vice, depend. The proper exercise 
of it tends greatly to increase our happiness, and the neg- 
ligent, or otherwise improper exercise of it, tends equally 
to render us miserable. 

Choices and purposes are more or less continuous, but 
like other mental exercises, are subject to necessary remis- 
sions. They require cotemporaneous ideas of objects, to 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 293 

which they relate equally with emotions, affections, and 
desires; and are capable of being modified, suspended, or 
reversed by similar means. 

Purposes vary in respect to their qualities as moral or 
not moral ; and moral purposes as either right or wrong. 
In respect to intensity, they are subject to variations sim- 
ilar to those of the emotions, affections, and desires, and 
are distinguished as firm or feeble, strong or weak. A 
firm purpose is not easily overcome ; a weak purpose 
easily gives way. 

They are also distinguished as occasional and habitual, 
transient and enduring. Occasional purposes may relate 
to occasional duties, or to habitual ones. In the former 
case they are right and proper; in the latter, defective. 
Habitual duties require habitual purposes. 

God's purposes are in constant exercise, and are un- 
changable ; being founded in unchangable and infinite wis- 
dom and goodness. The purposes of all finite beings, 
however, are subject to numerous and protracted remis- 
sions, and are liable to be changed by means of changes 
in the ideas and other mental exercises on which they 
depend. 



SECTION IY. 

THE NATURE AND LAWS OF VOLITIONS. 

Those purposes which relate to immediate action, are 
distinguished from others under the title of volitions. They 
relate to actions as future, equally with other purposes, 
but relate to them as immediate ; whereas, other purposes 
relate to them as more or less remote. 

Volition means, simply, an act of will. To exercise a 
volition, is to will some immediate action. We will a 
motion of the hand, and it moves ; we will to suspend its 
motion, and it is suspended. So of all voluntary corpo- 
real actions. We will their being done, and they are 
done ; and we will their not being done, and they are not 
done. Actions which do not depend upon our volitions, 

25* 



294 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

are not voluntary; and those which depend upon them 
only in some degree, are only in some degree voluntary. 

The sphere of volitions in respect to corporeal actions, 
is easily distinguished. All voluntary corporeal actions 
are contained within it, but cannot possibly fill it. Those 
corporeal actions which we perform in consequence of 
volitions, we easily distinguish from others in which we 
exercise an involuntary agency. In walking, standing, 
sitting, moving, &c, we are voluntary ; in breathing, and 
still more in the processes of absorption, secretion, per- 
spiration, and various spasmodic affections of the limbs 
and other organs, we are involuntary. 

Many important actions are involuntary, however, only 
in relation to the immediate acts of the will, directed to 
their production or suspension. We cannot produce or 
suspend them by volitions in favor of their occurrence or 
against it. Regular and irregular motions of the hands or 
other limbs, may be produced by volitions as their imme- 
diate concurring causes ; but this is not the case with the 
pulsations of the heart and arteries, or the other muscular 
motions involved in the various processes of organic life. 
The same power that moves the limbs by volitions, cau- 
ses the appropriate motions of the heart and arteries, and 
of the other related organs, without the intervention of 
these exercises, and according to other laws, which have, 
equally with those of volitions, been established by the 
Creator. 

Actions which are independent of volitions as immedi- 
ate concurring causes, are not entirely independent of the 
will, or of volitions as their remote concurring causes. 
Those which we cannot control by the direct influence of 
volitions, we may often control by intervening objects of 
volition. This is the case with many of the processes of 
organic life. We may derange those which are regular, 
and regulate those which are deranged, by various actions 
directly under the control of volitions. It is perfectly in 
our power to suspend all the functions of organic life, and 
to produce any conceivable degree of derangement in them, 
by means of voluntary corporeal actions. When some of 
them are deranged, we can often restore them to order by 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 295 

similar means. The whole science of medicine relates 
to the voluntary control of the processes of organic life. 
It teaches us to modify these processes in various ways, 
and to a surprising extent, by the use of medicines ; and 
thus greatly extends the dominion of the human will over 
those operations of the mind, which are concerned in the 
phenomena of organic life, and which are not immediate 
objects of volition. 

Voluntary corporeal action takes place by means of the 
contraction and relaxation of certain muscles, adapted for 
the purpose. 

The ultimate cause of the voluntary contraction of 
muscles is the mind. The action of the mind in produ- 
cing voluntary muscular action, terminates on the nerves, 
and is communicated by them to the muscles. The 
agents of voluntary muscular action are: (1.) The mind 
acting on the nerves ;.(2.) The nerves affecting the mus- 
cles ; (3.) The muscles contracting and moving the limbs, 
&c. 

The muscles of the dead may be contracted by galvan- 
ism, communicated to them by the nerves of motion, so 
as to produce actions analogous to the voluntary actions 
of living beings. This has often been done, to the sur- 
prise and astonishment of beholders. In life, the mind 
acts on the nerves of motion, and these organs on the 
muscles. There is no evidence that it acts at all directly 
on the muscles in voluntary corporeal actions, any more 
than there is that it acts directly on external objects, which 
it moves through the medium of the limbs. 

The contraction of the muscles by the galvanic fluid, 
after death, proves that they are adapted to operate in per- 
forming their legitimate functions as an effect of galvanic 
or other similar excitement. Their living action, there- 
fore, may be by means of this excitement. According to 
this hypothesis, the nerves act upon the voluntary muscles 
in living beings, by means of a galvanic or other fluid, 
and serve as conductors of this fluid to the muscles. The 
energy with which the muscles contract, other things be- 
ing equal, is proportionable to the amount of galvanism 
which they receive. All that the nerves receive they give. 



296 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The facts which are clearly involved in voluntary mus- 
cular action are ; 

(1.) Conscious and voluntary mental exercises ; 

(2.) The accumulation of the nervous fluid in those 
parts of the nervous system where the action is to be per- 
formed, and on the particular nerves with which the mus- 
cles to be operated upon are connected ; 

(3.) The discharge of this fluid from the nerves to the 
muscles with which they communicate ; 

(4.) The consequent contraction of the muscles and 
motion of the limbs or other organ. 

In this case, the agency of the mind is concerned 
directly; (1.) In accumulating the galvanic fluid where it 
is to be used ; (2.) In discharging it from the nerves of 
motion connected with the particular muscles to be moved, 
and in such proportions as are requisite for the ends con- 
templated. 

The theory of a nervous fluid does not w r eaken the ev- 
idence of the existence of human and animal minds, de- 
rived from voluntary action, and other conscious exercises. 
Material muscles may be excited by a material fluid ; the 
nervous system may serve as organs for the secretion and 
distribution of this fluid ; but beyond the nerves and ner- 
vous system, and the fluid which they secrete and distri- 
bute, there must be another agent to govern their secre- 
tion and distribution of this material element. That ulti- 
mate agent is the mind, and is the exclusive subject of 
volitions. 

Voluntary corporeal actions orignate in volitions. Their 
subjective causes are entirely material ; their ultimate ob- 
jective causes spiritual. The mind is the ultimate objec- 
tive cause of all the corporeal actions which it concurs in 
producing by volitions. 

Mental exercises are not, in any case, appropriate ob- 
jects of volition, in the sense that corporeal voluntary ac- 
tions are. The mind does not produce sensations, ideas, 
emotions, or choices, by the direct agency of volitions. It 
produces these exercises as it produces volitions, and is 
their common subjective cause. Some of its exercises 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 297 

are agreeable to its choice respecting them, and some are 
not. No possible conscious exercise can be an object of 
choice, except as far as it is at the same time an object of 
ideas. 

Mental exercises occur, and are then objects of choice 
as to their continuance or non-continuance. We have 
ideas of mental exercises, which do not exist at the time, 
as the objects of certain relations, and prosecute the more 
perfect attainment of them as rational objects of pursuit; 
but not as direct objects of volitions. 

Judgments, imaginations, reminiscences, emotions, af- 
fections, and desires, are in some degree under our volun- 
tary control. We can obtain many of them or not obtain 
them, as we choose ; but we cannot obtain any of them 
as the direct objects of volitions. Men move their limbs 
by means of volitions ; but they do not judge, know, ima- 
gine, or remember by these means ; neither do they expe- 
rience emotions, affections, and desires, or form choices 
and purposes by them. 

Volitions are not necessary to sensations, where the ap- 
propriate organic impressions exist ; they are not necessa- 
ry to the formation of judgments on the ground of sensa- 
tions ; or to the exercise of emotions as the consequence 
of emotion-producing ideas. 

Volitions which have respect to mental exercises, are 
denominated acts of attention. In attention, the mind is 
exercised voluntarily in existing ideas and their accompa- 
nying emotions. We attend to existing ideas in order to 
obtain others ; and to some existing ideas in preference to 
others, according as we suppose they are preferable, ei- 
ther as means of attaining desirable emotions or other de- 
sirable ideas. 

A large portion of our mental exercises depend on vo- 
litions directed immediately to the production of corporeal 
actions ; such as the exercise of the mind in seeing, hear- 
ing, tasting, &c. We perform certain corporeal acts as 
objects of volitions, with a view to obtain mental exerci- 
ses, and by that means attain them. 

Volitions, like choices and purposes, are subsequent in 
the order of succession to desires. We first desire, then 



298 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

will, in conformity with our desires. The immediate con- 
curring causes of desires, are remote concurring causes 
of volitions and voluntary actions. Considered with re- 
lation to the voluntary actions which they concur in pro- 
ducing, desires are denominated motives, and are distin- 
guished from the objects to which they relate, under the 
title of subjective motives, while their objects are denom- 
inated objective motives. Thus, wealth is an objective 
motive, and the desire of it a subjective motive to indus- 
try ; the favor of God an objective motive, and the desire 
of it a subjective motive to piety, &c. 

Objective motives are essential conditions of subjective 
ones ; and subjective motives, of choices, purposes, and 
volitions, and voluntary actions. 

Volitions vary in respect to intensity, like sensations 
and emotions. Some volitions have more intensity and 
others less. Other things being equal, their consequent 
actions or effects are proportionable to their intensity. 
With volitions of one degree of intensity, we lift one 
pound ; with those of two degrees of intensity, two 
pounds; with those of a hundred degrees of intensity, a 
hundred pounds ; and so on to the most intense possible. 

Voluntary actions are more or less difficult and labori- 
ous, and uniformly become less and less so by repetition. 
Processes which are difficult and laborious at first, be- 
come easier and easier by practice, till we perform them 
almost without effort. The muscular strength which we 
exert on different occasions, other things being equal, is 
proportionable to the energy of our volitions. 



SECTION V. 

THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE WILL. 

Our choices, purposes, and volitions, exert a powerful 
and extensive influence in determining our happiness and 
misery. Every other class of mental exercises is, to a 
great extent, determined by these. Their influence is of 
two kinds, direct and indirect. They exercise a direct in- 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 299 

fluence on our sensations and ideas in attention ; and on 
our bodies in voluntary muscular action. They exercise 
an indirect influence on our sensations, ideas, emotions, 
affections, desires, and future acts of will, by the effects 
of attention and of voluntary corporeal action. 

In these two modes our past acts of will determine, to a 
great extent, our present experience ; and our present acts 
of will, together with those which are past, our future ex- 
perience. The experience of each successive portion of 
life is thus linked to the exercises of the will. 

Our first acts of will modify our earliest experience, 
and extend their indirect influences to the remotest future. 
All our successive acts of will are added to the common 
stock of our previous exercises, and exert similar imme- 
diate and remote influences, which extend forward indefi- 
nitely. 

The exercises of will in infancy affect the experi- 
ence of youth, manhood, and old age. Those of youth 
affect the experience of manhood and old age ; those of 
manhood affect the experience of old age ; and those 
which belong to all the different periods of life, affect the 
experience of a future state forever. 

These influences ought to be constantly borne in mind, 
and carefully studied, that we may know beforehand what 
effect particular choices, purposes, and volitions will have 
on our whole destiny. We always act in view of some of 
their anticipated effects. We ought, as far as possible, to 
obtain a view of all of them, and to make such a view the 
basis of our judgments pertaining to this class of our 
mental exercises. 

The capacity of acting in view of motives, and for the 
accomplishment of those ends which we judge desirable, 
enhances the value of all our other capacities, and renders 
them available for the attainment of happiness. Without 
this endowment we might be sentient machines, operating 
according to the will and judgment of our Creator; but 
with this we are moral agents, acting according to our own 
will and judgment, and are the subjects of moral responsi- 
bility for our actions. 



300 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The will is adapted to the other mental faculties. It is 
the servant of the susceptibilities of pleasure and pain, 
and of the consequent affections and desires ; but operates 
according to the inferences or deductions of reason, deci- 
ding different modes of action to be both possible and de- 
sirable, at the time of their being resolved on or performed. 

According as our judgments are right or wrong, depend- 
ent acts of will are really useful or injurious. 

Reason is the guide of the will, and is exercised under 
its influence and direction. Here is the mystery of hu- 
man nature; and on this point multitudes are involved in 
endless perplexity. This mystery, however, admits of an 
easy solution, and may be solved as follows : 

The first exercise of will occurs under the direction of 
reason, uninfluenced by any previous purpose or volition. 
It is purely a dictate of reason, or a dictate of unbiassed 
reason. Its results become matters of experience, and 
produce corresponding judgments. Judgments resulting 
from that exercise of will, together with others not deri- 
ved from that source, produce other exercises of will ; and 
every successive exercise of will modifies the judgments 
which follow; the judgments constantly producing acts 
of will, and the acts of will producing and modifying fu- 
ture judgments. 

The changes which occur in our susceptibilities of 
pleasure and pain, in the course of our experience, modi- 
fy both our judgments and acts of will. In judging what 
is good or evil, we always consider the objects to be judged 
of, with respect to our existing or future possible capaci- 
ties and conditions; not in respect to those which we 
may have previously had and lost, or to those which we 
may yet have in future, but which we do not anticipate. 

Our capacity of willing, is limited by our susceptibili- 
ties of pleasure and pain, and our other mental and bodily 
faculties. It is greater or less, in proportion as these ca- 
pacities are increased or diminished. Will is not omnip- 
otent nor independent. Its powers correspond to the 
other faculties of voluntary agents, and its exercises de- 
pend entirely on previous or cotemporaneous mental exer- 
cises. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 301 

So far from being an independent and despotic ruler, 
wielding the mighty energies of sensation, emotion, rea- 
son, imagination, and the affections, in an arbitrary man- 
ner, it is their constant and obedient servant, doing their 
whole bidding, to the extent of its powers, and never at- 
tempting more. ISuch it must ever continue. In every 
possible condition of human nature, the will must be in 
accordance with the other mental exercises; the mind 
judging at each successive moment what is to be chosen, 
purposed, and done, and indicating both the ends to be 
sought, and the means for their attainment; and choosing, 
purposing, and doing accordingly. 

Our capacity of doing good to ourselves and others by 
voluntary action, of creating happiness and averting mise- 
ry, involving the formation of judgments, in respect to the 
modes in which we can accomplish these ends, is a high 
and valuable endowment. It adapts us to the circumstan- 
ces of our being, as subjects of God's moral government. 
We are impelled to action by the prospect of suffering, 
and invited to it by that of pleasure. 

All voluntary action is in pursuit of pleasure, and in es- 
cape from pain. This is the case now, and must ever be, 
in every possible condition of voluntary agents. 

If we should ever be placed in such a condition, that 
action would afford us no pleasure of any kind, and inac- 
tion expose us to no pain, voluntary action would be im- 
possible. The suspension of our pleasures and pains, 
upon our voluntary action, is necessary to the production 
of such action. It must prevail, therefore, in respect to 
all voluntary agents, not excepting God himself. God's 
happiness is the consequence of his right voluntary action. 
In proportion as we are assimilated in character and con- 
duetto him, we enjoy a similar felicity. 

There can be no voluntary action, without some degree 
of the exercise of reason, indicating the mode of action to 
be performed, and the ends to be gained by it; or, in other 
words, the consequences to flow from it. 

The idea of ends to be gained, suggests that of means 
for their attainment; and that of means, suggests ends. 
The idea of an action to be performed, and of some of 

26 



302 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the consequences to flow from performing it, tends to sug- 
gest all that we ought to consider, in order to act wisely in 
every possible case. 

God's moral government is administered by the dispen- 
sation of good and evil, as the consequence of right and 
wrong actions, so as to harmonize the interests of all holy 
beings. It consists of rewards and punishments, happi- 
ness and misery, resulting from particular moral actions, 
and courses of action, both in time and eternity. 

The less perfect government of families and states, is 
administered on the same principle. It encourages cer- 
tain actions, and courses of action, by the bestowment of 
rewards, and discourages others by the infliction of pun- 
ishments. It thus appeals to the will of the subject, 
through the medium of the susceptibilities which men 
possess, of happiness and misery, and through the exer- 
cise of reason, estimating the consequences of different 
actions, in different relations and conditions. 

Considered in relation to the Divine government, all the 
happiness which results from well-doing, is of the nature 
of rewards; and all the misery that results from sin, is re- 
tributive or primitive. 

Divine revelation greatly increases our knowledge of 
moral actions, both by its precepts and by its disclosures 
respecting their future and eternal consequences. It 
affords us essential benefit, by furnishing us definite and 
explicit rules of moral action ; and by exhibiting the most 
important and weighty reasons for doing right, and only 
riofht, in all cases whatever. 

Our general judgment may be in opposition to a partic- 
ular act, and we may regard it as on the whole undesirable 
and injurious; and yet, under the influence of temporary 
excitement, we may judge it desirable, and perform it. In 
this case, the excitement of the occasion perverts our judg- 
ment, and the perverted judgment misleads the will. 

Doing what we know to be wrong and injurious, under 
the influence of inordinate affections, admits of a similar 
explanation. Contemplated in some points of view, we 
judge such acts to be entirely undesirable and injurious; 
in other points of view, they are the subjects of vehement 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 303 

desire, and of favorable judgments. While we contem- 
plate them in relation to the law of God, and to their fu- 
ture evil effects, we do not and cannot judge it best to 
pursue them. But when, even for a short time, we con- 
template them simply with reference to our own inordin- 
ate passions, our desire^ for them becomes strong, and 
often decisive of our wills, to the prejudice of our high- 
est known interests. It is thus that we "see the right, 
and yet the wrong pursue." 

While the right is distinctly and prominently in our 
view, it determines our judgments, desires, and acls of 
will. But during the intervals, however short, in which it 
is left out of view, or made less prominent than it should 
be, perverted judgments are formed, inordinate desires 
spring up, and injurious acts of will are put forth. 

By the exercise of judgments we form comparative es- 
timates of different objects of pursuit and choice ; of the 
different modes of action by which to secure the objects 
we choose; and of the times to act. According as we 
judge, we act. Our judgments, however, may be perfect- 
ly right, or imperfect, in different degrees ; and our con- 
duct will be proportionably wise, or unwise and injurious, 
and right or wrong. 

Animals are, equally with men, subjects of choices, 
purposes, and volitions. They choose some objects in 
preference to others; purpose some future actions in pre- 
ference to others; and will some immediate actions, or put 
forth some volitions in preference to others. The laws of 
the animal, are similar to those of the human will. They 
are incapable, however, of forming ideas of actions as 
right or wrong, and of experiencing the emotions, affec- 
tions, and desires, which these ideas are adapted to excite. 
Their knowledge, and the sphere of their emotions, are 
more limited than those of men ; consequently they are 
incapable of many choices, purposes, and volitions, of 
which men, by reason of their higher endowments, are 
fully capable. 



304 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

SECTION VI. 

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 

Actions which depend either immediately or remotely 
on the will of their subjects, are distinguished from others 
under the title of free actions. Others are denominated 
necessary. All the actions of material agents and of veg- 
etable minds are necessary. Those of men and animals 
are either free or necessary, according as they depend on 
the choices of their subjects or not. 

The capacity of performing free actions, constitutes 
beings free agents ; those of performing only necessary 
actions, necessary agents. Material objects are necessary 
agents, and men and animals free agents, considered with 
respect to all their free actions ; and necessary agents, 
considered with respect to those which are not free. 

Freedom has respect to possible actions. Those which 
are possible at some times, may be impossible at others. 
In its greatest extension, human freedom relates to all 
those actions which are ever possible, and necessity is re- 
stricted to those which are never under our voluntary con- 
trol. Actions which are never possible, we are not free to 
perform, and those which it is never in our power not to 
perform, we are not free to decline. 

In the sense above described, freedom and necessity 
are applicable to choices, purposes, and volitions, equally 
with other human and animal actions. 

Many choices are determined indirectly by previous 
choices, in the same manner as sensations, ideas, and emo- 
tions are. Many conceivable choices are never possible 
to individuals, and their non-attainment is therefore neces- 

sar y- 

Freedom is either limited or unlimited. It is limited 
when actions, which were free for a time, after that time 
become necessary ; and is unlimited, when free actions 
never become necessary. We are the subjects of unlim- 
ited freedom in respect to all actions which depend upon 
volitions or immediate choices ; and of limited freedom 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL. 305 

in respect to all actions which are not immediately volun- 
tary ; but which depend on previous remote choices. 

Necessity is either relative or absolute. Actions are 
absolutely necessary which their agents never had power 
not to perform, and the non-performance of actions is ne- 
cessary, in respect to all agents who are never able to 
perform them. The actions of matter and vegetable 
minds, and their non-performance of other actions, are ab- 
solutely necessary. 

Human and animal actions are the subjects of relative 
or limited necessity, when it is impossible for the agent 
to perform or not to perform them after particular times, 
though either was possible before. No moral actions can 
be absolutely necessary ; and no absolutely necessary ac- 
tions can be the objects of moral obligation. 

All choices are free. The idea of a necessary choice 
is absurd and contradictory. There is no choice where 
there is no liberty. Voluntary actions are free, consider- 
ed as proceeding from choice, and depending on it as an 
essential concurring cause. Choices are essentially free. 
Freedom, however, is the opposite of necessity, not of 
dependence. 

Human and animal choices are dependent equally with 
other phenomena. They depend ( 1 .) on subjective causes 
or agents ; (2.) on objective causes ; (3.) on previous 
choices and other previous exercises ; (4.) on God as their 
ultimate external cause. 

?6* 



PART FOURTH. 

THE ORIGIN AND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE ORIGIN AND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 

The ultimate origin of all finite minds is by immediate 
creation. Minds are, equally with matter, the objects of 
Divine workmanship. God made them in the exercise of 
the same power which is displayed in the creation of mat- 
ter, but which is the subject of no other equal display. 

The principal question respecting the creation of minds, 
which comes within the province of reason, is that which 
relates to the time of their ultimate creation. Are they 
derived from pre-existing minds, without an original act of 
creation ? Or are they created singly and successively, 
as fast as bodies are provided for their reception ? One of 
these suppositions is doubtless true. Minds are either 
created as fast as bodies are provided for their reception, 
or else they are derived from pre-existing similar minds, 
without original acts of creation. 

It is a common opinion, that minds are brought into ex- 
istence by creation, at the time when they become princi- 
ples of life to appropriate bodies. This opinion is held, 
especially with respect to human minds. Few take the 
trouble to inquire whether animal minds are derived or 
created. There is probably, however, a general agree- 
ment in the idea, that animals and vegetables do not re- 
quire any actual creations to effect their development ; 
and that their principles of life are derived; not immedi- 
ately created. 

If, however, the principles of vegetable and animal life 
are pre-existent to their establishment in organized vege- 



308 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

table and animal bodies, as principles of life to those bo- 
dies, the same may be true of the principles of human 
life. The principles of animal life are animal minds, and 
those of vegetable life, vegetable minds. All agree in 
being substances which are not material ; that is, not the 
subjects of mutual attractions and repulsions. This is 
unquestionably true of the principle of animal life. An- 
imal minds are as evidently not material as human minds. 
The same rule, therefore, which applies to the origin of 
human minds, ought to apply to that of the minds of ani- 
mals ; and the same which applies to the origin of animal 
minds, ought to apply to that of human minds. 

If minds of any order are created successively as bo- 
dies are prepared for them, we may infer that those of all 
orders are ; and if those of any order are formed by deri- 
vation from pre-existing similar minds, we may infer that 
all are the subjects of such derivation. 

The origin or production of a mind involves that of a 
subject capable of certain operations. The powers of 
minds, however, like those of matter, are all relative. 
Were a single particle of matter to exist alone in the uni^ 
verse, it would neither attract nor repel ; neither would it 
be the subject of any possible phenomena. The same is 
true of a single created mind. Were such a mind, wheth^ 
er human, animal, or vegetable, to exist alone in the uni^ 
verse, with only its present capacities, it would be as in-< 
capable of any of its present exercises, as a solitary par- 
ticle of matter would be of attraction and repulsion. 
Human minds, with the properties which they exhibit in 
this world, are as dependent on organized bodies for their 
development, as one particle of matter is on others for the 
exercise of its powers of attraction and repulsion. The 
same is true of animal and vegetable minds. 

Minds are individual subjects, capable of certain opera^ 
tions and exercises in certain conditions. Human minds 
are capable of a certain number and variety of operations; 
animal minds of others in some respects similar ; and veg-- 
etable minds of others still. 

Single minds are capable of animating bodies of indefiU 
nite extent. The human body is at first small, but grow& 



ORIGIN AND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 309 

to be many times larger. The same vital principle which 
animates it when small, continues to animate it when in- 
creased to its largest size. The mind which gave vitality 
to the miniature man in the earliest stages of his existence, 
continues to animate him in his mature years and full size. 

The organs of the human body are, to a great extent, 
double. Each side has its own separate brains, its own 
separate spinal cord, its own separate nerves, muscles, and 
its own eye, ear, nostril, hand, and foot. The organs of 
each side of the body have their own capacities, indepen- 
dent of those of the other, and are capable of simultaneous 
exercises. All, however, are subject to one conscious rea- 
soning, feeling, and choosing mind. One and the same 
subject of sensations, ideas, emotions, and choices, gives 
vitality to the whole, and directs the whole. The pre- 
sence of this agent is evinced in every part of the body, 
from its central organs to its remotest extremities. It is 
comprehended within certain definite limits, capable of 
indefinite contraction and extension. If the body is con- 
tracted within smaller dimensions, by the amputation of 
limbs or other means, the sphere of its mental operations, 
and of the presence and agency of its vital principle, is 
proportionally contracted ; and if the body is increased 
in magnitude to double, treble, or hundreds of times its 
primitive size, the sphere of the agency of its actuating 
mind is proportionably increased. This is true of all or- 
ders of terrestrial minds, human, animal, and vegetable. 

The human body usually grows to many times its origin- 
al size; the same is true of the bodies of animals and in- 
sects, and of vegetables. Many vegetables grow to be 
thousands of times as large as their primitive size, and 
their extended bodies are as completely pervaded by the 
principle of life, as the diminutive ones with which they 
commenced their existence. 

Such is the physical nature of the human mind, that had 
Adam lived till now, and grown to a size equal to that of 
all his posterity, by the same gradual process by which 
his descendants have been multiplied, for aught that ap- 
pears, the mind with which he was originally endowed, 
would have been as fully adequate to the purposes of that 



310 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

extended organization, as it was to that of the smaller 
size in which he was created, and which he was not per- 
mitted to exceed. The same may be said of the first of 
each class of animals and vegetables. Had the first oak 
continued to exist and grow till now, so as to have been 
at this time equal in size to the sum of all the oaks which 
have sprung from it, the vegetable mind with which it was 
endowed would, for aught that appears, have been as ad- 
equate to the purposes of that extended organization, as 
it was to those of the more limited one actually attained. 

There is no evidence that the size of organized beings 
bears any proportion to the capacities of their vital princi- 
ples. They are limited to comparatively small sizes for 
wise reasons, many of which are obvious ; but none of 
these reasons are derived from any incapacities of their or- 
ganizing principles to serve as principles of organization 
to larger bodies. The vegetable mind which gives vitality 
to an acorn, does the same to an oak ; and the human or 
animal minds which give vitality to their respective bodies 
in the earliest periods of their existence, do the same to 
much larger bodies at later periods. 

The same mind exists in different places at the same 
times. This follows as a necessary conclusion from any 
hypothesis admitting the existence of minds. Take, for 
example, the human mind. Sensation is exercised simul- 
taneously in different parts of the body. But sensations 
are phenomena of minds ; therefore they indicate the 
simultaneous presence of the mind in different parts of 
the body at the same time. Even admitting the absurd 
supposition that the mind is restricted to the narrow limits 
of the brain, and that we are mistaken in conceiving of 
the subject of sensations as being in the tooth or limb, 
when we experience the tooth ache or other aches ; still 
we have as much reason to conclude that it is simultane- 
ously present in both lobes of the brain, as that it exists 
within the limits of either; and that it is simultaneously 
present in different parts of the same lobes, as that it ex- 
ists within any part of them. Consequently, we have as 
much reason to conclude that minds are extended, as that 
they exist at all. 



ORIGIN AND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 211 

According to the most rational supposition, that the 
same minds exist simultaneously as the subjects of sen- 
sations, in all parts of their respective bodies where sensa- 
tions occur, they possess degrees of extension equal to 
that of their bodies ; and according to the supposition, that 
the immediate agency of human and animal minds is re- 
stricted to the comparatively narrow limits of human and 
animal brains, they extend simultaneously to the right and 
left lobes of the brain, corresponding to the right and left 
sides of the body, and to different parts of the same lobes 
at the same times. We come, therefore, to the legitimate 
and necessary conclusion, that human and animal minds 
are extended. Having ascertained this fact, we next infer 
that they are capable of different degrees of extension, 
according to those of their appropriate bodies. The same 
conclusions may be drawn from similar phenomena, ex- 
hibited by vegetable minds. 

The same vegetable mind which is now limited to the 
narrow dimensions of an acorn, is capable of being ex- 
panded to those of the largest oak, and the same human 
mind which is now restricted to the narrow dimensions of 
an infant body, is capable of being expanded to those of 
the largest man. 

The expansion of minds takes place in appropriate cir- 
cumstances, and depends on appropriate conditions. The 
infant mind cannot exceed the limits assigned to it; that 
of the full grown man cannot exceed the limits assigned 
to it; and the minds of animals and vegetables cannot ex- 
ceed the limits assigned to them in the different stages of 
their existence. 

The expansion of minds in the same bodies, is a phe- 
nomenon of absolute certainty. Minds expand from small 
dimensions to large without any diminution, and with a 
large increase of their powers. This takes place among 
all the different orders of organized beings. Did their 
powers diminish as their magnitudes increase, we should 
have reason to conclude that their expansibility was limit- 
ed. But the fact is the opposite, and authorizes an op- 
posite conclusion. 



312 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

We infer, therefore, from clear and decisive evidence, 

1 . That minds are actually extended ; 

2. That they are capable of indefinite extension, with- 
out any diminution of their local powers. 

Thus far our conclusions rest on obvious and unques- 
tionable grounds, and are entitled to be ranked as matters 
of knowledge, equally with ideas of the extension of mat- 
ter. We have as logical grounds of certainty in respect 
to the extension of minds, as we have in respect to that 
of material bodies. 

We now return to the question respecting the succes- 
sive production of minds, human, animal, and vegetable. 
They are produced successively and continually, according 
to uniform physical laws, similar to those which regulate 
their gradual expansion after they are produced. Human 
and animal minds have power, within certain limits, to in- 
crease or diminish their dimensions. They also have sim- 
ilar power to produce successors. In taking that food and 
using the other means which result in growth, animals en- 
large the dimensions of their existing minds. The same 
is true of the production of successors. In producing 
both these results, voluntary beings exercise an agency 
partly voluntary and partly involuntary. 

Vegetable minds exercise an involuntary agency in their 
enlargement and growth, and in the production of succes- 
sors, similar to the higher and more complex agency of men 
and animals. 

Vegetables have a double method of production, by 
branches and by seeds. A branch from a tree may be 
inserted in a proper soil, and become itself a tree. Be- 
fore its separation from the parent stock, the vegetable 
mind of the tree pervaded all its branches, and existed 
cotemporaneously in all. When separated from the tree 
it retains a portion of the extended vegetable mind which 
it formerly received, and which becomes, in consequence ' 
of this process, an independent vegetable mind. 

The remaining vegetable mind of the tree remains per- 
fect, and is incapable of being exhausted by processes of 
this kind, because it is capable of indefinite expansion 
without any diminution of its local powers. That which 



ORIGIN #ND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 313 

is capable of indefinite expansion, without any diminution 
of its local powers, cannot be impaired by a removal of its 
expanded parts. 

The production of vegetable minds by seeds, is analo- 
gous to that by branches. A seed corresponds to a 
branch. Till it is ripened and perfected, it is a part of 
the tree or plant on which it grows. As soon as its or- 
ganization is completed, it is separated from the parent 
stock by a natural process, analogous to the artificial one 
of cutting off a branch, and takes its due portion of the 
extended mind of the vegetable by which it is produced, 
along with it. 

In the vegetable kingdom, therefore, the expansion of 
existing minds, and the production of new ones, are anal- 
ogous processes. The latter involves no more an original 
act of creation than the former. Both are phenomena of 
vegetable minds; are referable to them as their exclusive 
subjective causes; to the conditions in which they occur, 
as concurring causes; to God, as their ultimate cause; 
and to the design and will of God, as their final cause. 

The production of animal and human minds admits of 
an explanation similar to that of vegetable minds, and on 
equally valid grounds. From all which we infer, that the 
production of terrestrial minds is a phenomenon analo- 
gous to their increasing extension in the same bodies; and 
that minds exist in different parts of their bodies, howev- 
er extended, as single minds ; and are capable of being 
divided and multiplied, as well as extended, indefinitely, 
according to laws established by the Creator, and by asso- 
ciation with different bodies. 

The susceptibility of division, as possessed by minds, 
depends on the property of extension; and that of being 
divided into similar minds, possessing capacities of equal 
variety and extent, on the capacity of being extended in- 
definitely, without any diminution of their local powers. 
All the properties of beings are mysterious. This is 
particularly true of the properties of minds, the highest 
order of beings. The extension and divisibility of minds, 
however, and their capacity of being extended and divi- 

27 



314 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ded indefinitely, are no more mysterious than their capaci- 
ties of sensation, reason, feeling, or will. 

According to the foregoing arguments and conclusions, 
the true theory of the origin of minds is the following. 
God created the first minds of each of the different orders 
of organized beings, by the same Almighty power, in the 
exercise of which he created the ultimate particles of mat- 
ter. In connexion with other properties, he invested them 
with the properties of indefinite extension, in appropriate 
conditions, without any diminution of their local powers, 
and with the kindred properties of indefinite divisibility. 
Extension and divisibility are kindred properties, and the 
same is true of capacities of being indefinitely extended, 
without any diminution of local powers, and of being in- 
definitely divided. 

The capacity of becoming extended in given circum- 
stances, beyond the limits to which they are at first re- 
stricted, is common to all minds, human, animal, and veg- 
etable. The same is true of their capacity of operating 
as concurring causes in the production of other similar 
minds. 

In favor of the derivation of all minds directly from the 
creative power of God, there is no evidence direct or in- 
direct. That derivation is possible ; and if no other is in- 
dicated, may be admitted as probable; but it is not a sub- 
ject of revelation, either natural or supernatural. In favor 
of their derivation, by division from pre-existing minds of 
the same orders, we have evidence of a clear and deci- 
sive character; some articles of which have been brought 
distinctly to view in the preceding pages. 

The theory of the derivation of the minds of succes- 
sors, from those of their predecessors, is strongly corrob- 
orated by the hereditary transmission of mental peculiari- 
ties. Vegetables, animals, and men, propagate their own 
species, never beings of another species. Particular vari- 
eties of the same species, propagate their own varieties, 
not other varieties belonging to the same species. The 
peculiarities of vegetables depend upon corresponding 
properties of their principles of organization. The same 
is true of those which relate to the forms, colors, struc- 



ORIGIN AND DERIVATION OF MINDS. 315 

tures, and other physical endowments of men and ani- 
mals. These, therefore, indicate a resemblance between 
the minds derived, and those which precede them in the 
order of succession, sufficient to establish a presumption 
that the latter are derived from the former. This pre- 
sumption is greatly strengthened in the case of men and 
animals, by the transmission of personal mental peculiar- 
ities, to an extent which is inconsistent with any other 
rational hypothesis. The explanation of hereditary dis- 
positions and talents, by bodily conformation, is liable to 
insuperable objections. These qualities, dispositions, and 
susceptibilities, have their seats in the mind, as really as 
those by which men differ from animals, or one order of 
animals from others. 

The theory now under consideration, explains many in- 
teresting phenomena, which are inexplicable on any other 
hypothesis, and sheds important light on one of the dark- 
est subjects involved in the administration of the moral 
government of God; that of the fall and corruption of the 
human race, by the sin of our first parents. Through all 
the orders of creation, descendants inherit the essential 
features and characteristics of their progenitors, both in 
respect to capacities of organic and conscious action. 
The essential characteristics of progenitors, whether nat- 
ural or acquired, are capable of transmission to succes- 
sors. The same law applies to vegetables; and new va- 
rieties are constantly produced by this means. 

The theory of the derivation of minds from similar pre- 
existing ones, in the different orders of dependent crea- 
tures, explains as many facts in the world of minds, hu- 
man, animal, and vegetable, as the law of gravitation does 
in the world of matter. It is not the subject of supernat- 
ural revelation directly, but is in striking conformity 
with a scriptural representation of the descendants of Levi, 
as having existed in Abraham, their remote progenitor, 
long before they had any separate personal existence. 
Heb. vii. 9, 10. It may also be inferred from other scrip- 
tural evidence. • 






316 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 

"Now to the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise 
God, be honor and glory for ever. Amen? 

Accept, O thou Holy One, this humble offering. Forgive 
whatever is erroneous. Attend with thy blessing whatever is 
true and conformable to thy holy will ! Cause thy glorious 
works to be understood, and to become ladders of ascent to 
Thee. Especially may thy moral creatures learn the dignity 
and value of their mental endowments ; and love and praise 
thee as the gracious and beneficent father of their spirits, and 
former of their bodies ; as the fountain and source of their 
being and blessedness. 

Thine image in man is glorious, though trodden down and 
defiled ; all thy works of creation are glorious ; more glorious 
still are the wonders of thy redeeming love ! But what are 
thy noblest works to Thee ? As ten thousand stars are lost 
in the effulgence of one larger, brighter sun, so do all creature- 
glories vanish in the light of thy rising. Arise and shine, O 
God ! Thy works praise thee ; thy saints bless thee ; and 
louder, nobler, more joyful, and more frequent still, shall thy 
praise become, as thy creatures become wiser and better. 
Amen. 

END. 



ERRATA. 

Page 16, 14th line from the top, for sensation, read secre- 
tions. 

Page 62, 14th line from the bottom, for idea, read conscious- 
ness, and for it, the consciousness of it. 



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